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Abstract
This study examines the assemblage of scientific knowledge, engineering practices, measuring
instruments, and civilian and military institutions in the U.S. and Japan that went into the
construction of the machine operator as a historically situated category of person in the mid-
twentieth century. Over the three decades from 1930 to 1960, American psychologists,
physiologists, anthropologists, and engineers produced a large body of knowledge, instruments,
and techniques with which to understand, select, and train aircraft pilots. The figure of the pilot
thus constructed was less of a "flier" engaged in speedy movements and adventures than of an
"operator" with disciplined attention and posture.
The conditions that constituted the aircraft operator were multifarious: spatial, virtual,
psychological, anthropometrical, political, and cultural. I first examine the Link Trainer, a
ground-based flight trainer, and explore how the meaning of "flying" shifted with the use of
instrument flying technique and the experience of simulated training on the ground. Then I show
how psychologists redefined flying from a problem of movement to a problem of attention in
their research on pilot selection tests, especially by contrasting the validity of physiological tests
and psychomotor tests. Concurrently, physical anthropologists were articulating two different
ways of relating the pilot's body to flying; one was the correlation between physique and one's
success as a pilot and the other was the dimensional configuration of the body in the space of the
cockpit. In postwar Japan, this American notion of the pilot served as the model for Japanese
pilots, who embraced American norms and conventions for flying after a long ban on aviation.
Even the bodies of Japanese pilots were measured and compared with those of Americans. As
the scientists and engineers in postwar America extended wartime knowledge and techniques to
study various situations of machine operation, aircraft pilots also came to stand for human
individuals more generally, forming the conceptual basis of human factors engineering or
ergonomics. Through this expansion and generalization of the pilot, a particular type of human-
the one who operates machines through displays and controls-came into being as an object of
study and control.
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Introduction
What Is a Pilot?
This dissertation examines the historical development of airplane pilot selection and training
programs, which involved simulation instruments, scientific knowledge, engineering practices,
and military and civilian institutions. My study describes how several groups with varying
backgrounds and interests attempted to define, select, train, and constrain pilots and how their
research and practice forged a modern figure with specific qualities of body, mind, and skill.
Over the three decades from 1930 to 1960, psychologists, physiologists, anthropologists, and
engineers produced a large body of knowledge, instruments, and techniques with which to
understand and control pilots and other humans seated inside machines. These scientists and
engineers and their works formed the basis of what came to be called "human (factors)
engineering" or "ergonomics." The effort to situate pilots in the enclosed space of cockpits and
to train them to survive and work inside was an exemplary attempt in the crafting of modern
human beings for increasingly technological societies at war and peace. Aircraft pilots came to
stand for human individuals more generally, who more frequently than ever found themselves
operating various kinds of machines at work and leisure. The discourses and practices used to
probe into physical and mental make-up of pilots turned into an inquiry of the human condition
in the mid-twentieth century.
I focus mostly on the work of American engineers, psychologists, and anthropologists,
who addressed problems of pilot selection and training before and during WWII and carried their
wartime experiences over to postwar projects of human engineering. The figure of the pilot
examined in this dissertation, therefore, is an American character that was shaped by research
and practice in the context of war, technology, and culture in the United States. The primary
concern of the American engineers, psychologists, and anthropologists during the war was with
American pilots, but as they built upon their wartime experience for postwar projects of
selection, design, and automation, they attempted to universalize their object of study-from
American pilots to all kinds of machine operators in multiple nations. My first three chapters
center on the American practice of pilot selection and training, while the next two chapters
examine the travel and expansion of the American-born figure of the pilot-operator to postwar
Japan and to the driver's seats and factory machine control stations in postwar America. The
model of the American pilot was not transferred to these varied sites without some friction.
While there was much continuity in research questions, techniques, and personnel from
American wartime pilot studies to postwar Japanese aviation and American transportation and
industry, the pilot-operator figure was installed in new spheres only after meticulous
qualifications, calibrations, and negotiations. As a result-even though not all of us are aircraft
pilots-part of our modern personhood as operators of automobiles, machines, and computers
derives from the model of the pilot sitting in the cockpit.
In order to trace the process of engineering the pilot, I rely on various types of historical
sources. They include military technical reports, instruction manuals, scientific publications,
minutes of scientific committee meetings, personal correspondences, patent applications,
government records, corporate documents, product brochures and manuals, and media reports.
Many of these sources contain so-called "technical details" about mundane practices of research
or the functional mechanisms of apparatuses, and may lack some literary quality that one can
expect in popular descriptions of aircraft pilots such as the writings of Antoine de Saint-Exupdry.
It is often in these "technical details," however, that one can observe the actual process of
crafting the pilot, since they reveal the assumptions and expectations about pilots and piloting
that went into the design, implementation, and interpretation of scientific experiments and
engineering devices. The historical sources used in this dissertation convey the figure of the pilot
as analyzed by a collective of researchers rather than the lived experiences of flying by
individual pilots.
In this study, my concerns are not so much with what pilots did as with what they
became. To be sure, pilots performed reconnaissance, transport, and combat missions in times of
war and peace and their activities had immense significance in the conduct of war and in the
economy of peacetime. But I am most curious about what kind of people they came to be
through their selection and training to perform those tasks. One underappreciated significance of
aviation is that it has facilitated, mostly in the urgency of wars, the mass-production of people
with new capacities, such as perceiving the world through electro-mechanical instruments in the
absence of direct sensorial contacts with the world. What pilots embodied was a new mode of
existence and behavior-which I call an ontology of the operator-an ontology which they were
not born with but rather acquired through training.1 Instead of examining how famous heroic
1 Peter Galison has written on "the ontology of the enemy," the figure of a "calculating enemy" pilot, as assumed
and analyzed by the MIT mathematician Norbert Wiener. Peter Galison, "The Ontology of the Enemy: Norbert
Wiener and the Cybernetic Vision," Critical Inquiry 21 (1994): 228-66. My study looks at pilots not as the distant
enemy to shoot down with antiaircraft fire but as members of one's own (American) community in need of selection
and training. The ontology of the operator, therefore, reflects the existing social and cultural identities within the
U.S.
pilots flew in their heydays, this dissertation describes how civilian and military institutions
struggled to select novices and train them into capable operators of flying machines.
To call an aircraft pilot an "operator" is to highlight some particular aspects of the pilot
more than others. The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) lists several meanings of the term, the
sixth of which is "a person who operates a machine ... ; spec. a person who works at the
switchboard of a telephone exchange." Within the same sixth definition of "operator," the OED
also mentions the usage of the word in the U.S. as "a person who drives a motor vehicle." 2
Where and how, then, might the pilot be situated? Would he or she be somewhere between the
telephone operator and the motor vehicle driver? Pilots may seem closer to telephone operators if
we compare cockpit instruments to a telephone switchboard. Pilots may be more similar to
automobile drivers if we consider that both machines move in space and have manual controls
for physical movement (rudders, sticks, steering wheels). Drivers and pilots may even be closer
to one another because of the fact that an official license is required for both.
These comparisons, however, hold little water once we ask about the specifics of the
"operator" in different periods and locations. Both telephone operators and motor vehicle drivers
have evolved technically and socially. The skills required for each group have changed over
time, and so have their social and cultural identities. The work of mostly female telephone
operators has been replaced by automated switching machines at the Bell System beginning in
the 1920s, while more and more women chose to operate motor vehicles.3 Nowadays, the image
2 Oxford English Dictionary, on-line draft revision June 2008, accessed on November 4, 2008
(http://dictionary.oed.com/). According to the second edition of 1989, the word's meaning discussed above was
listed as the fifth: "One who operates or works a machine, telegraph, etc. ... ; spec. one who works at the
switchboard of a telephone exchange (now the usual sense)" and "one who is licensed to drive a motor vehicle."
3 On female telephone operators, see Venus Green, "Goodbye Central: Automation and the Decline of 'Personal
Service' in the Bell System, 1878-1921," Technology and Culture 36 (1995): 912-49; Venus Green, Race on the
Line: Gender, Labor, and Technology in the Bell System, 1880-1980 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001);
Kenneth Lipartito, "When Women Were Switches: Technology, Work, and Gender in the Telephone Industry, 1890-
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of the telephone operator has been eclipsed by that of an operator of machines with computerized
interfaces. One may also note that telephone operators and motor vehicle drivers predate aircraft
pilots in their origins. When the pilot of heavier-than-air flight came into existence at the
beginning of the twentieth century, he resembled neither of the two. The figure of the pilot was
closest to the bicycle rider, at least as conceptualized by the Wright brothers, with an emphasis
on the notion of control.4 This may explain the fact that the use of the term "operator" for pilots
is less familiar than for telephone operators or drivers, as indicated by the entries in the OED. By
the late 1940s, however, one could see the psychologists who studied aircraft equipment design
refer to pilots as "operators." It was precisely as operators that pilots came under the
psychologists' scrutiny.5
Given this semantic change over time, it is necessary to explain historically the shaping
of the pilot as an operator. If the earliest aircraft pilots did not look much like operators of
telephones or automobiles, their successors a half-century later seemed to offer the very
definition of the operator as someone who worked with displays and controls of a machine.
Intense research and practice on pilots during WWII changed the conceptual and historical
relationship among many types of operators. In the postwar period, the figure of the pilot became
the principal model of the operator, one that would shape the ways the operators of telephones,
1920," American Historical Review 99 (October 1994): 1074-1111. On women as automobile drivers, see Virginia
Scharff, Taking the Wheel: Women and the Coming of the Motor Age (New York: Free Press, 1991).
4 Tom D. Crouch, The Bishop's Boys: A Life of Wilbur and Orville Wright (New York: W. W. Norton, 1989).
Historian Hillel Schwartz describes the early flights by Wright brothers and others as an example of "torque," a new
kinesthetic experience of the early twentieth century. As a movement coming out from the center of one's body,
Schwartz suggested, powered flight belonged to a range of torque experiences from the modern dance of Isadora
Duncan to expressive penmanship to rollercoaster rides. See Hillel Schwartz, "Torque: The New Kinaesthetic of the
Twentieth Century," in Incorporations, ed. Jonathan Crary and Sanford Kwinter (New York: Zone, 1992), 70-126.
s See, for example, Paul Fitts, ed., Psychological Research on Equipment Design (Army Air Forces Aviation
Psychology Program Research Report No. 19) (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1947), 1-3. This
point is discussed further in chapter 5.
automobiles, or even computers came into being as the object of study and intervention by
human (factors) engineers.6
The understanding of modern personhood as machine operator is not predicated only on
technical requirement of machines. As psychologists, anthropologists, engineers, military
organizations, aviation authorities, and civilian airlines tried to specify who should be qualified
as a pilot and what made one a good pilot, they drew from diverse assumptions about what kind
of activity flying was and what kind of person a pilot was. Pilot qualification, selection, and
training proceeded at the junction of several on-going changes in cockpit instrumentation and
flying techniques, recruiting conditions for wartime urgencies, psychological and
anthropological understandings about human capacity, cultural perceptions about differential
abilities of Americans and the Japanese to become pilots, and the postwar political order and
economic condition. Each group with their own areas of expertise staked out some portion of the
pilot's personhood as important for one's qualification to fly. No single group could offer a
definite solution to all of the selection and training problems, but each of their perspectives and
claims contributed to the composition of the figure of the aircraft pilot and of the machine
operator. They all participated in "making up" modern pilot-operators, whose minds, bodies, and
skills became the object of definition, measurement, tests, and improvement.
To consider pilots as persons who were made up by others runs contrary to a romantic
view of the pilot that continues to hold strong in popular imagination. This image of pilots
emerged with the earliest public demonstrations of powered flight and reached its peak during
6 On the perspective that takes the objects of scientific research not as given or existing a priori but as emerging in
specific historical contexts, see Lorraine Daston, ed., Biographies ofScientific Objects (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2000).
7 Ian Hacking, "Making Up People," in Reconstructing Individualism: Autonomy, Individuality, and the Self in
Western Thought, ed. Thomas C. Heller, Morton Sosna, and David E. Wellbery (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1986), 222-36.
the 1920s and 1930s. As cultural historian Robert Wohl has put it, flying in this period was "a
sacred and transcendent calling that more than justified its cost in lives" and "aviators, like sport
figures and actors, became celebrities." Fliers seemed to realize, through the power of airplanes,
"humankind's determination to escape from age-old limitations, to defy the power of gravity,
and to obliterate the tyranny of time and space."8 Flying also earned, especially in North
America, a religious admiration as a "winged gospel." 9 John Magee, Jr.'s poem "High Flight"
(1941) captured a flier's own experience of religious transcendence:
And, while with silent, lifting mind I've trod
The high untrespassed sanctity of space,
Put out my hand, and touched the face of God.'0
In these depictions, fliers were recognized as heroic individuals who often flew alone and whose
personalities mattered to the public. As combat aces, record-breakers, prize-winners, or simply
daredevils, fliers made their names known.
Although popular audiences continued to celebrate individual pilots in films like "Top
Gun" or in their response to the early pilots-turned-astronauts, this study examines scientific and
engineering practices that transformed pilots into anonymous entities, technically polished but
not transcendent from earthly concerns. One event and one essay may serve as illustrative
brackets of the period that I examine: Charles Lindbergh's transatlantic flight in 1927 and
Roland Barthes's essay "Jet-man" published in 1957. Lindbergh undoubtedly epitomizes the
image of pilots as heroes and celebrities, but his meticulous preparation and execution of the
8 Robert Wohl, The Spectacle of Flight: Aviation and the Western Imagination, 1920-1950 (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2005), 1-4.
9 Joseph Corn, The Winged Gospel: America's Romance with Aviation, 1900-1950 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1983).
10 John Magee, The Complete Works ofJohn Magee, the Pilot Poet (Cheltenham: This England Books, 1989).
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technically challenging flight also signals a change toward new concepts and techniques of
flying." Famously captured in Lindbergh's description of himself and his plane as "We"-"We
have made this flight across the ocean, not I or it"-the concept of the pilot not as a stand-alone,
traditional hero but rather as a skillful and careful operator of the machine was just beginning to
appear around 1930.12 As much as he was deemed an American hero of unmatched courage and
character, Lindbergh was a very good operator of his machine. If Lindbergh was the ultimate
pilot-hero, he was a prototype of the pilot-operator as well. Fast-forward thirty years, and we see
a "Jet-man"-a jet aircraft pilot-who was described as "a new race in aviation, nearer to the
robot than to the hero." Barthes points to an interesting historical paradox in the identity of the
pilot. "The pilot-hero was made unique by a whole mythology of speed as an experience, of
space devoured, of intoxicating motion; the jet-man, on the other hand, is defined by a
coenaesthesis of motionlessness. By the late 1950s, the "pilot-hero," who had been essentially
a flier, turned into the "jet-man," a motionless operator. The once heroic flier was tamed into the
cockpit.
This study focuses on this historical change in the figure of the pilot, from a flier (or an
aviator) fully immersed in the experience of speed to a pilot-operator in the state of technological
"motionlessness." 4 There existed a stark contrast between the two images of the pilot. In
11 On Lindbergh's technical preparations with the Spirit ofSt. Louis, see Von Hardesty, Lindbergh: Flight's
Enigmatic Hero (San Diego: Harcourt, 2002), 48-50, cited in Wohl, Spectacle of Flight, 326.
12 Charles A. Lindbergh, The Spirit ofSt. Louis (New York: Scribner, 1953), 486 (emphasis original). "The Spirit of
St. Louis is a wonderful plane. It's like a living creature, gliding along smoothly, happily, as though a successful
flight means as much to it as to me, as though we shared our experiences together, each feeling beauty, life, and
death as keenly, each dependent on the other's loyalty. We have made this flight across the ocean, not I or it."
13 John Ward, "The Meaning of Lindbergh's Flight," American Quarterly 10 (1958): 3-16; Roland Barthes, "The
Jet-man," in Mythologies, trans. Annette Lavers (New York: Hill and Wang, 1972), 71-73.
14 In the Japanese language, it is easier to distinguish two possible meanings of the "pilot." Hikoshi means a person
who flies ("flier" or "aviator"), while sdjflshi means a person who operates or manipulates ("operator"). In current,
ordinary usage, sdjfishi is the more common word for the aircraft pilot. Nowadays, hikdshi is used to compose the
word for an astronaut (uchahikoshi, a "space flier").
Barthes's mythological reading, the jet pilot of the late 1950s "no longer seems to know either
adventure or destiny, but only a condition." Here, to be at standstill inside a machine is related to
being in some sort of "condition." If pilot-heroes had been celebrating freedom of movement in
the air, jet pilots were motionlessly conditioned or situated, if not constrained, in the cockpit. But
what exactly constitutes this "condition"? For Barthes, "this condition is at first sight less human
than anthropological: mythically, the jet-man is defined less by his courage than by his weight,
his diet and his habits (temperance, frugality, continence)." If courage is a human trait expressed
through the very act of flying, the anthropological condition of the jet pilot is something that is
cultured outside the cockpit and then brought inside and that can be monitored, measured, and
evaluated. Taking a cue from Barthes's observation and extending it, this dissertation will
examine the ways aircraft pilots have been put into conditions that are not only anthropological
but also technological, cultural, and political. The condition of the pilot as an operator is both
inside and outside the cockpit.
Therefore, the space of the cockpit becomes an important site to be examined. The
cockpit can be understood in several ways. First of all, it is physical space within which human
bodies should be fitted. It is also a psychological and physiological site where communication
between humans and machines occurs. With increasing sophistication in instrumentation, the
cockpit is also a technological medium that brings the chaotic outer air into well-ordered
representational panels. Lastly but no less important, it is a social and cultural space, into which
different groups bring different opinions about who should be seated there and who should not.
All of these suggest that, even as it became increasingly enclosed over time, the cockpit has been
saturated with the heavy traffic of knowledge, ideas, techniques, artifacts, and, of course, human
bodies and minds. I follow what went into the cockpit and what came out of it, exploring how the
figure of the pilot-operator was crafted around the space of the cockpit and then spread into other
quasi-cockpit spaces.
Viewed from these diverse perspectives, the aircraft cockpit serves as an example of what
Sherry Turkle calls an "object-to-think-with." As with personal computers, which, for Turkle,
pose questions about human identity in the age of online games and the internet, the cockpit
enables us to ask not just what machines do "for us" but what they do "to us as people." As pilots
were examined for their mental and physical states and were taught how to sit, watch, listen, and
act in the cockpit, they were reshaped into a mode of being that encouraged certain capacities
useful for operating a plane and discounted other less relevant factors. The cockpit may well be
the most "instrumental" of technological spaces, but it should also be examined as a kind of
"subjective" technology, which compels us to rethink who we are as we sit inside or live with
machines. 5 The cockpit that accommodated a pilot would not have been considered by Martin
Heidegger as a "dwelling place," where a person could find a true, integrated state of being that
was yet untouched by the force of modern science to turn "things" into "objects." Heidegger
listed hangars, power stations, stadiums, railway stations, and highways as examples that were
"buildings" but not "dwelling places." I add aircraft cockpits to this list. People spend time in
these places for work and leisure and even feel "at home" there, but cannot be said, from
Heidegger's perspective, to "dwell" in these buildings devoid of meaning. However, it is within
the cockpit and other cockpit-like spaces, I argue, that we can find concrete manifestations of
15 Sherry Turkle, "Cyberspace and Identity," Contemporary Sociology 28 (1999): 643-48, quote on 646. See also
Sherry Turkle, The Second Self Computers and the Human Spirit, 20th anniversary ed. (Cambridge, MA: The MIT
Press, 2005) and Sherry Turkle, Life on the Screen: Identity in the Age of the Internet (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1995).
what Heidegger phrased as "staying with things."'" One does not live in a cockpit, but the
technical, psychological, and somatic conditions within the cockpit came to constitute the human
condition of the mid-twentieth century and thereafter.
Aviation in the History of Technology
By considering airplanes and cockpits as "subjective" rather than simply "instrumental"
technology, I aim to connect aviation history to broader issues in the history of technology.
Many aviation histories have been written along the lines of gradual or revolutionary
developments of airplanes, whether in terms of engines, wings, materials, aerodynamic theories,
or various functions a plane can perform. Other studies with more contextual approaches have
addressed economic, institutional, or strategic issues that facilitated or obstructed the
development of aviation in times of war and peace. These histories have been mainly concerned
with airplanes and the social and political milieu that helped them fly, but not so much with the
pilots inside those airplanes.' 7 Meanwhile, pilots have been featured in biographies,
autobiographies, and cultural histories. As discussed above, these works have often dealt with
16 Martin Heidegger, "Building, Dwelling, Thinking," in Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New
York: Perennial, 2001), 141-59, esp. 143-44, 155.
17 Examples of technically inclined histories of aviation include: Ronald Miller and David Sawers, The Technical
Development of Modern Aviation (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1968); Edward Constant, The Origins of the
Turbojet Revolution (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980); and Walter Vincenti, What Engineers
Know and How They Know It: Analytical Studies ofAeronautical History (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1990). Political, business, and institutional histories of aviation include: Richard Hallion, Legacy of Flight:
The Guggenheim Contribution to American Aviation (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977); Roger
Bilstein, Flight in America: From the Wrights to the Astronauts, 3rd ed. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 2001); F. Robert van der Linden, Airlines and Air Mail: The Post Office and the Birth of the Commercial
Aviation Industry (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2002); Alex Roland, Model Research: The
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, 1915-1958 (Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, 1985); Nick Komons, Bonfires to Beacons: Federal Civil Aviation Policy under the Air Commerce
Act, 1926-1938 (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1989); Michael Sherry, The Rise ofAmerican Air
Power: The Creation ofArmageddon (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987); and Jeffrey Engel, Cold War at
30,000 Feet: The Anglo-American Fightfor Aviation Supremacy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007).
An excellent overview of more recent scholarship in aviation history is Roger D. Launius and Janet R. Daly
Bednarek, eds., Reconsidering a Century of Flight (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003).
heroic individual pilots who rose to the status of celebrity and their popular representations in
literature, paintings, film, magazines, or propaganda posters. These accounts offer a view of
pilots, literally and figuratively, looked up to by the people fixed on the ground; pilots were
always up in the air, revealing their courage and skill.' 8
My study is intended to ground both pilots in particular and the genre of aviation
histories more generally by focusing on the selection and training of aviators.'9 It also attempts
to go beyond the studies of "popular images" or "cultural representations" of pilots and seeks to
understand how airplane pilots have been selected, trained, studied, and engineered as
particularly modern sorts of human beings. Compared with other studies that deal with famous
pilots, then, my study pays more attention to anonymous pilots who were defined and designed
(by others) into the machines they operated. While I acknowledge the historical and cultural
roles of the pioneering pilots, I am more interested in describing the emergence of a new
category of fliers or operators. Their group shared certain physical and psychological
qualifications and the experiences of training and working in a cockpit. What defined them was
not their ceaseless movement, which had characterized factory workers' bodies, but rather their
posture or seated perception inside the cockpit, which involved only a little actual movement
and indeed much resistance against movement. In place of heroism and passion of pilots, this
18 A. Scott Berg, Lindbergh (New York: G. P. Putnam's, 1998); Linda A. Robertson, The Dream of Civilized
Warfare: World War I Flying Aces and the American Imagination (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
2003); James Doolittle, I Could Never Be So Lucky Again: An Autobiography (New York: Bantam Books, 1991);
Peter Fritzsche, A Nation of Fliers: German Aviation and the Popular Imagination (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1992); Robert Wohl, A Passionfor Wings: Aviation and the Western Imagination, 1908-1918
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994); and Wohl, Spectacle of Flight. Most writings have been about white,
male pilots, with few exceptions. On women pilots in the U.S., see Deborah Douglas, American Women and Flight
since 1940 (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2004). On black pilots in the U.S., see Von
Hardesty, Black Wings: Courageous Stories of African Americans in Aviation and Space History (New York:
HarperCollins Publishers, 2008).
19 There are only a few histories on the training of pilots. An authoritative study of the U.S. military pilot training is
Rebecca H. Cameron, Training to Fly: Military Flight Training, 1907-1945 (Washington, DC: Air Force History
and Museum Program, 1999). A brief account of Japanese naval flight during WWII is found in Osamu Tagaya,
Imperial Japanese Naval Aviator, 1937-1945 (New York: Osprey Publishing, 2003).
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study highlights scientific knowledge, measuring and simulating instruments, and diverse groups
of professionals that were generated to study and improve the pilots' capacity and performance.
The significance of aviation for twentieth-century history can be found not only in the
delight of flying or the efficiency of transport and bombing but also in the production of these
people and their experiences of working while sitting, and rarely standing, within a space created
and surrounded by machines. With a focus on the humans sitting in the cockpit, this study
explores deeper historical and cultural implications of aviation technology for those of us on the
ground. Using the case of airplanes and pilots, I describe how modern machines have been co-
produced with modern human beings trained for specific modes of perception and behavior. It is
often said that the "golden age" of aviation ended by 1950 when the activity of flying began to
seem routine, losing its spectacular appeal to the public.2 0 I will argue that, at the same time that
the public fascination with aviation became weaker, the knowledge, instruments, and techniques
spawned by wartime aviation began to flow into other technological and cultural domains with
the effect of both enabling and requiring people to resemble pilots as efficient operators of all
kinds of machines.
In that regard, the study of pilots as machine operators connects aviation history to larger
issues in the history of technology. Recent scholarship in the history of technology and science
and technology studies (STS) has shown increasing attention to the ways users shape
technological processes and products, and vice versa.2 In these studies, users, consumers, and
20 Corn, Winged Gospel; David T. Courtwright, Sky as Frontier: Adventure, Aviation, and Empire (College Station:
Texas A&M University Press, 2005). Against the usual characterization of the end of WWII as the decline of
aviation's "golden age," historian Jenifer L. Van Vleck has emphasized the lively discourse on aviation in the early
postwar period, which was closely related to the American political and diplomatic imagination of the postwar
world. See Jenifer L. Van Vleck, "The 'Logic of the Air': Aviation and the Globalism of the 'American Century,"'
New Global Studies 1 (2007), available at hltp: ww xx w.beprcss.com/nxs/vol I /iss 1 art2.
21 Ruth Cowan, More Work for Mother: The Ironies of Household Technology from the Open Hearth to the
Microwave (New York: Basic Books, 1983); Ronald Kline, Consumers in the Country: Technology and Social
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operators of technology appear as important actors, playing no less constitutive role in the
dynamic technological and social process than inventors, innovators, and system-builders do.
This dissertation shares the perspective of these studies in putting an emphasis on those
who actually experience technological apparatuses. My assumption is that more productive
insights can be gained by shifting the focus of historical studies away from how humans
developed better and better airplanes to fly and toward investigating how humans were trained to
fly, given certain sets of machines and techniques, within changing political and cultural
environments. I do not take, however, the category of users or operators as given, but consider it
as generated through research and training. The concept and figure of the operator was crafted
and refined through the study of pilots in the middle third of the twentieth century. In this study,
the focus is not how operators shape a particular technology so much as how certain people are
deliberately situated and crafted as operators, often simultaneously with the development of
their machines.
With its focus on human operators of machines, this dissertation calls for more attention
by historians to the human dimension of technology by combining, for example, the histories of
psychology and anthropology with those of engineering. The projects examined in this study
were not aimed at designing machines per se but rather at rearranging the dynamics between
these machines and the people who operated them by generating new modes of perception and
posture. My focus on pilots as operators derives from the obvious, though not always
appreciated, fact that a machine needs a person to operate it.22 Someone had to fill the space of a
Change in Rural America (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000); Nelly Oudshoorn and Trevor
Pinch, eds., How Users Matter: The Co-construction of Users and Technologies (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press,
2003); and David Edgerton, The Shock of the Old: Technology and Global History since 1900 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2007).
22 See, for example, S. S. Stevens, "Machines Cannot Fight Alone," American Scientist 34 (1946): 389-400.
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cockpit inside the airplane. In addition to how machines worked and how they were made,
history of technology should also discuss who these people were and how they managed to live
and work with technology.
Aircraft Pilots and the Human-Machine Relationship
The human-machine relationship has received much attention in the recent scholarship in the
history and anthropology of science and technology. David Mindell has provided a detailed
account of how the feedback loop between humans and machines was designed and implemented
within diverse engineering cultures of pre-WWII and wartime, constituting not a "technological
system" consisting only of multiple machines, but rather a system of humans and machines with
connections at multiple levels. The human position created inside the wartime military gun-
control system casts a long legacy on our contemporary life in front of various screens, which,
Mindell writes, should be considered "no recent invention but a historical, technological
descendent, an aggregate that includes pilot, machinist, human computer, telephone operator,
radio tracker, fire control officer, and antiaircraft gunner."2 3 Focusing on aircraft pilots, I ask
what constituted the shared conditions and skills of these operators as part of feedback control
systems. At the same time, this study pays attention to what kinds of persons were brought to
these positions in the first place and what they brought with them into the machine space. In so
doing, I ask how the pilots' new technical, professional identities inside the machines were
related to their existing social identities outside the machines, the relation between what they did
and who they were vis-A-vis the machines.
23 David A. Mindell, Between Human and Machine: Feedback, Control, and Computing before Cybernetics
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 321. See also David Mindell, Digital Apollo: Human and
Machine in Spaceflight (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2008).
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Another STS approach to human-machine relationship has been to examine historical and
contemporary attempts to create artificial forms of life through mechanical contraptions or
computer programs. In their studies of the eighteenth-century automata and the twentieth-century
artificial life, respectively, Jessica Riskin and Stefan Helmreich have discussed how these
artificial renderings reveal the life-creators' scientific and cultural assumptions about life itself
and their own world. As both scholars point out, the discourses and practices of making artificial,
machinic forms of life do not confirm the posthuman or transhuman vision that conveniently
collapses the boundary between human and machine, lumping them together into cyborgs.
Instead, we can use these cases as mirrors of the practitioners' conception of the human.2 4 In
popular imaginations, aircraft pilots are often portrayed as exemplary cyborgs, tightly coupled
with the planes that surround their whole bodies. But rather than describe pilots simply as
components in the cybernetic system, I emphasize their human role as the machine operator,
however prestigious or menial it might be. Machines do not blend with humans as smoothly as
often imagined. It takes great effort to situate humans amid machines and make them work
together. Machines do not force us to take up a certain form of individual life and society in any
deterministic way. Still, they do compel us to think again about who we are when we work with
certain forms of machines. They give "the human" a particular form.
The human-machine relationship must be examined within specific historical contexts.
Chronologically and conceptually, this study of pilots as a model for human-machine
relationship is in dialogue with the historian Anson Rabinbach's study of the nineteenth-century
metaphor of the "human motor," which viewed the human being (and the world) as an energy-
24 Jessica Riskin, "The Defecating Duck, or, the Ambiguous Origins of Artificial Life," Critical Inquiry 29 (2003):
599-633; Jessica Riskin, "Eighteenth-Century Wetware," Representations 89 (2003): 97-125; and Stefan Helmreich,
Silicon Second Nature: Culturing Artificial Life in a Digital World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).
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converting engine governed by the laws of thermodynamics. As a concept that captured the
interrelated working mechanisms of nature, industry, and society, Rabinbach writes, the "human
motor" provided "a new scientific and cultural framework" to the nineteenth-century scientists,
thinkers, and social reformers. The figure of the "human motor" and the discourses of energy and
fatigue concerned with its utilization and maintenance formed the basis for discussions about
modernity and productivism in the work-centered societies, which was also manifested later in
25Frederick Taylor and his followers' science of work in the early twentieth century.
The figure of the machine operator, best exemplified by aircraft pilots, emerged around
the same time the "human motor" was disappearing from factory floors and social discourses.
The condition to which the operator's body was subjected in the late 1940s and 1950s seemed
much different from that of factory workers and infantry soldiers, who always experienced
physico-muscular fatigue. Despite the apparent fact that pilots in airplanes routinely traverse a
long distance, "the pilot's life is," according to a leading expert in aviation psychology and
physiology during and after WWII, "for the most part, a sedentary one, with only partial use of
the gross musculature."26 This was a new sort of person who would not be a straightforward
target for time and motion studies. Just as the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth
century physiologists, philosophers, entrepreneurs, and social reformers worked to measure,
regulate, or improve the condition of the working (i.e. moving) bodies, mid twentieth-century
aviation researchers attempted to understand the condition of the operating body and mind for a
sedentary life with machines. The emphasis was increasingly put on experiencing and navigating
the world by reading representations on instruments and responding to them. Gone were the days
25 Anson Rabinbach, The Human Motor: Energy, Fatigue, and the Origins of Modernity (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1992), 1.
26 Ross McFarland, "Fatigue in Aircraft Pilots," New England Journal of Medicine 225 (1941): 845-55.
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of the celebrity barnstormers who stood and even walked on planes; now pilot-operators were
seated and permanently enclosed, as their bodies were carefully charted and classified and their
minds and skills tested and recorded. Although there were continuities in the techniques and
discourses that dealt with the "human motor" and the operator, the latter warrants a historical
explanation as a manifestation of the shifting human-machine relationship.
Machines, Measures, and Modernity
More broadly, we may also ask if the proliferation of particular types of objects presupposes and
contributes to the formation of corresponding types of subjects. This study takes things-
airplanes, cockpit instruments, flight trainers-and related fields of knowledge and practices-
aviation psychology, engineering anthropology, human (factors) engineering, simulation
industry-as seriously constituting a historically situated human condition of the twentieth
century and asks how they register, redefine and modify human capacities, limitations, and
differences. Hanna Arendt put it more philosophically when she wrote, "Men are conditioned
beings because everything they come in contact with turns immediately into a condition of their
existence. The world in which the vita activa spends itself consists of things produced by human
activities; but the things that owe their existence exclusively to men nevertheless constantly
condition their human makers."27 Things condition us, as much as we shape them.
Relevant here is art historian Jonathan Crary's insight about the early nineteenth-century
transformation of vision and visual devices and practices on the one hand and "the status of an
observing subject" on the other. The departure from classical models of vision was not simply a
change in representational convention, and it had to be accompanied by a reconfiguration of "the
27 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 9.
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productive, cognitive, and desiring capacities of the human subject." As Crary argued, "[v]ision
and its effects are always inseparable from the possibilities of an observing subject who is both
the historical product and the site of certain practices, techniques, institutions, and procedures of
subjectification." The figure of the observer, as signified, for instance, by someone who looked
attentively into a kaleidoscope, both enabled and reflected the endless circulation of objects,
images, and signs in the 1820s and 1830s. Crary's statement on historical specificity of the
observer of the nineteenth century may well be applied to a pilot-operator of the twentieth:
"Though obviously one who sees, an observer is more importantly one who sees within a
prescribed set of possibilities, one who is embedded in a system of conventions and limitations.
... If it can be said there is an observer specific to the nineteenth century, or to any period, it is
only as an effect of an irreducibly heterogeneous system of discursive, social, technological, and
institutional relations. There is no observing subject prior to this continually shifting field."2 8
Cultural historians of technology have examined similar formations of modern
subjectivity in relation to technological apparatuses that followed Crary's "observing subject"
chronologically. Wolfgang Schivelbusch described the experiences of railroad passengers in the
nineteenth century and the making of the "industrial subject," who learned to live with the
"industrialization of time and space." 29 More recently, Cotten Seiler wrote of the connection
between driving automobiles in the American interstate highways and the construction of the
28 Jonathan Crary, Techniques of the Observer: On Vision and Modernity in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge,
MA: The MIT Press, 1990), 2-6 (emphasis original).
29 Schivelbusch did not use the phrase "industrial subject" in the book, but spoke of the "pre-industrial subject"
whose "esthetic freedom" was contrasted with the travel experiences of railroad passengers. It was Alan
Trachtenberg who mentioned the construction of the "industrial subject" in his foreword to Schivelbusch's book.
Wolfgang Schivelbusch, The Railway Journey: The Industrialization of Time and Space in the 19th Century
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), xv and 121.
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"liberal subject," who would be autonomous, individualistic, free, but always safely so.30 As
these studies demonstrate, new technologies of mobility have been both enabling and
constraining for their users. Accounts of the enthusiasm for unprecedented freedom of movement
need to be qualified with corresponding analyses of the new codes, regulations, and interventions
that have been imposed on passengers, conductors, drivers, and pilots under the banner of safety,
efficiency, and comfort. Claims of unrestricted access and egalitarian uses also need to be
juxtaposed with the languages and practices of screening, selection, exclusion, and elimination.
Taking up a similar line of inquiry, this study describes the crafting of what may be
called the operating subject. If, as Crary states, "an observing subject ... was both a product of
and at the same time constitutive of modernity in the nineteenth century" shaped by forces of
capitalism and industrialization, the pilot-operator, figured and located during the mid twentieth
century, played a role in shaping our contemporary understandings and discourses of ourselves at
work and play.3 ' Supplementing the cultural history approach of previous studies, I examine the
process by going directly into scientific and technical literature such as psychological test
questionnaires, tables of measurement data, and factory manuals of training equipment. The
operating subject has been shaped not only by languages of acclaim, advice, and regulation but
also by dials, knobs, sticks, seats, masks, radio signals, checklists, and other technical and spatial
arrangements that constituted the condition of the operator.
The construction of the operating subject was a project of measurement, as much as it
was a discursive one. Each chapter of this dissertation deals with attempts to measure pilots'
skills, aptitudes, minds, and bodies to pick better pilots and position them in the cockpit. Each
30 Cotten Seiler, Republic of Drivers: A Cultural History ofAutomobility in America (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2008), chapter 5.
31 Crary, Techniques of the Observer, 9.
group involved claimed that their method and perspective would give more "objective" measures
for evaluating pilots. The story told in this study, however, is not one of increasing
rationalization and standardization achieved through scientific measurement and analysis with
unquestionable "objectivity."3 I aim to qualify the historical actors' claims of objectivity by
examining who was measuring whom with what agendas and purposes, and exactly what they
were measuring and were not measuring, how they conducted measurement and evaluation, and
in what terms they advocated their own method over others. The practice of measurement was
often embedded in academic, professional, and cultural assumptions about what was worth
measuring and what was obvious prior to measurement. There did not exist an easy agreement on
what made a good pilot against which to measure and select one; the criteria were repeatedly
questioned in various locations and time periods. There were partial measures, biased measures,
and even what Stephen Jay Gould would have called "the mismeasure of man," all of which
contributed to the making of the pilot-operator.
Going beyond issues of accuracy or bias in the measurement of pilots, however, it may be
useful to speculate on the shifting notion of "machines as the measure of men" and its
implication for the discussion of technology and modernity. As historian Michael Adas argued,
machines, as a shorthand for science and technology, have been taken as the true measure of
general achievements of human societies by the people in the industrializing and imperialistic
West of the nineteenth and early twentieth century. They found in machines of transportation and
communication a rationale and justification for their "civilizing missions" in Africa and Asia.
Design and production of machines served as a yardstick of modernity that was defined in terms
32 On the history of the concept and practice of "objectivity," see Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, Objectivity
(New York: Zone Books, 2007).
33 Michael Adas, Machines as the Measure of Men: Science, Technology, and Ideologies of Western Dominance
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989).
of material progress; it was the work of homofaber, which not all the peoples in the world were
capable of. In the post-WWII period, machines continued to be the measure of the superiority of
some nations, especially the United States, over others, providing "technological imperatives"
for America's dominance in the world.
What is new in the postwar period is that machines such as airplanes and automobiles
came to require, literally, "the measure of man" in the forms of mental and psychomotor test
scores as well as detailed body dimensions. New machines with a large number of displays and
controls, spatial constraints, and high speeds justified stringent screening of potential operators
of the machines, which generated instruments and techniques to measure human proportions and
abilities as well as to construct huge archives of measurement and test data. Thus it became
possible to judge individuals, if not nations, by their capacity to fit in, attend to, and control
machines. This rearrangement of the human-machine relationship adds a new dimension to the
discussion of technology and modernity. Scholars have largely focused on the power of
technology to produce new things and to dismantle traditional notions of time and space and on
the imperative of modem machines to turn people into "cogs in the machine." Machines have
been represented as the material agents of the constructive and destructive forces of modernity,
in which "all that is solid melts into the air."36 The emergence of the operating subject through
measurement, testing, and design directs our attention to smaller, more intimate spaces of
34 Michael Adas, Dominance by Design: Technological Imperatives and America's Civilizing Mission (Cambridge,
MA: Belknap Press, 2006).
35 Here, "the measure of man" refers to the handbook of human body dimension data published in 1960 by the
industrial designer Henry Dreyfuss (see chapter 5), rather than the similar phrase by Michael Adas.
36 Marshall Berman, All That Is Solid Melts into the Air: The Experience of Modernity (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1982); Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990);
Thomas Hughes, American Genesis: A Century of Invention and Technological Enthusiasm, 1870-1970 (New York:
Viking, 1989). For a more recent discussion on the important relationship between technology and modernity, see
Thomas Misa, Philip Brey, and Andrew Feenberg, eds., Modernity and Technology (Cambridge, MA: The MIT
Press, 2003).
modernity, in which humans came to face machines in an autonomous and disciplined manner
and reconfigured themselves to meet the demands and dimensions of the machines. In the
cockpit and other cockpit-like spaces, the human and the machine became the measure of each
other, creating the technological conditions of modernity.
Chapter Outlines
The chapters that follow examine several conditions constitutive of the pilot-operator, each
focusing on detailed practices of selecting and training pilots by diverse expert groups in the U.S.
and Japan between the 1930s and the early 1960s. The pilot's conditions are multifarious: spatial
(the cockpit), virtual ("flying" on the ground), psychological (mental and psychomotor tests),
anthropometrical (body types and dimensions), racial (Americans' stereotypical perception of
Japanese fliers), and cultural (Japanese effort to adapt to the American way and language of
flying). Each chapter deals with certain aspects of the larger project to define, study, and control
the conditions of pilots and flying, paying attention to instruments, equipment, techniques, and
discourses of measurement and evaluation. The final chapter will describe the convergence of
some of these efforts after WWII and the formation of human (factors) engineering as a field
centered around the pilot-operator.
Simulated Cockpits and the Virtual Flier
Among several conditions of the pilot-operator, I first examine the physical space enclosed by
the cockpit and the experience of occupying the small space. The cockpit is anything but a void
unconsciously left by aircraft designers. It is a technologically and culturally rich space created
by modern aviation. That we do not find such a space in the first Wright Flyer I may testify to
the novelty of the cockpit as a modern space. Aviation technology is often invoked in discussions
of space and modernity by a familiar explanation of how airplanes connected distant places,
shrinking the space between them and creating a modern sense of space and time." Looking at a
map filled with dense lines of airline networks reveals how the sky itself has been turned into a
modern space that is highly fragmented, classified, and regulated. To this general picture of what
Peter Redfield called "modern sky," I would add another dimension by treating the cockpit as a
small pocket of modern space, carefully designed and manufactured amid an essentially chaotic
space of the air.38
To design a cockpit was an attempt to create a "striated" space inside, or against, the
"smooth" air, which is to say that it was part of the more general project of modern science and
engineering. The space of a modern high-tech cockpit is analogous to the homogeneous, coded,
Euclidian space of the chess game that can be measured and monitored, whereas the outside air
remains a heterogeneous, turbulent, less predictable space like that of the Go game.39 At least
since the 1930s when instrument flying was gaining momentum, the sky was drawn into the
cockpit, represented through diverse instruments on the panel, and then "striated" into
discernible and even legible entities. As in a scientist's laboratory on the ground, each time a
new instrument was added to the display panel, the cockpit could bring increasing amount of
information from the air, which enabled pilots to better perceive and judge the space outside the
cockpit. The cockpit gradually became a space of "inscriptions," created and mediated through
37 Stephen Kern, The Culture of Time and Space, 1880-1918 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983),
241-47; Bernhard Rieger, Technology and the Culture of Modernity in Britain and Germany, 1890-1945
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), chapter 5.
38 Peter Redfield, Space in the Tropics: From Convicts to Rockets in French Guiana (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2000), 111.
39 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 351-63.
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technology.4 0 Cockpits and the pilots in them were simultaneously produced inside and against
the modern air.
In a densely instrumented cockpit, the pilot can be made to control the plane without
referring to the outside natural world-the basic idea of instrument flying. And the development
of instrument flying, which began seriously around 1930, is closely associated with the new idea
of training to fly on the ground. Training on the ground could not become an attractive method
until flying in the air did not have to involve watching and feeling the air. In chapter 1, I discuss
the Link Trainer, a ground flight-training device invented in 1929 by Edwin Link, which created
a closed space and made flying students focus on instruments. Therefore, what the Link Trainer
simulated was not theflying environment in the air, but rather the space of a cockpit that had
already pushed the air out. The chapter will explore this connection among the practice of
instrument flying, the space of a cockpit, and the meaning of simulation. A distinctive feature of
the Link Trainer is that, as much as it was a simulation, it offered a real, physical experience. As
a quasi-space that is at once real and simulated, the Link Trainer provided not only the simulated
feeling of flying in the air, but more importantly the real experience of sitting in a closed space
and taking control of a machine with no interruption from outside.
The Psychomotor Pilot and Technological Personhood
Closely related to the spatiality of physical cockpits are pilots' psychological and physiological
conditions. In the U.S., as in other countries, medical and psychological tests played an
important part in the selection and training of pilots since the early years of aviation. Exacting
standards of physical strength often resulted in the rejection of many applicants. Moreover,
40 On the role of inscriptions in science and engineering, see Bruno Latour, Science in Action: How to Follow
Scientists and Engineers through Society (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987).
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around WWI several paper-and-pencil tests including the I.Q. test were implemented for
selection and classification.
In chapter 2, I describe a shift in the perspective of psychologists about the methods of
selecting pilots that occurred between the late 1930s to the end of WWII in the context of the
Civilian Pilot Training Program (1939-45) as well as the military pilot screening. If the earlier
group of flying surgeons focused their attention on "physical fitness" of pilot candidates, a new
perspective began to emerge on the flying "in a functional or operational sense."4 Ross
McFarland, a psychologist and physiologist at the Harvard Fatigue Laboratory and later at the
Harvard School of Public Health, played an important role in drawing attention to the tests of
psychomotor ability before and during the wartime. McFarland conducted research for the
National Research Council's Committee on Selection and Training of Aircraft Pilots, which was
related to the Civilian Pilot Training Program. As those research and training programs were
quickly extended into the military business of selecting and training a vast number of new pilots
within the shortest time possible, the emphasis was put onpredicting who would make a
successful pilot and who would be a failure. Now "physical fitness" was no longer good enough
to judge an aviation cadet or a college student pilot. Physical fitness had to be supplemented by
different tests that would reveal in an "objective" manner the functional and operational ability to
fly a plane. Then the psychologists would be able to weed out those who would fail at the earliest
stage possible, saving precious time and money.
McFarland's emphasis on "functional or operational sense" of piloting and the notion of
"aptitude for flying" as a requirement for successful pilots and as something that is measurable
contributed to the development of what I would call "technologies of the operator"-the
41 "The Selection of Student Pilots," box 89, file 1, Ross A. McFarland Papers, Special Collections and Archives,
Wright State University, Dayton, Ohio.
instruments, techniques, knowledge, and selection and training procedures to cast pilots not
simply into fliers in the sky but more importantly into operators in the cockpit. For this purpose,
McFarland and his colleagues used various instruments available, such as the serial reaction time
apparatus and the two-hand coordination apparatus. What these apparatuses had in common was
the goal of evaluating flying aptitude without actually taking the students into the air, which
would have cost time and money. The student pilot would sit on a chair and watch a series of
light bulbs, just as he would if he was watching cockpit instruments; he would likewise try to
coordinate his two hands on a table as he would if he were maneuvering a plane. All these
techniques and apparatuses helped generate the sense that a pilot's working space was not so
much the turbulent air as the instrumented cockpit. The demand to select pilots in the quickest
and cheapest manner was more compatible with attentive operators of instruments and machines
than with daredevils of "unusual physical make-up."42
Pilot Bodies Inside and Outside the Cockpit
As the wartime practice of sifting through a huge number of pilot candidates illustrates, the
cockpit was not an abstract space in which an idealized human being was seated. It had to be
occupied by physical bodies with all their singularities. The obvious fact that there was great
variation in human body sizes and capabilities posed a serious challenge for the military in both
selecting personnel and designing equipment. In the U.S. military during WWII, the task of
measuring pilots' bodies and charting their variations in relation to the cockpit and other
equipment fell on a group of physical anthropologists including Earnest Hooton and his student
Albert Damon, both of whom studied and taught at Harvard University. Chapter 3 will examine
42 The phrase "unusual physical make-up" is in Ross McFarland, "The Psychological Aspects of Flying, with
Special Reference to Problems of Selection," International Clinics 1:5 (1942): 17-35.
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how, in their studies of the U.S. Army Air Forces pilots, these physical anthropologists brought
with them their pre-existing research questions and practices on individual and racial differences
in bodies and their relevance to temperamental and behavioral characteristics. Earlier
anthropological questions such as Hooton's "what is an American" turned into a technological
question that could be raised and solved in the cockpit. Through their work, the technological
space of the cockpit became a registrar of human differences and the pilot-operator came to be
defined in anthropological terms within and across cultures, anticipating Barthes's observation of
the jet pilot's "condition" as "less human than anthropological."
The chapter demonstrates that, within the physical anthropologists' analytical frame,
there existed two kinds of personhood, representing two different assumptions about flying and
pilots. One is what I call "the somatotypic man," a holistic yet typological understanding of the
human body and its relation to temperament and behavior that was first devised by constitutional
psychologist William Sheldon in the late 1930s and adopted by Hooton and Damon. The
physical anthropologists regarded flying as a type of behavior that they could correlate with a
pilot's somatotype, a numerical designation of one's physique, just as they had done for
criminals, juvenile delinquents, and college students. The other kind of the pilot's body is what
the AAF researchers called "the functional man," who was defined in terms of his body
dimensions and their possible fit with machine parts. Materially manifested as type heads,
manikins, and busts, the functional man in the cockpit did not possess traits or qualities as a
person, but only had physical dimensions that were based on measurements of the AAF
personnel. Although the somatotypic man served as a topic for what Sheldon and Damon
considered more "scientific" research, the functional man would have a lasting influence on the
design practice of aeronautical engineers. Both of them, however, are illustrative of the many
ways the human body related to machines, each suggesting different kinds of people well- or ill-
suited for working with the machines.
The Unmaking and Remaking of Pilots in Postwar Japan
Chapter 4 begins with a presumption that the figure of the pilot described in the previous
chapters was an American character. The American researchers did not consider their subjects
and studies as distinctively American in a self-reflective manner. One can recognize, however,
the American-ness of the pilot figure by taking it to another political and cultural environment
and examining how one kind of pilot encountered a different kind. Chapter 4 examines the
rehabilitation of Japanese aviation in the 1950s after a ban on all aviation-related activities,
including Japanese nationals' piloting, which was imposed by the Allied Occupation from 1945
to 1952. Under the "no Japanese in the cockpit" policy, the aircraft cockpit was politically
declared off limits for all Japanese.
When Japan attempted to resume aviation activities at the Occupation's end, including
the retraining of veteran pilots and the training of new ones, American pilots and the American
way of flying served as the norm and reference for the Japanese. It was not until he was properly
disciplined and trained in a manner acceptable to Americans that the Japanese flier would be
allowed to operate airplanes again. The remaking of the Japanese pilot in the postwar U.S.-
dominated order posed several challenges to Japanese pilots and researchers. Political
considerations delayed the Japanese pilots' return to the air during the Occupation, and American
popular perceptions about Japanese fliers as dreadful kamikaze lingered on to qualify Japanese
pilots, who worked hard to adapt themselves to the new flying skills and conventions, including
the new standard language of international flying, English. In addition to bringing the first group
of postwar Japanese pilots to the U.S. for American flight training, the American aviation
authorities also made great efforts literally to accommodate Japanese pilots into American-built
cockpits by measuring their bodies and designing flying suits, for which Japanese aviation
researchers cooperated as well. In post-occupation Japan, the skill, language, and bodies of the
Japanese pilots were judged against those of Americans, so that they could become able and
reliable fliers of America's new ally nation. Far from being a neutral, technical space, the cockpit
reflected wider political, cultural, and somatic arrangements.
The Pilot-Operator and Human (Factors) Engineering
Taking the American pilot back to the postwar U.S., chapter 5 examines another kind of travel
by the pilot-from the aircraft cockpit to the cabs of buses and trucks as well as the factory floor.
I argue that the operator sitting in a space full of instruments and controls was forged first in
aviation during WWII and spread into wider population and occupational groups, contributing to
the concept of the "human factor," which was closely related to the notion of the human operator
of vehicles and other equipment. Carried over from the cockpit to the driver's seat were not only
McFarland's emphasis on the "functional and operational sense" and the "sedentary" life inside
each vehicle, but also Damon and his colleagues' anthropological agendas of differentiating the
superior from the inferior and designing better equipment for all. Indeed, Damon and McFarland
collaborated in the 1950s for the studies on bus and truck drivers, drawing upon their previous
work on pilots. And their anthropometric data were picked up by industrial designers of
automobiles and other equipment (for example, Henry Dreyfuss's The Measure of Man: Human
Factors in Design, published in 1960). The pilot became the model for machine operators.
The postwar discipline called "human factors engineering" (in the U.S.) or "ergonomics"
(in Europe) or "human engineering" (in Japan) came to center around the figure of the operator
working with machines. The institutionalization of this field of research between the late 1940s
and the early 1960s attests to the proliferation of operators and operating spaces during the
period. Concerned with apparatuses ranging from office furniture to military equipment, human
(factors) engineering aims to intervene wherever there is an operator, that is, almost everywhere
modern human activity occurs. The International Ergonomics Association currently defines the
aim of the discipline as "the understanding of interactions among humans and other elements of
a system" and the profession's job as the application of "theory, principles, data and methods to
design in order to optimize human well-being and overall system performance."44 Less obvious
from these abstract terms are its connections to particular wartime and postwar technologies and
cultures of pilot selection and training. Stating that human factors engineering treats a human
being as a component of the system does not fully capture the historical change that this
dissertation describes. Before a human was incorporated into a system, he or she had first to be
brought to the machine and conditioned as an operator. Even as humans were increasingly
subjected to abstract analysis to maximize the system's performance, their humanity was also
reasserted, though without any grandiosity, in small cockpit-like spaces that were both
comforting and limiting.
43 In the late 1940s and early 1950s, American scholars and practitioners called their field of study "human
engineering." By the late 1950s, however, it became conventional to call the discipline "human factors engineering,"
which continues to be used nowadays. In Japan, where much of American scholarship and practice has been adopted
since the late 1950s, the field is still called "human engineering" (ningen kigaku), partly because a literal translation
of "human factors engineering" sounds rather awkward in the Japanese language.
44 A definition adopted in 2000. See htp: www fes-network.or. hat-s-ereoncs iea-definition.html , accessed
on July 10, 2010.
Machine Operators and the Modern Human Condition
Can these proliferating cockpit-like spaces bring about a distinct condition, a mode of being, for
human life? Do operators in cockpits and in front of other equipment deserve analysis as a
category? By the late 1950s, scholars and practitioners in human factors engineering and
ergonomics were grappling with these questions. Without the urgent wartime need to screen
student pilots and design battle equipment, their work had implications for more general
discussions on humans and machines. The first substantive article in the first issue of the
American journal Human Factors, the official publication of the newly established Human
Factors Society, began with a new definition of the human: "Man as the Monitor." Instead of
making direct perception of and action onto the world itself, "man" was supposed to "monitor"
the representations of the world on machines and respond to them. A monitor, not equal but
analogous to an operator, both presupposed and was conditioned by a technological environment
consisting of artificial things and signs. Studies of systems science and cybernetics have focused
on the redefinition of the human being as an information-processing cyborg, blurring the
boundary between human and machine. The concept of the human monitor, I argue, complicates
the story of smooth blending, since the task of human (factors) engineering has been to re-
demarcate the boundary and re-center the human being as a monitor or an operator. With its
insecurity and instability vis-A-vis machines, the position of the human monitor better captures
the human condition of the mid-twentieth century than does the concept of the cyborg.
It is suggestive that Hannah Arendt's book The Human Condition, quoted above, was
published in the same year (1958) as the first issue of the journal Human Factors, addressing
similar issues of the human condition in the modem world in philosophical and engineering
terms, respectively. If an increasing number of humans were becoming operators by choice or
out of necessity, how would that affect our understanding of the three realms of human activity
that Arendt discussed with an ascending order of importance: labor, work, and action? Does, for
instance, the figure of the operator belong to the realms of labor and work but not to that of
(political) action? Is the operator engaged less with labor than with work? How different is the
operator from homofaber (the human being as the maker)? The concluding chapter situates the
human operator of machines in postwar America by juxtaposing it with the discussions on the
fate of homofaber and the general social condition, which connected machines and engineering
with history, politics, and philosophy.
Chapter 1
The Virtual Flier: The Link Trainer and the Meaning of "Flying"
Introduction
On May 9, 1946, in a meeting of the Western Division of the American Philosophical
Association held at the University of Chicago, Daniel Sommer Robinson delivered a presidential
address titled "A Philosophy for the Atomic Age." As the title of his address indicated, Robinson
attempted to suggest "a fresh approach to philosophy," one that took seriously the recent
development of science and technology and could engage with "the drastic effects of this
growing mastery of nature upon philosophy." One year after the war that many believed had
been ended by the power of atomic energy, it seemed timely and pertinent to contemplate some
philosophical implications of "the recent technological exploitation of scientific knowledge,"
which Robinson believed was "a major human need for the Atomic Age."i
Fittingly, Robinson looked to the past war for some examples of the new "ternary
experience" (terranean, marine, and aerial) attained from humankind's technological mastery of
nature. The vast expansion of human experience in nature made possible by "a submarine, an
airplane, an aircraft carrier, an underwater sound-detecting device, a gyro-pilot, a gyro-compass,
a cyclotron, a megatron, a betatron, a radar, radio sending and receiving sets, an electron
microscope, or an atomic bomb" could be understood as "the contribution of wartime
1 Daniel Sommer Robinson, "A Philosophy for the Atomic Age," The Philosophical Review 55 (1946): 377-403, on
378 and 383.
engineering to civilization." For a case of new "terranean experience," Robinson offered the use
of atomic energy and even suggested the famous Henry Smyth report on the development of the
atomic bomb as "a 'must' for every teacher of philosophy." For "the great enrichment of marine
experience," he credited submarines and radars that had proven so effective by enabling the
American Navy to locate and fire against the Japanese fleet from so long a distance as to be
humanly invisible. Both could serve as decent topics for philosophical discussions.2
For the last component of the "ternary experience," Robinson asked the audience to
imagine what a pilot flying at 12,000 feet would experience from a philosophical perspective.
Before him is the instrument panel on which are delicate gauges and other devices that
tell him at a glance his altitude, the angle at which the plane is flying, the speed, the
distance from the take-off and to the next landing field, the weather conditions
surrounding him, and the flight conditions ahead of him. To the pilot, this is a unique
objective situation quite different from any he ever confronted on land, ... .
It is notable that the centerpiece of new "aerial experience" was neither the upper air the pilot
was flying in nor the bodily experience of speed through the air. What made the aerial
experience "a unique objective situation" was the instrument panel in the cockpit, which told the
pilot "at a glance" about air, speed, and everything else worth knowing during the flight. Flying
by instruments, often called "blind flying," was not a World War II invention, but had become
more sophisticated and routinized during the war. Like the experience in a submarine dependent
on the sonar, a pilot's aerial experience with information-feeding instruments seemed to add a
philosophical layer to flying. It was not just a new way of flying, but more importantly a novelty
2 Ibid., 384-90.
3 Ibid., 390.
in human experience, which was both "complication and enrichment" of the prior ones including
the Wright brothers' achievement.4
Robinson thought that this aerial experience of instrument flying was qualitatively
different from any experience on the ground. There was at least one place on the ground,
however, where Robinson acknowledged such experience was possible. He ended the last
sentence of the passage quoted above with a qualifying clause: "... unless it was in a Link Trainer
devised to simulate flight conditions." From a philosophical point of view, Robinson implied,
being in a Link Trainer was equivalent, or as close as possible, to being in a cockpit at 12,000
feet. Robinson did not elaborate any further on the Link Trainer, but his passing observation
poses a question about the new "aerial experience," the new device of simulation and training,
and the relationship between the two. One interpretation of his comment is that the Link Trainer
was such a sophisticated device that it could "simulate flight conditions" to a degree that had not
been possible previously. Or, it could also mean that the nature of "flight conditions" that
constituted the new "aerial experience" had undergone an earth-bound change; what had been for
the Wright brothers a vivid bodily sense of speed from physical contact with air turned into
something closer to the situation of telephone operators sitting in front of instruments.
Simultaneously with the development of simulation technology, "flight conditions" themselves
became more subject to a possibility of simulation-blurring the boundary between terranean
and aerial experiences. One can even say that, as much as they seemed to diverge in their
4 Ibid., 390.
locations, all three of the ternary experiences came to resemble one another, making it possible
to substitute one realm of experience for another.
This chapter asks how it became possible to speak of the Link Trainer-a training device
for instrument flying-as something that did not simply simulate "flight conditions" but rather
constituted the new "aerial experience" in the nascent Atomic Age.6 The concept and practice of
instrument flying made it possible to connect aerial flying with ground training in the Trainer,
since the experience of flying by instruments was an experience not so much in the free air as
within the cockpit. It was a technological experience mediated through various instruments that
interpreted the air and the world for the pilot. As the cockpit evolved from a non-demarcated
space in the first Wright Flyer to a completely enclosed space of the Link Trainer and actual
aircraft, it turned into a semiotic space filled with numerous signs from dials, indicators, and
radios, which brought the conditions of both the outside world and the aircraft itself to the pilot's
attention. The Link Trainer simulated not the conditions of the air, which wind tunnels for
aerodynamics research claimed to do, but rather the conditions of the cockpit, within which all
"aerial experience" occurred as far as the pilot was concerned. This point became more explicit
5 Ibid., 391-93. It is noted, however, that the ultimate integration of the ternary experience, which Robinson had
observed in person, was the attack on Iwo Jima, in which land, aerial, and marine forces combined so effectively to
produce a decisive victory against the Japanese forces.
6 The Link Trainer has not received much historical attention. General histories of aviation seldom mention the Link
Trainer, which also reflects overall inattention to the problems of pilot training in aviation history. When aviation
histories describe the Link Trainer at all, they usually rely on the memoir of a former Link executive Lloyd Kelly,
which narrates the history of the Trainer and the company for a popular audience. Lloyd Kelly, The Pilot Maker
(New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1970). Kelly joined the Link Aviation in 1945 and worked there for many years. In a
history of blind landing techniques and systems, Erik Conway discusses the Link Trainer with regard to the new
practice of instrument flying, using Kelly's book as his main source. See Erik Conway, Blind Landings: Low-
Visibility Operations in American Aviation, 1918-1958 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 29-
33. Kelly's book also served as a major reference for the brief histories written by those working in the flight
simulation field. For example, see Paul Adorian, W. N. Staynes, and Martin Bolton, "The Evolution of the Flight
Simulator," in 50 Years of Flight Simulation: Conference Proceedings, Session I (London: Royal Aeronautical
Society, 1979), 1-23. It is notable that this 50 year celebration of flight simulation traces its history back to 1929, the
year of the Link Trainer's invention. A similar account is found in J. M. Rolfe and K. J. Stapes, eds., Flight
Simulation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), which includes a chapter on a short history of flight
simulators.
when, around 1950, the Link device started to duplicate each particular model of actual
airplanes, changing its name from "trainer" to "simulator." It was an aircraft simulator rather
than aflight simulator.
The change in flying methods and cockpit instrumentation was associated with the
shifting notion of the pilot from a daredevil hero (fully in the world) to a scientifically minded,
cautious monitor of instrument needles. Even before World War II began, the introduction of
more and more cockpit instruments raised questions about pilots' role and status, prompting one
writer to ask, "Who's Flying This Ship?"7 It was during the urgency of wartime training,
however, that pilots began to be trained in the instrument flying technique on a large scale and
the meaning of this practice was manifested more clearly. There was something more than
simply learning to trust the instruments rather than their own senses; their instrument training in
the Link Trainer were led by lower-rank instructors, some of whom were women (who were not
permitted to fly), had no flight experience, or both. Instrument flying, as practiced inside the
Link Trainer, was taught by many who did not know how to fly. In this regard, it was not flying
in the literal meaning of the word, but rather "flying" (to fly in scare quotes). It was a way of
flying that was quite different from what the Wright brothers practiced. As hundreds of
thousands of students went through the Link Trainer sessions and learned to fly by "flying" on
the ground, what would happen to the notion of the pilot as someone who "flies"? As the way
one should fly changed, so did the person who did the flying.
7 W. A. Patterson, "Who's Flying This Ship?" The Saturday Evening Post, 12 February 1938. For the impact of
cockpit instrumentation (esp. the Sperry autopilot) on pilots' professional identity, see Mindell, Between Human and
Machine: Feedback, Control, and Computing before Cybernetics (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press,
2002), chapter 3. The questions of pilots' role and identity in relation to the degrees of automation remained a
serious issue even for the astronauts in the 1960s. See Mindell, Digital Apollo: Human and Machine in Spaceflight
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2008).
Given the large scale production, distribution, and use of the Link Trainer during and
after the war, it is necessary to examine the Link Trainer not only as a proxy of aircraft that
produced virtual effects of flying but also as an actual piece of machinery that had its own
properties in terms of parts, dimensions, location, production schedule, and what is now called
"user experience." Following the philosopher Sergio Sismondo, it is helpful here to distinguish
two meanings of the word "virtual": virtual(1) as "in effect, but not actual" and virtual(2) as
"simulated on or mediated by a computer." On the one hand, the Link Trainer was intended to be
a virtual(1) flying machine, making a "flight" in effect, but not actually going into the air. A
"flight" in the Link Trainer, however, could be claimed as a virtual(1) flight, because actual
conditions of flying in the air had already been reliant on virtual(2) technologies, though they
were mechanical gears and analog dials rather than digital computers. The Link Trainer
employed the same virtual(2) technologies plus pneumatic bellows and the electrically-operated
flight recorder to produce a "flight." As in today's computer-generated virtual realities-which
Sismondo thinks are virtual(2) realities rather than virtual(1) realities-the Link Trainer was
able to "produce new types of experiences of non-virtual realities." Not simply a close
representation of an aerial flight, the actual experience of "flying" the Link Trainer affected
pilots' experience of actual flight in the air and their sense of being a pilot. Thus, philosopher
Slavoj Zizek's statement that "[t]he ultimate lesson of 'virtual reality' is the virtualization of the
very 'true' reality" can be employed to ask how the use of simulation for flight training also
virtualized actual flight.8 The Link Trainer taught pilots not some timeless essence of flight,
which was difficult to define, but rather how to get used to this virtualized form of flight.9
8 Sergio Sismondo, "Reality for Cybernauts," Postmodern Culture 8:1 (1997) [electronic journal article]. Zizek is
quoted in Sismondo's article. Original source is Slavoj Zizek, Tarrying with the Negative: Kant, Hegel, and the
Critique of Ideology (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993), 44. As the case of the Link Trainer illustrates, the two
45
This chapter is concerned less with theoretical possibilities of flight simulation than with
the questions raised by the production and use of flight trainers and simulators around World
War II. It is worth emphasizing that early technologies of simulation such as the Link Trainer
were training devices that aimed to produce people to be placed in real world jobs. Therefore,
questions about simulation techniques and their "realism" need to address specific conditions
under which innumerable Trainers were produced and used as physically existing equipment. In
what terms and settings could the Link Trainer be said to "simulate" aircraft flight? How was the
distinction between flying and "flying" made around the Link Trainer, and by whom? What was
the pilot student supposed to learn in the Link Trainer? How was the authority of instructors
created and maintained in the Link Trainer room? When did the Link "Trainer" become a
"simulator" and what made the name change necessary? All of these questions were related to
the reshaping of the pilot's identity over the middle third of the twentieth century.
The Idea and Technique of Flying Blind
Airplane cockpits before World War I featured few instruments. The 1903 Flyer of the Wright
brothers, in which a pilot flew in a prone position, had three instruments, but they were not for
in-flight use. The recordings from an engine revolution counter, an anemometer, and a stopwatch
meanings of the virtual are not opposed to each other but rather related. The Oxford English Dictionary also lists
these two meanings as variations under the same (fourth) entry of the definitions of "virtual." Virtual(l) is close to
the OED definition 4.a.: "That is so in essence or effect, although not formally or actually; admitting of being called
by the name so far as the effect or result is concerned." And virtual(2) is close to 4.g.: "Computers. Not physically
existing as such but made by software to appear to do so from the point of view of the program or the user." The
Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd edition (1989), accessed on-line.
9 The Link Trainer is occasionally mentioned in the literature on virtual reality, including Sismondo's work cited
above. See, for example, Benjamin Woolley, Virtual Worlds: A Journey in Hype and Hyperreality (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1992), 39-44. Woolley included a diagram from the first patent application of the Link Trainer in 1929,
as if pointing out the crude, mundane origin of the much-hyped virtual reality. Woolley's source was Rolfe and
Stapes, Flight Simulation. Subsequent literature on virtual reality and simulation cited Woolley's book as their
source for the Link Trainer, though they were always very brief. For example, Ken Hillis, "A Geography of the Eye:
The Technologies of Virtual Reality," in Cultures of Internet: Virtual Spaces, Real Histories, Living Bodies, ed. Rob
Shields (London: SAGE, 1996), 70-98.
were retrieved after a flight to be used for a calculation of aircraft speed (air and ground) and
engine revolution rate. The Wright 1909 Military Flyer, in which a pilot now sat, had no flight
instruments. Louis Bleriot's Type XI, famous for its first cross-English Channel flight in 1909,
included only a fuel pressure gauge, a pressure altimeter, and an oil pulsator. A pilot would bring
his own compass and clock to fly this kind of aircraft. The wartime need for more reliable flight
helped bring into cockpits more instruments that aided pilots in finding altitude and speed and
monitoring engine performances. Yet, except for air speed indicators and compasses, most
cockpit instruments were indicators of engine performance. Germany's Hallberstadt CL.IV, a
military aircraft introduced in 1918, had a fuel gauge, a gas pressure gauge, an oil pressure
gauge, a level indicator, and an airspeed indicator in its cockpit. It is notable that some other
instruments were placed outside the cockpit; tachometer in the windshield, a barographic
altimeter at the wing strut, etc. Information on aircraft performance and location was not
concentrated inside the cockpit. The Fokker D.VII, one of the most famous German fighter
planes of World War I with a synchronized machine gun in the cockpit, had a tachometer at the
center of the instrument board. There were also two pressure gauges for fuel tanks and a
compass. 10
Even after World War I, instruments for aircraft attitude or location remained marginal.
For example, in the Douglas M-2 Mailplane that the U.S. Post Office first bought in 1925, the
pilot could hardly monitor the airspeed indicator and the compass because they were placed in
the forward cockpit seat for a passenger. The inventor Elmer Sperry introduced in 1918 a turn
10 Photographs and explanations of the cockpit instruments described here are found in Tom Alison and Dana Bell
(editors) and Eric Long and Mark Avino (photographers), At the Controls: The Smithsonian NationalAir and Space
Museum Book of Cockpits (Washington, DC: Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum, in association with the
Boston Mills Press, 2006), 18-23 and 27-29; Eric Long and Mark Avino (photographers) and Dana Bell (writer), In
the Cockpit: Inside 50 History-Making Aircraft (Washington, DC: The Smithsonian Institution, 2007), 12-17 and
22-23. An excellent overview of cockpit instruments and controls is given in L. F. E. Coombs, Control in the Sky:
The Evolution and History of the Aircraft Cockpit (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Aviation, 2005).
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indicator that showed the rate of turn of the aircraft better than did the magnetic compass. Yet
many pilots in the 191 Os and early 1920s were not enthusiastic about this and other instruments
for flying attitude and navigation. Most flights were made during the day under fair weather
conditions in which pilots could see and feel without referring to cockpit instruments. Active use
of these instruments was not a norm but rather an exception, as exemplified by Charles
Lindbergh's trans-Atlantic flight from New York to Paris in 1927. The large fuel tank of the
Spirit of St. Louis, custom-designed for Lindbergh, blocked Lindbergh's view, forcing him to use
a periscope to look outside. Lindbergh therefore relied much on instruments for navigation. In
addition to general engine instruments, the front panel included a magnetic compass, an earth
inductor compass, an inclinometer, an altimeter, an airspeed indicator, and a turn and bank
indicator." The historic 33-hour flight was made possible by Lindbergh's persistent attention to
and dexterous use of these instruments that guided his way through the Atlantic. Not all pilots in
the 1920s shared such strong "instrumental faith." As historian Erik Conway writes, "[m]ost
pilots flew for the joy of seeing the earth from the air and had no desire to place their attention
inside the cockpit." 2
There were some issues of self-esteem with flying by instruments. A pilot who relied on
instruments seemed to fall in the category of the "mechanical pilot" as opposed to the "natural
pilot." According to a popular classification among pilots, the latter was said to fly "by the
acuteness of his natural senses" and have "natural aptitude in correcting skids, slips, stalls, etc."' 3
The natural pilot (also called "the born flier") could detect delicate changes in the plane's
motions and attitudes with his bodily senses, especially the inner ear mechanism, and therefore
11 Alison and Bell, At the Controls, 32-37.
12 Conway, Blind Landings, 21.
13 Ray H. Boudreaux, "The Ocker-Myers Method of Blind Flying," Aero Digest, July 1928, 48 and 183-85.
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flew by "the feel of the ship." A true natural flier would have no problem in maintaining proper
attitude even in thick clouds. By contrast, the mechanical pilot, without this natural ability, was
"forced to rely upon his sight in the guiding of the plane." Without a clear sight with which to
orient the plane, he might not even know whether his plane was in a tilted position or not, since
his body could not feel it. 4 If mere use of sight in flying was deemed somehow mechanical and
not admirable, then, reading the dials and numbers on cockpit instruments was even less
reputable.
The pressure for instrument flying, however, was building up. In the late 1920s, the need
for regularly scheduled flights increased with the growth of air mail services and commercial
airlines. In 1925, the Air Mail Act took effect, enabling private contractors to carry mail for the
Post Office. In 1926, the Air Commerce Act was signed into law, specifying the role of the
federal government in the regulation of civil aviation businesses such as aircraft certification,
pilot licensing, and aerial navigation. Early airlines such as the Western Air Express began to
carry mail and even passengers on a regular basis. The first-year operation of the Western Air
Express had only nine cancellations out of 735 flights. Regular flights required pilots to fly more
frequently under low-visibility conditions due to bad weather or during the night. Flight under
these conditions was called "blind flying." Pilots who flew on regular schedules for mails and
passengers were increasingly asked to be competent in flying blind, which meant more reliance
on instruments."
14 "Aviation Problems, with Special Reference to the Internal Ear and the Cerebellum" (Proceedings of New York
Neurological Society 364th regular meeting on April 2, 1918), The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease 49
(March 1919): 227-33, quote on 228. The distinction between "natural" and "mechanical" pilots is also discussed in
chapter 2.
15 Tom Crouch, Wings: A History ofAviationfrom Kites to the Space Age (New York: W.W. Norton, 2003), 216-36
and 249-53; Nick Komons, Bonfires to Beacons: Federal Civil Aviation Policy under the Air Commerce Act, 1926-
1938 (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1989), 65-124.
49
Still, the pilots had to be convinced of the accuracy of flight instruments before they
embraced the instrument flying technique as part of their routine. Many pilots had reasonable
doubts about the instruments. In the early days of aviation, some basic instruments such as the
compass often misguided pilots in the air, though the situation got better soon. The turn
indicator, a crucial piece in instrument-aided navigation, received much suspicion. It seemed to
malfunction when the aircraft was in fog or clouds, increasing the danger of mishandling the
aircraft. Pilots of one major airline recommended that the turn indicators be returned to the
manufacturer, which saw no need for repair, only worsening the pilots' "mistrust" of the
instrument. From the pilots' perspective, the instruments were not reliable enough to fly through
clouds with. Reliance on instruments in bad weather could even increase the risk of accidents. 16
As it turned out, it was the pilot's senses, not his instruments, that were malfunctioning in
the clouds. William Ocker, a U.S. Army Air Corps major who started his flying career during
World War I, is credited with this "most fortunate discovery." In 1926, Ocker underwent a test
on the Barany revolving chair with flight surgeon David Myers. The Barany chair was used as
part of routine physical examinations for pilots to test their sense of balance and equilibrium.
When asked to perform the test with his eyes closed (a new practice implemented by Myers),
Ocker found out that he could not tell the direction and rate of the turning chair, which reminded
him of the discrepancy between the turn indicator and his own senses while flying in the clouds.
When the chair's turning decelerated but maintained the original direction, one could be easily
mistaken that the chair started to turn in the opposite direction. Later, Ocker did the same test,
this time with a turn indicator fixed on his head, so that he could see only the instrument but not
the surroundings. By focusing on the turn indicator, Ocker could tell the right direction without
16 William Ocker and Carl Crane, Blind Flight in Theory and Practice (San Antonio, TX: Naylor Printing Company,
1932), 9-13.
being misguided by his own senses.' 7 Under blind flying conditions when one could not see
outside, this experiment demonstrated, "the feel of the ship" was no longer trustworthy. When
one s senses conflicted with instrument readings, the pilot would have to follow the latter, even
though it meant becoming a "mechanical pilot."
Ocker, Myers, and another army pilot Carl Crane conducted more research and actively
promoted a new understanding of blind flying with instruments. Much effort went into
persuading pilots of the desirability of using instruments when unable to have a clear view. As a
rhetorical strategy, Ocker and Crane chose not to advertise instrument flying as an idea or a
technique that was novel and different. In their influential book Blind Flight in Theory and
Practice, published in 1932, Ocker and Crane started out by asserting that "the pilot always flies
by instrument." They took up a broad dictionary definition of "instrument" as "that means by
which something is effected, or caused to happen." This enabled them to refer to "any
combination of terrestrial or astronomical objects" as "natural instrument." As soon as a pilot
used the sight of natural landmarks to orient the plane, they were no longer pure nature and
immediately turned into "instruments." The implication of the closed-eye Barany chair
experiments was that it was "humanly impossible" to fly an airplane "without reference to
instruments," whether natural or artificial. The natural horizon and the turn indicator were simply
different sorts of instruments, and there was no reason to accept one but not the other.'8
Accordingly, Ocker and Crane emphasized that "blind flight" was not synonymous with
"instrument flight." Blind flying was not a method of flying but rather "a condition under which
flight is accomplished." And that condition was defined by being "unable to maintain visual
reference with the natural instrument." Blind flight did not mean flying blindly with no visual
17 Ibid., 13-14.
18 Ibid., 2.
cues but simply being blind to objects outside the airplane. Since "visual reference" itself was
indispensable in every kind of flight, the pilot under blind flying condition without "exterior
visual reference" would have to find some other means of getting a visual reference. The pilot,
Ocker and Crane maintained, had only to look inside the cockpit, where a set of instruments
could provide necessary visual references. As a condition of flying, blind flying was becoming
unavoidable in the age of regular mail and passenger flights and one had to be able to fly under
such conditions.' 9
Ocker and Crane's rhetorical move-turning nature into one of possible instruments for
flying-preceded by several decades a similar strategy by researchers of artificial life, the
simulation or creation of life inside computers. As anthropologist Stefan Helmreich pointed out,
promoters of artificial life research in the late twentieth century conceived natural life ("life-as-
we-know-it") as one of many possible forms of life ("life-as-it-could-be"), making it plausible
for them to treat self-replicating programs as (artificial) life and the computer that housed them
as a world on its own.2 0 Just as artificial life researchers redefined (if not reduced) natural life as
"life-as-we-know-it," Ocker and Crane's promotion of blind flying as equally valid and useful
method had the effect of renaming what had been regarded a natural way of flying as "contact
flying"-a particular condition of flight under which the pilot makes visual contact with objects
in the world, or natural instruments, outside the cockpit. While it is now customary to
characterize the change in flying method as "the transition from contact to instrument-radio
flying," the term "contact flying" came into wide usage after, not before, the term "blind flying"
19 Ibid., 1-2 (italics original); William Ocker, "Economic Value of Flying by Instruments," Aero Digest, October
1930, 62-63.
20 Stefan Helmreich, Silicon Second Nature: Culturing Artificial Life in a Digital World (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2000), 13; Stefan Helmreich, "The Word for World Is Computer: Simulating Second Natures in
Artificial Life," in Growing Explanations: Historical Perspectives on Recent Science, ed. M. Norton Wise (Durham:
Duke University Press, 2004), 275-300.
did.2 1 The traditional flying by visual contact, previously thought of as natural and indispensable,
no longer seemed so natural in any absolute sense and instead began to be defined only in
relation to the newly introduced blind flying.
Despite such rhetoric of comparability of traditional and new methods, however, visual
cues from the early cockpit instruments were not exactly the same as those gathered from
looking at the outside world. The cockpit instruments gave directions, numbers, rates, or angles,
but not a pictorial view that was analogous to the landscapes and landmarks seen under normal
flight condition. Since they were not intuitively recognizable without mental work, it was not
easy and straightforward to use them as "visual references." Thus, the essence of the Ocker-
Myers method of blind flying consisted in the pilot's ability to imagine, from the instrument
indications, something akin to the familiar visual reference. In other words, the pilot had to
visualize an "artificial horizon" in his mind. The natural horizon, or the outside world in general,
passed through the filters of various cockpit instruments, becoming abstract and legible
information, and then would be re-constituted in the pilot's mind as the artificial horizon.
Complicating the popular contrast between natural and mechanical pilots, the Ocker-Myers
method emphasized the pilot's ability to create a mental-artificial equivalent of the natural
horizon with the help of instruments.2 2
21 William Leary, "Safety in the Air: The Impact of Instrument Flying and Radio Navigation on U.S. Commercial
Air Operations between the Wars," in From Airships to Airbus: The History of Civil and Commercial Aviation Vol.
1. Infrastructure and Environment, ed. William Leary (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1995), 97-113,
quote on 106. It is difficult to demonstrate exhaustively that "blind flying" preceded "contact flying" as terminology
whereas the latter preceded the former as actual practice of flying. Some search queries in the historical database of
the New York Times gives a hint. A search of the phrase "contact flying" between January 1, 1924, and December
31, 1930, turns out zero result, while the search of "blind flying" for the same period gives 104 results. A search of
"instrument flying" has 18 results. If "contact flying" is searched for the period between January 1, 1920, and
December 31, 1937, there are five appearances in the New York Times database.
22 Boudreaux, "The Ocker-Myers Method of Blind Flying," 184.
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An analogy can be made here between the pilot watching cockpit instruments and the
nineteenth-century "observer" watching visual contraptions such as a stereoscope. As art
historian Jonathan Crary argued, the early nineteenth-century studies of vision departed
markedly from the previous model of camera obscura, in which the objective world made
unmediated impression on the eye. According to the new theory, vision was a problem of human
physiology, which meant that it could be subjective, even distorted, depending on complex
internal workings of the eye. Based on this new understanding of vision, Crary wrote, a modern
subjectivity as an "observer" came into existence through "a severing (or liberation) of
perceptual experience from a necessary relation to an exterior world." Within the cockpit of the
1930s, a similar change occurred in the ways of flying, as the cockpit instruments came to
intervene between the pilot and the outside world, which was, to borrow Crary's words, "newly
decomposed into autonomous and abstract stimuli."2 3 The cockpit became a space filled with
signs, in which flight instruments not only represented but also eliminated the outside world.
In the early version of blind flight technique, the cognitive burden of making the invisible
world visible artificially was imposed on the pilot. Before long, however, a new instrument
relieved the pilot of the interpretive work by providing more intuitive representation of aircraft
and flight. On September 24, 1929, in the first complete blind flight from take-off to landing, the
Army lieutenant James H. Doolittle made use of the Sperry Artificial Horizon. It was made by
Elmer Sperry, Jr. as part of the instrument flying research at the Full Flight Laboratory at Mitchel
23 Jonathan Crary, Suspensions of Perception: Attention, Spectacle, and Modern Culture (Cambridge, MA: The MIT
Press, 1999), 12 and 309. This theme was more directly addressed in Jonathan Crary, Techniques of the Observer:
On Vision and Modernity in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1990).
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Field, NY, and placed in the hooded cockpit of the NY-2 plane.24 On the display of the artificial
horizon instrument, a small bar that appeared to "simulate a miniature aircraft" moved up or
down, replicating on a smaller scale the up- or down- pitch of the actual aircraft. Another wire on
the display represented the horizon and responded to the aircraft's right or left bank; if the
aircraft banks to the right (the right wing down), the horizon would turn counter-clockwise,
making the miniature aircraft look as if it were banking to the right. Behind these bars, the
circular face on the instrument was horizontally divided into two parts painted blue and gray,
each representing sky and ground. In addition to this graphic representation of aircraft and
horizon, the pilot could also get numerical indications of pitch and roll by reading the numbers
inscribed around the circular display panel. With the artificial horizon installed on the front
panel, the pilot acquired an imaginary view of the aircraft and the horizon seen from behind the
aircraft. Rather than become one with the aircraft and "feel" it, the pilot could now maintain a
cognitive distance from his plane as he monitored its miniaturized version in front of him. He
was in a virtual position of following his own aircraft (See Figure 1).
24 James H. Doolittle, Early Experiments in Instrument Flying (Washington: Smithsonian Institution, 1962). For the
blind flight research at Mitchel Field, see also Richard Hallion, Legacy of Flight: The Guggenheim Contribution to
American Aviation (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977), chapter 7.
25 Elmer Sperry, Jr., Bert Carlson, and Mortimer Bates, "Artificial Horizon," US Patent 2,044,151, filed January 16,
1935, issued June 16, 1936. An earlier patent related to the artifical horizon is Preston R. Bassett and Elmer A.
Sperry, "Attitude Indicator for Aircraft," US Patent 2,038,531, filed May 23, 1929, issued April 28, 1936. In other
versions, the miniature aircraft could tilt with the banking airplane while the ground bar remained horizontal. For an
analysis of how cockpit instruments relieve pilots of cognitive workload and participate in the computation of speed
and location, see Edwin Hutchins, "How a Cockpit Remembers Its Speed," Cognitive Science 19 (1995): 265-88. On
distributed or extended cognition in general, see Edwin Hutchins, Cognition in the Wild (Cambridge, MA: The MIT
Press, 1995); Andy Clark, Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2008).
Figure 1. Sperry Artificial Horizon
ISource: part of U.S. Patent 2,044,151.1
The power of the Sperry artificial horizon consisted in the fact that it offered a pilot a
representation of "the earth, sky and horizon" that resembled pictorially "visual flight stimuli
similar to those he receives when outside visual reference is available." In other words, the blind
flight condition was made similar to that of normal flying condition by bringing the outside
visual field onto the small circular face of the instrument. In achieving this, a three-way
relationship was established; the pilot controlled the aircraft, whose attitude was computed in
real time by the artificial horizon and represented to the pilot, who then read and responded to
the miniaturized display by making further control motions. The pilot could control the larger
aircraft by controlling the attitude of the miniature one, and vice versa.26
26 Ocker and Crane, Blind Flight, 49-54.
Although instrument or blind flying was promoted as a solution to the difficulties and
dangers of flying under bad weather and during the night, its implication went much further. As
Doolittle's first complete blind flight experiment illustrated, the normal flying condition with
nice weather and sunlight could easily be turned into blind flying conditions by covering the
cockpit with a hood and creating an artificially blind environment. It then became conceivable to
fly on instruments even when outside visual reference was available. The pilot did not have to
look out even when he could. In this regard, the cockpit instruments including the artificial
horizon did more than simply help pilots flying in bad weather. A comparison of a 1939 aircraft
and the 1903 Wright Flyer makes it plausible even to say that the instruments created the
cockpit. More specifically, the comprehensive inside visual references that the instruments
provided made the cockpit a space complete on its own. As an enclosed space whether naturally
(by weather and daylight) or artificially (by an overhead hood), it could exist independently of
the outside world and did not have to maintain constant mediation between inside and outside.
The world still needed to be referenced, but only in the form of dials, numbers, and miniature
bars on instruments.
Conversion to instrument flying, however, did not happen instantly. Feasibility of blind
flying did not directly lead to its routine practice. By Ocker and Crane's estimate from their
experience, less than five per cent of "otherwise skillful pilots" could comfortably practice flying
on instruments in blind conditions. As Ocker and Crane's dedication of their 1932 book reveals,
pilots were deemed "courageous" when they were "precisely relating their own difficult
experiences during bad weather flight," let alone practicing instrument flight in such weather.
27 Engineer and historian L.F.E. Coombs writes that the cockpit came to be regarded as worthy of special attention
only gradually: "By 1914 the word 'cockpit' was being used increasingly in contemporary writing. However,
finding the cockpit being written about as the centre of interest before about 1930 is rare." Coombs, Control in the
Sky, 7.
Those who provided valuable testimonies, Ocker and Crane assumed, "risked criticism and loss
of professional prestige." 28
While the formation of "technological faith" was a slow psychological process,
institutional arrangements propelled by commercial and military requirements helped make the
instrument flying technique more routine among professional pilots. New commercial airlines
carrying mails and passengers soon had their pilots take tests of blind flying, as proposed by the
Department of Commerce. By 1934, airline pilots acquired much better blind flying skills than
the Air Corps pilots. Although the Air Corps incorporated instrument flying into their instruction
program, Army pilots had little incentive to actually fly under blind conditions. Training for
aerial combat presumed non-blind flying weather, under which the fliers could see each other.
The incompetence of Army fliers in instrument flying was brought to the fore in the 1934 air
mail crisis, when president Roosevelt canceled mail contracts with large private airlines and
asked the Air Corps to take it over. On a very short request from the president, the Army pilots
started to fly mails on February 19, and more than a dozen pilots lost their lives within two
months of operation. Concerned and irritated, the Air Corps had to limit the mail flights to
daytime and reasonable weather condition. Soon the mail contracts were given back to private
operations, but this short crisis highlighted the need for instrument flying training and hopefully
a more affordable way of doing it.29
It was in this context that the Link Trainer, which by then had been available for five
years, came to the Army's favorable attention. In order for the Link Trainer to be considered as
viable training equipment, flying itself had first to change from "natural" to "mechanical" act.
Appreciation for the rules built around instruments, rather than natural instincts, was a
28 Ocker and Crane, Blind Flight, preface and dedication page.
29 Conway, Blind Landings, 25-34. For the air mail crisis in 1934, see Komons, Bonfires and Beacons, 249-75.
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precondition for the possibility of training in a hooded cockpit and even on the ground. As the
American Airlines instrument flying instructor Karl Day wrote in 1938, "there [was] nothing of
the 'born pilot' about [instrument flying]." It could be taught by "cold logic," which made it
suited for ground instruction.30
Training on the Ground
The Link Trainer was not the first training device in the history of aviation to be used for ground
instruction. There had been earlier attempts to teach basic principles of flying on the ground. But
it was the first to be produced, distributed, and used at a large scale.3 ' Born in 1904, Edwin
Albert Link, Jr. learned to fly in 1926 and started barnstorming in 1928. Link began to work on
the idea of a ground instruction device while he was working at his father's Link Piano and
Organ Company in Binghamton, New York. Using motors and bellows from the company, Link
developed a device that tilted and rotated on a fixed base. When first invented in 1929, his
training device was not specifically for instrument flying. With no flight instruments on the front
panel, it was originally conceived of as a ground device to reduce the time and cost of primary
flight training by teaching students basic control maneuvers for aircraft.
Link's own descriptions of his invention, however, sounded more ambitious. In the patent
application filed in March 1930, Link claimed that his was "an apparatus simulating almost
exactly every actual condition which a flier encounters in actual flight." The student was to
"operate the device exactly as an airplane is operated," acquiring practical skill to control the
rudder, aileron, and elevator. Learning to recover the airplane from an abnormal attitude was
30 Quoted in Conway, Blind Landings, 28. The original source of this quote is Karl S. Day, Instrument and Radio
Flying (Garden City: Air Associates, Inc., 1938), vi.
31 For early ground flight trainers, see Adorian, Staynes, and Bolton, "The Evolution of the Flight Simulator."
32 Kelly, Pilot Maker, 16-3 1.
another important use of the device. For maximum degree of simulation of flight condition, Link
stated, the device was made "in the form of a miniature airplane sufficiently large to
accommodate one person therein." Indeed, when he referred to his device in the patent
application, Link put scare quotes around the word plane ("plane"), suggesting the nature of the
device that simulated a "regular airplane." Sitting in a plane in scare quotes, the student was
"subjected to all the natural sensations of flying" on the ground. To be sure, it did not mean the
sensations of speed or wind. "The operator or student" was provided only with "a means for
causing and correcting all of the various natural positions which an airplane assumes in flight."
Instead of cruising, the "plane" could only change positions from a fixed center (see Figure 2).
'3-
.. ....
Figure 2. A diagram of the Link device ISource: part of US Patent 1,825,462.1
The inventor's seriousness about realistic simulation of flight condition is compromised
by other parts of the device. Instead of a turn and bank indicator, Link's device had a "novel
33 Edwin A. Link, Jr., "Combination Training Device for Student Aviators and Entertainment Apparatus," US Patent
1,825,462, filed March 12, 1930, issued September 29, 1931.
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indicator" to tell the student by means of a lamp whether the "plane" was going off the level
position. Located at the height of the operator's eyes, the lamp turned on when the device tilted
more than a certain degree. Link installed a "recording device" that counted the number of errors
of the student in maintaining the level position. While these features might well be used, as Link
claimed, "for teaching the art of aeroplaning," they also revealed another possibility of its use
"for profit as an entertainer." The lamp indicator and the error counter were equally suitable for
amusement park installations. Moreover, the device could be made to start by inserting coins into
a box connected to the electrical circuit. Indeed, Link made explicit the connection between
flight training and entertainment in his patent application, which was titled "Combination
training device for student aviators and entertainment apparatus."3 4
The entertainment feature on the flight trainer was Link's response to the weakening
flying instruction market in the middle of the Great Depression. Link established his own flying
school and advertised a very low cost instruction, $85 for both ground and aerial training,
through the use of his own device. Since the Link Flying School did not fare well, Link took
various flight-related jobs such as charter flights, stunt flying, and barnstorming. Meanwhile, he
also took his trainer to exhibits and amusement places, where he charged 25 cents for a ride in
the trainer. The majority of the early sales of his device went to amusement parks.35 During the
1930 season, the Link Air Trainer was placed at Playland in Rye, NY, and other parks. In
December 1930, the journal Amusement Park Management reported on the formation of Link
34 Link, "Combination Training Device."
3 Kelly, Pilot Maker, 32-38.
Aviation Trainer Sales Corporation, which saw "chance for parks to promote free ground schools
at profit."36
In contrast to almost fifty sales to amusement parks, there were only three purchases from
aviation-related organizations in 1930 and 1931. Pioneer Instrument Company bought one for
the purpose of demonstrating the efficacy of their own flight instruments (turn and bank
indicator, magnetic compass, and air speed indicator) on this moving plane-like device on the
ground. The second buyer was the Museum of Science and Industry in New York City. Both of
them were sold at $450 each. In 1931, the U.S. Navy bought the third one at $1,500 that, unlike
the other two, was equipped with instruments and could be used for flight training.
Unfortunately, it did not lead to more purchases from the Navy. After that, there was not a single
delivery of the Link Trainer until June 1934."
For almost five years after the first invention, then, the Link Flying School was the sole
user of the Trainer for flying instruction. Gradually, more instruments were placed in the Trainer
and the instruction curricula emphasized instrument flying technique. A student enrolled in the
program would spend three hours in a Primary Trainer and then two hours in an Instrument
Trainer. The Primary Trainer, Link explained, was "really a reflex action machine." It would
"simulate air bumps," to which the student was expected to respond by maintaining level flight.
The error counting device helped the student monitor his progress. In his explanation of
Instrument Trainer, Link became a sincere promoter of blind flying by means of instruments.
"The old idea that a real flyer flies by 'feel' or thru the 'seat of his pants' is okay up to a certain
36 Amusement Park Management (December 1930), 68, found in box A/ff 1920+1930 [oversized], The Link-
Roberson Collection, Special Collections and Archives, Binghamton University, Binghamton, NY.
37 Kelly, Pilot Maker, 38-39. In the sales record of the Link Aviation, the very first delivery was to Link Flying
School in 1929, though with no price information. The early sales records are in box F/ff/6, The Link-Roberson
Collection, Binghamton University.
point," Link wrote. In bad weather or darkness, "he must use instruments or 'bail out."' Since it
was "more difficult to teach an old dog new tricks than a pup," Link stressed that instrument
flying should be taught from a very early stage of instruction. Moreover, instrument flying was
"science" that needed to be learned through repeated practice in a safe and controlled
environment. His own Instrument Trainer, of course, was an ideal device for the purpose. In
order that "it can be used in perfection," Link added a hood to the Trainer, making it similar to
the artificially created blind flying condition in the 1929 Doolittle experiment, except that the
Trainer did not leave the ground. The stark difference of flying and not flying seemed to matter
less than the similitude established between the blind conditions of the actual cockpit and the
Trainer cockpit. In a hooded Trainer cockpit, the student could develop "the proper, sub-
conscious reflex actions" until they became "second nature." When that happens, Link stated,
"there is nothing mysterious or difficult about flying." One became a mechanical, but competent,
flier.38
In the middle of the air mail crisis in February 1934, Link Aviation Devices succeeded in
selling six trainers to the Army Air Corps, which was in desperate need of training its own pilots
for all-weather flying. The company delivered the trainers to Selfridge Field (Michigan), Langley
Field (Virginia), Duncan Field (Texas), Wright Field (Ohio), March Field (California), and
Mitchel Field (New York) in June, each priced at $3,400, which gave a net return of $2,720 after
$600 commission payment. More orders followed soon. Four trainers were sent to the U.S.S.R.
in 1934, and the U.S. Navy also bought one. In 1935 and 1936, both Army and Navy bought
more trainers, and orders also came from U.S. Air Service and Curtis Wright. From 1937,
38 "Prospectus on Aviation School Using Link Instruction System," box 72, folder 1098, Edwin A. Link Papers,
Special Collections and Archives, Binghamton University, Binghamton, NY (hereafter EAL-BU). This "prospectus"
was written as an attempt to sell Link's Trainer and instruction program to someone in Missouri. From the early
sales record, it is not clear if the result was successful.
airlines started to buy Link Trainers; customers included not only American airlines such as
American, United, and Pan American but also foreign ones including Air France and British
Airways. 39
Interestingly in the light of future events, the Japanese military was one of the earliest and
more serious customers of the Link Trainer. In June 1934, the same month that the Link
company delivered the first six trainers to U.S. Army Air Corps, one Link Trainer was sold to
Japan through Okura & Co., a New York-based Japanese trading company. Okura & Co. bought
four more trainers in December 1934 for Japanese government, and additional eight trainers went
to Japan in 1935. Apparently remaining interested in the device, Japan bought five Link Trainers
in 1936, six in 1937, and two in May 1938. Between purchases, the Japanese government sent its
air inspector to the Binghamton factory where Link gave tours and demonstrations. 40 The
Japanese military even invited the inventor to the country from November 1936 to January 1937.
Link met with Japanese military officials and gave them demonstrations of his Trainer. Now
recognized as an expert of flight training and air power, Link was asked, on his way back to the
U.S., to evaluate the status of Japanese air power. "Japan is not prepared for war," Link was
quoted by a Hawaiian newspaper, "nor is she eager for conflict right now." Link assured the
Hawaiian readers that "Japan today is more industrially inclined than war inclined." 4'
When Japanese pilots arrived at Pearl Harbor in December 1941, they once again proved
to be a booster of Link's business, though in a very different manner this time. In late 1941, Link
Aviation, Inc. had more production capacity than there was demand. About two weeks after the
39 Sales record, box F/ff/6, Link-Roberson collection, Binghamton University.
40 Link sales record; Undated local newspaper clippings, found in box 1990R7.4376 A/ff 1930s, The Link-Roberson
Collection, Binghamton University.
41 "Japanese are not prepared for conflict ...," The Hawaii Hochi, 22 January 1937, found in folder 1990R7.1369 A
1937/1/22, The Link-Roberson Collection, Binghamton University.
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Pearl Harbor attack, Link wrote that "we must have a new contract now, [otherwise] ... we are
bound to have a layoff."42 Initial order after the Pearl Harbor was not as big as Link had expected
(50 per week), but by the fall of 1942 the Link Aviation was "going along in roar." Accordingly,
the number of employees at the Link factory increased from 250 in 1940 to more than 1000 in
1944. There were ups and downs in the production rate during the war, but in general the Link
Trainers were widely distributed and used in the U.S. military, even to the point of "over-
production" in late 1943. In fact, there were so many Trainers out in the field that Link predicted
in January 1944 that "the Trainer field, due to our excess production, is probably ruined for
sometime to come." Link responded to this end-of-war prospect of downturn by releasing a new
1945 Trainer, which he thought would "find a substantial replacement market ... even after the
fighting stops." Although the effects of demobilization could not be avoided, the Link Trainer at
the end of the war became routine training equipment for both Army and Navy and the company
received "Certificate of Service Award" from the Army Air Forces.43
Virtuality and Physicality of the Link Trainer
Over the course of the war, the Link Trainer did two things. First, by means of delicate
mechanism, it produced "simulated" flight. Several models were designed and manufactured
before and during the war, but they were all said to reproduce the effects of actual flight on the
ground. It acted like a plane, but was not an actual plane. In other words, it was a "plane."
Second, as quantity-produced equipment, it trained numerous pilots. Popular accounts say that
42 Link to Casey S. Jones (J.V.W. Corporation), 23 December 1941, box 1, folder 1, EAL-BU. Jones was in charge
of distribution of Link products.
43 Link to P.F.M. Fellowes, 29 January 1942, box 1, folder 1; Link to Michael Fellowes, 5 September 1942, box 1,
folder 1; Link to P.F.M. Fellowes, 23 September 1943, box 1, folder 2; Link to A.G. Binnie, 5 January 1944, box 1,
folder 3; Link to employees of Link Aviation Devices, Inc., 8 November 1944, box 1, folder 4; B.K. Yount (Lt.
General, AAF) to Link, 1 October 1945, box 40, folder 483, all in EAL-BU.
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more than half a million pilots were trained in the device during the war. As a trainer, it was an
actual, physical device, in which a real person sat to learn how to fly. However sophisticated the
simulation mechanism might be, there was no point in creating simulated flight if there had not
been a person to experience it. And its daily use as a trainer required an instructor to guide the
student-pilot through successive steps in the device, generating a social relationship that was
similar to, but also significantly different from, the conventional flying student-instructor
relationship. These two aspects of the Link Trainer as a virtual plane and as an actual trainer
combined to produce a specific kind of pilot. It was an instrument and radio flying pilot, who
was less a flier than a machine operator.
During the war, the Link Trainer was produced and used primarily as an instrument and
radio flying trainer, which was very distinct from the original 1930 version. Although the word
"simulate" continued to be used in descriptions of the Link Trainer, what was simulated by the
Trainer changed over time.44 When the 1930 patent application claimed that the Trainer was
capable of "simulating almost exactly every actual condition which a flier encounters in actual
flight," it meant the reproduction of "natural sensations of flying" and "natural positions" of an
aircraft, by which the student learned how to control the stick and keep the fuselage on level
position. When Link stated in the 1936 patent application that his Trainer would create
"conditions simulating exactly those of an aeroplane in actual flight," it was not just the trainer's
movement as a whole but also "the response ... of the essential instruments" that had to be
"simulated." In this new version, the instruments were made to "function ... in a manner exactly
44 Jessica Riskin has made a similar point in her analysis of the attempts to simulate life through machinery, from the
late eighteenth century automata to the late twentieth century artificial life. What counted as essential to "life" and
therefore were subjected to simulation varied from one era to another-mechanical structures, physiology,
breathing, birthing, skin, speech, or sensations-and resulted in different manifestations of artificial life. See Jessica
Riskin, "Eighteenth-Century Wetware," Representations 83 (2003): 97-125; Jessica Riskin, "The Defecating Duck,
or, the Ambiguous Origins of Artificial Life," Critical Inquiry 29 (2003): 599-633.
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simulating these same instruments in an aeroplane in flight." They would respond faithfully to
throttle control and also register changes in air speed, altimeter, and other variables in a way that
actual instruments would do in actual flight . As a trainer for radio flying technique by the 1934
patent application, the Link Trainer included "a novel signaling device" that produced "signals
simulating exactly the actual radio signals of a broadcasting station."46 Instrument dials and radio
signals, instead of air bumps, largely constituted the "conditions" of flight (see Figure 3).
Figure 3. A wartime model Link Trainer
ISource: Army Air Forces, Instrument Trainer, 105.]
These additional referents of simulation by the Link Trainer were a consequence of the
gradual acceptance of instrument and radio flying since the early 1930s. From the perspective of
the pilot-student sitting in an enclosed Trainer or actual aircraft, the world (including the air)
intervened in the flight only in the form of dials, gauges, and signals, making it unnecessary for
45 Edwin A. Link, Jr., "Trainer for Aviators," US Patent 2,099,857, filed August 14, 1936, issued November 23,
1937.
46 Edwin A. Link, Jr., "Aviation Trainer," US Patent 2,119,083, filed July 26, 1934, issued May 31, 1938.
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the Trainer to "simulate" the world in the raw. Simulation of instruments and signals would be
sufficient to teach pilots the experiences of flying. The enclosed space of the Link Trainer
effectively pushed the world out of the cockpit, which then became self-contained without the
need of direct contact with the outside. When the New York Times reported on the Army's flight
training procedure in 1939, it described the Link Trainer as "that fixed machine on the ground
which simulates all the thrills ofactualflight." This casual statement must be qualified, however,
by the preceding sentence on the purpose of the Link training, which was to make the pilot
"guided entirely by those little, dancing dials on his instrument board." To a pilot in the Link
Trainer, it was not flight per se but rather the "dancing dials" that "lost their mystery.
In using the Link Trainer during the war, the Army knew well the possible mismatch
between "all the thrills of actual flight" and watching the "dancing dials" in the Trainer. Despite
institutional purchase and use of the Link Trainer, the Army pilots as a group were not always
enthusiastic about the idea of practicing it on the ground and under the hood. The Army's
manual for instrument trainer instruction in 1943 started by acknowledging this "very poor
reputation" of instrument trainers in military aviation. One of the causes was the inhospitable
attitude of "the flight line" toward "the Instrument Trainer department" within the Army training
organization. Flight instructors did not hide "their antipathy toward any kind of ground training
device," which the cadets absorbed before going in the Link Trainer for instrument training.4 8
Those in charge of instrument trainer instruction had to deal with the unwelcoming
"flight line" by admitting limitations of the Trainer and still emphasizing its contribution to
"flight." In the words of the instrument trainer manual,
47"And How He Is Trained," New York Times, 22 January 1939.
4 Army Air Forces, Instrument Trainer: Instrument Flying Instruction Guide, Technical Order No. 30-IOOC-1
(Army Air Forces, 1943), 1 (italics original).
Flight instruction by the "full panel" system teaches the student to fly the aircraft under
instrument conditions. Basic trainer instruction develops the habit of noting and reading
instruments.
It had to be "carefully and completely explained" that "the trainer is obviously not an aircraft"
but also that it would simulate instrument indications and radio features "very closely." Being
good at "flying the trainer" would not necessarily translate to "an equal proficiency in an
aircraft." In other words, "[t]here is no substitute for flight." However, incompetence to "fly the
trainer" would result in "similar difficulty in an aircraft." Since it was not an actual aircraft, the
trainer was said to be "easily flown," which enabled the student to "devote his full attention to
the instruments, or radio procedures." The skills thus learned would be valuable just "when he
must rely upon his instruments to control the flight of an aircraft." In another carefully worded
sentence in the manual,
It is not the aim to develop skill inflying the trainer beyond the point where the student is
able to "fly" the trainer without conscious concentration.
Although the ultimate purpose was to learn to (actually).fly an (actual) aircraft, the verb "fly"
was frequently used for the Link Trainer with or without scare quotes. There was probably no
better verb to choose. It was a thing to fly and "fly." In other words, the Link Trainer was
simultaneously "not an aircraft" and an aircraft in scare quotes.49
The semantic hodgepodge in descriptions of the Link Trainer and its operation was also
unavoidable in explaining the "instruments" installed in it. Although they were all clustered on
the same instrument panel, the Trainer "instruments" manifested diverse concepts and
mechanisms to "simulate" the conditions and experiences inside the cockpit. The most
4 Army Air Forces, Instrument Trainer, 2-3 and I1 (emphasis original).
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straightforward of them was the directional gyro, which was "a standard aircraft instrument," a
real thing that would have been found in a real aircraft as well. As no attempt to mimic its
indications from actual flight was necessary, it measured and displayed the direction of the
Trainer. By contrast, much simulation was involved in the altimeter. Whereas the Trainer's
direction actually existed in a visually recognizable manner, its "altitude" had first to be created
virtually to allow measurement. Since the Trainer's altitude was almost constant all the time,
what the altimeter displayed was "the simulated altitude at which the trainer is 'flying."' The
Trainer's altimeter measured "the vacuum pressure in the climb and dive tank," whose change
was caused by opening and closing of the valves to actuate the Trainer upward or downward, and
then translated the measurement to the "number of feet of altitude" to be displayed on the dial,
which had nothing to do with the actual altitude of the Trainer. Moreover, the Trainer's
earthbound nature resulted in "a peculiarity," requiring that the default altitude indication of the
Trainer in rest position be set at 500 feet below sea level in order to "provide sensitivity when the
trainer is flown above sea level." Accordingly, the student was instructed to "consider that the
trainer is airborne when the altimeter indicates above sea level."5 0
The attitude indication in the Trainer by the artificial horizon was more complex than that
of direction (directional gyro) or altitude (altimeter). The "artificial horizon" in the Trainer was
"designed to simulate the reactions of the gyro operated instrument used in aircraft."5' While an
actual artificial horizon instrument simulated the attitude of an aircraft in flight by displaying a
miniature aircraft and a horizon bar, the instrument in the Link Trainer was "a 'simulated'
artificial horizon." Due to the lack of centrifugal force in operation, this Trainer instrument
50 Link Aviation Devices, Instrument Flying Trainer: Handbook of Instructions, AN-2550-1 (AN-T-18)
(Binghamton, NY: Link Aviation Devices, Inc., 1943), 7, 30, and 34; Army Air Forces, Instrument Trainer, 16.
51 Army Air Forces, Instrument Trainer, 16.
functioned not by gyroscope (as did the actual aircraft instrument) but instead by pendulum,
giving indications "similar" to those from an aircraft artificial horizon. From the Trainer's
perspective, however, it did give indications of the actual attitude of the Trainer (and not any
imaginary aircraft) in relation to the "horizon" in the Trainer room. As much as it was meant to
simulate an actual artificial horizon, it also represented the Trainer's real position. To satisfy the
dual referents (the aircraft artificial horizon and the Trainer's attitude) was not possible without
some distortion. Whereas the Trainer could physically bank only up to 15 degrees, a proper
simulation of artificial horizon required indications of more than 40 degrees. A truthful
representation of the Trainer's attitude would not give realistic instrument reading experience.
To solve this problem of simulating two things at once, therefore, the banking pendulum was
connected to the horizon bar of the Trainer artificial horizon at the ratio of three to one. The
Trainer's 15 degree banking would produce a 45 degree indication in the Trainer's cockpit. The
mechanical limitation of the Trainer to simulate aircraft's banking was cleverly compensated by
adjusting the internal working of the "'simulated' artificial horizon." Again, what mattered for
the student's learning was the 45 degree indication from the artificial horizon rather than a
physical 45 degree movement of the Trainer.52
Thus, there were at least three ways of simulating or not simulating for the "instruments"
in the Trainer. They were actual instruments on their own in the sense that they all measured and
displayed some changing qualities. But they differed in what they measured and in the similitude
of their mechanisms to their counterparts in actual aircraft. The directional gyro for the Trainer
was identical to the aircraft one, and its indications were readily interchangeable with the ones
during actual flight. The Trainer altimeter was similar to the aircraft altimeter in its function to
5 Link Aviation Devices, Instrument Flying Trainer, 8 and 35.
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measure pressure changes, but what it measured (vacuum pressure in the tank) had to be
translated and appropriated to make it look like the altitude of flying aircraft. By contrast, the
Trainer artificial horizon did represent the actual attitude of the Trainer. Due to the physical
limitation of the Trainer's movement, however, that was not close enough to the indications from
actual flight, which necessitated a scaling-up of the instrument's reading. It also had to rely on a
mechanism (pendulum) different from its aircraft equivalent (gyro). In both mechanical
movements and instrument indications, the Trainer was an assemblage of some reality and some
virtuality. Some aspects of it were indistinguishable from actual aircraft and some others had
little resemblance. The capacity of the Link Trainer to produce "conditions simulating exactly
those of an aeroplane in actual flight" was an effect of this mixture of various ideas and
mechanisms.
The Independence of the Trainer
Although the Link Trainer was primarily a device to mimic what an aircraft did and produced,
there were parts and features of the Trainer that were not mere simulation of the aircraft and its
flight. In some aspects, the Trainer was intentionally designed to be different from actual aircraft.
And there were certain things in flight instruction that only the Trainer could offer in a way that a
real aircraft could not. As much as it was an imitation, the Trainer was a physical machine with
its own distinct features and mechanisms. For training benefits or other practical matters, the
Trainer maintained some degree of independence from the real aircraft. As discussed below, this
point distinguished the Link "trainer" until the end of 1940s from later Link equipment called a
"simulator." 53
There was a good reason that "flying" the Link Trainer should not be identical to flying
an aircraft. A Link advertising brochure stated that the Trainer was "more difficult to fly than an
airplane." The Trainer models used during war were "purposely designed to be very sensitive to
the controls." In addition, unlike "inherently stable" modern planes, the Trainer was "definitely
unstable," requiring the pilot's constant control and attention. As the pilot became used to "the
delicate touch" in the Trainer and learned not to over-control, he would be better at actual
instrument flying in the air. According to the brochure, an experienced instrument pilot would
not necessarily find it easy to "fly the Trainer" and at least half an hour had to be spent in the
Trainer to get accustomed to its "characteristics." Not merely a fake in which one pretended to
"fly," it was also a real thing on its own terms for the pilot to fly.54 In the Army Air Forces
(AAF) training sessions, students were reminded that the Trainer could make turns "which
cannot be reproduced in an aircraft." As seen in this (probably) unintentional reversal of aircraft-
trainer relationship (trainer movement "reproduced" in aircraft), it was necessary to emphasize
the imperfect realism to prevent confusion among the students. Indeed, the AAF instruction
manual stated that "[a]ny reference to the handling of an actual aircraft should be avoided."5 5
5 Jessica Riskin has made a distinction between analogy and simulation: "... an analogy rests upon an assumed
difference between its two terms, while a simulation is an attempt to eradicate the difference." Riskin, "Eighteenth-
Century Wetware," 118. It can be said that the Link Trainer attempted a simulation of flight conditions but kept a
relation of analogy with actual aircraft.
5 J.V.W. Corporation, Link Aviation Trainer (a product brochure with no date information, but likely to have been
published in 1941 or 1942), box 59, folder 704A, EAL-BU; A. E. Jarvis, "Notes and Instructions on the Visual Link
Trainer, Initial Training School, Royal Canadian Air Force, Toronto, October 1940," box 88, folder 1521, EAL-BU.
* Army Air Forces, Instrument Trainer, 44. Whether the airplane should be inherently stable or unstable was a
matter of serious debate in the early development of aircraft. This issue was closely related to a question of
professional identity for aircraft pilots: a "chauffeur" who flew a stable plane without much skill or an "airman" who
controlled unstable aircraft with great dexterity, courage, and pride. See Mindell, Digital Apollo, chapter 2.
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In the 1945 model Trainer, which was developed to replace earlier wartime models, this
purposeful difference from the actual almost disappeared. Described by Link as "a new and
radical Link Trainer," the 1945 model was supposed to "do everything-and I mean
everything-that an airplane will do." Link believed that "[i]ts flying characteristics are almost
perfect with an airplane and instrument indications are much more real."5 6 Link told Army and
Navy officers that the new model was developed "from the same angle as an airplane rather than
a static training device." The instruments would now operate as "a function of airspeed,"
producing "a much truer picture" and shortening the "transition period" from the Trainer
exercise to actual flying. To make it look "more nearly like actual airplane cockpit," Link also
enlarged the fuselage and base of the 1945 model.5 7
The realism of the 1945 Trainer, however, could not be homogeneous across the board.
Contrary to the enlargement of fuselage and base, the 1945 Trainer dropped its wings and tail,
making it less similar to aircraft. A realistic cockpit was more important than a realistic aircraft
body as a whole. While the new model introduced "inherent longitudinal, lateral and directional
stability" that was absent (purposefully) in previous models, this was done, however, "not to the
extent that it would be too easy for the student to fly." Training should somehow be harder than
the actual. The realism in instruments had to be qualified as well. The prospect that the 1945
model would include many instruments that were "the same as standard aircraft instruments"
raised a concern; the Trainer instruments could be "'robbed' for actual aircraft." "After
considerable discussion between Army, Navy and Link Aviation Devices," therefore, they
56 Link to M.P. Fellowes, 22 August 1944, box 1, folder 4; Link to P.F.M. Fellowes (father of M.P. Fellowes), 4
December 1943, box 1, folder 2, EAL-BU;
" "Link Trainer conference held in HDQS, AAF, 17 May 1944," box 77, folder 1175, EAL-BU.
58 "Link Instrument Flying Trainer, 1945 Model," unknown date, box 85A, folder 1472, EAL-BU.
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agreed that the instruments in the Trainer "be modified so that they would fit only the Link
Trainer" and not real airplanes. They must be real but not too real.59
The most significant feature of the Trainer that distinguished it from an actual aircraft
was the automatic recorder that was electrically connected to the fuselage and put on the
instructor's desk. The recorder had not been part of Link's original 1930 Trainer patent, but was
filed as a separate patent application in 1936. Equipped with two synchronous motor-legs and
one recording pen, it moved on a chart at a speed "in proportion to the predetermined and
assumed forward 'speed' of the trainer, simulating the flight of an aeroplane through the air." For
training sessions with the recorder, the AAF provided a standardized chart on which "actual
radio range installations at selected localities in the United States." The scales of the chart were
coordinated for use with different types of Trainer with varying recorder speeds-for C-3 and C-
5 trainers, the recorder moved 0.84375 inch per minute with an 160 miles per hour airspeed. By
replicating movements and turns of the Trainer "simultaneously," the recorder "preserved an
accurate indication of the performance of the pilot or operator."60 After each session flown, the
recorder produced a "visual picture" on the chart, which was "impossible to obtain by actual
flying." It was something that only an earthbound Trainer with a real-time inscription device
could provide (see Figure 4).61
59 "Link Trainer conference held in HDQS, AAF, 17 May 1944," box 77, folder 1175, EAL-BU.
60 Edwin A. Link, Jr., "Recorder," US Patent 2,179,663, filed 30 September 1936, issued 14 November 1939; Army
Air Forces, Instrument Trainer, 38-41.
61 "Of 'Blind' Flying," The Observer-Dispatch Sunday Magazine, 2 April 1939, found in box 70, folder 1049, EAL-
BU. See also J.V.W. Corporation, Link Aviation Trainer, box 59, folder 704A, EAL-BU.
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Figure 4. A female Link Trainer instructor looking at the "crab" recorder, circa 1943.
[Source: U.S. Navy historical photo available online at
http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/images/g200000/g200190c.html
By this recorder, also called a "flight log" or simply a "crab" (from its multi-legged
appearance), the so-called "flight" of the Trainer on the fixed base was electrically translated into
real displacement on the two-dimensional map, which then could stand for an actual "flight" in
the three-dimensional air. After the Trainer and the "crab" were "flown" simultaneously, the
student and the instructor could observe the chart and discuss as if a plane had actually traveled
from point A to point B in, say, Memphis, Tennessee. A turning and banking motion of the
Trainer was now represented as a curve on the flight chart, whose path and accuracy could be
analyzed much better than in actual flight. Technically speaking, the recorder's traces were a
representation of the Trainer's virtual flight, that is, a simulation of simulation. Instead of getting
disconnected from the real flight, however, the recorder made it more plausible to speak of the
Trainer's movements as a "flight."6 2
The crucial role of the recorder for the Trainer operation makes it necessary to consider
the two devices, including the cables between them and the instructor's desk where the recorder
was placed, as constituting one large integrated training unit. The fully equipped Trainer was
much more than a mock-up airplane. No longer suitable for outdoor operation as at the
amusement parks, this Trainer unit needed careful spatial arrangement for installation and
operation. Factory manuals or product brochures of the Link Trainer included detailed
instructions for location and room size requirements. For example, the minimum room size for
AN-T- 18 Trainer was 14' x 9', but at least 17'6" x 22'6" was desirable for smooth operation.
Since the fully equipped Trainer weighed 1000 lbs and the desk 422 lbs, the company manual
recommended a ground floor room to avoid the need to dismantle the Trainer. Proper lighting,
ventilation, and room temperature were necessary, but more emphasis was put on the control of
dust in and outside the room because of the vacuum-operated mechanism. Also kept away from
the Trainer room were large transformers and other electrical devices as well as large volumes of
metal such as an aircraft engine, since they could interfere with the magnetic compass in the
Trainer. Even the appropriate door openings were provided for smooth move of the Trainer into
the room for installation-minimum width of 3' 4" for passing without disassembly. It was also
recommended that the training room be "running north and south," so that the north direction of
the map on the desk would align with that of the Trainer compass. Finally, a training room was
completed with "a filing cabinet for storing maps and tracings; a storage cabinet for books, spare
instruments, etc., and extra chairs and headphones so that additional students may sit around the
62 Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, trans. Sheila Faria Glaser (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,
1994).
desk, listen in and observe operations." All combined, the Trainer, the desk, the recorder,
cabinets, chairs, and the room created an immersive training environment for pilots (see Figure
5).63
As the careful instructions for room
dimensions and installation details indicate, the
pilot's experience with Link training was not
limited to the effects of simulated flight inside
the Trainer. It consisted of reporting to the
Instrument Trainer Department, entering the
Trainer room, talking to the instructor, stepping fAj
into the Trainer, flying it, evaluating the traces
left by the recorder, and filling in the forms of
training record. Responding to simulated
instrument indications and radio signals was
only part of the training exercise. As shown in
the room layout, what distinguished the trainer Figure 5. A Trainer room layout
[Source: Link Aviation Devices, Instrument Flying
session from aerial training was the presence of Trainer, 67.1
the desk, chair, recorder, and control console with which the instructor could constantly monitor
the pilot's performance and even record it on paper. It was a novel experience for pilots not only
because they trained on the ground but also because it was done within a room where the
instructor sat by the desk instead of flying with him. Rather than merely simulation of something
63 Link Aviation Devices, Instrument Flying Trainer, 66-68. Subsequent models of the Link Trainer varied in sizes,
requiring rooms and doors of different dimensions. For example, Model D4 Instrument Flying Trainer, a British-
manufactured equivalent of the American Model F Trainer, weighed 2,450 pounds (fuselage and base) and its desk
set weighed 600 pounds.
real, the trainer room session was a reality in itself. In that space filled with devices, effects, and
protocols, there emerged a delicate relationship between pilot students and trainer instructors that
was distinct from the one between pilots and regular flight instructors. Just as the Trainer
equipment did, this new breed of Link Trainer instructors brought into relief the changing ideas
of flying and pilots.
The Link Trainer Instructor and the Pilot Student
Who were the Link Trainer instructors? The Link Aviation brochure considered it "absolutely
essential that the instructor be properly trained." An instructor must be not only competent in the
Trainer's operation but also knowledgeable about many rules and procedures of flying such as
radio ranges and instrument landing technique. Proper training of an instructor, Link Aviation
claimed, required at least three months "regardless of his prior experience."64 The Instructor's
Course at the Link's own site consisted of 13 weeks of training, 44 hours per week (total 572
hours). After spending the first three weeks on the maintenance course and the fourth on aircraft
instruments, the students began to learn the Trainer operation while continuing to take classes. In
addition to acquiring skills to operate the Trainer, these future instructors sat at the desk and
practiced the drills of an instructor.65 The Army, Navy, and Civil Aeronautics Authority also set
up their own classes to train the Link Trainer instructors.
For all their skills and knowledge about aviation and instrument flying, however, the
Link Trainer instructors were not required to be able tofly. It was "not essential," the same Link
brochure stated, for the instructors to "have pilot's ratings, though in most cases it is desirable."
In fact, from the military perspective of personnel selection, officers were less preferred as Link
64 J.V.W. Corporation, Link Aviation Trainer.
65 "Link Trainer Instrument Flying Instructor's Course," box 87, folder 1516, EAL-BU.
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Trainer instructors than non-commissioned officers (NCOs) "with some flying or wide technical
experience." These NCOs were regarded as "the most satisfactory instructors" since they were
more likely to see the Trainer as a potential venue for career development and be better
motivated on the job than were officers, let alone flying officers. The problem, then, was how to
enable the instructors "to effectively train men who out-rank them." The pilot-students possessed
not only higher military ranks but also actual flying experience that not every instructor had.
How would it be possible for military pilots to practice with instructors who did not know how to
fly (in the air)? How should the instructors be "trained and vested with the necessary authority"
to do so? It was for this reason that "[t]he importance of care in the selection of instructors [could
not] be emphasized too much." In addition to having technical skills, the Link brochure claimed,
the instructor "must be alert and ambitious with unlimited patience, yet possessing sufficient
personality, confidence, courage and tact to enable him to command the respect and obedience of
any student." 66
Of course, selecting instructors with appropriate temperament could not be the ultimate
solution. More organizational efforts had to be made to equip the instructors with experiences
and capacities to compensate their non-flying status. The Army instrument training manual
stipulated that the Link instructors should "be flown" (rather than fly) "on actual range
installations" so that they could "become acquainted with the sound of the signals received by
the pilot on instruments." Repetition of this "demonstrational flight" would help the instructor
"perfect his technique" and more importantly "dispel some erroneous ideas held by many
instructors." One could not be an effective teacher in simulation, the logic went, without first
66 J.V.W. Corporation, Link Aviation Trainer.
knowing the actual. For this purpose, the Army manual called for flying officers' cooperation in
"scheduling rides" for the Instrument Trainer Department personnel.67
The non-flying status of the Trainer instructors set a limit on their authority,
responsibility, and expectation. The instructors' daily operation at the control desk was
monitored and supervised by the Chief Instructor, who took care of maximum 10 Trainers. The
Chief Instructor saw to it that "the problems and exercises to be flown by the students are
properly set and conducted." Then there was the Assistant to the Officer in Charge, who was not
necessarily a rated officer but charged with giving lectures and classroom instructions for both
students and instructors. He would also "monitor the signals simulated by the various instructors
from time to time, to assure himself that the quality of the instructors' technique is improving."
Finally, there was no doubt that the Officer in Charge of an Instrument Training Department had
to be "a flying officer, who must be interested and qualified in instrument flight instruction." It
was unthinkable that the ground Trainer exercise was ultimately put in the hands of a non-flying
person. To make this point clear, a sample organizational chart in the Army instructional manual
put an airplane beside the Officer in Charge, whose title read, "Officer in Charge (Pilot)."3 8 (see
Figure 6).
67 Army Air Forces, Instrument Trainer, 4.




Figure 6. Organizational chart of an instrument training department
ISource: Army Air Forces, Instrument Trainer, 5.]
Col. Joseph Duckworth, the Commanding Officer at Bryan Field, Texas, followed these
policies in the manual dutifully. In a 1944 issue of Trainer Topics, an Army newsletter for the
Trainer instructors, Duckworth reminded readers of the limitations of the Trainer and the non-
flying instructors. First, he asked the instructors to emphasize for students the difference between
a Trainer and an airplane "to avoid any negative teaching." Then, he made it clear that becoming
familiar with flight procedures and instrument readings in the Trainer did "not mean that he can
fly instruments." Flying by instruments, Duckworth added, was "a product only of actual flight."
Thus he could not give his full trust to the instructors. "The only provision" for effective training
in radio flying was that "the trainer instructor must be competent." The instructor needed much
more than "[m]ere knowledge of a procedure." Also required were "reasoning behind the
material given, its proper application, and associated information." In order to become fully
capable, however, the instructor "must have seen it performed in actual flight, and if possible, he
should do it himself." Training sessions would be best conducted when the instructor taught
things "he knows from his own experience in the air." And, of course, it needed to be aided by
the flying officer's "constructive information on actual instrument flying."69
Given this attitude of flying officers to the Trainer instructors, maintaining authority
during a session in the Trainer room was not easy. Not all pilots entered the room with
enthusiasm. To keep them interested and respectful, the instructors needed something other than
personal qualities such patience, confidence, or courage. The "crab" recorder was one of the
things that empowered the instructors in their interaction with pilot-students. In his patent
application for the recorder, Link was aware of what his invention could bring for the student-
instructor relationship. The previous method of marking the path by hand, Link claimed, had put
extra workload on the instructor and had been more prone to recording errors. This raised "the
question in the mind of the student pilot" about the accuracy of the recording and possibly the
reliability of the instructor. 70 As the recorder provided "absolute proof of the problems flown,"
the Link brochure claimed, the student could observe his performance with his own eyes. The
recorder "relieve[d] the instructor of much responsibility" for making the traces, and even
"eliminate[d] possible disputes" regarding the student's flight path. Claim of "mechanical
objectivity" provided by a neutral inscription device had the effect of empowering the outranked
instructor and garnering the fliers' respect.72 (see Figure 4 above).
69 Joseph Duckworth, "The Instrument Flying (Link) Trainer," Trainer Topics, October 1944 (published at Bryan
Field, AAF) (italics added), box 84, folder 1415, EAL-BU.
70 Link, "Recorder."
71 J.V.W. Corporation, Link Aviation Trainer, box 59, folder 704A, EAL-BU.
72 Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, Objectivity (New York: Zone Books, 2007). For an account of inscription
devices as a source of empowerment and authority, see Bruno Latour, "Drawing Things Together," in
Representation in Scientific Practice, ed. Michael Lynch and Steve Woolgar (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press,
1990), 19-68.
In practice, however, the recorder was not a perfect example of "mechanical objectivity."
The instructor could affect, or manipulate, its movement on the chart. But this often happened in
the pilot's favor rather than to his disadvantage, which revealed the instructor's weak position in
military hierarchy and flying status. For example, it was possible for the instructor to "'lead' the
recorder and thus produce a perfect pattern." The instructor was duly warned against this
practice:
No useful purpose is achieved by this type of performance, and harm to the student will
result. The grading of the student must be based on his reaction to the signals, not
primarily on the appearance of the track.73
In an effort to prevent the instructor's accommodating attitude toward pilots, the recorder's
objectivity was degraded in favor of the direct observation of the student's responses in the
Trainer. Another way of intervening in the recorder movement was to "give a pilot a 'friendly'
wind to 'blow' the recorder back onto the proper track when he has wandered from his course."
The Wind Drift Mechanism was designed to enable the instructor to introduce the effects of wind
up to 60 miles per hour and from any direction without letting the pilot know. Instead of giving
hard time (and presumably helpful training experience) to the pilot, the instructor could use the
power to manipulate the weather for a neat trace on the chart. This practice was explicitly
discouraged as well.74
For some wartime Link instructors, military rank was not the only source of tension in the
Trainer room. Soon after the Navy decided to enlist women to serve as WAVES (Women
Accepted for Voluntary Emergency Service) in August 1942, 74 of them were selected as Link
73 Army Air Forces, Instrument Trainer, 44.
74 "Some Suggestions Offered for Applying Weather to Trainer Exercise," Trainer Topics, October 1944. box 84,
folder 1415, EAL-BU; Link Aviation Devices, Instrument Flying Trainer, 41-50.
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Trainer instructors. After finishing the boot camp, they were sent to the Link Trainer School in
Atlanta, Georgia, for an eight-week training to become instructors. When the difficulties of
getting into and out of the Trainer in skirts became apparent, they were allowed to wear slacks.
The first women Link instructors in the Navy graduated on March 27, 1943, and the inventor
Edwin Link himself came to the graduation to congratulate them. Then they were assigned to
Naval training stations around the country.75
The WAVES did not accept African-American women until much later in the war, but
there was at least one Asian-American woman in the first group of Link instructors. Susan Ahn,
a Korean-American from California, had joined the enlisted WAVES program after having been
turned down at the officer's program. Ahn was arguably the first Asian woman to join the U.S.
Navy. Her father, Chang Ho Ahn, was one of the most famous leaders in the Korean resistance
movement against Japanese colonialism. Mr. Ahn and his wife Heyron Lee were the first married
couple from Korea to have arrived in the U.S. in 1902, and they gave birth to Susan in California
in 1915. Meanwhile, Chang Ho Ahn traveled all over the world including Korea, China, Russia,
Mexico, and many places in the U.S., organizing and educating Korean communities, until he
was arrested by the Japanese police and died in prison in Korea in 1938. By the time Susan
graduated from the Link Trainer School in March 1943, this family history drew attention from
the Atlanta Constitution, which quoted her remarks about the Japanese cruelty against Koreans
and her determination to fight against the Japanese by teaching "America's airmen" in the U.S.
7 "74 WAVES Petty Officers: Atlanta Graduates Are Assigned to Link Trainer Teaching," New York Times, 28
March 1943; John Cha, Willow Tree Shade: The Susan Ahn Cuddy Story (Korean American Heritage Foundation,
2002), 96-117.
Navy. Hoping that her pilots would shoot down the Japanese Zeroes, she took her assignment at
the Miami Naval Air Station.76
By Ahn's recollection, she enjoyed "flying" the Link Trainer even with a feeling of
freedom, but her pilot-students did not. She had to calm the aviators' complaints about the
Trainer exercise and persuaded them of the need for blind flying practice to defeat Japanese
aviators. In the Trainer room, she instructed with deliberate composure the suspicious aviators
who, to their own embarrassment, kept stalling and crashing. Ahn was, in the words of her
biographer, "way ahead of the hotshot pilots in terms of instrument flying." The aviators might
have been humbled by Ahn's knowledge and skill with the Trainer, but the hierarchies and
tensions in military ranks, gender, and race were always present between them. Although she
enjoyed going on picnics with some aviators on weekends, she also had to escape from some
others who approached and teased an Asian lady in the dark Trainer room. Ahn could be
effective at taming them into instrument fliers, but dealing with military masculinity was another
matter.77
The relationship between pilots and Link instructors, which was at once delicate, tense,
and even funny, illustrates the concurrent changes in flight techniques and conditions as well as
in the pilot's professional identity between 1930 and 1945. The assemblage of a Trainer with
cockpit instruments, a recorder, a desk, a chart, an interphone, and a room made it possible for a
non-flying female non-commissioned officer to believe she could teach a flying officer, even a
combat returnee, how to "fly," albeit in scare quotes. Sitting in a dark Trainer cockpit with the
hood closed, the pilot behaved as a docile student, while listening to the instructor's messages
76 Jane Noland, "Kin of Korean Hero Proud To Be WAVE," Atlanta Constitution, 27 March 1943. The article
included a full-length photograph of Susan.
77 Cha, Willow Trade Shade, 115-25.
through an interphone. Although the flying officers could not be put under full control of the
Link instructors, they were at least temporarily at the mercy of the "crab" recorder and the
instructor's exacting supervision. Pilots came to do more of reading, listening, and interpreting
and less of feeling and moving. Simulation not only made the task better trainable, but also
affected those who did the task.
As the interaction between instructors and pilot-students in the Trainer room reveals, the
use of the Link Trainer produced both virtual(1) (though not sophisticated) flight and actual
experience of flight training. Some pilots may have been wary about both the simulation of flight
and the social relationship it entailed, regarding them as potentially undercutting their
professional authority as fliers. Historian of science Peter Galison has argued that, along with the
introduction of computer simulation in physics, "a new category of physicist emerges" as well.
"New techniques are not merely appendages to a time-invariant physicist," Galison wrote,
"simulation and simulator [a person] enter together."78 Like a physicist working with simulation
and asking himself whether he is a theorist, an experimenter, or something else, a pilot in the
Link Trainer could ask what kind of pilot he was becoming. He was being forced to learn to fly
by learning to "fly" in a simulated cockpit of the Link Trainer. No female Link instructors would
have dared to compete with him in the air, but they were nevertheless teaching him how to "fly,"
evaluating his maneuvers one by one on the desk. He had to be trained as a good virtual flier in
order to be qualified as an actual flier. Tilting and rotating awkwardly on the fixed base, the Link
Trainer served as a "link" between the virtual ground and the actual air. 79
78 Peter Galison, "Reflections on Image and Logic: A Material Culture of Microphysics," Perspectives on Science 7
(1999): 255-84, quotes on 256. This theme is fully developed in his Image and Logic: A Material Culture of
Microphysics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997).
79 The Link Trainer as a "link" between ground and air, between training and actual flight, was a predictably
common pun among those at the Link Aviation. The company's newsletter circulated in the aviation community was
titled Connecting Link.
To Move or Not to Move: From Trainer to Simulator
In the end, though, there emerged a question whether it needed to be tilting and rotating at all. As
a ground training device, the wartime Link Trainer simulated two main features of flight:
physical response of aircraft fuselage to cockpit control and the instrument indications and radio
signals inside the cockpit (which was associated with fuselage movement). While the former was
built into the Trainer from the very first patent application, the latter was a later addition in
response to the growing need for instrument flying instruction. In a typical Trainer session, the
student responded to the instrument indications by controlling the fuselage appropriately, which
then affected the instruments. If things went wrong, the Automatic Spinning mechanism in the
Trainer would "cause it to spin when stalled, in the same manner as an airplane." The spin was
fast enough "to produce vertigo, so that the pilot to recover properly must follow his
instruments." 0 When one pushed to the logical extreme the instruction to disregard one's
sensations caused by aircraft's spinning movement, however, a difficult question arose. If the
purpose of the Trainer was to teach how to focus on instrument indications and radio signals,
why would it be necessary to have the Trainer move? Did the Trainer have to move at all? Could
the Trainer "simulate" flight if it did not move? How would a pilot be trained in a motionless
Trainer? In the late 1940s and early 1950s when the Trainer business was struggling to recover
from postwar slump, these questions challenged both Edwin Link and his Trainer.
From their reviews of the Link Trainer in use, the Air Force and the Navy began to
discuss the possibility of removing motion from the device, whose movement was deemed not
realistic since the pivot point was located beneath the pilot's body (instead of around his upper
80 J.V.W. Corporation, Link Aviation Trainer.
body). Moreover, by 1947, a competitor in the field, the Curtiss-Wright Corporation, was
introducing a device that operated on an electronic analog computer and did not move. The
pneumatic and mechanical Link Trainer had to respond to this new demand and new rival.
Engineers and managers of Link Aviation also began to consider the idea of a motionless
trainer.81
The inventor Link simply hated it. He did not see any prospect for a stationary trainer
such as the Dehmel trainer by Curtiss-Wright, since the experience of movement and especially
of vertigo was essential in the training of a pilot. Link wrote with confidence in July 1947:
The one glaring and important factor that is missing in any stationary type trainer is the
total lack of vertigo. I believe anyone who is familiar with instrument flying will confess
that unless vertigo is present on training means, you will not turn out very satisfactory
instrument pilots for air work, because vertigo is definitely experienced in the air and part
of one's training is to overcome this sensation. Therefore, any machine that will simply
teach instrument reading without the effect of vertigo, which causes disbelief in
instrument readings, is bound to be unsatisfactory in the final result.82
In a spirit similar to Ocker, Crane, and Myers in the early 1930s, Link still pointed to vertigo as
an essential element in teaching instrument flying. Speaking less as the famous inventor of a
ground-based trainer than as a member of the barnstorming generation, Link came out to defend
physical movement as a defining characteristic of flight training. Link and his Trainer's roots in
the piano and organ business were also surfacing after almost twenty years. His original Trainer
was a simulation of aircraft's physical movement with bellows and valves. To remove the
pneumatic motion was to negate the Trainer's origin.
81 Kelly, Pilot Maker, 69-70.
82 Link to Marion Vandiver, 28 July 1947, box 1, folder 10, EAL-BU.
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Link's firm belief in movement led him to criticize his own company's ambitious
products. Though he had not been persuaded at all, he agreed in 1949 to produce a stationary
Trainer for jet aircraft named C-11. When the Air Force personnel complained during
development process that the C-Il felt "more difficult to fly than the airplane," Link made an I-
told-you-so reply. Even if every mechanism was corrected to reduce such effects, Link claimed,
the difficulty would never go away completely, because "one of the most important sensations of
flying is completely left out-that is Movement." He then proceeded to acknowledge the
fundamental limitation of his lifetime work.
It is my own personal view, based on years of experience in evaluating synthetic trainers,
that we are never going to build a synthetic trainer that is perfectly like the airplane-in
the air; and if we leave out some important element like Movement it will be less like the
airplane. 83
It was "a grave mistake" of the Air Force to expect the stationary trainers to "teach flying
techniques." At most, they were good for "cockpit drill and procedure work." "Movement" was
crucial in any flight instruction, Link argued, "because the airplane actually moves and is not a
stationary mass." If anyone insisted on the stationary trainers for "improving flying techniques,"
he finally warned, "there will be a failure in this program."8 4
Despite Link's denigration, it should be noted, the Link Trainer had been useful exactly
for "cockpit drill and procedure work." As aviation writer and pilot Robert Buck recalled,
commercial airlines around 1940 used the Link Trainer in their effort to "institute procedures,"
hoping to "get everyone to do things the same."8 5 As flying involved an increasing number of
83 Link to Wm. W. Wood, Jr., 15 June 1949, box 1, folder 12, EAL-BU.84 Ibid.
85 Robert Buck, North Star over My Shoulder: A Flying Life (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), 157-58.
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instruments and controls, it became more complex and procedural, sometimes overwhelming an
individual's capacity of memory. To cope with this complexity of operation, the checklists for
each stage of flying, which had been introduced in the late 1930s with the Boeing B- 17 bomber,
were becoming a regular feature in the postwar period.86 Also, the pilots in the early postwar
period were "overloaded with information" from an array of instruments whose locations and
arrangements did not always provide pilots with cognitive and physical convenience.87 With the
introduction of jet aircraft in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the procedural complexity in the
cockpit increased even further, requiring pilots not just to keep the plane moving but also to
follow standardized procedures. In light of these developments, then, what Link dubbed as "a
grave mistake"--removing movement from his equipment-could rather be a strategy to focus
on newer challenges in aircraft operation. The aircraft cockpit was becoming a regulated
workplace where missing no items on the checklist was preferable to making creative
maneuvers.
Still, Link was not convinced. When Link Aviation was developing more stationary
electronic trainers in 1950, Link wrote directly to Major General Robert Harper of the Air
Training Command and reemphasized his opinion on the movement issue. Referring to recent
development of the SNJ Operational Flight Trainer and the F3D Jet Operational Trainer for the
Navy, Link reported that some pilots including himself tended "to make stick corrections in the
wrong direction." "This is most puzzling," he confessed, "in light of the accuracy of simulation."
Now he came to question the connection between "the accuracy of simulation" and the efficacy
86 Robert Buck, The Pilot's Burden: Flight Safety and the Roots of Pilot Error (Ames: Iowa State University Press,
1994), 48-50. The origin of the checklist in aviation and its potential benefits for other work situations, especially in
medical surgery, have received popular attention through medical writer Atul Gawande's recent book, The Checklist
Manifesto: How to Get Things Right (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2010).
87 Coombs, Control in the Sky, 147.
of flight training. Despite the high level of "fidelity" that these new devices achieved in
"reproduc[ing] the flight performance," they were causing problems that had not been found in
"the movable type trainers."88 Therefore, he could not see any reason he should abandon the war-
proven type of motion trainers without any conclusive scientific studies in favor of the stationary
type. As late as December 1950, he was "very reluctant" to devote new trainers to the stationary
type design, which, he suspected, could one day turn out to have "some very definite and serious
deficiencies which ... could even cause serious accidents."8 9
Despite Link's skepticism and complaints, the trend was set toward the stationary,
electronic type. Moreover, in the early 1950s, with this new class of training devices, the Link
business entered another boom era as the Korean War, which had started in June 1950, put huge
demand on the training devices. 90 But the debate on movement, which seems to have been
between Link and everyone else, raised old but crucial questions. What did the Link Trainer do?
And, what did the Link Trainer simulate? In the light of Link's remarks on movement and its use
in training, the questions can be put somewhat differently: How is the Link Trainer's capacity to
simulate connected to its capacity to train? Can a device with superior simulation capacity be a
poorer trainer? If so, what does simulation do, by the way?
It is worth noting that, around the same time of Link's dissatisfaction with stationary
devices, the products of Link Aviation and its competitors began to take up a new name: the
simulator. Although the verb "simulate" was frequently used in patent applications, company
88 Link to Robert W. Harper, 3 October 1950, box 1, folder 14, EAL-BU.
89 Link to Robert W. Harper, 15 December 1950, box 1, folder 14, EAL-BU.
90 Link C-I IA Jet Trainers were dispatched to the Far East, where the older AN-T-18 Trainers were also used during
the Korean War. See "C-I lA Makes Debut in Far East," Connecting Link, October 1952. See also George Christian,
"Link Thrives on Simulator Boom," Aviation Week, 9 July 1951, 43-48; Philip Klass, "Link Simulator Boosts B-47
Potential," Aviation Week, 16 June 1952, 65-70; William D. Perreault, "Link Expansion Ahead; Simulators Boom,"
American Aviation, 16 March 1953, 27-29. It was reported that, as of March 1953, Link Aviation had a $70 million
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brochures, military manuals, and media reports, the wartime Link Trainer was not called a
"simulator." Until the end of the 1940s, the Link devices remained "trainers" and the same
applied to the stationary C-Il Jet Trainer, developed in 1949. The devices for the Navy, about
which Link complained in 1950, were described in the company's newsletter Connecting Link as
"trainers [that] simulate the SNJ-5 training aircraft and F3D twin jet night fighter." 91 These
trainers were also said to "duplicate F3D, SNJ aircraft." As the Connecting Link proudly noted,
this was the first time that a training device was "manufactured concurrently with the actual
aircraft." "Link will complete the F3D Trainers," the company announced, "at about the same
time that Douglas Aircraft Corp. delivers the Skyknights to the Navy."92 The F3D Trainer,
however, soon began to be called "Operational Flight Simulator," while also being referred to as
a trainer in the same text. Likewise, B-47B Stratojet Trainer for the new Air Force bomber was
also called "the B-47 flight simulator."93 By mid 1952, it was more than common to describe it
simply as "Simulator." 94 This change in nomenclature soon became the norm.
The difference between the Trainer and the Simulator, as perceived in the early 1950s,
may seem subtle, but it was significant. Joseph Duckworth, who during the war had commanded
an Instrument Training unit at Bryan Field and had written on instructors' roles and
qualifications, offered his explanation of the "instruments trainer" and the "aircraft flight
simulator" in 1953, now in his new position as a consultant for Link Aviation. The instrument
trainer, being "simpler and less costly," was useful for the early stage of training to teach "the
basic art and science of flying, both contact and instrument." During the past war, the trainer had
91 "Navy Sets Up Training with New Linktronic Models," Connecting Link, October 1950.
92 "Navy Orders Trainers Which Duplicate F3D, SNJ Aircraft," Connecting Link, October-November 1949.
93 "Navy Gets Link F3D Trainer" and "Link to Build B-47B Stratojet Trainer for Air Force," Connecting Link,
January 1951.
94 See, for example, "Link B-47B Simulator Makes Its Debut," Connecting Link, May 1952.
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been good enough for most needs, since "[a]ircraft and missions flown then were relatively
uncomplicated." With the advent of "faster and more complex aircraft," Duckworth stated, the
skills and knowledge required of a pilot grew substantially. What was needed for new kind of
training was "the simulator," which was, according to him, "in effect, a grounded aircraft of a
particular type."95 Taking a cue from his use of "in effect," it may be also possible to speak of
the simulator as a virtual aircraft in contrast to the trainer that produced virtualflight. Going
beyond general instructions of flight, the training of pilots had to be tailored to a specific model
of aircraft, which the flight simulator, not the instrument trainer, could provide.
In the transition from the trainer to the simulator, that which was "simulated" changed. If
the trainer simulated what a pilot saw, read, listened, and did inflight, the simulator duplicated
what a pilot saw, read, listened, and did in a specific aircraft. The Link pamphlet in 1954 stated
that "Link trainers have become actual 'flight simulators,' duplicating specific aircraft with
complete exactitude." What did it mean by "actual 'flight simulators"'? The Link "SNJ flight
simulator," for example, did not simply "resemble the airplane's cockpit." Rather, "it is the
airplane as far as location, appearance and operation of the instruments and controls are
concerned." 96 An article in Aviation Week noted that "the realism" of a simulator was "enhanced
by cockpits which are exact replicas of the original." Even better, the article continued, some of
them were "the real thing furnished by the airframe manufacturer." 97 The previous efforts to
make "trainers" almost real but not too real did not apply to "simulators." By another definition,
while a flight trainer was "a training device having cockpit and flight characteristics specific to a
95 J. B. Duckworth, "Trainer Versus Flight Simulator," Connecting Link, September 1953.
96 The LINK Story (company pamphlet from January 1954), box 59, folder 714, EAL-BU.
97 Christian, "Link Thrives on Simulator Boom."
class of aircraft," a flight simulator had the same qualities except that it was "specific to a given
aircraft."98
Edwin Link's lone resistance to the motionless training device occurred in the midst of
this transition from the simulation of flight in the air to the simulation of an aircraft. In the latter,
one could say, the absence of movement and vertigo seemed to matter less than Link would have
claimed. Indeed, W. W. Wood, the chief engineer at the Link told Aviation Week in June 1952
that, despite some distraction from the lack of motion, the pilots were "so preoccupied with the
realism of their flight duties in the simulator that they don't appear to miss the sensations of
motion." Wood said that it was yet to be decided if "motion and/or acceleration actually
contribute to complete simulation." Pace his boss, Wood was opposed to "haphazardly chosen
motions or accelerations which differ from those experienced in actual flight." If all motions in
ground training devices were essentially imperfect replica of actual aerial motions, they could be
detrimental, not integral, to simulation.99 One could hardly justify the huge extra cost of motion
in the age of simulated aircraft, which was not the same as simulated flight. 100
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Conclusion: The Virtual Flier
What did the Link Trainer do? It trained pilots, and it did a particularly good job in aiding the
mass production of pilots during the war. One can ask a slightly different question about the Link
Trainer: what did it do to the pilots it trained and to the rest of us it did not train?' 0 ' The
philosopher Robinson (quoted in the intro) believed that it created a ground equivalent of the
new "aerial experience" that was characteristic of the Atomic Age. In a more celebratory tone,
physician-scientist and deep-sea explorer Joseph Maclnnis wrote, soon after Link died in 1981,
that "[i]t altered our perceptions of what the sky was really like." "If we could simulate flying
through clouds and wind and weather, and the response of our eyes and hands and minds," he
thought, "then we had mimicked Nature, thereby changing forever our relationship with it." 0 2
A more sober evaluation would be that it changed our perception and experience not of
air or Nature in its pure state so much as of flight, a technologically mediated human activity.
The "flight conditions" that the Link Trainer was said to simulate did not mean turbulent flow of
air. By the time the Trainer was invented, it had come to refer to the conditions in the cockpit,
which was gradually filled with more instruments and signals. The cockpit became a work space
for pilots, and the Link Trainer aptly reflected such changes in the conditions of flight. As early
as 1938, when the "robot pilot" was able to "take over and land the ship," it was said that the
continues to be a contested issue, especially in the commercial aviation enterprise where the urge to cut cost
confronts pilots' safety concern about training efficacy. See, for example, the position statements by the Air Line
Pilots Association (ALPA): "The Need for Motion in Flight Simulation," ALPA White Paper Statement of Position,
September 2007; "Producing a Professional Airline Pilot: Candidate Screening, Hiring, Training, and Mentoring,"
ALPA White Paper, September 2009.
'0' Sherry Turkle has asked a similar question about computers and people. Turkle wrote, "I was writing against the
common view that the computer was 'just a tool,' arguing for us to look beyond all the things the computer doesfor
us (for example, help with word processing and spreadsheets) to what using it does to us as people." Sherry Turkle,
The Second Self Computers and the Human Spirit, 20th anniversary ed. (Cambridge: MA: The MIT Press, 2005), 3.
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pilot was no longer "a daring athlete" but instead "an alert, dutiful engineer-scientist." It was not
athletic speed and motion but scientific attention that made a good pilot.'0 3 By 1954, when the
Link F-89D Flight Simulator was being produced, the "realness" of the simulator that
"approximate[d] a perfect illusion" had nothing to do with motion, since there was none, but
instead was a consequence of "the sound effects and the trainee's preoccupation with the flight
instruments and the flight problem." This experience could not be "wholly illusionary," however,
because the instrument response in the simulator was "precisely that of the plane in flight, even
to thrust, drag and alti-ude [sic] effects and to the fuel consumption rate and distribution." The
realism here was not measured against Nature but in the similitude with a nearly self-contained
technological working environment. Instead of bodily sense, the fuel consumption rate was to be
simulated.10 4 Just as technologies of simulation matured over the course of the war, what was
considered as real flight also changed over time, affecting, in turn, the role and image of the pilot
and also the criteria for selecting pilots among numerous applicants (see chapter 2 for the latter).
It is remarkable that the evolution from the flight trainer to the flight simulator was
accompanied by the removal of movement, a quintessential element of what we call flight. It can
be said that the original inventor himself had an "anxiety that in simulation, something important
slips away." 05 Few people claimed that movement was useless in simulators, but many thought
that it could be done away with, since the simulator experience was not the final goal and there
would always be a chance for real flight. Yet, was there enough movement left in real flight for
pilots to experience? It would not be accurate to say that the Link trainer or the Link simulator
103 Patterson, "Who's Flying This Ship?"
104 John Killick, "Proxy Flight," Pegasus, January 1954, in box 70, folder 1050, EAL-BU.
105 Sherry Turkle, Simulation and Its Discontents (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2009), 7.
97
produced a virtual experience of flight. Rather, one could say that the experience of flight itself
became virtual. And in both actual and simulated flight, the pilot became a virtual flier.
Chapter 2
The Psychomotor Pilot:
Psychological Tests and Technological Personhood
Introduction
The virtual flier in the Link Trainer was an attentive person, keeping one's eyes on cockpit
instruments. Instrument training sessions in the Link Trainer taught pilots how to remain rule-
abiding and alert in the cockpit. In this chapter, I shift the focus from training procedures to
selection processes, and discuss how American psychologists defined and measured the attentive
pilot, a psychological equivalent of the virtual flier in the Link Trainer. The makers of the Link
Trainer and the psychologists involved in pilot selection were working within similar contexts of
increasing cockpit instrumentation and the war. Just as Edwin Link tried to develop a safer and
cheaper method of training pilots, the psychologists sought to find a faster and more reliable way
to screen flying applicants.
The psychologists' languages, instruments, and techniques in pilot selection and
qualification from 1930 to the World War II period reveal the complicated nature of the
seemingly plain task of "selecting the best."' The meaning of "the best" has always been difficult
to agree upon. What is the person selected the best for? The answer is flying. But in what ways is
the person the best one for flying? The answer to this question could not be given until more
From the title of a veteran's account of World War 11 aviation psychology in the U.S. Army Air Forces. A. Jack
Jernigan, Selecting the Best: World War II Army Air Forces Aviation Psychology (Bloomington: I stbooks, 2003).
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questions were posed. Does the air in which a pilot flies require a certain type of person? Or
does the machine in which a pilot flies do so? These two questions were about the location of
pilots and their job specification. Where is the pilot situated (air, machine, or both) and what
exactly does a pilot do with the machine? The selection criteria and processes were predicated on
one's answers to these questions. In this chapter I examine how certain types of tests given to
pilots presupposed and constituted a particular figure of the pilot being tested and selected.
Examining the period between 1930 and 1945, I argue that American psychologists
involved in pilot selection re-defined flying from a problem of movement to a problem of
attention, and re-characterized the pilot from a physical superman to an attentive subject. If the
formerflew in cold, rarified air, the latter watched and responded to an instrument panel while
sitting in the cockpit. Until the early 1930s, medical examiners, flight surgeons, and psychiatrists
mainly spoke of physical, physiological, and mental "fitness" to endure the harsh environment of
the air and fierce sensations of speed and movement. Exacting physical standards and long
interviews to get at the deep soul of the fliers were necessary to find persons who possessed what
later came to be called the "right stuff." Between 1939 and 1945, when American psychologists
were called upon to study quicker methods of selecting pilots with predictive validity, it was
found that psychomotor ability had higher correlation with successful flying performance than
did physical and physiological measures. Measurement of serial reaction time, for example, gave
a better indication of flying ability than did the measure of equilibrium senses. Given the
wartime requirement of quick selection among a huge pool of candidates, the psychomotor pilot
was easier to identify and produce than the heroic flier of a superman type.
When flying was studied as a problem of movement, it was customary and useful to
compare it with other aerial movements or activities at high altitude such as ballooning,
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mountain-climbing, or living in the Andes. As a movement into the upper air, the task of flying
became one of adjustment, or acclimatization, to the new environment of the air. Then, an
investigation of how well a pilot would do needed to be conducted by putting pilots in low-
2pressure chambers or having them wear breathers to simulate stark change of environment. As a
high-speed, three-dimensional movement, flying an airplane could be also likened to riding a
rollercoaster or other "vertigo machines," which an increasing number of visitors to fairs and
exhibitions had experienced since the late nineteenth century and considered a constitutive and
symptomatic element of modernity. 3 As discussed in the previous chapter, overcoming vertigo in
flight was certainly an important part of becoming a skilled pilot. In this view, the cockpit
becomes a space of unsettling disorientation, and flying was a venture into the unknown and
fearful.
In contrast to the view of a pilot as a curious rider in a vertigo machine, to define flying
as a problem of attention meant treating aspiring fliers and cadets as subjects in a laboratory of
psychophysics. It was no accident that this claim of American psychologists was made with a
huge number of college student fliers who volunteered for the Civilian Pilot Training Program
and agreed to be experimental subjects for psychological and physiological tests. As these
students were brought to the serial reaction time apparatus and other test equipment for
psychophysical coordination, the airplane cockpit came to be regarded less as a vertigo machine
2 For a historical study of German aviation medicine in the 1930s and 1940s from this perspective of flying as
movement in a dangerous sky, see Christian Kehrt, "'Higher, Always Higher': Technology, the Military and
Aviation Medicine during the Age of the Two World Wars," Endeavour 30:4 (2006): 138-43. For a research
program in the American Navy, part of which is mentioned in this chapter, see Kenton Kroker, "Washouts:
Electroencephalography, Epilepsy and Emotions in the Selection of American Aviators during the Second World
War," in Instrumental in War: Science, Research, and Instruments between Knowledge and the World, ed. Steven A.
Walton (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 301-38.
3 Lieven de Cauter, "The Panoramic Ecstasy: On World Exhibitions and the Disintegration of Experience," Theory,
Culture & Society 10 (1993): 1-23, esp. 17-20. Indeed, the notion of vertigo often serves as a metaphor to capture
the turbulent atmosphere of Europe and North America at the turn of the twentieth century and until WWI. For
example, see Philipp Blom, The Vertigo Years: Europe, 1900-1914 (New York: Basic Books, 2008).
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in the air than as an attention machine in the lab.4 For the purpose of finding a possible
correlation between psychomotor ability and flying aptitude, the student pilots were subjected to
various "modes of fixation, of sedentarization, of enforced attentiveness" in a way that one
experiences in front of present-day computer screens.5 Despite the undeniable centrality of speed
and displacement in any flight, student pilots were required to become attentive and responsive
subjects, especially for the ease of screening and selection. However nomadic a pilot might look,
a life of flying was significantly "sedentary" as well.
Whether screened for flying as movement or as attention, the would-be pilots were going
through a disciplinary process that examined, classified, and made docile the machine-operating
subjects. In all of the physical, physiological, psychiatric, and psychological examinations, they
were measured, inquired, observed, written about, labeled, and ranked. The biographies as well
as present conditions of their bodies, minds, attitudes, and behaviors were made visible through a
range of measuring and inscribing apparatuses in order to find the correct ones for the job. As
Foucault wrote of techniques of examination, "this turning of real lives into writing is no longer
a procedure of heroization; it functions as a procedure of objectification and subjection." Pilots
were not born to fly, but screened, selected, and trained to do so. 6 What differentiated various
ways of selecting pilots, especially in the urgency of the war, was the speed and predictability of
observation, measurement, and calculation. Tests of reaction time and hand-eye coordination
4 It is also suggestive that most experimental subjects for the attention research and other early experimental
psychology research, such as Wilhelm Wundt's in Leipzig and James Cattell's at Columbia University, were the
male students working in those labs. See Kurt Danziger, "A Question of Identity: Who Participated in Psychological
Experiments," in The Rise of Experimentation in American Psychology, ed. Jill G. Morawski (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1988), 35-52, also cited in Jonathan Crary, Suspensions ofPerception: Attention, Spectacle, and
Modern Culture (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1999), 29.
5 Crary, Suspensions of Perception, 37.
6 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books,
1977), 192, also quoted in Nikolas Rose, Inventing Our Selves: Psychology, Power, and Personhood (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 105 (In Rose's quotation, though, the word "subjectification" is used instead of
"subjection").
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were quicker and easier to score and evaluate than a physiological test in a flight over the Andes
and a long interview to fill out questionnaires. Moreover, as the Harvard physiological
psychologist Ross McFarland emphasized, the psychomotor tests were more functionally and
operationally relevant to the actual activity performed in the cockpit. Compared with physical,
physiological, and psychiatric strength and fitness, McFarland and colleagues argued,
psychomotor coordination was more important in constituting a technological personhood,
suitable for the life in the cockpit.
Different definitions of piloting and pilots were linked to the question of who possessed
the legitimate expertise to make such claims. The identity of the pilot was bound up with the
professional authority of each group involved in the process. Flight surgeons, flight instructors,
physiologists, and psychologists saw different things in pilot candidates and used different
methods to observe them. By claiming flight instructors' opinions to be subjective and
physiological measures to be of little predictive value, psychologists wanted to assume a larger
role in setting the terms on who could sit in the cockpit and who was likely to succeed. As
piloting was understood as psychomotor activity, instead of, say, art, the instruments and
techniques of experimental psychology became central in understanding "human factors" in
aviation. And the physiological matters, though still relevant to the maintenance of pilots, were
deemed less significant in predicting success in flying. With their contribution to the task of
selecting pilots in preparation for WWII, the psychologists described in this chapter were among
what historian James Capshew has called the "psychologists on the march."7 As in the case of
James Capshew, Psychologists on the March: Science, Practice, and Professional Identity in America, 1929-1969
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Capshew's brief account of the AAF Aviation Psychology
Program during WWII (pp. 107-110) focuses on its origin and organization rather than actual research activities. A
series of activity reports of the this program were published in Psychological Bulletin in 1944 and 1945. On the
wartime psychology work and the postwar growth of psychology in America, see also Ellen Herman, The Romance
ofAmerican Psychology: Political Culture in the Age of Experts (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).
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their colleagues in clinical psychology or social psychology, the wartime experiences of aviation
psychologists prepared the way for the postwar expansion of the role of psychology in America.
Rather than solving the problems of mental health and human-human relationship, however, they
would fashion themselves as the experts of human-machine relationship (see chapter 5).
Are They Fit to Fly?: The Physical Fitness Approach to Pilot Selection
What kind of a person is a pilot? The Wright brothers did not set up strict requirement to fly their
Flyer in 1903, but by the time of World War I, the military need for recruiting able pilots created
stringent standards of physical fitness. Combined all together, these physical standards seemed to
amount to an almost impossible search for "the perfect man." A complaint about naval aviator
selection in 1918 illustrates the heavy emphasis on physical standards:
Indeed, if all ideals that have been set forth for them were ever complied with by any one
of our aviators, one might point to him and truly say, "Behold, the perfect man!" No one
but Bernard McFadden, Douglas Fairbanks, or Jess Willard could qualify, and the great
Guynemer, with all his nerve, would not have the boldness, were he alive, to apply for
enlistment in our flying corps.8
Although this quote was part of an article that called for "non-physical standards," the focus on
high physical standard continued even after World War I. The search for a physically strong
person was predicated on a particular assumption that flying an airplane was a physically
challenging task that was performed in unpredictable and harsh atmosphere. Heroic aces of
World War I, including "the great Guynemer" mentioned above, were fitting examples of this
8 R. P. Parsons, "A Search for Non-Physical Standards for Naval Aviators," United States Naval Medical Bulletin 12
(April 1918): 155, quoted in Adrianne Noe, "Medical Principle and Aeronautical Practice: American Aviation
Medicine to World War II" (PhD diss., University of Delaware, 1989), 100. Noe's dissertation offers a lot of useful
information on the development of aviation medicine in the United States until World War II.
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way of thinking about flying and pilots. Piloting was a tough, dangerous, and therefore manly,
activity that required those who could overcome the challenges and fulfill the tasks assigned.
This figure of a pilot may be called the pilot-flier-the pilot understood as someone who
flies in unfamiliar and dangerous air. The understanding of a pilot as a flier was prevalent long
after the first world war ended. Practitioners of aviation medicine mainly defined both flying and
pilots this way. In this line of thought, the environment of a flier was the air, deemed as an
entirely new sphere of human experience.9 As Ralph Greene, a medical examiner for the
Department of Commerce noted in the first issue of Journal ofAviation Medicine (1930), flying
in the air meant "a situation of the human being going into a new and strange environment." In
this new environment, the flier would undergo "reactional experiences which are entirely new
and for which no precedent in his own human experience has been laid down." 0 Major R. F.
Longacre at the Medical Corps of the U.S. Army also described flying an airplane as a "special
task," that is "utterly foreign to racial experience." Since flying is a venture into an unknown
realm, wrote Longacre, a pilot's "store of experience is at first relatively useless." As a race,
human beings could not expect to benefit from previous activities and experiences."
If the human race had not been prepared for flying, it would not be so surprising that
pilots made frequent errors that caused fatal accidents. Statistics from the late 1920s were
already showing that about sixty per cent of plane accidents were caused by pilot errors in both
9 For a brief account of American aviation medicine in the 1920s, see Kroker, "Washouts," 307-11. The most
influential text in American aviation medicine before WWII was Harry G. Armstrong, Principles and Practice of
Aviation Medicine (Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins, 1939), whose new editions continued to be published after the
war.
10 Ralph N. Greene, "The Viewpoint of the Pilot-Flight Surgeon," Journal ofAviation Medicine 1:3 (1930): 171-74,
quotes on 171. The titles of some histories of aviation medicine reveal similar understanding of flying. See, for
example, Douglas Robinson, The Dangerous Sky: A History ofAviation Medicine (Henry-on-Thames: Foulis, 1973);
T.M. Gibson and M.H. Harrison, Into Thin Air: A History ofAviation Medicine in the RAF (London: R. Hale, 1984).
Examining EEG tests for naval aviators, Kroker also regards pilots as "working within a physiological and
psychological environment that was both challenging and novel." Kroker, "Washouts," 302.
1 R. F. Longacre, "Certain Special Aspects of the Physical Examination for Flying," Journal ofAviation Medicine
1:3 (1930): 160-65, on 162.
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commercial and military flying. Less than three decades after the first powered flight, human
causes in accidents seemed more common than machine failures. The questions raised for both
engineers and medical personnel were: "Has design, construction, and maintenance outdistanced
the pilot himself? Has selection, and cadet and service training lagged behind aeronautical
engineering?" The rapid development of flying machines towards better speed and capacity
could be endangering pilots by subjecting them to physically extreme and mentally stressful
conditions.'2
In recognizing this mismatch between airplanes and pilots, Harold Cooper, Assistant
Medical Director of the Aeronautics Branch in the Department of Commerce, made an analogy
between the two. Just as "structure, performance, and handling qualities" of an aircraft had been
studied and improved, Cooper pointed out, a pilot's "physical and neurological background"
(structure), his "flying history" (performance), and his "adaptability to the aeronautical
environment" (handling quality) might be discussed. Although it would be impossible to
redesign the flier like a machine, at least "defects in the flyer himself' could be found during his
flight, revealing "what is, and is not, desirable" for flying. Following the analogy, one should not
expect to see a perfect flier with all of the desirable qualities and none of the undesirable, since a
plane was always "a compromise structure" among different levels of structure, performance,
and handling quality. One could still hope, however, to "select those showing the maximum in
the way of suitability." The task fell on flight surgeons.' 3
But what exactly are these "desirable" traits for flying and how does one recognize them?
Among medical examiners in aviation in the 1920s and 1930s, one common way to describe
12 R. F. Longacre, "Physical Fitness for Airplane Pilot Duty," Journal of Aviation Medicine 1:2 (1930): 64-80, on
64.
13 Harold J. Cooper, "The Relation Between Physical Deficiencies and Decreased Performance," Journal ofAviation
Medicine 1:1 (1930): 4-24, on 4.
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them was the concept of "physical fitness" for flying. The phrase may sound self-explanatory,
but the meaning of "physical fitness" changed over time, mostly expanding the range of traits it
covered. Since World War I, finding "physical defects" had been the main and obvious concern
among medical examiners. While different levels of standards were applied to military and
commercial pilots, a candidate for flying would generally go through examinations of visual
acuity, depth perception, diplopia, color vision, peripheral vision, auditory acuity, or the sense of
equilibrium. The student was also screened for other "gross physical limitations." These included
"muscular weaknesses and joint restrictions" and "deltoid paresis or paralysis" that concerned
with the control of the stick; the stiffness of knees and hips regarding the use of the rudder; or the
power and range of the ankle movement to operate brakes. Among more extreme sorts of defects
was the loss of one hand, arm, leg or even two, which did not always discourage aspiring
students of flying. For example, a man whose both forearms were lost asked for the use of
"extension hooks" for control of throttle and stick.' 4 These defects for flying were literally
"physical," in that they concerned with the ordinary workings of visual and auditory senses and
the strength and range of muscles and joints. A flier in the sky was supposed to be able to see the
world (landmarks, approaching objects, or landing field) clearly while maintaining the body's
balance. And since the practice of relying on cockpit instruments was not widespread until the
early 1930s, his engagement with the plane was mostly muscular.
Around 1930, when the Journal ofAviation Medicine began its publication, medical
personnel in aviation made many calls for other qualifications than literally "physical
deficiencies." Physical fitness for flying, they argued, should include "nervous stability" in order
to provide better methods of selection. Speaking in 1930 at the Second Annual Meeting of the
" Ibid.
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Aero Medical Association, which published the Journal, Longacre argued that the physical
examination of flying applicants should go beyond checking "mere physical fitness." Given the
newness of flying at both individual and racial level, said Longacre, a study must be made on
"the mental and emotional life." In routine check-ups by flight surgeons, however, "the purely
physical" was still all that was examined. Making a reference to the statistics of plane accidents
with sixty percent "pilot error," Longacre maintained that these were not due to "physical defect"
in the literal sense but rather to "error or fault somewhere along his higher levels, namely
personality defect." Therefore, he continued, the "non-physical part of the examination for
flying" needed to be done "with utmost care and discernment" in order to reduce the accidents
from pilot-error. 5 Writing in an earlier issue of the Journal, Cooper of the Commerce
Department expressed similar concerns about the current state of physical examination for fliers.
Although "neuropsychic examination" needed to be central part of the physical exam, Cooper
pointed out, it was the "least understood and most inadequately covered."' 6 Frederick R.
Haselton, flight surgeon in the U.S. Navy, echoed Cooper's opinion by asking why a number of
applicants in the Army, Navy, and civilian schools, who apparently met "a high physical
standard," still failed in flight instruction. It was due, Haselton argued, to the failure of flight
surgeons and medical examiners to "determine the psychological equipment for flying."' 7
The "personality study," "neuropsychic examination," or the study of "psychological
equipment for flying" advocated by Longacre, Cooper, and Haselton meant a shift in the
attention among aviation medical examiners from "organs and tissues" to the "individual factor."
In this regard, Longacre asked physicians engaged in aviation duties to look favorably to
" Longacre, "Physical Examination for Flying."
16 Cooper, "Physical Deficiencies," 20.
4 Frederick R. Haselton, "Psychological Considerations in Judging Aeronautical Adaptability," Journal ofAviation
Medicine 1:1 (1930): 29-32, on 29.
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psychology and psychiatry. For many physicians, psychology seemed "an abstraction permitted
certain quaint professors" and psychiatry was "a strange interest absorbing certain physicians
themselves manifesting peculiarities inviting investigation." Rather than accepting "such
fancies," Longacre urged, those in aviation medicine should embrace these new subjects for the
study of personality in aviation.'8 Likewise, Haselton pointed to the lack of expertise or interest
in psychology among flight surgeons and medical examiners, probably because of "the
pioneering stage of his specialty." "However," Haselton urged those in aviation medicine, "he
must strike out into the uncharted sea of psychological possibilities concerned in aviation."19 The
appeal to psychology and psychiatry to improve physical examination of fliers resonated with the
notion that flying was a unique activity in the history of human race and that no previous
experience or instincts would make one a great flier. If there was "no preformed habit pattern
reactions laid down in the nervous system" for flying, the pilot must nevertheless possess "a
background of qualities, attributes, aptitudes." When one takes to the air, these "background"
characteristics would "come into play, serve as instruction progresses, and later, in combination
with acquired skill, save in emergency." 20 It was then the mission of examiners to "discover
whether the candidate for flying training possesses in sufficient degree the requisite qualities,
attributes, and aptitudes, as well as whether these remain unimpaired in the seasoned pilot." Here
the emphasis was given to the person as a whole rather than to each sense, muscle, joint, or organ
of the student flier. What made a flier a good and safe one were hidden inside the person in the
form of a lesion in the brain, a history of epilepsy, or simply personal character. It was often said
that such "qualities, attributes, and aptitudes" would be revealed only during a flight in the air,
18 Longacre, "Physical Examination for Flying," 163.
9 Haselton, "Psychological Considerations," 29.
20 Longacre, "Physical Examination for Flying," 162.
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but one could hope that psychological investigation might render them discoverable on the
ground.
The personality study or neuropsychic examination was intended to supplement the
screening of physical defects by looking at different aspects of an individual. The long list of
physical defects that disqualified applicants was likely to intimidate them, giving an impression
that only a "Roman gladiator" type or "supermen" were fit for the flying task, especially in the
military. Although flight surgeons emphasized that they were not looking for "any particular
type," let alone the "Roman gladiator," but wanted to find "merely the average, or perhaps
average plus," the talk of "supermen" was frequent. In contrast to this, tests of personality were
said to show if an examinee was a normal person with "nervous stability." The important
question was then how to define "normal" and how to recognize it in an individual.
In assessing one's personality and nervous condition, Longacre emphasized that the
examiner should deal with "the total experience of the individual," which included different
stages of one's life as well as his "antecedents and inherited factors."22 Similarly, Cooper stated
that the examiner should look for "all the traits and behavior characteristics" in an examinee. In
the Army, this totality of examination was implemented by studies of the applicant's family
history, personal history, aviation history, physical examination, and personality trends, each of
which had a considerable number of check points. Moreover, the appraisal of personality was not
confined to the exam section designated for it. According to Longacre, it "begins the moment the
2 Longacre, "Physical Fitness for Airplane Pilot Duty," 71-72.
22 Ibid., 72.
2 Cooper, "Physical Deficiencies," 20.
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subject is seen or heard and ends when he passes from sight and hearing." It was to be both
intensive and extensive.
The intimate nature of the study, however, made it necessary to give a cautionary
instruction to examiners. This kind of study was only possible in an environment of "such
relaxation and intimacy" that would induce "the complete confidence of the subject and secure
full cooperation." Despite its aim for comprehensiveness, it had to be done "informally." And the
questions needed to be put "in the accusative, rather than in the indicative form" ("how much do
you drink, not, do you ever use liquor?"). Most of all, the examinee should not notice such
intimacy of the test. As Longacre put it, "[t]he examiner must be on the alert and the subject at
ease, never being permitted to feel that his innermost self is under minutest scrutiny and his
entire life history and ancestry under review."2 5 The Navy flight surgeon Haselton also asked the
examiner not to be "offensive" to his examinee, "who may be on the verge of giving him access
to his intimate self, and yielding a most guarded secret." 26 Being a superman might not be
necessary to become a flier, but giving his "most guarded secret" to a flight surgeon might be.
Care must be taken not to be noticed by applicants, but their "innermost self' or "intimate self'
was what the medical examiners were getting at through personality study or neuropsychic
examination.
How, then, did a flight surgeon approach the "innermost self' and confirm the subject's
"nervous stability" for flying? In the first part, the family history of insanity and other psychotic
tendencies were briefly investigated. The second part, personal history, was much more
24 R. F. Longacre, "Examination of the Nervous System in Aviation," The Physical Examinist 1, p. 243, quoted in
Cooper, "Physical Deficiencies," 20.
2 R. F. Longacre, "Personality Study," Journal of Aviation Medicine 1:1 (1930): 33-50, on 33-34 and 40 (italics
added).
26 Haselton, "Psychological Considerations," 31 (italics added).
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extensive. Starting with birth traumas, questions were asked on one's age of the first walking,
talking, and tooth, followed by "history concerning thumb sucking, nail biting, stammering,
somnambulism, pavor nocturnus, and nocturnal enuresis, particularly whether the latter persisted
after the third or fourth year." The subject was also asked if he was "an only child, the youngest
of many, the only son amongst many daughters, or the child of his father's old age." Among
"environmental factors," there were questions as to whether he was close to his father or he was
a "mother's boy" and whether he was raised "by a widowed mother, a maiden aunt, or by
grandparents." His "play life" was the next concern: sports activity, his attitudes to
companionship or being alone, the age and sex of his playmates, and the number of fights and
27their causes.
Among more mature stages of life, "sex life" received extensive coverage, since "no
study of the personality can be complete without learning whether the sex demands are met
frankly and hygienically, or otherwise." 28 His attitude toward the opposite sex was characterized
as "sissy, masculine, or effeminate" and as "normal, exaggerated, or diminished." He was also
asked if he tended to be, in the presence of the other sex, "natural and at ease, masterful or timid,
chivalrous or ungallant; modest, prudish, or given to an affectation of innocence." Other
questions concerned with the "degree of sex curiosity," his preference regarding the age of the
opposite sex, the number of love affairs, the causes of break-ups and his reactions to them. If he
was married, was he "kind, affectionate, considerate, and generous; irritable, fault-finding,
jealous, and penurious; indifferent, domineering, or very submissive--content to play the minor
role, rather than take the leading part?"
2 Longacre, "Personality Study," 40-41.
2 Longacre, "Physical Fitness for Airplane Pilot Duty," 74.
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After "sex life" questions, another important part was his education, since it revealed his
character as well as his intelligence. Starting with simple ones about his performance at schools,
he was then asked if he had gotten sick before examinations and other occasions of "special
difficulty." More important, "did he 'brace up' and 'carry through' or refuse to face the
situation-perhaps leave school or college rather than meet the ordeal?" His attitude to conflicts
also mattered: "Courageously face and solve them, or weakly retreat along some line of less
resistance?" On the more intelligent side, his ability to read and discuss books and articles was
questioned as well as his current reading list. On a more abstract level, his "trends of thought"
were investigated. These ranged from his thoughts on his own life ("Does he think he has had a
fair chance?") to his views on other worldly matters ("What are his views concerning education,
church, theatre, womanhood, duties of citizenship, trade unionism, Bolshevikism, governmental
institutions, the social order?"). As these questions reveal, what the examination presupposed
was not an "average" or "normal" person in the abstract, but a particular type of person with
certain political and social opinions. After going through the subject's life history, aviation
history, and physical conditions, the examination lastly touched on the three aspects of his
personality-temperament, intelligence, and volition-each with lots of descriptive categories. 29
As can be expected, all of these endless questions were combined to produce a list of
characteristics that were "entirely favorable and most conductive to efficiency," thereby
constituting "the optimum type." Being single was preferred to marriage, "if wife opposes
flying." Education at high school and college "with good scholarship, throughout" was always a
good thing. "Unusual ability in athletics" was favorable, as was "manual dexterity-good at
billiards, tennis, sailing, golf, violin, piano, horseback riding." As for civil occupation, success in
29 Longacre, "Personality Study," 41-44.
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"active" occupations was better than "poor or moderate success" in "sedentary" occupations. In
terms of personality, a long list of dichotomy was created. In temperament, "cheerful" was
preferable to "depressed"; "self-reliant" to "submissive"; "aggressive" to "pacific"; "modest" to
"vain"; "frank" to "withholding"; "fond of people" to "likes to be alone"; "satisfied" to
"hypercritical of conditions." As for intelligence, "precise, penetrating, sharp, alert, resourceful"
were more desirable than "vague, superficial, dull, hesitant, without initiative, untrained." In
volition, "sluggish, slow, recklessly impulsive, restless, poor tenacity of purpose" were to be
avoided. These descriptors on both sides of the dichotomy formed a circular logic, both
explaining and defining successful people not just in flying, but in any task. Successful pilots, it
was assumed, were successful persons.30
A personality study with such comprehensiveness required of flight surgeons, Longacre
admitted, "much time and an alertness and degree of concentration fatiguing in the extreme." But
the importance of "each and every instance" of the study more than justified the time and effort,
without which one would end up with "routine and perfunctory studies."3' As the details in
instructions might be "difficult to keep in memory," Longacre added in another venue, some
"time, patience, practice, a certain understanding of human nature and its problems" were
necessary on the part of examiners. Moreover, "without essential abridgment," this procedure
could do well for examining a large group during "a major emergency. 32 Some examiners,
however, were not persuaded of its practicality. During a discussion period after Longacre's
presentation at an Aero Medical Association meeting, a doctor from Iowa regarded it almost
30 Ibid., 44-50.
31 Ibid., 33-34.
3 Longacre, "Physical Fitness for Airplane Pilot Duty," 75.
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impossible to implement thorough psychological tests for civilian pilots, who must be busy with
other things and want to be done quickly, unless this was made mandatory.
You must get acquainted with this man, sit down and talk to him, and take some time to
size up his reaction time, his coordination, and his phobias, and other mental defects. ...
The physical affair goes along smoothly enough. The mental examination should take a
second sitting, if possible, or perhaps a third.
Not everyone in aviation would have liked this to happen. In particular, those who were
promoting commercial aviation or running aviation schools would not welcome the idea of
prolonged mental examinations, which would discourage some applicants. In reply, Cooper,
representing the Department of Commerce, re-emphasized the need for screening those who
might be normal physically but not mentally. "The purely physical end of things" would not help
flight surgeons to reduce the high rate of pilot-error accidents. As regards to the time, however,
Cooper had no solution. "I don't know how you can better the element of time," he confessed.
"You cannot hasten it beyond reasonable limits." The Department would stand behind the
examiner in dealing with those who wanted to be "rushed through," but it was the examiner's
responsibility to "take the requisite amount of time" for a good exam. To select "average or
average plus" required more time and effort than to find a "super-man," and it could not be
helped.
As medical examiners began to deal with psychological, neurological, or personality
characters, another concept was as important as the "nervous stability." The personality study
also aimed to gauge "the aptitude for flying." It was not a new concept in the 1930s. Flight
instructors had long believed that not everyone could become a flier, let alone a good one, and
33 Longacre, "Physical Examination for Flying," 163-65.
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medical examiners generally agreed. Just as there seemed to be aptitude for becoming a
mechanic or an executive, good aptitude for flying was said to be necessary regardless of the
amount of training one received. Also known as "flying adaptability," aptitude for flying was
regarded as one's "endowment." There was a possibility that environment and education
influenced these qualities in the course of one's life, but by the time of flying examination it
must have been established well enough to determine one's suitability. In the words of a flight
surgeon, "one has it, or hasn't it, as one is either a flyer or a failure at it." One may not even
know whether he himself has it or not, but "one must have it to become a flyer." As every flight
instructor would have admitted, however, the problem was that this aptitude for flying was an
"intangible something," recognizable but not recordable. Of course it would be eventually
revealed as a student went through training in the air, but it would be much better for the sake of
time and money if it could be "predetermined" before actual training. By introducing
neuropsychic exam and personality study, flight surgeons and psychologists hoped that they
could identify basic human qualities that made up one's aptitude for flying before a flight
instructor did.3 5
The notion of flying aptitude as something one had to have before entering any flight
training course was in accord with the widespread understanding of flying as an "art." Since
flying was an art that was done "entirely by feel and not by formula," the Navy flight surgeon
Haselton claimed, it was necessary to consider one's temperament such as "affective and artistic
trend." Without these "fundamental inherent characteristics," the student would not "get the feel
3 Longacre, "Physical Fitness for Airplane Pilot Duty," 78; Cooper, "Physical Deficiencies," 22-23.
5 J. Henry Schroeder, "A Study of the Proposed Flying Adaptability Test (A. C.) in the Course of Physical
Examination of Civilian Aviators," Journal of Aviation Medicine 3:3 (1932): 150-55, on 150.
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of the ship" and instead end up a "mechanical flyer, which is always considered dangerous."36
These characteristics determined whether the student would be a "natural" flier or a
"mechanical" one. As discussed in the previous chapter, a mechanical pilot who lacked natural
aptitude for flying was assumed to be dependent on instruments, which was not so honorable
practice even in the early 1930s.
If flying was an art, for which "feel" mattered more than "formula," however, this
seemed to put a limit on what psychology and psychiatry could contribute to the selection of
fliers. However comprehensive a psychological screening might be, there would always remain
some aspects of one's aptitude that evaded the medical examiner's eye. According to this view,
no examination would completely determine one's prospect to be successful in flying, just as
success or failure in playing the violin could not be determined by an exam that did not include
actual playing. This dilemma rendered flight surgeons to remain dependent on and respectful of
flight instructors who actually took students to the air. Longacre admitted that, in matters of
flying aptitude, "the opinions of skilled instructors are of great interest, indeed should be final."
Longacre noted the fact that many cadets who passed physical and psychological screening with
satisfactory results still failed as a pilot or ended up being a "mediocre" one. This meant,
Longacre reasoned, that some "qualities" in individuals could only be tested "in the air" and that
mechanical testing equipment being developed and used at the time could not be a final solution
since they were to be used on the ground. The introduction of personality study and other
psychological testing did not question the authority of flight instructors to judge the "fitness to
fly." Rather, flight surgeons around 1930 thought that the instructors were in the best position to
conduct "intensive personality study" through their intimate contact with students. In fact, it was
36 Haselton, "Psychological Considerations," 29.
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something that instructors were doing everyday, and flight surgeons would continue to seek their
final opinions.3 7
As of 1930, the pilot-flier that physical and psychological tests purported to help select
was someone whoflew in the air. This tautological statement would not have impressed those in
the aviation circle at the time, but this most obvious point framed the practice of pilot
examination and selection in a particular way. As the air in which a pilot was flying was deemed
a completely new environment for humankind, the aerial activity seemed to require physical
standards higher than other military services or civilian activities. Even as medical examiners
denied the necessity for "supermen" or "Roman gladiators," the adaptability of the flier's body to
the air remained a serious concern. New psychological testing, or personality study, also
presupposed the stress one faced in the air as the main focus in sorting out the good aptitudes for
flying. Many questions in neuropsychic exam dealt with the applicant's previous experiences in
stressful situations (in school, in driving, etc.) in order to predict his reactions to "stress in
flying." 38 The fundamental question among flight surgeons and instructors, "Are they fit to fly?"
centered around one's ability to maintain stability in seeing, hearing, and feeling and to act
reasonably in the exacting environment of the air. In addition, since flying was still deemed an
art, being "mechanical" at it was a "dangerous" quality and was inferior to being "natural." The
qualities one possessed through inheritance, environment, or education were thought to have
prepared the candidate for flying even before any training started.
Therefore, what was relatively absent in the discussion among flight surgeons was a
concrete examination as to what the pilot actually did while sitting inside the cockpit of a plane.
The questions on "total experience of the individual" including family history and sexual life did
37 Longacre, "Physical Fitness for Airplane Pilot Duty," 78-79.
38 See Cooper's discussion at the end of Longacre, "Physical Examination for Flying."
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not concern with exactly how the pilot thought and moved in the cockpit. This was left in the
hands of flight instructors, with justifiable reasons, whose job was to observe it in the air. In most
tests on the ground, the assumption was often that the pilot's engagement with his plane was
limited to physical and muscular movements that seemed to require, say, both hands and legs or
fully extendable joints. The cockpit as a working space of a pilot did not figure in a meaningful
way in these tests and discussions. To be sure, the flier in the early 1930s differed much from the
one in the 1910s. For example, the tests on ears and equilibrium senses, especially the one on a
"whirling chair" (Barany test), lost its appeal in the late 1920s, as several studies on "blind
flying" began to stress the need to disbelieve one's own senses and instead trust the instruments.
As the pilot-flier was no longer expected to endure and feel the "whirling" air with his own body,
the importance of otology decreased, while vision came to be considered the most important in
maintaining equilibrium.39 However, despite recent development of cockpit instruments and the
invention of the Link Trainer (the latter was not widely known yet), most tests and selection
processes presumed that the pilot-flier was flying in the air rather than sitting in the cockpit.
Ross McFarland and the High Altitude Research
The pilot as a flier in the sky served as the main problematic in Ross McFarland' research in the
early and mid 1930s. McFarland acquired his Ph.D. degree in psychology in 1929 under the
supervision of the pioneering experimental psychologist E. G. Boring at Harvard, having also
spent a year at Cambridge University during 1927-28 with Frederick Bartlett. He taught at
Columbia University before moving to the Fatigue Laboratory at Harvard Business School in
39 Cooper, "Physical Deficiencies," 17-19. For the validity of the Barany test, see Robert Parsons and Louis Segar,
"Barany Chair Tests and Flying Ability: A Correlation Study of One Hundred Naval Aviators," Journal of the
American Medical Association 70:15 (1918): 1064-65.
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1937. McFarland's earliest publications dealt with "the relationship between speed and mental
ability" or "the psychological effects of oxygen deprivation (anoxemia) on human behavior.'"1
His most important study in this vein was conducted when he participated in the International
High Altitude Expedition to Chile (1935). As physiologist and epidemiologist Ancel Keys wrote
in the Scientific Monthly, a research in "the adaptation to life at high altitudes" could be easily
justified by recent developments in aviation as well as the needs of mining industry or
mountaineering activities, all of which required attention to human body and mind in oxygen-
lacking environment. "Each day brings new stories," Keys wrote, "of high flying records,
stratosphere balloons and plans for commercial transportation in the sub-stratosphere." Based in
Chuquicamata, a copper mine site, and several other high-altitude experimental stations in Chile,
the Expedition set out to conduct experiments on the process of acclimatization and the
individual differences in life at high altitude. The team was composed of ten researchers from
Harvard, Columbia, Chicago, Duke, Cambridge, and Copenhagen, and from the fields of
physiology, psychology, biochemistry, medicine, and zoology. McFarland, then at Columbia
University, conducted psycho-physiological experiments and published the results as a four-part
series in the Journal of Comparative Psychology in 1937.
In arguably one of the first psychological studies during high altitude flights,
McFarland's team made a seventy-five minute flight between Santiago, Chile, and Mendoza,
40 Malcolm L. Ritchie, "Ross A. McFarland, 1901-1976," in Division 21 Members Who Made Distinguished
Contributions to Engineering Psychology, ed. Henry L. Taylor (Washington, DC: Division 21, American
Psychological Association, 1994), 94-107. During WWII, Frederick Bartlett led the British research on pilot error
and fatigue, using the Cambridge Cockpit, an experimental apparatus that resembled the Link Trainer. See D.
Russell Davis, Pilot Error: Some Laboratory Experiments (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1948).
41 Ross McFarland, "The Role of Speed in Mental Ability," Psychological Bulletin 25 (1928): 595-612; Ross
McFarland, "An Experimental Study of the Relationship between Speed and Mental Ability," Journal of General
Psychology 3 (1930): 67-97; Ross McFarland, "The Psychological Effects of Oxygen Deprivation (Anoxemia) on
Human Behavior," Archives of Psychology (1932): 1-136.
4 Ancel Keys, "The Physiology of Life at High Altitudes," Scientific Monthly 43:4 (October 1936): 289-312.
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Argentine, with a high rate of ascent by which the height between 14,000 and 18,000 feet was
reached within twenty to thirty minutes. As psychological experiments in anoxemia conditions
till then had been done mostly in low-pressure chambers at the sea level, McFarland regarded his
experiment during an actual flight "not comparable" with those past studies. The real flight
would give "increased excitement," "sudden movements," and "the vibration and noise from the
motors," all of which would "accentuate the disturbances" for the subjects. Two main
psychological tests were designed to measure the perseveration or the "mental lag" of a subject
and the duration of the first negative after-images. The perseveration test involved performing
addition and subtraction first in ordinary manner and then doing the calculation by interpreting
the plus or minus sign oppositely. The subject was also asked to copy symbols first in one pattern
and then in a reverse pattern. In the after-image test, the subject first closed his eyes for two
minutes, fixated the eyes on a yellow square on a blue background, and then reported the timing
of the appearance and disappearance of the first after-image. While the perseveration test
concerned with "shifting quickly from one mental task to another" (as represented by addition
and subtraction), the after-image test took into account the high-altitude situation in which one
happened to stare "bright objects, such as the sun," more frequently than on the ground. When
compared with the scores at sea level, the number of errors in calculation, the number of losses
in copying symbols in reverse patterns, and the latency and persistency of after-images all
increased notably at high altitudes during a flight. Moreover, the difference was greater in the
return flight during which the weather condition was much worse than the first flight.
Although these tests were touted as the first in-flight psychological experiment, the
airplane as a distinct kind of machine requiring specific manners of maneuvering did not figure
4 Ross McFarland, "Psycho-Physiological Studies at High Altitudes in the Andes-I. The Effects of Rapid Ascents
by Aeroplane and Train," Journal of Comparative Psychology 23:1 (1937): 191-225, quotes on 203.
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in the design or interpretation of the experiment. Nor was there any distinction made between the
pilot and the passengers in the discussion of changes in mental functions during the flight. The
experiment addressed what happened to the human mind while the person was at high altitude,
whether flying an airplane or simply staying in it. In other words, the question remained the same
as when Paul Bert had studied the effects of high and low air pressure in the 1870s. If the
airplane as a machine made any difference in the result, it was only through the high rate of
ascent it produced. It was therefore worthwhile to make comparison with the results from similar
tests during a relatively slower ascent by train or by motor. Combined together, these speedy
ascents were then compared with the acclimatization process over a much longer period of time.
The analysis revealed that the rate of ascent played an important role in psychological and
physiological changes at high altitudes, since the degree of such changes was greatest in the case
of airplane ascent while the train ascent resulted in greater changes than the month-long gradual
acclimatization. Whereas a person in a rapid ascent tended to become "quite unfit to carry out
complicated mental tasks at 18,000 to 20,000 feet," those who went through gradual
acclimatization were "capable of complex mental work for limited periods of time." In all of
these comparisons, an airplane, a train, and a motor vehicle differed from one another only in the
rate of ascent to high altitude and the specific mode of operation of each transport did not figure
in any meaningful way.44
One significant differentiation, however, was obtained through this study of high altitude
psychology. Not all faculties, McFarland observed, were impaired equally with increasing
height. Among various categories of psychological tests conducted at Lima (sea level) and at
Morochocha (14,890 feet), sensory tests such as auditory thresholds or negative after-images
44 Ibid., 221.
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showed the least impairment at the high altitude. More impairment was found in motor tests such
as the dotting test. Mental tests on "more complex functions" recorded the greatest difference at
high altitudes. The research team investigated "(a) the speed of apprehending series of four-letter
words first one word at a time, then two, and three, exposed tachistoscopically for 0.35 of a
second, (b) the transliteration of non-meaningful syllables from a code, (c) the rapidity in
learning a code involving associations of digits with symbols, (d) memory for paired associates,
(e) the rapidity in naming colors, and (f) perseveration, or the tendency of one task to interfere
with another, in various complications of simple mathematical problems, writing letters of the
alphabet, and drawing horizontal and vertical lines." This could be a meaningful differentiation
with implications for pilot selection and training, but it remained to be studied further which of
these different functions-sensory, motor, and "complex reactions"-was most relevant to those
involved in piloting.
While it may be possible to make associations between the mental functions listed here
and what a pilot actually did when flying, McFarland did not make such a connection. Effects of
high altitude on the pilot's capacity to fly an airplane were addressed only at a general level, not
covering specific performance in the cockpit. The actual flight experiment was thought more
realistic than the one in low-pressure chambers at sea level, but it did not mean any more than
stating that an actual stay in Chilean high mountains was more realistic than sitting in the low-
pressure chambers. As a study in high altitude physiology and psychology, McFarland's research
in the Expedition did not deal with the pilot who controlled an airplane but only with the person
who flew in it. Comparisons and analogies were made among the pilot, the balloonist, the
" Ibid., 217-18.
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mountaineer, and the Chilean resident in the mining town with little emphasis given to the fact
that these people worked with different kinds of tools or machines.
This approach was maintained in McFarland's study on trans-Pacific flights in 1937. This
time the focus was "prolonged exposures" during a long flight between Alameda, California, and
Manila, Philippines, with the total flying time of 122.5 hours while making stops at Honolulu,
Midway, Wake Island, and Guam over the period of three weeks. In the experiments conducted
during a regular flight of Pan American Clipper Ship, McFarland once again pointed out the need
for studies during real flights because of "the psychological factors of being actually in the air."
A series of physiological, biochemical, and psychological tests were done on both air crew and
passengers at several points during the flight. Physiological tests included the Schneider Index of
neuro-circulatory fitness from pulse and blood pressure measurements, a measure of minute
volume of circulation obtained by multiplying pulse rate and pulse pressure, and a measure of
urine output from "mental stress and excitement." In addition, the researchers took biochemical
measurements and conducted psychological tests on vision and mental capacities.46
Given the moderate height of the flight (average 9,500 feet), it was generally concluded
that the subjects demonstrated "a high degree of physical and mental efficiency." It was notable,
though, that the airmen accustomed to this long flight manifested characteristics similar to those
found in the people well acclimatized to high altitude life, such as "increased capacity of the
blood to transport oxygen, the higher alveolar partial pressure of oxygen, and the tendency
toward normal circulatory reactions." It meant that an experienced airman flying at about 10,000
feet would show "little objective evidence of any impairment." In other words, they were found
comparable with people who went through acclimatization in the Chilean Andes. More
46 Ross McFarland and H. T. Edwards, "The Effects of Prolonged Exposures to Altitudes of 8,000 to 12,000 Feet
during Trans-Pacific Flights," Journal ofAviation Medicine 8 (1937): 156-77, quotes on 156 and 166.
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important, the results suggested that "the added burden of flying the ship had no impairing effect
on the respiratory mechanism." Piloting, it turned out, was no extra burden on human respiratory
system. In addition to physiological stability, "no unusual temperamental reactions" were
observed except in the stewards busy in serving meals. As to psychological functions, both
sensory and mental, there were "no reliable differences" between the results at sea level and
flying altitude. Both physically and mentally, pilots were acclimatized well enough to long-
distance flight across the Pacific. Even the passengers on the flight "showed no objective signs of
fatigue or physical distress," though not to the same degree as the airmen, giving a promising
sign for the airline industry.47
Overall, McFarland's study of crew and passengers on a trans-Pacific flight showed that a
long-distance flight was definitely possible on a regular schedule with normally experienced (i.e.
acclimatized) airmen for ordinary customers in reasonable health condition. To make the point
even clearer, McFarland cited others' studies implying that the plane ascent was in fact "much
less disturbing than by train," possibly because the several hour-long ascent by train plus the
circular movements around mountains created more visual disturbance. Moreover, the Schneider
Index for the airmen and passengers during the oceanic flight was higher (i.e. better suited for
high altitude) and the degree of psychological impairment was lower than the data taken during
the train ascents in McFarland's own Andes study. Unless one went up higher than, say, 15,000
feet, as did the experimenters in the Andes study, flying over an ocean was completely doable for
ordinary people, just as "millions of acclimatized people" could live normal lives at around
10,000 feet.48 Explaining his research to the alumni of Harvard Business School, McFarland
47 Ibid., 172-76.48 Ibid., 174.
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emphasized this point again. "Much to our surprise," McFarland wrote, experienced pilots
seemed comparable to athletes on the ground or acclimatized people in high mountains.49
In addition to assuring the airline industry, this observation had another implication for
psychologists interested in aviation. While the responses of human body and mind to the lack of
oxygen during flight would no doubt remain a major concern in aviation medicine, it would be
also justifiable to worry less about the "new and strange environment" in which there was "no
precedent in his own human experience" and instead to start thinking of most pilots and their
work as a modification from ordinary people and their work in the ordinary environment. It had
the effect of metaphorically grounding the pilots, so that psychologists would be able to study
them more carefully in a less physiologically-challenging condition. This opened more research
possibilities in the practical business of pilot selection.
The Committee on Selection and Training of Aircraft Pilots
When McFarland reported on his trans-Pacific research in 1938, he was proud of having done
"the most extensive investigation ever made of airmen during prolonged flights at high altitude."
At the same time, he lamented the poor state of research in this direction. While there had been
much advance in "the motors and the mechanical side of flying," McFarland asked, "who can
mention even one good book on the human machine while in flight?" Expectedly, McFarland
cited the ever-alarming statistics of accidents due to "human error," this time 80-90 per cent, to
emphasize the need for more experimental research of "pilot error" or "human factor." His recent
study over the Pacific, however, seemed to complicate the issue. If the usual suspect of oxygen
deprivation did not give the airmen "sufficient deterioration" to render them "seriously or
49 Ross McFarland, "Research over the Pacific," Harvard Business SchoolAlumni Bulletin (February 1938): 3-10,
on 6. By this time, McFarland was affiliated with the Harvard Fatigue Laboratory at the Harvard Business School.
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dangerously impaired," who were making these errors and why?50 If the air was not the sole
cause, was there something else that would predispose some pilots to make more errors than
others? By this time, most researchers agreed that it was not about being a superman, but the
answer to these questions was still unclear.
A golden research opportunity for psychologists to tackle these issues came in 1939. The
Civil Aeronautics Authority (CAA) was launching an ambitious project to train more than
10,000 young people-mostly white, male college students but not excluding women, blacks, or
non-students-per year with a view to creating a large pool of civilian pilots to prepare for a
possible war situation and to boosting the aviation sector in the (postwar) economy. By one
estimate in 1939, there were only 3,800 commercial pilots and 3,600 private pilots between the
age of eighteen and thirty. As historian Dominick Pisano summarized, therefore, the Civilian
Pilot Training Program (CPTP) was designed "to fill the skies with pilots."'5 As part of this
large-scale pilot training program, CAA included a research project on the methods of selecting
and training pilots. Not willing to establish an entirely new institution for such research, CAA
asked the National Research Council (NRC) to create a committee under its Division of
Anthropology and Psychology to investigate the problem. On September 16, 1939, Robert
Hinckley, the Chairman of CAA, wrote to Ross Garrison, the Chairman of NRC to make this
request, and three days later, a meeting was held between NRC members and Dean Brimhall, the
director of research at CAA. In the meeting, Brimhall asked for "a good psychological job
analysis of flying" that would lead to improvement in selection and instruction methods.5 2 In
50 Ibid., 3 and 7.
51 Dominick Pisano, To Fill the Skies with Pilots: The Civilian Pilot Training Program, 1939-46 (Urbana and
Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1993), 29.5 2
"Conference on Civil Aviation," 19 September 1939, Records of the Committee on Selection and Training of
Aircraft Pilots, The National Academies Archives, Washington, DC. (hereafter CSTAP-NAA).
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another conference the next month, where several psychologists and physiologists including
McFarland attended, Brimhall laid out more specific objectives of the proposed research
program along with more than $100,000 budget. "(1) To improve the methods of acquiring skill
in piloting an airplane. (2) To devise objective measures of individual differences in flying
aptitude."53 These were old yet unsolved problems in aviation.
The research questions themselves might not have impressed the well-established
psychologists and physiologists in the NRC network. But the "conditions of the research" must
have. All participants in the training program, that is, about 11,000 young people between
eighteen and twenty-five, would be offered as experimental "subjects." Per the design of CPTP,
most of them would be college students, but about 300 women and several hundred blacks would
be included, too. In addition, there would be more than 1,000 instructors, also available as
research subjects. These subjects would be studied during their ground school course of seventy-
two hours and the flying course between thirty-five and fifty hours. Additionally, volunteers
would be brought into laboratories for more examination. These student fliers were believed to
be "homogeneous in age and physical requirements" and representative of "all sections of the
country, and all kinds of upbringing and environment." CAA administrator Hinckley proudly
told a newspaper that "probably never before in any such group with a single occupational trend
has there been such a fine sample for study in such capable hands." The homogeneity and
representativeness of the student fliers may be disputed, but there was no doubt that eleven
thousand college students were "the best field for research" given to psychologists. 54
5 "Conference on Selection and Training of Civilian Pilots," 6-8 October 1939, CSTAP-NAA.
"18 Will Devise Ways to Test Student Flyers: Research Council Names Board of Psychologists, Physicians and
Aviators," unidentified newspaper, unknown date, box 86, Ross A. McFarland Papers, Special Collections and
Archives, Wright State University, Dayton, OH (hereafter RAM-WSU).
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The Committee on Selection and Training of Civilian Pilots was composed of
psychologists and physiologists from several universities and representatives from military and
civilian organizations." Psychologist John Jenkins at the University of Maryland was the
chairman. Carl Guthe, the chairman of the Division on Anthropology and Psychology was an ex
officio member. Walter Miles at Yale University, H. M. Johnson at Tulane University, and V. A.
C. Henmon at University of Wisconsin participated as psychologists. Among the physiologists
were Alexander Forbes at Harvard University and H. S. Liddell at Cornell University. Of course,
Ross McFarland was invited as well. Jerome Hunsaker at MIT's aeronautical engineering
represented the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics. The $100,000 budget for the first
year (November 1939-June 1940) was distributed over ten research projects. Among the larger
programs were "development of criteria and standards of success in learning to fly" and
"analysis of skills of student fliers." McFarland was charged with a $13,500 project on
"physiological and psychological characteristics of student fliers." Johnson was given $10,000 to
work on "objective records of behavior of students and pilots in flight." A study of the Link
Trainer was also allotted $5,000.56
ss It was first named as the Committee on Selection and Training of Civilian Pilots in 1939, but as the focus of the
committee research quickly shifted to the military flying, "Aircraft" replaced "Civilian" in the title in 1940.
Research projects of this Committee have received little historical attention from historians of psychology or
aviation historians. One exception is Kroker, "Washouts," which deals with the electroencephalography (EEG)
research for naval aviator selection. Kroker puts the use of such instruments as the EEG for aviator selection in the
context of the concurrent trend of increasing instrumentation in the cockpit (autopilot, etc.) and the early
development of flight simulation. Although Kroker does not examine psychomotor tests for pilot selection, his
general perspective on instruments in aviation is in line with my own, which considers the assemblage of
instruments, techniques, and procedures as constituting the "technologies of the operator."
56 Carl Guthe to members of Division of Anthropology and Psychology, 29 December 1939, CSTAP-NAA.
Participants from outside the academia included Commander James Adams (Head of Aviation Section, Navy's
Bureau of Medicine and Surgery), Harold Bohlman (C.A.A. medical examiner and the Flight Commander at
Maryland National Guard), Dean Brimhall (C.A.A. Assistant to the Chairman), Lt. Col. David Grant (Acting Chief
of the Medical Division, Army Air Corps), Major J. F. McBlain (Office of the Chief of the Air Corps), Captain G.
D. Murray (Navy's Bureau of Aeronautics), L. J. O'Rourke (Director of Research, U.S. Civil Service Commission),
L. Povey (C.A.A. Chief Pilot Instructor), C. L. Shartle (Chief, Occupational Analysis Section, U.S. Bureau of
Employment Security), Col. A. D. Tuttle (Chief Medical Inspector, United Air Lines), L. B. Tuckerman (U. S.
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The fact that CAA turned to NRC's Division of Anthropology and Psychology reveals
the underlying dissatisfaction with the current program of pilot selection in civil aviation and
probably military aviation as well. As Brimhall explained to those who gathered for the
conference in October 1939, the selection process in civil flying was still limited to "physical
qualifications" such as "sensory tests of vision, hearing and the like." Mental and emotional
aspects did not constitute a major requirement in flying.57 The situation was not any better in the
military sector, either. In CAA's view, the main focus in military flying was still medical, not
touching on "psychological aspects of pilot aptitude."58 Therefore, one of the major objectives in
the research program for CPTP would have to be the development of aptitude tests that would
reveal individual differences in the ability to become good pilots. And this should be based on
precise knowledge about piloting skill in general."59 In short, what constituted the pilot's skill
that not everyone was equally capable of learning? This was a slightly different question than the
one asked around 1930. Although it continued to ask how a pilot could endure the mental stress
of flying and make a successful flight, the exact nature of the piloting skill emerged as a more
specific question. And while the state of knowledge on psychological aptitude for flying might
not differ radically from 1930, the government money and a vast number of human subjects were
now offered for a coordinated research project to tackle the issue.
In the NRC Committee's focus on "rapid elimination of the unfit," the language that
smacked of eugenics blended well into the urgency and practicality of the selection task. It was
hoped that psychological testing would offer more information about a flier's potential within
Bureau of Standards), Frank Fremont-Smith (Direction of Medical Division, Josiah Macy, Jr. Foundation), and
Conrad Berens (Director of Ophthalmological Foundation).
" "Conference on Selection and Training of Civilian Pilots," 6-8 October 1939, CSTAP-NAA.
58 John Crider, "C.A.A. Begins Flier Study: Allots $100,000 for Long Student Analysis by Research Council," New
York Times, 12 November 1939.
59 "Conference on Selection and Training of Civilian Pilots," 6-8 October 1939, CSTAP-NAA.
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shorter time than did the actual flying instruction. In the meeting with committee members, Dean
Brimhall articulated this purpose:
Our aim is to set up psychological tests so that within an hour 's examination we may be
able to eliminate those who would not be successful pilots, thus trying to find out more
about the candidates in psychological tests than is done by a long drawn-out period of
eliminations, as in the case of army training where elimination does not take place until
after 38 hours of training.60
As A. D. Tuttle at United Air Lines noted at the full committee meeting in June 1940, given the
scale of "a tremendous training program," it was desirable to "keep out of the air the unfit" to
protect the young fliers. And if the unfit were to be eliminated, it was best to happen "at the
start." A complete determination of future aces and failures would certainly be impossible, but
early elimination of 10 % of "possible failures" would be "something to be taken into
consideration." 6' In this version of psychological testing, a long inquiry of the flier's personality,
let alone getting at the "innermost self," would not be a priority. The psychologists were given
one hour to recognize an ace or a washout.
Before making any judgment on the potential of a flier, however, the committee members
first had to define what a good flier was. And this was not easy and straightforward at all. In his
summary of the committee's first year, the chairman John Jenkins started out by doubting the
notion that "everyone knows what a good flier is." The pilots interviewed by the researchers
maintained that they could see "whether a man is a good flier or not." Knowledge of other
industries, however, led the researchers to suspect that it might not be true, since "experienced
men rarely agree on rating novices." In debunking flight instructors' claim, the scientists pointed
60 "Abbreviated Minutes of Meeting, December 15, 1939," CSTAP-NAA (emphasis added).
61 "Minutes of Full Committee Meeting, June 3rd, 1940," CSTAP-NAA.
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to the discrepancies among different instructors' ratings on the same flier. The pilots were "much
like foremen." Everyone claimed to know who a good pilot was, but such a belief did not stand
scrutiny. When the researchers checked one group's ratings against the previous year's ratings on
the same group by different instructors, the coefficient of correlation was only 0.20, which meant
"approximately a chance agreement." The scientists could predict, the explanation went, a
student's second rating "almost exactly as well by rolling dice or drawing number from a hat as
we could by asking the inspector to rate him." Apparently, the instructors were not giving
objective and reliable ratings.62
If there was no reliable consistency in flight instructors' ratings, could psychologists do
any better? With the help of recording instruments, they thought they could. Psychologists hoped
to bring in a battery of instruments to record and analyze "what actually goes on in the air" or
even "what the eyes actually do while a pilot is landing his ship." Instruments were believed to
show "in terms beyond argument about the mechanical performance of good and bad fliers and
of expert and novice fliers." By recording what good fliers really did in the air on papers,
photographs, or movie films, the instruments would establish "the general patterns of good
flying," against which student fliers could be compared for improvement. In fact, the
instrumental recording on a massive scale was what this research program was doing "the first
time in the history of aviation." Of course, Jenkins admitted, instruments could not "tell the
whole story" and mechanically great performance could not make one a good pilot "in a total
sense." Jenkins emphasized that the instruments were to "supplement," not "supplant," the
62 "The 1939-40 Program of the Committee on Selection and Training of Civilian Pilots-Summary Report Given
by Dr. Jenkins before the Full Committee on June 3, 1940," CSTAP-NAA.
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instructors' views on candidates.63 The tone, however, felt like a lip service. It was different from
that of Longacre who, in 1930, wrote that if some quality had to be evaluated "in the air," it
needed to be done by an instructor. In 1940, psychologists were putting measuring instruments in
the air as well as on the ground, evaluating pilots and instructors.
Once the definition of a good flier was presumably sorted out, the next task would be to
find out what made a good flier. Even if the real-time recording of great flight performance
offered a standard for each student, whether the individual would and could reach it was a
different matter. Especially, it was believed that there was always going to be a bottom group
who would never make through the training and become a capable pilot. What did these people
have in common? It was still assumed, as it had been ten years earlier, that there were qualities or
traits that an individual possessed even before one arrived at the flight school and that would
likely determine one's failure or contribute to one's success as a pilot. How much of the traits
were given at birth or attained through upbringing remained undetermined and would continue to
be discussed. What had changed, however, was the means to find them. It had to be done
quickly, within hours if possible, objectively with recording instruments, and on a massive scale,
at least 10,000 per year but possibly even larger number if the war came.
"In a Functional or Operational Sense"
McFarland's research projects since 1939 through the wartime were conditioned by these
requirements. As part of the NRC Committee activity, McFarland was charged with the analysis
of psychological and physiological characteristics of the student fliers from Boston area schools.
The CPTP trained 320 students in the area during the 1939-1940 academic year: 80 from
63 "The 1939-40 Program of the Committee on Selection and Training of Civilian Pilots-Summary Report Given
by Dr. Jenkins before the Full Committee on June 3, 1940," CSTAP-NAA (emphasis original).
133
Harvard, 60 from MIT, 30 from Boston College, 30 from Tufts, 10 from Middlesex University,
20 from Northeastern, 10 from State Teachers College, 30 from Brown, 30 from Providence
College, and 20 from Springfield College.64 McFarland's team at the Fatigue Laboratory in the
Harvard Business School asked these students to come to the laboratory twice, one for
physiological tests (basal metabolism, respiration, and circulation) and another for psycho-motor
tests. To facilitate participation, McFarland visited each school and gave lectures on the pilot
training program and the researches in selection and training of pilots, or "human factors in
aviation," including his own studies about trans-Pacific flights. 65 As a result, the research team
managed to give laboratory tests to 216 students during 1939-40: 75 from Harvard, 54 from
MIT, 20 from Tufts, 16 from Boston College, 31 from Northeastern, 10 from Middlesex College,
and 10 from Hyannis College.66 At the same time, McFarland conducted a similar study for 400
naval aviation cadets going through training in Pensacola, Florida, starting from summer 1940.67
And even earlier than Boston and Pensacola projects, McFarland studied 200 civil airline pilots
at Pan American Airways in San Francisco in the summer of 1939.68 Combining all three studies,
within one year from the beginning of the NRC committee, McFarland's team obtained a mass of
data from more than 800 pilots in different stages of flying career with different degrees of
success.
64 "CAA Student Pilot Training Program," box 86, RAM-WSU.
65 McFarland to Rev. John A. Tobin, 25 April 1940, box 86, RAM-WSU; McFarland to anonymous students, 27
June 1940, box 86, RAM-WSU.
66 "Summary Report on the Selection of Student Pilots in the Boston Area (1939-41)," box 87, RAM-WSU.
67 "A Proposal for the Analysis of Certain Physiological and Psychological Characteristics of Naval Aviation
Cadets, Pensacola, Florida, July and August 1940," box 89, RAM-WSU. For an account of the aviator selection
research at Pensacola NAS with a focus on EEG, see Kroker, "Washouts," 323-35.
68 Ross McFarland, Ashton Graybiel, Eric Liljencrantz, and A. D. Tuttle, "An Analysis of the Physiological and
Psychological Characteristics of Two Hundred Civil Air Line Pilots," Journal ofAviation Medicine 10 (December
1939): 160-210.
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With these subjects and test data at hand, McFarland's team attempted to gauge the
predictive capacity of each test in screening the good and poor pilot materials. The more
predictive a test was, the easier it would become to weed out failures in advance. Predictability
of a test was predicated on whether it produced a recognizable, consistent difference between
those who were known to be good and bad fliers. Supposing that it was possible to designate a
flier as successful or not from instrument recordings, instructor opinions, or simply the length of
flying career, McFarland wanted to find out which tests on the ground-paper-and-pencil,
physiological, or psychomotor-produced scores that were neatly correlated with actual success
in flying.
McFarland's group considered several paper-and-pencil tests already available. For
example, Otis Self-Administering Tests of Mental Ability designed to measure "how well you
can think" was a mixture of vocabulary questions ("A man who is averse to change and progress
is said to be (?) 1 democratic, 2 radical, 3 conservative, 4 anarchistic, 5 liberal"), simple
arithmetic problems ("If a boy can run at the rate of 6 feet in %A of a second, how many feet can
he run in 10 seconds?"), factual knowledge ("Which word makes the truest sentence? Men are
(?) shorter than their wives. 1 always, 2 usually, 3 much, 4 rarely, 5 never") , and some value
judgments ("Which word makes the truest sentence? Fathers are (?) wiser than their sons. 1
always, 2 usually, 3 much, 4 rarely, 5 never"). After trials in the study, this was recommended
for screening out those who were unlikely to pass ground school courses or follow flight
instructions well. Bennett Mechanical Comprehension Test was also recommended. On the other
hand, Thorndike-Kelly Athletic Achievement Test, which asked examinees to list preferences for
games and sports (chess, music, motorcycle, golf, boxing, wrestling, etc.), was not recommended
since, despite its history of use during the previous war, it did not seem to "discriminate the good
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pilots from the poor ones." Revision would have to include questions more related to "eye-hand
coordination and the judgment of speed and distance in moving objects." Likewise, Revised
Minnesota Paper Form Board Test on the ability to see if geometrical parts would fit together
was not recommended, though it might be useful for selecting flight engineers. Strong Interest
Blank could not be recommended since it had many similar questions with other tests and was
too long to administer along with other tests. While Otis and Bennett tests took thirty minutes
each, the Strong test took sixty minutes.69 Overall, some paper-and-pencil tests were regarded as
correlated with flying ability, but others were unpredictive, long, or unrelated to flying.
Physiological tests also showed mixed results. Among the nine tests tried in the Boston
study, only two were recommended for pilot selection purposes. Breathing pattern test showed a
good measure of "emotional stability" under stressful conditions. Tilt table test, which combined
blood pressure and pulse rate while a subject was put on a tilting table at varying degrees, was
also recommended for an indication of both "physical fitness and emotional stability." The other
tests were either disapproved or regarded inconclusive for pilot selection. Schneider Index,
which had been widely used among flight surgeons as a combinatory measure of blood pressure
and pulse rate, was seen as inferior to the tilt table test, as the physiological components for the
index had "no direct relation to flying ability." Electrocardiogram test was considered useful for
accumulating normal and abnormal records but did not show any strength in testing aptitudes for
flying.
69 Samples of these pencil-and-paper tests are found in box 86, RAM-WSU; Ross McFarland, "Progress Report on
Boston Study," 27 October 1947, box 87, RAM-WSU; McFarland, "Summary Report on Harvard Projects (1939-
42)," 1 June 1942, box 87, RAM-WSU.
70 McFarland, "Summary Report on Harvard Projects (1939-42)," 1 June 1942, box 87, RAM-WSU; "Analysis of
CAA Data, 1940," box 87, RAM-WSU.
136
Figure 7. Tilt Table Test
ICourtesy of Special Collections and Archives, Wright State University]
Perception tests turned out to be the worst. None of the five tests evaluated were
recommended. Pallesthesiometer test of vibratory stimuli, dark adaptation test, and aniseikonia
test did not seem much relevant to pilot selection though they might be good for other purposes.
The test on "perception of change of position," in which an examiner slightly moved the
examinee's chair in four different directions, was not recommended for more significant reason.
While the test had been used since World War I, it was no longer useful for the "modern flying"
environment, in which the pilot was to "depend on instruments and not on one's perception of
positions." Awareness of positional changes with one's eyes closed was not particularly useful
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for flying in the early 1940s and could not be a differentiating factor between good and poor
pilots.7 1
Figure 8. Perception of Change of Position Test
[Courtesy of Special Collections and Archives, Wright State University]
What received the most favorable consideration from McFarland's team were the
psychomotor tests. Three psychomotor tests-Serial Reaction Time Test, Two Hand
Coordination Test, Eye-Hand Coordination Test-were recommended for screening flying
aptitude. Especially, except for the Otis Mental Test, the Serial Reaction Time test and the Two
Hand Coordination test showed "more promising results in differentiating the poorer pilots from
the good ones than any of the others." In these two tests, the "wash-outs" in the Boston study and
the Pensacola study tended to belong to the lower half in a proportion not explained by mere
71 McFarland, "Summary Report on Harvard Projects (1939-42)," 1 June 1942, box 87, RAM-WSU.
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chance. If one was really poor at these psychomotor tests, it was likelier that the person would be
washed out during flight training. "By taking the bottom 5 or 10 per cent in these tests,"
McFarland stated, one could "eliminate many of those who would fail the training course, and at
the same time, only eliminate a few of those who would pass." 72 In other words, these tests
showed high "prognostic validity." 73 Moreover, the tests were shorter than others. While Otis
mental test, breathing pattern test, and tilt table test took thirty minutes each, it only took ten
minutes each for Serial Reaction and Two-Hand Coordination and twenty minutes for Eye-Hand
Coordination.7 4 Two central requirements for flying aptitude tests-predictability and speed-
were met by these tests.
Most of all, McFarland believed that the psychomotor tests were a perfect supplement to
medical examinations, which were still limited to "physical fitness," at least in McFarland's
view. The biggest problem of aviation medical examinations was that they were "not directly
related to flying" and therefore unable to recognize the "traits" that were useful or detrimental to
actual flying.
In certain respects the medical examinations for pilots have not been specifically related
to the tasks involved in handling the plane in afunctional sense. In other words, the basis
of disqualification in regard to certain cardiovascular or visual tests has not been
specifically related toflying. Many of the tests have been retained without an empirical
basis.75
72 Ross McFarland, "Psycho-Physiological and Psycho-Motor Tests in the Selection of Pilots," box 81, RAM-WSU.
73 Ross McFarland, "An Analysis of Flight Performance," box 81, RAM-WSU.
74 McFarland, "Summary Report on Harvard Projects (1939-42)," 1 June 1942, box 87, RAM-WSU.
75 McFarland, "Psycho-Physiological and Psycho-Motor Tests in the Selection of Pilots," box 81, RAM-WSU
(emphasis added).
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In his emphasis on psychomotor tests, McFarland made a frequent use of the phrase "specifically
related to flying." This criterion excluded most medical examinations which had been based on
and compatible with the notion of the pilot-flier. It implied that much of flight surgeons' work
was in fact not concerned with flying itself.76 Similar complaints had already been made around
1930 with a call for neuro-psychiatric or personality tests. But this time, the argument was not
simply that "mental" factors were as important in flying as "physical" ones. It was rather that
there were some mental traits "specifically related to flying" whereas many physical ones did not
have much to do with flying. And a psychologist, or a "physiological-psychologist" as
McFarland called himself, had "empirical basis" for his claim and the means to work on the
traits.
As indicated in the quote above, the key was the "ability to fly a plane in a functional or
operational sense." If tests were to predict one's "ultimate success in flying," they had to test the
skills that would "bear a direct relationship to a person's ability to operate a plane." This meant
that aptitude tests should account for a pilot's engagement with the stick and rudder as well as
some instruments available in the cockpit.77 McFarland thought that these qualities boiled down
to the capacity of coordination:
The ability to coordinate seems to be an important trait in appraising aptitude for flying,
along with the ability to think and act intelligently while carrying out motor responses
with the hands and the feet simultaneously.78
A very basic observation was made here: to "fly" a plane was to "handle" or "operate" it through
the coordination of hands, feet, and the mind. In a sense, this was tantamount to confirming the
76 McFarland, "Psycho-Physiological and Psycho-Motor Tests in the Selection of Pilots," box 81, RAM-WSU.
77 McFarland, "The Selection of Student Pilots," box 87, RAM-WSU; McFarland, "Summary Report on the
Selection of Student Pilots in the Boston Area (1939-41)," box 87, RAM-WSU (emphasis added).
78 McFarland, "Summary Report on Harvard Projects (1939-42)," 1 June 1942, box 87, RAM-WSU.
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fact a human being cannot fly like a bird. The pilot's relationship to the air would only be
actualized through the machine that he was operating. Accordingly, the apparatuses used in the
three psychomotor tests did not concern the pilot's body and mind vis-d-vis the rarified air.
Instead they focused on "functional or operational" perception, judgment, and movement that
occurred inside a cockpit. In other words, the psychomotor tests were designed to find the traits
for an attentive pilot-operator rather than a strong pilot-flier. If the pilot-flier was thrown into
"new and strange environment" of the air, the pilot-operator worked in a mechanical space made
of the stick, rudder, and most importantly, the cockpit instruments.
The Serial Reaction Time Apparatus used by McFarland was a modification from the
Mashburn Automatic Serial Action Apparatus originally developed by Major Neely Mashburn of
the Army Air Corps in the early 1930s.7 9 The Mashburn apparatus itself was an improvement
from the earlier reaction tests such as the Thorne Reaction Time test, the O'Rourke Coordinator
test, and the Reid test. The big difference was that the older ones were single reaction tests,
whereas the Mashburn apparatus aimed to test "serial reaction" that was thought to be closer to
"actual conditions of human performance." Here "human performance" did not mean the
maintenance of normal physiological function at high-altitude, which had been a main concern of
many physiological studies including McFarland's trans-Pacific study. It referred to the human
capacity to pilot a plane, in which stimuli were presented in a serial manner. "Relationship of test
to piloting and airplane," Mashburn wrote about his apparatus, was "close enough to bring forth
the best effort of the student."80
79 For a history of reaction time research in general since the late nineteenth century, see Jimena Canales, A Tenth of
a Second: A History (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009). See also Edwin G. Boring, A History of
Experimental Psychology, 2nd ed. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1950).
80 Neely C. Mashburn, "Mashburn Automatic Serial Action Apparatus for Detecting Flying Aptitude," Journal of
Aviation Medicine 5 (1934): 155-60.
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Figure 9. Serial Reaction Time Apparatus
[Courtesy of Special Collections and Archives, Wright State Universityl
The apparatus was "a highly simplified cockpit of an airplane," at least as seen by
McFarland.8 ' It consisted of a light panel, a seat, and the stick and rudder set. On the light panel
were three pairs of rows of small light bulbs, two of them horizontally parallel and the third
connecting them vertically. Light bulbs in one row in each pair were automatically controlled by
the apparatus setting (red light), and the lights in the matching row were lit by the subject's
control of stick and rudder (green light). The top row represented the aileron control (moving the
stick left-right), the bottom row the rudder control (pushing left or right pedal), and the middle
one the elevator (moving the stick forward-backward). The subject was told to respond to the
81 "A Proposal for the Analysis of Certain Physiological and Psychological Characteristics of Naval Aviation
Cadets, Pensacola, Florida, July and August, 1940," box 89, RAM-WSU.
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stimuli of red lights, as quickly as possible, by controlling the stick or rudder in appropriate
manner to turn on matching green light bulbs. In this way, the apparatus could "roughly simulate
the stick and rudder movements involved in flying a plane." The performance was rated by the
total time taken to finish forty stimuli settings. The faster the subject responded to the changing
light panel, the better qualified the person was as a pilot.82
The results from three years' tests seemed promising. McFarland's team managed to test
more than 1,800 pilots, from novices to experienced ones, in the Boston study of college
students, the Pensacola study of naval aviators, and the civil airlines study. In both Pensacola and
Boston studies where comparison between good and poor pilots was made, the poor ones tended
to score lower, showing "marked and statistically significant displacement." For example, in the
1940-41 cycle in the Boston study, the average time of forty-nine students who were rated
"good" by instructors was 4.84 minutes with a range between 3.52 and 6.57 minutes, whereas the
thirty-two "poor" students made an average of 5.97 minutes ranging from 4.43 to 8.65 minutes.
In fact, instructors did "wash out" five poorer students citing "poor motor aptitude." The
distribution table also suggested that if the bottom ten low scorers among the poor group (with
scores of 6.5 minutes or longer) had been sent home right away, the same score bar would have
eliminated only one among the forty-nine good pilots. For "both civil and military pilots,"
McFarland's report concluded, it would be possible to set a score limit of "predictive value," by
which to eliminate potentially poor ones "upon application for flight training."83
82 Ross McFarland and Ralph Channell, "A Serial Reaction Time Apparatus for Appraising Pilot Aptitude," March
1942 (report on the NRC research project), Rare Books and Special Collections, Francis A. Countway Library of
Medicine, Harvard University, Boston, MA. In the original Mashburn version, the stimulus light was in green and
the response in white.
83 Ibid.
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Like the Serial Reaction Time Apparatus, the Two-Hand Coordination Apparatus
required the subject to make movements similar to the actions that "a pilot must make while in
flight." The subject was told to manipulate two handles (perpendicular to each other) to keep one
disc over another randomly moving disc. In following visually the irregular movement of the
lower disc and making "rapid and accurate coordinated movements with both hands
simultaneously" to control the upper disc accordingly, the subject would reveal the ability of
"thinking and acting at the same time" when there was "a conflict of attention." While this test
was based on the principle of lathe, which had been previously used for tests in industrial
settings and therefore did not "duplicate" piloting movements, researchers believed that the test
involved "psychological behavior" not unlike to those of "controlling the stick with one hand,
and the delicate adjustments of certain instruments, or the throttle, with the other." The
performance was rated by the length of time during which the upper disc stayed exactly above
the lower disc. The longer the time was, the better the subject's aptitude for flying would be.
Here again, "a statistically significant displacement" was found among poor pilots. While the
test's reliability was not as high as the serial reaction test, it was still recommended to be part of
the motor coordination tests.84
84 Ross McFarland and Ralph Channell, "A Two Hand Coordination Apparatus for Appraising Aptitude for Flying,"
March 1942 (report on the NRC research project), Rare Books and Special Collections, Francis A. Countway
Library of Medicine, Harvard University. In the earlier version of the test, the score was based on the time during
which the two discs were separated, making the lower score a better performance. The scoring method was revised
to measure the time of the two discs' exact overlapping, making the higher score a better performance. The lower-
than-expected reliability had to do with correlation among different trials. It was attributed to the learning effects
over the course of trials and the low speed of the target disc.
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Figure 10. Two Hand Coordination Apparatus
|Courtesy of Special Collections and Archives, Wright State Universityl
Flying applicants eliminated by this sort of tests were thought to be different from those
screened by physical examination or personality study. As Mashburn acknowledged in 1935,
personality study had been useful to eliminate "queer guys, eccentrics, disturbers, irritable,
unsocial, peculiar, gossipy, arrogant, and other mental twist types-all unsuited to aviation."
This screening, however, was simply not thorough enough. Mashburn pointed out that, even after
elimination of the "personality handicapped," only 35 per cent were finishing the training school
successfully in the Army. Apparently, there was something wrong with selection methods. A
more objective process was necessary for "the selection of suitable men." As Mashburn insisted
with his own apparatus, the new method should focus on gauging an applicant's "traits as
measured by performance." McFarland repeated Mashburn's argument for "a battery of objective
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tests" to measure "potential flying ability." 5 The limitation of "rigid physical examinations" in
military flying would have to be overcome by looking at "motor coordination and related
psychomotor behavior." 6 The emphasis on "traits as measured by performance," as attempted
with the huge set of experimental subjects between 1939 and 1942, marked a departure from
earlier understanding of flying as art, a talent that was recognizable by someone who knew it but
not necessarily measurable or recordable. As Mashburn and McFarland defined it, flying
performance was to be measured by the swiftness to respond to the changing stimuli in the
cockpit (not necessarily from the outer world, though) and the dexterity of two hands in
coordination with visual tracking.
The instruments in the psychomotor tests performed at least two functions other than that
of selecting "suitable men." As McFarland and other psychologists designed psychomotor tests
"specifically related to flying," they were also designing the figure of the pilot-operator. During
the ten or twenty minute period of testing simple psychomotor abilities of the subject, they were
making statements about what a pilot's job was and where a pilot was situated. Self-evident as it
might sound, the pilot was to sit in front of an instrument panel with hands on the stick and feet
on the rudder pedals. The cockpit, the workplace of a pilot, was not so much a "vertigo machine"
immersed in rarified air as an attention machine filled with instruments and controls. At the same
time, by careful design and use of the testing instruments, the psychologists were making it
explicit that they possessed the proper authority and expertise in pilot selection. As flight
instructors' ratings were considered "too unstable to be used as standards" and many existing
examinations were shown to be far from effective and exhaustive, the psychologists could claim
" Neely C. Mashburn, "Some Interesting Psychological Factors in the Selection of Military Aviators," Journal of
Aviation Medicine 6 (1935): 113-26. Mashburn was the director of Department of Psychology in the School of
Aviation Medicine, Randolph Field, Texas.
86 McFarland and Channell, "Two Hand Coordination Apparatus."
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a legitimate role in coping with "the advent of mass instruction" that required fast and objective
testing of tens of thousands of subjects.87 The significant saving of time in conducting these
psychomotor tests was certainly an advantage. Armed with these instruments and tests,
psychologists would be as effective in aviation as they had been in other vocational selections for
industry.
The "Men Who Know How to Take It" and the Boys Who Cried
While the psychologists worked hard to define a pilot and to set up objective measures to select
good ones, they never expected the one-hour psychological testing to be exhaustive or final. And
despite all the physiological and psychomotor tests, there remained rather subjective
considerations about pilots and piloting. Psychologists themselves continued to discuss other
means to differentiate good and poor pilot materials such as interviews or biographical
inventories. They also had to deal with the difference between military and civilian flying,
although the implicit goal of CPTP was to produce a pool of civil pilots who would turn readily
into military fliers. Flight instructors whose opinions were regarded "completely subjective" still
took students to the air and made evaluations that could disqualify them at any stage. And
finally, the student fliers participated with varying degrees of expectation and enthusiasm, which
could potentially undermine the validity of these tests.
For example, members of the NRC full committee meeting in May 1941 discussed how
much education was desirable for selection as a military pilot. David Grant of the Army Air
Corps noted that the current system tended to look for education instead of intelligence, by
87 Ross McFarland and Alfred Holway, "The Measurement of Flight Performance in Relation to Piloting. I.
Introduction," March 1942 (report on the NRC research project), Rare Books and Special Collections, Francis A.
Countway Library of Medicine, Harvard University.
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exempting the college-educated from exams. "Take a high school and pick the boys from an
intelligence standpoint," Grant proposed to the contrary, "you would get a better group of
pilots." At least for military flying, Grant believed, intelligence mattered more than education,
since the military did not look "merely for the men to fly but for men who know how to take it
after they know how to fly." Apparently, to know how to fly was not the essence of being a
military pilot, since "[y]ou can teach anybody to fly but you can't make pilots of them." A pilot
was someone "who can stand the gaff." Grant could almost ask why, then, they would bother to
test all the psychomotor skills. James Adams of the Navy's Bureau of Medicine and Surgery
expressed similar views. Navy would look for, Adams said, "fundamental intelligence rather
than attained educational standard" and also for one's "constitutional stability" to endure "the
stresses associated with military flying." The nature versus nurture dichotomy was being made
for pilot selection, but here the emphasis was clearly put on innate traits such as "fundamental
intelligence" rather than on psychomotor skills that one might attain through practice.88
Similar suggestions were made for civilian pilots as well. An anonymous memo either
written by or sent to McFarland advised aviation examiners to start to look, among eight to
twelve year olds, for "the characteristics of successful as well as unsuccessful pilots" and then to
use them for future selection. It was assumed that the virtues of a good or bad pilot could be
discoverable by the age of eight. The first of "unfavorable characteristics for flying" was
"brilliant scholastic achievement." Its counterpart on the "favorable characteristics" list was
more specific: "A scholastic record not of the first rank nor in the rank of mental retardation-
rather, a rank in the middle or upper third is preferable." Not unlike with military pilots, it was
desirable to select civil pilots who had shown "a willingness from 8 to 12 year old to fight." To
8 8 
"Minutes of the Meeting of the Full Committee on Selection and Training of Aircraft Pilots," 25-26 May 1941,
CSTAP-NAA (emphasis original).
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be avoided was "a bully which is a camouflaged coward." So were "musical, poetical or artistic
tendencies," which meant emotionalism. "Vivid personalities" indicated "inconsistent"
individuals, whereas a person of "reason" would show "neither passionate likes or dislikes."
Combined with other psychological and physiological criteria such as reaction time, digestion,
respiration, or skin dryness, these impressionistic suggestions on where to find the best pilot
materials ended with a note that was an essentialist claim: "On the whole one would expect to
find the most favorable candidates among the northern cold adapted than among the tropic
adapted group, i.e., a Nordic, rather than a Latin. Quick thinking and slow emotion is the key."8 9
The most prominent among these non-measurable traits was "the desire to fly." In the
annual committee meeting in June 1943, upon hearing the story of a man who traveled across the
country to take the exam repeatedly until passing it on the fifth trial, J. G. Jenkins cited "the
genuine desire to fly" as a strong measure of "the ultimate ability to fly an airplane." Should the
military really turn down, Jenkins wondered, those who kept failing but never gave up?90 By a
similar logic, the army and navy officers believed that, even with all the tests that turned an
applicant into "a guinea pig," what mattered most might be just "the cadet's reason for
enlistment," according to a newspaper report.
No matter what other defects he may have, if he answers honestly that he is in the service
because he wants to fly, they know his chances of success are the greatest. There is no
substitute for that eager ambition.91
89 
"Suggestion for the Selection of Civil Pilots," box 86, RAM-WSU. Eugenic languages and techniques in pilot
selection will be examined more extensively in chapter 3.
90 
"Annual Meeting of Committee on Selection and Training of Aircraft Pilots," 26 June 1943, p. 15, CSTAP-NAA.
91 Foster Hailey, "War's Needs Spur Aviation Medicine" (unidentified, undated newspaper clipping), box 86, RAM-
WSU.
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Although military personnel put most emphasis on this factor of motivation, psychologists
generally acknowledged its significance as well. "Most important of all," McFarland noted in a
presentation on selection tests, "he should be eager to fly and be highly motivated to become a
good pilot."92 Indeed, McFarland found that CPTP student pilots scored higher averages than
naval cadets or civilian pilots in the serial reaction test due not only to their younger age but also
to higher motivation at the very beginning of their training. The same reason-differences in age
and motivation-seemed to explain the Pensacola flight instructors' lower scores than those of
successful cadets there. Meanwhile, the applicants for the Advanced Flight Officers Training
Course at Northeast Airlines, which offered possibilities of working as ferry pilots at Pan
American Airways, made the best average scores of all the groups tested by McFarland. Their
"desire to fly" could not be higher. 93
How could this desire to fly be measured? In CSTAP studies on interview methods, for
example, there was a rating scale for one's desire to fly from 1 to 25. The highest ratings for
those with "an ardent, irrepressible desire to become a flyer" were given to a student who "has a
very strong and sincere interest in becoming a flier; would rather fly than eat; bubbling over with
enthusiasm for flying; knows a lot about flying already; can't wait until he gets in the air; heart is
set on flying; has always wanted to fly." The lowest rating was given to an interviewee who "has
pseudo-interest in becoming a flier; is a 'draft-dodger'; drifted into flying; [thinks] flying is a
means to some other end; is only curious about flying." Although the interview method, which
included this rating sheet on the desire to fly, was judged inferior to easier and quicker paper-
92 McFarland, "Psycho-Physiological and Psycho-Motor Tests in the Selection of Pilots," box 8 1, RAM-WSU.
93 McFarland and Channell, "Serial Reaction Time Apparatus."
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and-pencil tests in the efficiency of time and cost and the predictive value, the "desire to fly"
nevertheless remained an important aspect of a good pilot.94
As a group the CTPT students in primary training did well on psychomotor tests, but not
all students in the group participated with a strong "desire to fly." Interviews with some students,
especially those who failed, reveal the complicated nature of the business of recruiting, testing,
and selecting a large number of people with varying personalities and interests. A student from
Harvard was rated "below average" and described as "rough" by his instructor, although he
scored higher than average in psychomotor tests, finishing the serial reaction test in 4.62
minutes. In an interview, he blamed his instructor, who was "a pain in the neck." At the same
time, the psychomotor tests were also "a pain in the neck." He still got good scores on them, the
student thought, because he had had experiences with similar kinds of tests. The early morning
training made it hard for him to stay alert and the instructors did not show much interest in the
students, either. He believed that he could become "a pretty good pilot" if given another chance,
but military flying did not attract him at all. As far as the interviewer could tell, "his way of
talking was listless and shifty, and he gave the impression of not giving much of a damn about
anything." Would that mean he was a man of "reason" with "neither passionate likes or dislikes,
" as suggested by a memo on pilot selection? The problem was, even when asked of flying, he
"didn't like or dislike it." 95
A slightly better case in terms of motivation was an MIT student, who did not think
seriously about "becoming a competent pilot" but started training "merely because it was in the
line of his interests." But it turned out that his academic schedule was so tough as to make it
"impossible to keep his appointments." The study was always a priority. All of his psychomotor
9 Morris Viteles, "The Aircraft Pilot: 5 Years of Research," Psychological Bulletin 42 (1945): 489-526, on 499-500.
95 "Interview with [a Harvard student]," box 86, RAM-WSU.
151
scores were "considerably above average" and his instructor had no other complaints than his
missing the appointments. He ended up quitting, however, since the time ran out. By contrast,
another student had a fair desire to be a pilot, but did not care much about psychomotor tests.
Enrolled in the advanced course as a self-described "pretty good pilot," he did not show the usual
pattern of psychomotor test performances. His scores were low in the serial reaction and two-
hand coordination but higher than any others in the eye-hand test. There was "no incentive to try
hard" in the tests, since he was in the mood of "playing around" and was not even aware of the
timing evaluation until in the middle of the serial reaction test. Some instructors' biggest
frustration might have been another MIT student, who was washed out in the spring of 1941.
Though the simple reason was "inaptitude," a longer description by his instructor read,
"washout-? 'cries' tense, fear, no confidence." 96
The rich detail of individuals' motivations and preferences may seem to complicate the
statistical validity and prognostic value of psychomotor tests. It also revealed, however, that
McFarland and other psychologists were right at least on one point. The selection or elimination
by flight instructors' evaluation was a long process. An instructor Thurston Plantings had to
spend quite some time with three students including the Harvard student, before writing about
why they should be disqualified.
In my opinion these students are not the best pilot material, because they lack initiative or
self-confidence. Reaction time is slow. That is, after receiving instruction and
demonstrations several times on some simple procedure, they still will not make any
attempt to follow them. For example, there is not any attempt made to ease the throttle
after takeoff. There is no attempt made by these boys to do anything by themselves.
96 The interview reports and the instructor evaluation sheets are in box 86, RAM-WSU.
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Everything that is done regarding flying, it must either be done for them or they must be
told to do it. Even such a simple thing as getting a dispatch card when they come in for
their flight. In general, the greatest trouble with these boys is that they lack self-
confidence and initiative plus a slow reaction time.97
For these unmotivated students, this instructor could be "a pain in the neck." For psychologists
like McFarland, his descriptive report was representative of the "subjective judgments about the
pilot," which would have to be supplemented by more objective and faster measures.98
Subjective or objective, slow or quick, selection could be done either way, but there was
no one best way for all occasions. For the relative merits of different methods were predicated on
the circumstances and purposes of selection. When there was pressure to recruit as many
personnel as possible, the selection criteria had to get lower and the pace quicker. And by the
summer of 1941, such pressure was building up for pilot training. CPTP had started in 1939 by
training 11,000 a year, an ambitious number, but in 1941-42 the Army was planning to train
more than 50,000 pilots and the Navy more than 15,000. "Will it be possible to get," asked
Jenkins in the NRC committee meeting, "in one year, 70,000 boys who can pass the present
qualifications?" What seemed necessary to consider under this kind of pressure was the
"administrative applicability." From the Navy's experience in selection, James Adams stated,
"the personal interview is out." Taking psychiatrical approach instead of psychological one was
not encouraged, either. Being "self-administrative and readily applicable" was certainly valued.
At the same time, the washout rate in Navy's Pensacola station dropped suddenly from 30 per
cent in summer to 7 per cent in fall 1941, which seemed to Alexander Forbes of Harvard less like
selection than the drive "to get them through." H. M. Johnson of Tulane University wondered if
97 Instructor Thurston Plantings's description of three students with poor performance, in box 86, RAM-WSU.
98 McFarland, "Psycho-Physiological and Psycho-Motor Tests in the Selection of Pilots," box 81, RAM-WSU.
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"the tendency to pass as many as possible" was putting the work of selection after that of
training. "The group passed may include," Johnson worried, "a large proportion of those who
will cause trouble later." If instructors were asked to "give extra time to get a man through,"
wouldn't they get the impression that "there is no use in washing out a man"?99
The discussion above touched on a deeper question on "the relative importance of
training and selection." If the focus was on getting as many pilots as possible and the aptitude
tests were eliminating only 5 per cent or so, would it still be meaningful to put much effort on it?
Did selection matter at all under the pressure of maximum recruiting? CAA's Dean Brimhall
claimed that, like in chemistry, the "real washouts" in flying would occur only in later stages "as
problems become difficult," and also that improvement in washing out those 5 per cent was
much worthwhile. On the other hand, Walter Miles of Yale University saw more possibility of
psychologists' contribution in training than in selection. Selection by tests, Miles pointed out,
was "only one part of selection." There also existed "the social structure of selection," which was
beyond the control of psychologists or any other selection officers.
It is automatically a cut-off due to the general opinion as to the qualifications of a pilot.
The matter of selection is always going to be against the frame of the other and more
general screening processes that are drawing men toward aviation or keeping them from
it.
If the process of selection was not confined in recruiting stations but enmeshed from the
beginning in social structures and cultural perceptions, one would have to acknowledge the
limitations on what a battery of tests could achieve. In training, by contrast, there was "greater
99 "Minutes of the Meeting of the Full Committee on Selection and Training of Aircraft Pilots," 25-26 May 1941,
CSTAP-NAA.
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opportunity." Miles believed that "you can teach individuals more aviation skills if the training
can be better schematized." 00
The opinions on pilot selection varied from strong emphasis on functional and
operational aspect of piloting to the eventual importance of one's personality and the desire to
fly. Overall, it remained undetermined to what extent the selection of pilots could concern with
their operational behaviors within the cockpit as compared with character traits and life histories
that aspiring fliers brought into the cockpit from outside. The students continued to arrive at
recruiting stations as socially structured and culturally shaped individuals, and the vague notion
of "aptitude for flying" could not reduce them neatly onto paper-pencil, physiological, or
psychological tests. McFarland's emphasis on the psychomotor ability to operate a plane
presupposed the pilot as an operator sitting in front of a machine within the mechanical space of
the cockpit. Effective as it was for selection purposes, however, this cognitive-mechanical view
of the pilot did not make trivial the heterogeneous characters and life histories of those who came
from "all sections of the country, and all kinds of upbringing and environment." The cognitive-
mechanical abilities "specifically related to flying" was not a guarantee for a person to be a good
pilot. Very often, experiences and situations outside the cockpit turned out to be very much
related to flying in the cockpit. This was especially true once a person was selected as a pilot and
put into the cockpit. For, at this point, flying was not simply a skill set but one's life as well.
The Sedentary Life of a Pilot inside the Cockpit
What does a pilot really do when he is flying? This was the question that drove McFarland's
research toward the functional and operational aspects of piloting and the psychomotor tests to
1 "Minutes of the Meeting of the Full Committee on Selection and Training of Aircraft Pilots," 25-26 May 1941,
CSTAP-NAA.
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measure them. The same question served as a guide in his other research on pilots. In an article
published in the New England Journal ofMedicine in 1941, McFarland set out to explain the
fatigue in pilots. Fatigue as a scientific concept had not been clearly defined. There was little
scientific agreement as to where fatigue was located and how it happened. But, as a subjective
feeling of being tired or as a manifestation of decreasing work efficiency, there was no question
that fatigue was a real phenomenon. "In a practical sense," McFarland wrote, "everyone,
particularly a pilot after a long flight over difficult terrain and in adverse weather conditions,
understands in a subjective sense what is meant by the words 'nervous and physical exhaustion'
and 'fatigue.'"" 0
One of the big challenges in pilot fatigue study was that the existing studies on the fatigue
of workers or athletes could not be directly applied to pilots. 0 2 Unlike factory laborers, athletes,
or infantry soldiers, pilots belonged to "more sedentary occupations." Previous studies with
ergographic records, McFarland wrote, "sheds little light on the fatigue problem in aviation, in
which the pilot's gross musculature is not used excessively." Reports on glucose intake from
"heavy muscular work" was not useful to understand pilots' exhaustion, either. From the
physical and physiological point of view, pilots were fundamentally different from other
workers: "Since the pilot's life is, for the most part, a sedentary one, with only partial use of the
gross musculature, it is unlikely that the reserves of energy would be exhausted." For pilots,
energy exhaustion was "hardly be an important causative factor in fatigue."103 It may be noted
here that "sedentary civil occupation with poor or moderate success" was among the unfavorable
101 Ross McFarland, "Fatigue in Aircraft Pilots," New England Journal of Medicine 225 (1941): 845-55.
102 For the concept of the fatigue in workers and various research and policy measures to deal with the fatigue
problem in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, see Rabinbach, The Human Motor: Energy, Fatigue, and the
Origins of Modernity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).
103 McFarland, "Fatigue in Aircraft Pilots."
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factors in the personality study for pilot selection in the early 1930s. More "active, successful
civil life" might be better for being a pilot, but physically and physiologically speaking, a pilot's
life was sedentary in essence.' 0 4 A pilot sat still in the cockpit, with not much muscular
movement.
Where, then, should one look to explain the pilot's fatigue? McFarland turned to
"psychologic factors," which touched on many aspects of a pilot's life outside the cockpit. They
included "emotional stress, regardless of whether it is related to adverse flying conditions, fear of
accidents, economic and social insecurity, and unhappy marital adjustments." A pilot with many
challenges in life was prone to be fatigued. And here was the job for flight surgeons in the
maintenance of pilots' condition, if not in selection. They should "know the airmen well enough
so that they will discuss their emotional problems freely and openly," and emotionally unstable
pilots "should be grounded until their difficulties are straightened out." Other factors that
contributed to pilots' fatigue were the ones they had more control of: exercise, diet, alcohol and
tobacco. McFarland believed that food was more important than any other factors for a pilot's
efficiency. Meals before or during a flight, pilots were told, should be high in calories. They
were advised not to believe cigarette advertisements that implied "smoking necessarily goes with
being a good athlete, explorer or aviator" and also not to smoke before breakfast. Stable
personal, economic, social life maintained by temperance, not bravery, was the
key to a successful, though sedentary, life of a pilot. 0 5
The sedentary life of a pilot required someone who took good care of oneself. In an
article published in 1942, McFarland reiterated his view regarding who could sit in the cockpit of
a modem (commercial) plane. "Piloting a modern airplane does not necessarily demand a person
44 Longacre, "Personality Study," 44-45.
105 McFarland, "Fatigue in Aircraft Pilots."
157
of unusual physical make-up, but only normal men who are well endowed mentally and
physically with emotional traits of stability and poise." This statement was almost a repetition of
what flight surgeons had said around 1930; they did not look for supermen but just those with
average or average plus fitness. What was new in McFarland's view of a pilot was the increasing
attention to the self-maintenance of one's condition for flying. "Even under the present
conditions of operating," McFarland added, "pilots who live hygienically with due regard to rest,
exercise and diet, and are moderate in the use of tobacco and stimulants may be able to maintain
a high degree of efficiency until 50 years of age or longer."' 06 Given the fact that pressurized
cabins were not a routine fixture yet, the threat of rarified air did not go away, but now it was at
least believed that the problem of air (oxygen) could be managed by a well-disciplined pilot. The
days were gone when flying was a liberation from the ground into the free air. The life of a pilot
was configured in a cockpit and vigilantly maintained outside the cockpit. 0 7
The Psychomotor Pilot
At the annual meeting of the CSTAP in June 1945, Morris Viteles, then the chairman of the
committee, summarized the five years' research program. Among many achievements and
findings, Viteles cited its work on "the possibilities of psychomotor tests" that had been
incorporated in the Army Air Forces Classification Program. These psychomotor tests were
designed to measure and monitor what was thought to be analogous to a pilot's behavior in the
cockpit rather than the pilot's bodily stability or change in the air. By contrast, the committee had
106 Ross McFarland, "The Psychological Aspects of Flying, with Special Reference to Problems of Selection,"
International Clinics 1, series 5 (1942): 17-35.
107 As a later chapter will discuss, these findings of McFarland provided a framework to think about pilots and other
operators of machines, which materialized as two influential books on human aspects of aviation, both written by
McFarland: Human Factors in Air Transport Design (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1946) and Human Factors in Air
Transportation: Occupational Health and Safety (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1953).
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also showed "the limitations of physiological measures in predicting success in learning to
fly." 08 Many of physiological tests were judged to be of "low reliability" since they tended to
give "merely a measure of a biological instant" rather than physiological indicators during a long
flight.' 0 9 They were not representative of an actual flight. As a predictor of success in flying,
especially in the context of urgent military recruitment and training of a large number of
candidates, the physiological pilot was less useful than the psychomotor pilot. The pilot-operator,
as presupposed and shaped by the psychomotor tests, was a practical figure that was conceived
and acted upon for the purpose of quick and efficient selection of wartime pilots. In this regard,
the psychomotor tests constituted the "technologies of the operator," a set of instruments,
techniques, knowledge, practices, and rhetoric to recruit, position, train, constrain, and maintain
the operator." 0
To be sure, the physical and physiological pilot was not completely replaced by the
psychomotor one, but the latter acquired increasing significance over the period examined in this
chapter. Also, while more attention was given to psychomotor actions in the cockpit as a
predictor of a pilot's success, other factors-physical health, personal characters, or social
lives-turned into something that could be taken care of by a routine self-maintenance. These
qualities outside the cockpit were still contributing factors to the pilot's efficiency or fatigue, but
they were less predictive of one's success as a pilot. A technological personhood of an aircraft
pilot was a collaged product of multiple inquires that asked how much and what aspect of a
108 Morris Viteles, "The Aviation Psychology Program of the Committee on Selection and Training of Aircraft
Pilots-Annual Report-June 30, 1945," in The Contribution of Psychology to Aviation: Addresses at the Annual
Meeting of the Committee on Selection and Training ofAircraft Pilots, National Research Council (Washington:
Civil Aeronautics Administration, 1945), 17-26.
109 Viteles, "The Aircraft Pilot," 498.
110 For a review of psychomotor tests for military pilot selection up to the 1990s, see Glenn R. Griffin and Jefferson
M. Koonce, "Review of Psychomotor Skills in Pilot Selection Research of the U.S. Military Services," International
Journal of Aviation Psychology 6:2 (1996): 125-47.
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person was needed functionally in the cockpit or could be left outside the cockpit to be managed
otherwise.
The search for the psychomotor pilot can be located within the history of attempts to
define, produce, and discipline attentive individuals, who were expected to operate efficiently
and creatively in various configurations of modern capitalist society. Art historian Jonathan
Crary has argued that "attention," instead of being a timeless human quality, emerged in the late
nineteenth century as "a fundamentally new object within the modernization of subjectivity." "It
was through the new imperatives of attentiveness," Crary wrote, "that the perceiving body was
deployed and made productive and orderly, whether as student, worker, or consumer." As Crary
suggested, the legacy of this historically specific shaping of attentive subjectivity is manifested
in our contemporary conditions of life in front of television and computer screens.mI1
Psychomotor testing of WWII-era pilots belongs to this genealogy of modern attentive
subjectivity, especially when we consider the fact that the wartime studies of pilots led to
postwar formations of human factors engineering and ergonomics, whose object of study is the
attentive user/operator of machines.
Despite the psychologists' successful reformulation of flying as a cognitive task,
however, the body of the pilot remained much relevant to the business of selection. A group of
physical anthropologists, some of whom had connections with McFarland and his research, were
working with the Navy and the Army Air Forces on the question of the human body in airplanes.
On the one hand, instead of the human body's responses to the air, these anthropologists focused
on the body's inherent constitution. On the other hand, instead of the pilot's psychomotor
engagement with instruments and controls, they dealt with the problem of body dimensions
" Crary, Suspensions of Perception, 17 and 22.
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within the mechanical space of the cockpit. The next chapter will describe the relationship




Physical Anthropology, Somatotypes, and the "Functional Man" in the Cockpit
Introduction
At about the same time that McFarland and his colleagues were working on pilots' psychology,
physical anthropologists were approaching pilots from a different angle, that of pilots' physical,
rather than physiological, bodies. Their approach to pilot selection and training sought to answer
two big questions: (1) How does the pilot's physique contribute to his flying skill? (2) How
should the pilot's body be configured in the cockpit? These two questions conceptualized the
pilot's body in two distinct ways. One related the body to flying as the behavior of an individual.
The other saw the body bound to the aircraft as a machine. The first body was an anthropological
one and was animated by questions about pilots' constitution, physique, racial traits, and
masculinity. The second was a dimensional body, provided not so much with freedom in the air
as with comfort, safety, and efficiency in the cockpit. The two were not entirely separate, since
both bodies could only be assayed through analyses of various kinds of measurement. But
physical anthropologists, most of whom were Harvard-trained or -based, saw the first as a
scientifically interesting topic and the second as a mostly practical matter in their service for the
war efforts.
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The first question-of the correlation between a person's physique and his success in
military flying-was based on anthropometrical measurements, especially those involving the
technique of somatotyping. As a method of classifying body types with nude photographs,
somatotyping was developed by psychologist William Sheldon and adopted by physical
anthropologist Earnest Hooton and his students at Harvard in their search for the correlation
between one's body and one's temperament and behavior such as masculinity, juvenile
delinquency, and even flying.' Physical anthropologists argued that flying skill involved not only
physiological and mental functions but also some sort of personality or "type of behavior,"
which the somatotyping technique hoped to correlate with physique. They also believed that the
physiological and mental testing of pilots, elaborately developed during the war, was still
missing some important elements in flying aptitude, as evidenced by the fact that many cadets
who passed the tests often failed during training or that many who scored low still succeeded as
pilots. In other words, psychological or physiological tests were not enough objectively to
distinguish between the good and bad in flying aptitude. In producing a self-proclaimed
"objective" way of differentiating good pilots from bad ones, however, physical anthropologists
brought in assumptions and techniques from their eugenically motivated research on college
students, criminals, and juvenile delinquents. In this chapter, I will describe how the body of the
pilot came to be compared with the bodies of these other social groups, and moreover, how the
' For a history of modern anthropometry, usually in relation to racial and criminal anthropology, see Stephen Jay
Gould, The Mismeasure of Man, revised and expanded ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1996), chapters 2 and 3;
Nicole Rafter, Creating Born Criminals (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1997). The works of Cesare
Lombroso, a founding figure of modern (biological) criminology with the use of anthropometry in the late 19th
century, have been newly translated from Italian into English. Cesare Lombroso, Criminal Man, trans. Mary Gibson
and Nicole Hahn Rafter (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006); Cesare Lombroso and Guglielmo Ferrero,
Criminal Woman, the Prostitute, and the Normal Woman, trans. Nicole Hahn Rafter and Mary Gibson (Durham,
NC: Duke University Press, 2004). For the use of anthropometric data in history-"anthropometric history"-in
relation to social and economic conditions, see John Komlos, ed., Stature, Living Standards, and Economic
Development: Essays in Anthropometric History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).
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act of piloting was put in the range of behaviors, normal and abnormal, with which, the physical
anthropologists believed, one's physique was closely correlated.
The second question that the anthropologists addressed was concerned less with a pilot's
success than with his functionality, achieved through a better configuration, or integration, of the
body in the cockpit. In aviation history, talk of the integration of a pilot and his aircraft is
familiar. One could even say that "[m]an and machine merged into one, each lending qualities to
the other" even for the pilots in World War I. As historian Peter Fritzsche has described, during
World War I the machine gun was carefully synchronized with the aircraft engine, turning them
into "a single machine." It then incorporated the pilot as part of the synchronized entity.
Accompanying this mechanical integration, there also emerged an "almost personal relation," or
even "spiritual contact," between the pilot and the machine.2
It was not until the second World War, however, that aircraft designers took into account
the specific dimensions of the pilot's body. Requirements of longer flying hours, and more
cockpit instruments and personal equipment made it necessary to consider body dimensions and
machine dimensions as mutually dependent. While individual pilots always maintained personal
attachment to their aircraft, anthropometrical measurement and analysis turned the relationship
into a non-personal one by rendering the pilot a functional unit. The "functional man," as
conceived by the physical anthropologists, was not so much a person with qualities,
temperament, and behaviors as an entity with dimensions, postures, and (some) movements.3
2 Peter Fritzsche, A Nation of No Fliers: German Aviation and the Popular Imagination (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1992), 67-73.
3 The "functional man" was defined in Francis Randall, Albert Damon, Robert Benton, and Donald Patt, Human
Body Size in Military Aircraft and Personal Equipment (Dayton, Ohio: Air Materiel Command, 1946) (AAF
Technical Report No. 5501), 6.
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In what follows, I argue that the transition from the somatotyped pilot to the functional
pilot was mediated through the space of the cockpit. In other words, the cockpit turned the issue
of eugenic fit into the problem of dimensional fit. In this connection, it was significant that the
somatotype photographs for physique analysis were taken of a standing subject and the Army
Air Forces (AAF) diagrams of the functional man were drawn for a seated pilot. For what I
would call the "somatotypic man"-the subject and product of somatotyping-the ideal form of
a person was that of a Greek statue; the figure's full humanity was meant to be captured by
representing it in the nude.4 By contrast, the functional man acquired meaning only when seated
in front of machines or put inside personal gear, and might even look awkward and incomplete if
the mechanical parts were deleted from the picture. Rather than possessing a holistically
conceived human character, the functional man could be easily represented by an
anthropometrically crafted manikin, empty of subjectivity. While the somatotypic man was the
"total man" who stood independently of the flying task, the functional man existed only in his
relation with the machine; one lived in the world and the other was seated in the cockpit.
This contrast between standing and seated pilots does not merely suggest that there were
two different ways of representing pilots' bodies used for two different conformations. As
historian Shigehisa Kuriyama argues in his comparison of "the expressiveness of the body" in
ancient Greek and Chinese medicine, different ways of representing, seeing, touching, and
knowing bodies were "bound up with different ways of being bodies." Kuriyama suggests that
the strong interest in the muscular body, which appeared in Greek medicine and art but not in
Chinese counterparts, was "inextricably intertwined with the emergence of a particular
4 Indeed, William Sheldon's nude photographs for somatotyping are a worthwhile subject for discussion in art
history, as George Hersey did in his study of preferred body proportions in art from the perspective of sexual
selection. George L. Hersey, The Evolution of Allure: Sexual Selection from the Medici Venus to the Incredible Hulk
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1996), 90-100.
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conception of personhood," one that possessed "autonomous will" and "agency."5 I examine in
this chapter how the two conceptions of the pilot's body represented different modes of being a
pilot, as seen by physical anthropologists, military recruiters and instructors, and aircraft
designers. Individual pilots, who went through actual processes of selection, training, and flying,
might have continued to identify themselves with the first category. In the eyes of those who
measured, recorded, and configured the pilots' bodies, however, the second category proved
practical for the purpose of seating pilots in cockpits. Among possible somatotypes, the muscular
body of high mesomorphy, which was often associated with athleticism and heroism, was
considered better suited for flying than a fat or linear body. A muscular pilot was a heroic flier.
By contrast, the dimensional body of the functional man did not possess muscles, suggesting less
of a sense of agential efficacy-or, better, that agency could only be revealed in relation to a
machine. This mode of being a dimensional body does not trace back to antiquity, but emerged, I
argue, under the conditions of modernity to fill cockpits and other operating spaces of machines.
The concept of the functional man also marked a departure from the concepts of the
"average man" and the "ideal type" that had been central to the eugenic discourse among
physical anthropologists in the 1920s and 1930s. The study of the correlation between one's
physique and success in flying was based on the premise shared by many contemporaries that
there were unmistakably recognizable "types" of racial as well as individual bodies. These types
were derivable from a variety of anthropometric data including, most notably, the measurements
of WWI army soldiers. Physical anthropologists calculated "the average" out of this data, which
sculptors used to create "the Average Man" to be displayed in fairs and museums and regarded
5 Shigehisa Kuriyama, The Expressiveness of the Body and the Divergence of Greek and Chinese Medicine (New
York: Zone Books, 1999), 13 and 144.
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by the public as an ideal or a norm for them to strive for.6 Sheldon's somatotyping was similarly
concerned with classifying people into neatly designated types and eventually finding the
eugenically desirable "ideal type." And it was partly out of this search for an ideally suited type
that Sheldon and others conducted somatotype studies of pilots. 7 But as soon as a pilot of a
certain body type, ideal or not, was equipped with flying gear and seated in the cockpit,
engineers and physical anthropologists soon realized that they were not dealing with an average
man or a man of ideal type but with men of indefinite variations and idiosyncrasies. Moreover,
some dimensions that were not essential for determining "types" such as buttock-knee length
and finger or grip diameters-were necessary for the functional man's fit in the cockpit. At least
for the sake of practicality, instead of the average or the ideal type, the percentile numbers were
used to ensure maximum inclusion. The requirement of the cockpit was more mundane than
ideal.
Even so, there existed continuities and overlaps among the physical anthropologists who
worked on the projects for measuring the somatotypic man's physique and the functional man's
dimensions. Albert Damon, who learned anthropometry from Hooton, produced studies of both
kinds in the same year (1946), one for his dissertation and another for the AAF. The two kinds of
man, therefore, were measured and drawn up with the same instruments and techniques, though
the somatotype photos were not included for the AAF study of the functional man. It is also
possible to see these two approaches to the pilot's body as complementary to each other. While
the somatotypic man's physique as a whole seemed to be useful for predicting one's flying
success and making decisions on selection, the anthropometrical dimensions of local body parts
6 Christina Cogdell, Eugenic Design: Streamlining America in the 1930s (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 2004), chapter 6.
7 For this line of study that predated Sheldon's, see W. B. Wilson, "The Ideal Body Type for an Aviator," Journal of
Aviation Medicine 9 (1938): 155-60.
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were deemed necessary for accommodating those who were actually selected as pilots. Once
selected for his (nude) body's superior nature, it could be said, the pilot was then seated in the
environment of the protective equipment and the cockpit designed with anthropometrical
considerations.
William Sheldon and the Technique of Somatotyping
On February 16, 1940, an executive meeting of the Committee on the Selection and Training of
Aircraft Pilots (CSTAP; see chapter 2) was held to discuss a number of research proposals. One
proposal under consideration, written by Eric Liljencrantz, who was one of McFarland's
collaborators, aimed to conduct "physical anthropology" of flying applicants with "the service of
anthropologists for measurements." Commenting on this proposal, McFarland noted that this was
to see if "pilots will fall into physical typology from the point of view of diseases." This line of
research was being done elsewhere, McFarland explained to other committee members, most
notably by William Sheldon. McFarland also added that Sheldon already worked on 10,000
cases, which would be published soon as two volumes with the help of the Harvard psychologist
S. S. Stevens. McFarland believed that these studies would "create interest and discussion." At
the time of this meeting, however, Sheldon's work on human body constitution had yet to prove
its efficacy, and the psychologists of CSTAP were not sure whether they should open the door to
this kind of anthropological research for the purpose of improving pilot selection and training.
The committee had not yet involved any other anthropologists, but McFarland thought that
anthropological work on the pilot's body might be useful if it could be "correlated with
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psychological studies."8 Indeed, Sheldon would end up working for McFarland's Pensacola
Study on naval aviators.
Sheldon's research interest went far beyond simple measurement of bodies. Having
acquired a Ph.D. in psychology (1926) and an M.D. (1934) from the University of Chicago,
Sheldon devoted his research career to developing new techniques of making correlations
between individuals' body types and their temperament, personality, and behavior.9 Sheldon's
book The Varieties of Human Physique (1940), written during his temporary stay at Harvard,
was meant to be "an introduction to constitutional psychology." In order to make psychology
"useful," Sheldon set out to "bring system and order" in the ways psychology described human
differences. The first step was the standardization of the methods to chart "quantitatively the
varying physical endowments of individuals." In this volume, Sheldon tried to provide
"descriptive classification of the behaving structure: the physical constitution." And he aimed to
do this with "a three-dimensional system" applied to the data of 4,000 students from University
of Chicago, Wisconsin, Northwestern, Oberlin, and Harvard.' 0
For Sheldon, systematic measurement and classification of the human body was a
platform from which to ask questions that might be more important to psychologists. The
8 "Committee on Training and Selection of Civilian Pilots, Meeting of Executive Subcommittee, February 16,
1940," folder "Executive Committee Meetings, 1940," CSTAP-NAA.
9 For a brief biographical sketch of Sheldon's life and work, see J.E. Lindsay Carter and Barbara Honeyman Heath,
Somatotyping-Development and Applications (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), chapter 1, esp. 3-
15. There are only a few historical studies on William Sheldon. Stephen Gatlin wrote a master's thesis and then a
Ph.D. dissertation on Sheldon: "William H. Sheldon's Constitutional Psychology: The Somatotype as Fiction"
(master's thesis, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1992) and "William H. Sheldon and the Culture
of the Somatotype" (PhD diss., Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1997). For Sheldon's place in the
history of criminology and his relationship with Earnest Hooton, see Nicole Rafter, "Earnest A. Hooton and the
Biological Tradition in American Criminology," Criminology 42 (2004): 735-71; Nicole Rafter, "Somatotyping,
Antimodernism, and the Production of Criminological Knowledge," Criminology 45 (2007): 805-33. On Sheldon's
role in constitutional research program, see Sarah W. Tracy, "An Evolving Science of Man: The Transformation and
Demise of American Constitutional Medicine, 1920-1950," in Greater than the Parts: Holism in Biomedicine, 1920-
1950, ed. Christopher Lawrence and George Weisz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 161-88.
10 William Sheldon, The Varieties of Human Physique: An Introduction to Constitutional Psychology (with the
collaboration of S. S. Stevens and W. B. Tucker) (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1940), xi-xii.
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physique data in this volume would be juxtaposed with those in the second volume, The
Varieties of Temperament (1942), allowing for a possible correlation between the two kinds of
human differences. In plain terms, Sheldon was ultimately interested in answering the following
questions: "Do those who look most alike behave most alike? Does a particular sort of
temperament go with a definite physique? Can we predict a man's likes and dislikes by
measuring his body?" As Sheldon emphasized, these questions were far from novel at his time.
Rather, "the idea of a fundamental connection between physique and temperament" had been
repeated throughout history and numerous "artists, caricaturists, dramatists, and novelists" had
expressed this underlying assumption in their works. Sheldon defined "constitutional
psychology" as "the study of the psychological aspects of human behavior as they are related to
the morphology and physiology of the body." Sheldon's constitutional psychology was part of
the Constitutional Research Program, a holistic approach in medicine that attracted many
researchers in the U.S. during the 1920s and 1930s. As a critique of reductionistic approaches in
modern medicine, the constitutional research called for a focus on "the whole individual." In the
constitutional framework, studies of morphology, physiology, and psychology could not be
separated and the interconnection among them should be sought for. In this myriad of
interconnected elements, Sheldon chose to start with physical morphology, since he believed he
could find a secure "anchorage in the solid flesh and bone of the individual." It would then serve
as "frame of reference" to investigate other issues in human personality such as "physiological
function, susceptibility to disease, manifestation of temperaments, social adjustments, and so
on.""
"Sheldon, Varieties of Human Physique, 1-3. By Sheldon's definition, "constitution" meant "those aspects of the
individual which are relatively more fixed and unchanging-morphology, physiology, endocrine function, etc.-and
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Sheldon's originality consisted in the classification system of human physiques and the
instruments and techniques to produce such an archive of data. Sheldon introduced photography
to capture the subject's body dimensions.12 Typically, a nude photograph was taken of a subject
from three different angles-front, back, and side-using a revolving pedestal, so that the subject
did not have to move at all. After acquiring 4,000 sets of photographs from the five colleges,
Sheldon examined them and chose "the most extreme variations in physique," which was "an
easy task." To Sheldon's eyes, there were three kinds of extreme variations that seemed to "stand
out with especial clarity" and even to "be made of different stuff."'3 For those who might not be
convinced of the neat number three, Sheldon added:
Repeated combing of the population for what might reasonably be called a fourth basic
type of extreme variation simply yielded nothing at all. We were not committed to find
three first-order variants-and only three. It is, indeed, fair to state that we rather
expected to find more than three. We were initially reluctant to accept the conclusion that
only three fundamentally different extremes can be isolated.14
Apparently by happenstance, then, Sheldon's three types were found to "correspond,
approximately, to [Ernst] Kretschmer's three types-pyknic, athletic, and asthenic." Kretschmer,
a German psychiatrist, whose work Sheldon read and cited, had explored the relation between
body types and disposition to manic-depression and schizophrenia. Manic-depressive patients,
may be contrasted with those aspects which are relatively more labile and susceptible to modification by
environmental pressures, i.e., habits, social attitudes, education, etc."
1 Of course, Sheldon was not the first to use photography for anthropometric measurement, but his innovation was
in the use of numerically scaled components in analyzing the photographs taken. For the use of photography for
anthropometry in the 19th century, see Frank Spencer, "Some Notes on the Attempt to Apply Photography to
Anthropometry during the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century," in Anthropology and Photography, 1860-1920,
ed. Elizabeth Edwards (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 99-107. For the creation of the "criminal body"
and the photographic archive, see Allan Sekula, "The Body and the Archive," in The Contest of Meaning: Critical
Histories of Photography, ed. Richard Botton (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1989), 343-88.
13 Sheldon, Varieties of Human Physique, 4-5.
4 Ibid., 31.
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according to Kretschmer, tended to be of the pyknic type (meaning, "compact"), while those
with schizophrenia often belonged to the asthenic (meaning, "without strength") or the athletic.
Moreover, as Sheldon noted in his historical survey of the field, the three-type system was also
used in the nineteenth-century phrenological literature as well as other classification systems of
human body after that. Whether or not he was influenced by these predecessors, Sheldon was
quite certain that "any experimenter can readily pick" those three extremes and therefore "the
procedure was strictly empirical and no a priori criteria were admitted."' 5
Figure 11. From the top, extreme examples of
endomorphy, mesomorphy, and ectomorphy.
[Source: Sheldon, Varieties of Human Physique,
frontispiece.
"5 Ibid., 20-27, 31, and 46.
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Sheldon thus claimed he could identify precisely three "components" in morphology that
would "differentiate one of the extreme variants from the others." Not satisfied with Kretchmer's
terminology, however, Sheldon called his three components "endomorphy," "mesomorphy," and
"ectomorphy" (see Figure 11). Endomorphy was defined as "relative predominance of soft
roundness" throughout one's body, in which "the digestive viscera are massive and tend
relatively to dominate the bodily economy." It was observed that endomorphic people were
"made of loose, flabby tissue" and would "float in water." In short, "[s]uch people are physically
weak." Mesomorphy referred to "relative predominance of muscle, bone, and connective tissue."
A mesomorphic body would seem "heavy, hard, and rectangular." But they were not necessarily
"athletic," as Kretschmer's term might indicate. With large and solid bodies, they could also be
"slow of movement, awkward, and 'muscle-bound."' Finally, ectomorphy was characterized by
"relative predominance of linearity and fragility." Being linear and fragile, an ectomorphic body
had "the greatest surface area" per mass and therefore "relatively the greatest sensory exposure
to the outside world" as well as "the largest brain and central nervous system."16
The essence of Sheldon's method was to rank the manifestation of each component and
assign a number. Examination of the photographs soon revealed that a human body would be
better understood as a mixture of these components rather than as only one type of the three. The
4,000 photographs were laid out in the order of the expressiveness of each component, regarding
five different regions of the body, which produced fifteen rank orders. Then a number was
assigned to each of the three components-i for the least manifestation of a component, 7 for the
maximum degree, and 4 for "halfway between 1 and 7." Sheldon was aware of the apparently
subjective nature of this numbering. One problem would have consisted in assigning numbers for
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16 Ibid., 4-5 and 31-32.
non-extreme or non-average aspects, namely 2, 3, 5, and 6. Here Sheldon attempted to "objectify
the procedure" by acquiring anthropometric measurements from the photographs, though not
directly from the bodies. A total of eighteen "anthropometric indices" were used-seventeen
measurements and an index from one's height and weight-to complement "inspectional criteria
(anthroposcopy)" (i.e. visual observation) in determining numbers for all the subjects. Sheldon
claimed that this practice of using anthropometric data made the number assignment "a
thoroughly objective procedure." As a final act of launching a new scientific technique, Sheldon
coined a term for this neat numerical result of nude photographing, visual inspection,
anthropometry, and interpretation: the somatotype. It referred to "the patterning of the
morphological components, as expressed by the three numerals." (Sheldon instructed his readers
how to read a somatotype; 354 is three-five-four, not three hundred fifty four.) Sheldon could
find only 76 somatotypes among the 4,000 students. For example, the research team found some
"excellent examples of the striking 712," but they could never find a 713 in the sample,
prompting Sheldon to state that "[c]ertain somatotypes appear not to have been created." Sheldon
left open, however, the possibility of finding more somatotypes in the future within other
samples. 17
To capture other characteristics of physical constitution not represented by the three
numerals, Sheldon introduced "secondary variables," the list of which revealed Sheldon's
underlying assumptions about different kinds of human bodies. Dysplasia, for instance, aimed to
describe "disharmony" in one's body proportions. A body was called dysplastic if different
17 Ibid., 5-7 and 60-63. Indeed, many somatotypes that Sheldon had not seen in his American college sample were
found among a Japanese sample in a 1945 study (see chapter 4). Even within the American population, Sheldon
found 12 more somatotypes, partly due to additional subjects and partly through re-somatotyping of existing records,
increasing the total number of somatotypes to 88. This new result was published in William Sheldon, Atlas of Men:
A Guide for Somatotyping the Adult Male at All Ages (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954). Sheldon made a direct
analogy between his method and that of Mendeleyev, who created the periodic table of elements. Sheldon, Atlas of
Men, 5-6.
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regions in the body showed different somatotype numbers. By inference, a harmonious body
would be the one with same somatotype numeral-same degree of roundness, muscularity, and
linearity-across different regions of the body. Another was gynandromorphy, a measure of "the
bisexuality of a physique," which Sheldon also rated on the scale from one to seven. The other
secondary variables were less numerical. Texture, for which Sheldon could not yet provide
"objective defining criteria," was the degree of "fineness" or "coarseness." No less difficult to
measure objectively was hirsutism, the degree of "the abundance of body hair." Combined with
the numerically assigned somatotype, these variables constituted an important part of "the
scientific study of man."'
At first glance, the large number of types in Sheldon's somatotyping may seem to be a
departure from the contemporary academic and popular discussions that were based on only a
few designated types and the averages. In the 1920s and 1930s, psychologists and physical
anthropologists offered ordinary Americans the concept as well as the actual figures of the
"average man" and "racial types." Robert Yerkes, for example, used the results of I.Q. tests on
WWI army recruits to provide the average of white male Americans' intelligence, which turned
out to be at the level of a thirteen-year-old. He also claimed to show that the Nordic race scored
the highest.19 The anthropometrical data of WWI army soldiers were employed to create
sculptures of the average American. Most famously, the American Museum of Natural History
displayed "the Average American Male," which was a work of Jane Davenport Harris, the
18 Sheldon, Varieties ofHuman Physique, 7. Due to the unavailability of clear, standardized photos of women,
Sheldon could not work on women's somatotypes to the extent that had been possible for men. The team
nevertheless produced some results of women's somatotypes from "the inspectional method" but without
anthropometric measurement. Remarkably, "the same 76 somatotypes that are found among men seem to occur
among women, and no more, although the distribution of the population among the somatotypes is different" (p. 66).
9 For Robert Yerkes and I.Q. testing, see Gould, Mismeasure of Man, chapter 5; John Carson, The Measure of
Merit: Talent, Intelligence, and Inequality in the French and American Republics, 1750-1940 (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2007), chapter 6.
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daughter of biologist and well-known promoter of eugenics Charles Davenport. Physical
anthropologists such as Earnest Hooton gathered and analyzed anthropometrical data of
thousands of Americans to produce a list of "pure" or "mixed" "racial types" (discussed below).
Racial types-not only in America but throughout the world-were rendered into sculptures,
most notably by Malvina Hoffman, whose works were displayed at the Chicago Field Museum's
Hall of Man in the 1930s. In 1942, statues of an average American man and a woman, named
Normman and Norma, were created by a researcher-sculptor team and attracted much public
attention, even leading to a Norma contest-finding the one who looks most like Norma-in
Ohio. In addition to the "average man" of the present, "a superman of tomorrow" was envisioned
as a possibility with the advancement of the science of eugenics: "a man of superior intellect,
immune from many diseases, with a greater span of life and power to choose the sex of
children." Indeed, a Superman with an ideally shaped body had his debut in popular culture in
1939 as a comic books character created by Jerry Siegel and Joe Shuster.
The "varieties" of human bodies that Sheldon emphasized were not offered as a
refutation or invalidation of the prevalent practices of setting up the "average man" or the racial
"ideal type" in contemporary psychology and physical anthropology. Rather, Sheldon's work
had the effect of embedding these forms in a putatively more objective language, combining
what Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison have called "mechanical objectivity"-by the use of
20 Mary K. Coffey, "The American Adonis: A Natural History of the 'Average American' (Man), 1921-32," in
Popular Eugenics: National Efficiency and American Mass Culture in the 1930s, ed. Susan Currell and Christina
Cogdell (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2006), 185-216. The concept of the "average man" is traced back to the
astronomer and statistician Adolphe Quetelet. See Theodore Porter, The Rise of Statistical Thinking, 1820-1900
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).
21 Cogdell, Eugenic Design, 190-204; H. Gordon Garbedian, "Science Pictures a Superman of Tomorrow," New
York Times, 8 December 1929, quoted in Cogdell, Eugenic Design, 46. Ever since Quetelet's first conceptualization,
the "average man" was casually presented not simply as a mean value but as a sign of normality. As Allan Sekula
writes, "the 'average man' constituted an ideal, not only of social health, but of social stability and of beauty."
Sekula, "The Body and the Archive," 355.
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photography-and "trained judgment"-by an experienced somatotyper's visual inspection and
22decision. In addition to being seemingly factual descriptions of bodies, Sheldon's 76
somatotypes were given differential moral and cultural weights, and Sheldon did not fail to
recognize among them the "average" as well as the "heroes." For example, for the somatotype
344, the most frequent among male college students, Sheldon asserted that, "This is the 'average'
young man." The numerical average in all components, namely somatotype 444, was common
but "the most dysplastic," since "nature" would not be able to "hold in balance so many strong
components" without losing balance in some regions of the body. Sheldon also matched his
types to famous religious or cultural figures. The somatotype 235 was "the most acceptable
visualization of the Christian Messiah," followed by 236, which appeared in about 30 percent of
the artists' rendering of him.23 The honor of "the masculine ideal" went to 172, "which, in heroic
moments, rides in the romantic imagination of both men and women." Sheldon's celebration of
this mesomorphic man was deeply rooted in contemporary popular culture:
As an ideal, it carries supreme strength and masculine ruggedness with no trace of
softness or weakness, yet it also carries a secondary note of ectomorphic linearity and
sharpness of outline and feature. This is the legendary ideal of nearly all combative and
dominating peoples. The perfect hero for the serial action-thriller of the cinema or of the
newspaper cartoon is the 172. "Tarzan," "Dick Tracy," "Smilin' Jack," "Li'l Abner,"
"Superman" and so on, all are fine 172's. These are the current heroes.2 4
2 Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, Objectivity (New York: Zone Books, 2007).
23 Sheldon, Varieties of Human Physique, 155-72.
24 Sheldon, Varieties of Human Physique, 190. For a history of "muscle-consciousness" as well as the "the
enchantment of what, to us, look like muscular bodies," see Kuriyama, Expressiveness of the Body, chapter 3.
Kuriyama also points to the artificiality of extremely muscular bodies, unachievable without extreme bodily exertion
and food intake, which may be employed as a critique of Sheldon's claim of naturalness and permanence of
physique. The figure of the "masculine ideal" has been reproduced in later heroic characters. Art historian George
Hersey juxtaposed Sheldon's photograph of a 172 type and a drawing of Batman from 1970, commenting that
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Through Sheldon's sifting through college male nude photos, the "superman of tomorrow" was
brought to the present and made recognizable on the street or in comics and movies.
Sheldon's preference for three types rated on a seven-point scale continued in his
treatment of human temperament, published in 1942 as The Varieties of Temperament. Just as he
did in the classification of body morphology, Sheldon could pinpoint three basic "components"
of temperament. Viscerotonia referred to "general relaxation, love of comfort, sociability,
conviviality, gluttony for food, for people, and for affection." For a person of viscerotonia, "[t]he
digestive tract is king, and its welfare appears to define the primary purpose of life." The second
component, somatotonia, was defined by "a predominance of muscular activity and of vigorous
bodily assertiveness." A somatotonic person was someone who valued "action and power." The
last component, cerebrotonia, was characterized by "a predominance of the element of restraint,
inhibition, and of the desire for concealment." A cerebrotonic person tended to be
"hyperattentional" and also to "sedulously avoid attracting attention to themselves." To arrive at
these three first-order components, Sheldon and his colleagues started with 650 temperament
traits, which were "sifted, condensed, and described as systematically as possible" to produce a
list of 50 traits. Calculations of correlations among these traits led to the discovery of three
groups of traits that seemed to be highly correlated among its own group but negatively
correlated with others. Just as in the search for morphological components, Sheldon emphasized,
the neat classification into three groups was not a result of a priori conception.2 5
We did not start with the three components. These were arrived at empirically. Indeed
they in the first place forced themselves upon us, and we believe that anyone who will
"Batman ... is clearly a 172 or close to it, though compared to Sheldon's figure Batman has extremely long legs-a
variation that we have seen as both Michelangelesque and Aryan." Hersey, Evolution ofAllure, 96-97.
25 William Sheldon, The Varieties of Temperament: A Psychology of Constitutional Differences (with the
collaboration of S. S. Stevens) (New York: Harper & Row, 1942), 10-14.
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follow our procedure in detail will be confronted by the same three components. We
merely accepted these three components, building around them only in later stages of the
construction of the Scale.26
Sheldon even claimed that he had in fact "entertained a hypothesis that probably at least four
primary components existed-both temperamentally and morphologically." If there had been the
fourth, Sheldon "expected" it to be of sexuality. But his search for it was futile.
Figure 12. A floor plan for a somatotyping station.
ISource: Sheldon, Atlas of Men, 351.1
Sheldon's claim of objectivity is in retrospect unsettled by Barbara Heath. She worked
closely with Sheldon as an assistant and collaborator in the late 1940s and early 1950s on various
projects including the photographing and somatotyping of almost 4,000 college women. In a co-
26 Sheldon, Varieties of Temperament, 402 (emphasis original).
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authored textbook on somatotyping (1990), Heath states that, in the course of her work on the
publication of Atlas ofMen (1954), Sheldon asked her to manipulate, with scissors, some
photographs to make them fit with the extreme types he wanted to present (e.g. from 1.5-2.5-7 to
1-1-7). This sort of expose, had it been released at the time, might have tainted Sheldon's
reputation, but not substantially. Even though he included nude photographs as examples for
each somatotype, giving an impression that actual bodies of certain somatotypes existed in
reality, he also cautioned the reader that "perhaps no living physique is a perfect example of a
somatotype." The descriptive characteristics were distilled, Sheldon noted, from "a large number
of photographs spread out on a table," each of which could not be similar to the last detail.28
Therefore, the usual critique that real persons of any pure type were almost non-existent in
reality was not a serious concern to Sheldon.29 "It cannot be too strongly emphasized," Sheldon
wrote, "that in describing somatotypes we are not describing people."30 The power of
somatotyping, Sheldon believed, lay in the impersonal quality of the numbered types, out of
which it was possible to calculate correlations. As Sheldon acknowledged, each intermediate
stage of assigning numbers for physique and temperament might have been subjective, but when
27 Carter and Heath, Somatotyping, 12. Eventually, Heath severed her relationship with Sheldon and worked to
modify the methodology of somatotyping.
28 Sheldon, Varieties of Human Physique, 141. Sheldon made an analogy between his method and what Mendeleyev
did to create a periodic table of elements, and called his arranging and re-arranging of somatotype photographs the
"Mendeleyev method." He also pointed to the fact that Mendeleyev's initial table had many blanks, which were
eventually filled since Mendeleyev's death, implying that his own somatotype classification would go through
similar stages. Sheldon, Atlas of Men, 6.
29 For inherent tensions between schematic classification systems and the nonconformity of the real world, see
Geoffrey C. Bowker and Susan Leigh Star, Sorting Things Out: Classification and Its Consequences (Cambridge,
MA: The MIT Press, 1999), esp. chapter 6. For a historical account of physical anthropology research on "races"
and "types" in the late 19th and the early 20th century, including Franz Boas's critical thinking on the issue and "the
passing of a romantic conception of race-of the ideas of racial 'essence,' of racial 'genius,' of racial 'soul,' of race
as a supraindividual organic entity," see George Stocking, Jr., "The Critique of Racial Formalism," in Race, Culture,
and Evolution: Essays in the History ofAnthropology (New York: The Free Press, 1968), 161-94, quote on 194.
30 Sheldon, Varieties of Human Physique, 142.
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taken as a whole, it was a process of "objectification," producing numbers that are comparable,
calculable, and conducive to standardization.
By emphasizing that the three-component schemes in physique and temperament were
made separately, Sheldon set himself up to be surprised by the "higher correlations" than he had
expected between morphology and temperament. Correlations were found between endomorphy
and viscerotonia (+.79), between mesomorphy and somatotonia (+.82), and between ectomorphy
and cerebrotonia (+.83). Although Sheldon was reluctant to assert that one's somatotype
sufficiently explained one's personality, he did emphasize the need to consider the somatotype
seriously in any study of human personality. Admittedly, the causal link must be more complex,
but it could be at least said that "[t]hose who are 2-3-5's are not found to behave like 7-1-l's,
however they may have been 'conditioned,' and mesomorphs do not ordinarily develop
cerebrotonic characteristics."32 A perceptive reader, however, would have found it hardly
surprising or impressive to observe a high correlation between a body type defined as "relative
predominance of muscle, bone, and connective tissue" and a temperament defined as "a
predominance of muscular activity and of vigorous bodily assertiveness." The correlations were
almost anticipated by clever definitions of somatotypes and temperaments.
Sheldon's attempts to relate the way one's body looked and the way one behaved had
eugenic implications. In a genealogical explanation of his own research path, Sheldon regarded
the nineteenth-century phrenology literature as "rich in human insight" despite its "questionable
scientific validity." He was also excited by the Italian scholar Sante Naccarati's research
conducted at Columbia University in the 1920s. Working with a small sample of 75 students,
31 Sheldon, Atlas of Men, 7. For the quantification practice in science and the notion of objectivity, see Theodore
Porter, Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1995).
32 Sheldon, Varieties of Temperament, 368 and 401.
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Naccarati "found the remarkably high correlation coefficient +0.36 between morphological index
and intelligence test scores."33 Inspired by Naccarati's "striking" outcome, Sheldon did a larger
study at Chicago with 400 students about morphology and mental abilities, but obtained much
less striking results. He was not deterred, however, since he believed that "[s]omething might be
there" if only he continued to "dig further." Despite repeated failures to get positive correlations,
Sheldon was consistently driven by "the same irritatingly persistent promise that deeper down
lay something very interesting."34
The eugenic implication was made more explicit, as Sheldon re-arranged the physique
and temperament data according to the order of the "achievement and adjustment" of the 200
college students in the sample. Sheldon set up four "sociological categories, or achievement-
groups," into one of which each student was designated through reviews and interviews: the
Superior Group, the Normal Group, the Unadapted or Poorly Integrated Group, and the
Constitutional Inferiors. It was observed that out of 29 students in the Superior Group sixteen
were "predominantly ectomorphic." The number accounted for about 30 per cent of all
ectomorphs in the sample, whereas only 10 per cent of endomorphs and 7 per cent of
mesomorphs belonged to the Superior Group. The majority of endomorphs (77 per cent) and
mesomorphs (71 per cent) fell in the Normal group as either "normal-without-effort" or "normal-
through-effort." In contrast, less than half of ectomorphs belonged to this group. "It is certainly
clear," Sheldon wrote, "that the 'normal' people about a university are mainly endomorphs and
mesomorphs." Between the two, the champion of normality was the endomorphs, as there were
no endomorphs found in the third, Unadapted or Poorly Integrated group. "Endomorphs seem to
be born for normality," Sheldon added. Compared with the normalcy of endomorphs and
3 Sheldon, Varieties of Human Physique, 11 and 15.
1 Ibid., 16-24.
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mesomorphs, the ectomorphs were those "who stand out as different." The flip sides of these
findings also had significant implications. The high likelihood of an endomorph to become "a
normal, adapted but undistinguished person" meant that he was "extremely unlikely to become a
troublesome misfit." A mesomorph, when not staying in the normal category, had a relatively
higher chance to become such a person. Both endomorphs and mesomorphs had lower chances
to make "distinguished achievement." Good or bad, the ectomorphs, at least those protected by
"the academic sanctuary," had more diverse possibilities ahead.35
One important question that arose with all these data of somatotypes, temperaments, and
achievements was about the changeability of the "components" over time, both in individuals
and nations. As to the individual somatotype, Sheldon had not observed such changes in an
individual in spite of "dramatic enough changes in nutrition and metabolism." Somatotype was
believed to exist below the level where "environmental influences" could reach. The changing of
one's somatotype was so unlikely that it was "comparable (although not equivalent) to that of
changing the race of an individual." The possibility of change at the national level, however, was
uneasily paired with the stability of an individual's somatotype. It was well known to Sheldon
that the stature of Americans had been increasing in the past decades, but the changes in
somatotypes, if any, had not been documented. "Possibly America has been growing a little more
ectomorphic," Sheldon noted cautiously. 36
More important was the question whether some changes in temperament would
accompany the changes in somatotype in a nation or in a race. Sheldon did not have a clear
* Sheldon, Varieties of Temperament, 384-90.
36 Ibid. 431-34. To be fair, Sheldon acknowledged a possibility of changes in a person's temperament, associated
with physiological changes caused by endocrine therapy or surgery.
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answer, and for some insight into this, he turned to examples of other nations, a move possibly
affected by the expansion of the war at the time:
According to a sample of 186 Chinese students in American colleges, the South Chinese
are at the present time among the least mesomorphic (and presumably among the least
somatotonic) of the peoples of the earth. Were they once more mesomorphic? Have they
degenerated (or perhaps evolved) from a more mesomorphic and somatotonic stock, like
that of the present-day Japanese? Would it be possible through selective breeding to
speed up or reverse the present trend-whatever it may be?3 7
Here Sheldon took the recent Japanese move toward another war as a case of somatorosis, an
over-manifestation of somatotonia. If a war was to be understood as an act of an excessively
somatorotic nation, Sheldon suggested, his constitutional research could predict "these costly
tidal waves of somatorosis among geographic groups," that is, the recurrence of war in human
history. Of course the same could be applied to Germany. Sheldon considered the post-WWI
measures toward Germany as a failure, since the focus had been only on "the economic and
political appeasement of an essentially impenitent, historically somatorotic group of people."
Sheldon asked himself and his readers, "Had we been able to define somatotonia, is it possible
that we might have saved Germany from herself and ourselves from Germany?" Going beyond
the issues of individual criminal behaviors or immigration policies that had occupied many
eugenicists, Sheldon gave himself a task of predicting and even preventing wars by examining




Somatotypes and the Successful Navy Pilots
For Sheldon, the war was more than a venue for a theoretical speculation about what his research
program could do. The war offered Sheldon an opportunity to apply his somatotyping technique
to American fliers in the military. When McFarland started his Pensacola study of naval aviator
selection with many colleagues from Harvard, Cornell, Brown, and Dartmouth (many of them
now on Naval Reserve, including McFarland) in the summer of 1940, he included a study of
physical constitution. Although he did not go to Pensacola as a research staff, Sheldon worked
with the posture photographs sent to Harvard from Pensacola. He studied hundreds of naval
aviators in an attempt to find a correlation between body types and success in flying and wrote a
section with S. S. Stevens for the project's progress report in 1941. As of May 1941, nude
photographs of 600 cadets and 100 instructors were taken in the laboratory facility, which also
housed apparatuses for serial reaction time test, two-hand coordination test, tilt table test, and
electroencephalography on the same floor. The photographs of 700 people were somatotyped at
Harvard and 250 of them were also examined for the second-order characteristics of dysplasia
and gynandromorphy.39
The results, when compared with those of the 4,000 college students, were "strikingly
different" in the frequencies of various somatotypes. It turned out that flying cadets were
"predominantly mesomorphs," some of whom were of the types rarely found in the college
population. On the other hand, ectomorphs were much more numerous among college students
than among pilots. More specifically, the number of people whose mesomorphy rating was the
lowest among the three components was five times higher at the colleges than in Pensacola naval
3 W. Sheldon and S. Stevens, "The Measurement and Description of the Physical Constitution of Aviation Cadets."
This report was a section in the "Selection of Naval Aviators, Pensacola Project, Progress Report, May 1941," in
folder: Progress Report: CAA, Selection of Naval Aviators (Pensacola), May 1941, CSTAP-NAA.
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station. The aviation population also seemed more homogeneous in terms of somatotypes, since
one could find only 41 somatotypes in Pensacola, roughly the half of the 76 types from college
students. The missing 35 types constituted about 20% of the college population. The study
suggested that naval pilots and elite college students possessed different kinds of bodies. In
Sheldon and Stevens's interpretation, this result warranted the exclusion of a significant portion
of college population from serving in the air. In fact, the somatotypes missing in Pensacola were
mostly those regarded "ill-adapted to coordinated muscular activity." The implication was that
"certain somatotypes appear definitely unsuited to aviation." Encouraged by this result, Sheldon
planned an analysis of the relation between "constitutional fitness for aviation" and actual
success or failure at flight training. Physical constitution, especially the somatotype, was thought
of as another predictive measure for a pilot's success.
Following his broader research agenda, Sheldon moved on to an explanation of
temperaments found in successful pilots. If morphology was somehow related to one's ability at
flying, the logic of constitutional research suggested that certain temperament traits known to be
correlated with morphology would also work as a predictor of flying success. Many of these
character traits were not so different from those mentioned in earlier personality studies on pilots
(see chapter 2): "Initiative, independence, an[d] essential aggressiveness" or "composure,
imperturbability. Antithesis to the tendency to become panic-stricken in crises." Also listed were
"relaxation" in the body and the manners and some "care-free buoyancy." Whereas McFarland's
psychomotor tests focused on the coordination between the two hands or between the hand and
the eye, Sheldon's constitutional approach valued "coordination of the body as a whole" that
40 Sheldon and Stevens, "The Measurement and Description of the Physical Constitution of Aviation Cadets,"
CSTAP-NAA.
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could be applied to "whatever he does," including baseball and golf. The contrast between good
and bad pilots was similar to that between a "body hitter" and an "arm hitter."
These characteristics were not, to use McFarland's phrase, "specifically related to flying."
Further afield from flying activity was an observation that Sheldon took from "several persons
experienced in aviation"; there seemed to be "a preponderance of the Nordic blue or gray eyes
among successful aviators." 4'
Working in the context of military aviation, Sheldon made a distinction between the
temperaments of bomber pilots and combat pilots, who were "naturally adapted" to each
specialty. The most successful bomber pilots, according to an "apparent agreement" among
aviators, were usually "especially relaxed, well composed" and were "ordinarily of heavier, more
endomorphic physique." By contrast, the combat pilots were found to be "more aggressive,
quicker in reaction, more athletic and mesomorphic, and more reckless and daring." A direct
fifteen-minute interview with each aviator, Sheldon claimed, would give more information in
this regard, and it had to be done by a researcher "well trained in constitutional analysis." The
presumably different natures of the bombing mission and the combat flight were not articulated,
but it was still possible to make correlations between somatotypes and temperaments on the one
hand and the success in different categories of flying.42
Sheldon's note of the predominance of mesomorphs and Nordic eye colors is neatly
consistent with the contemporary perception of the eugenic quality of successful military pilots.
In 1940, when the Pioneer Fund based in New York launched an experiment in positive eugenics
41 Sheldon and Stevens, "The Measurement and Description of the Physical Constitution of Aviation Cadets,"
CSTAP-NAA.
42 Sheldon and Stevens, "The Measurement and Description of the Physical Constitution of Aviation Cadets,"
CSTAP-NAA. Sheldon and Stevens also noted that a civil airline pilot was similar to a bomber pilot in terms of
physique ("massive or corpulent"), "overweight," and some physiological measures, putting the combat pilot again
in a separate category.
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to facilitate the reproduction of better human stocks with the Army's cooperation, the successful
pilots in the Army Air Corps became the target group as desirable fathers of superior babies of
the future. As an incentive for increased reproduction rate, the Fund gave the fourth child of an
Army pilot officer a scholarship fund of $4,000 with no strings attached. For both Sheldon and
the Pioneer Fund, it must have been no surprise that there existed more masculine types and
Nordic traits among successful military pilots.43
Or, the very correspondence between popular perception and Sheldon's observation
could be interpreted as undermining the legitimacy of his studies. In fact, the optimism and
confidence Sheldon and Stevens expressed in the progress report were significantly qualified by
the project's final summary report (November 1944) prepared by McFarland and Raymond
Franzen. Whereas Sheldon suggested that the higher frequency of mesomorphs in Pensacola had
something to do with their suitability for aviation, the editors of the report noted that there might
have been "a possibly unintentional bias in favor of the mesomorphic type" at the initial
selection center. Rather than reflecting an inherent correlation between somatotype and
performance, the results could be merely revealing "preconceived physical standards held by
who select pilots." A statistical analysis with such a "homogeneous" group could not offer many
practical lessons to apply to actual selection. A kind of what the Yale psychologist Walter Miles
called "the social structure of selection" (see chapter 2) was happening at the earliest stage of
pilot recruiting, potentially undermining Sheldon's claims. As a predictive test for success or
failure in flying, the somatotype analysis at Pensacola did not show promise. A more useful by-
4 Douglas Blackmon, "A Breed Apart: A Long-Ago Effort to Better the Species Yields Ordinary Folks," Wall
Street Journal, 17 August 1999. Psychologist John Flanagan conducted a family-size study of army pilots related to
this project of the Pioneer Fund, before he was commissioned as a major and established the AAF Aviation
Psychology Program. John Flanagan, "A Study of Factors Determining Family Size in a Selected Professional
Group," Genetic Psychology Monographs 25 (1942): 3-99, cited in James Capshew, Psychologists on the March:
Science, Practice, and Professional Identity in America, 1929-1969 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1999), 108.
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product was the discovery of the tendency or "bias" among physicians and selection boards "to
pick out the athletic type of individual (predominating in mesomorphy)." The predominance of
mesomorphs among successful pilots might as well reflect social and cultural perception about
what a pilot should look like, rather than a true manifestation of the potential in their physique.44
Explaining the methodology of somatotyping in The Varieties of Human Physique,
Sheldon included anthropometrical measurement as an objective supplement to the
anthroposcopic evaluation by a somatotyper. But he thought that the core of somatotyping lay in
the visual observation by a well-trained observer and that the numerical measurement would
change the outcome very little. Indeed, in the initial survey of Pensacola pilots in the summer of
1940, Sheldon only used anthroposcopic method and did not conduct anthropometrical analysis,
which he regarded as "a time-consuming process."45 For Sheldon, what eventually mattered was
a morphological type, visually judged by a competent somatotyper on a numerical scale. The
numerical values of varying breadths on the subject body were not Sheldon's research goal.46 In
this regard, Sheldon remained a psychologist by training, or a constitutional psychologist by his
own labeling. The concept and technique of somatotyping, however, held great appeal to
physical anthropologists concerned with the questions of human differences (racial as well as
individual) and evolutionary changes. During his two-year stay at Harvard University (1940-
1942), while working on his Varieties books with S. S. Stevens of psychology department,
Sheldon also had a lot of support from Harvard's best-known physical anthropologist, Earnest
Hooton. It was through the connection with Hooton that Sheldon's somatotyping technique
44Ross McFarland and Raymond Franzen, The Pensacola Study of Naval Aviators: Final Summary Report
(Washington, DC: Civil Aeronautics Administration, 1944) (report no. 38), 69-74.
45A practitioner experienced in anthroposcopy would finish four or five somatotyping cases in an hour. Sheldon and
Stevens, "The Measurement and Description of the Physical Constitution of Aviation Cadets," CSTAP-NAA.
It was always breadth of some sort, since the anthropometric data were taken on the photo of a subject.
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spread into the Army Air Forces in the form of a large-scale anthropometric survey of army
pilots.
Earnest Hooton and the Pilot Bodies in the Army Air Forces
Born in 1887 in Wisconsin, Hooton finished his Ph.D. in Classics at the University of Wisconsin.
It was during his stay at Oxford the next year as a Rhodes scholar that he received training in
anthropology and archaeology. Returning to America, Hooton took a position in anthropology at
Harvard, where he taught and researched until his death in 1954. Starting in the 1930s, Hooton
conducted several large projects in anthropometrical survey. Aided by the processing power of
the IBM machines installed at his laboratory in the Peabody Museum of Harvard, Hooton
vigorously measured, for example, criminals, college students, the Irish population, and the
visitors of the New York World's Fair. As his students Stanley Garn and Eugene Giles wrote in a
biographical memoir, Hooton's anthropometrical studies "represented a major management task,
keeping track of workers at distant locations, a major accomplishment in data handling
(thousands of completed anthropometric and observational forms), and a major accomplishment
in data analysis, made possible by the use of IBM punched cards and the Hollerith card sorter." 7
Combining technologies of management, logistics, and computing, Hooton attempted to
provide what he considered to be scientific and objective descriptions of human races, especially
those inhabiting America.48 In an essay titled "What is an American?" (1936), Hooton claimed
that only a physical anthropologist could offer an objective definition of an American. One could
47 Stanley M. Garn and Eugene Giles, "Earnest Albert Hooton, November 20, 1887-May 3, 1954," Biographical
Memoirs (National Academy of Sciences) 68 (1996): 167-79, quote on 170.
48 For Hooton's work on race and criminals, see Jonathan Marks, Human Biodiversity: Genes, Race, and History
(New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1995), chapters 6 and 7; Nicole Rafter, "Apes, Men, and Teeth: Earnest A. Hooton
and Eugenic Decay," in Popular Eugenics, ed. Currell and Cogdell, 249-68; Rafter, "Hooton and Biological
Tradition," 735-71.
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dismiss, Hooton wrote, "an alien nationalistic standpoint" that tended to reflect its "economic,
political, and social relations" and could amount to "literary and political hearsay." On the other
hand, most Americans' self-definition had a danger of falling into "a Narcissian self-
idealization." Physical anthropologists, by contrast, worked with "caliper measurements, indices,
morphological observations and statistical analysis," freeing themselves from biases and
prejudices. What gave the work of physical anthropology an impression of objectivity were
probably "drudgery" and the "abysmal boredom of the routine" that each analysis had to go
through. Even with a computing machine and well-classified forms, physical anthropologists
often had to take "a protracted sojourn in a statistical purgatory" before discovering something
meaningful. One of the prominent results from such scientific rigor and labor was the
classification of nine "racial types," which Hooton believed were "clear-cut and statistically
validated." 4 9
Hooton was well aware of the contentious nature of physical anthropology, especially
when it was used for racial differentiation in the U.S. "Anthropology is an innocuous pursuit,"
Hooton wrote, "only when restricted to the study of savages." When anthropologists turned their
eyes to the "civilized" parts of the world, they tended to "shatter cherished delusions." This was
particularly true in the case of physical anthropologists, who were "most suspect and least
tolerable" among all anthropologists. Contrary to cultural anthropologists who could enjoy
"relative impunity," physical anthropologists' inquiry could make people uncomfortable, since
they would "[strip] off the cultural veil and [examine] each individual man in his organic
49 Earnest Hooton, "What Is an American?" American Journal of Physical Anthropology 22 (1936): 1-26, quotes on
I and 8. For a critical comment on Hooton's notion of "types," see Edward Hunt, Jr., "Anthropometry, Genetics, and
Racial History," American Anthropologist 61:1 (1959): 64-87.
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nakedness, for which there is no alibi." Painful as it might be, Hooton thought, a nation should
face the anthropological truth.
Like many of his contemporary scholars in human heredity and social reformers, Hooton
did not hide the eugenic implication of his research. Hooton's list of nine racial types in the
white population started with "[t]he Pure Nordic type of pure blond long-heads" and ended with
"[tjhe mixed Dinaric type of round-heads with intermediate pigmentation and narrow noses."
Hooton analyzed the racial composition of the three groups surveyed- 5689 criminals, 815
"law-abiding civilians," and 2664 visitors at the Century of Progress Exposition-in terms of
each type's frequency in the population. What should one do with this result? On the one hand,
Hooton made clear his opposition to "the ridiculous and pernicious doctrines of racial
inequality." Each racial type comprised both criminals and respectable citizens. Anthropological
research did not offer any justification to single out a racial, ethnic, national, linguistic, or
religious group in its entirety as blessed or condemned. On the other hand, Hooton considered it
necessary "to segregate and to eliminate the unfit, worthless, degenerate and antisocial portion of
each racial and ethnic strain," so that the society's "sound majority" and "superior members"
could contribute fully to its betterment. Hooton concluded:
Racial purity is desirable and attainable in one sense only. Every racial strain in our
country, should be purified by the sterilization of its insane, diseased and criminalistic
elements. The candidates for such biological extinction would not be selected on the basis
of Aryan or Semitic descent, blond hair or black skin, but solely on the score of their
individual physical, mental and moral bankruptcy.
5 Hooton, "What Is an American?" 9-10.
" Ibid., 26.
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The role of physical anthropology would be to offer methodology and evidence of differentiation
not among races understood as holistic groups but among individuals with varying physique and
52capacity.
Hooton met Sheldon in 1938, when Hooton was conducting anthropological studies on
criminals to be published in 1939 as The American Criminal and Crime and the Man. Sharing
interests in criminals and eugenics with Sheldon, Hooton thought highly of him, calling Sheldon
"a genius" and even bringing him to Harvard for research. During Sheldon's stay at Harvard
until 1942, Hooton became a mentor of Sheldon and a supporter of his somatotyping technique,
although Sheldon's inhospitable personality eventually reversed Hooton's and other Harvard
colleagues' attitudes.5 3 It was to Hooton that Sheldon dedicated his book, The Varieties of
Human Physique. And when Pearl Harbor was attacked in December 1941, Hooton had already
been preparing to launch a major measurement project for the AAF, which included Sheldon's
somatotyping.
Anthropologists Go to the Army Air Forces
In February 1941, Hooton visited Wright Field in Dayton, Ohio, by invitation from Colonel Otis
0. Benson, Jr., who was heading the Aero Medical Research Unit there and had been assigned to
the Harvard Fatigue Laboratory since the summer of 1940. Benson had been working on
physiological issues in high-altitude flying, but was also aware of human body size problems in
aviation, which he discussed with Hooton at Harvard. At Wright Field, Hooton was asked to
52 Although Hooton did not regard a certain race as a whole as undesirable, the passage quoted above puts him
among what Daniel Kevles called "mainline" eugenicists. See Daniel Kevles, In the Name of Eugenics: Genetics
and the Uses of Human Heredity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985). Kevles mentions Hooton only
once, quoting him as saying that America needed "biological housecleaning" (p. 114).
" Rafter, "Somatotyping, Antimodernism," 818-19.
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examine American and British turret models and offer suggestions for relevant body dimensions
to be considered in the design and use of the turrets. Hooton advised Benson to conduct a large-
scale survey of the Army Air Corps personnel to investigate the suitability of existing equipment
dimensions and the implications for personnel classification and assignment.5 4
The plan for such a survey was almost ready at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack
through negotiation between Hooton and Benson. According to the plan, four physical
anthropologists would go to two pilot training centers (Maxwell Field in Montgomery, Alabama,
and Kelly Field, San Antonio, Texas) and two gunner schools (Tyndall Field in Panama City,
Florida, and Las Vegas, Nevada) to conduct anthropometrical surveys for three months. The data
thus collected would be sent to Hooton's office at Harvard, where his graduate students would
compile them. In addition to general anthropometric measurement, the physical anthropologists
in the field were also instructed to take somatotype photographs. For analysis of these
photographs, Hooton recommended the inventor of the technique, Sheldon.5 5 Soon Sheldon was
commissioned as a major and moved to the School of Aviation Medicine at Randolph Field in
Texas.
On December 10, 1941, Hooton wrote to Albert Damon to offer him a job in the
anthropometrical survey as a civilian scientist with a monthly salary of $200. Damon had studied
with Hooton as an undergraduate at Harvard and was now at the University of Chicago, having
just started the doctoral course in "Human Development." At Chicago, Damon was known as "a
Hooton man," pursuing Hooton's research agenda in physical anthropology. By the time Hooton
5 For the wartime research of American social scientists for the military, see Peter Buck, "Adjusting to Military
Life: The Social Sciences Go to War, 1941-1950," in Military Enterprise and Technological Change: Perspectives
on the American Experience, ed. Merritt Roe Smith (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1985), 203-52; Capshew,
Psychologists on the March; and Ellen Herman, The Romance ofAmerican Psychology: Political Culture in the Age
of Experts (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).
5 Hooton to Albert Damon, 10 December 1941, box 7, Earnest A. Hooton Papers, The Peabody Museum Archives,
Harvard University, Cambridge, MA (hereafter EAH-PMA).
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wrote to him, Damon had been busy with "a very delicate business" of getting "the green light"
for taking nude photographs (presumably of criminals) at state institutions. He also measured and
photographed young draftees at their physical examinations, especially the Irish, Italians, and
Jews, hoping to get "a fair approximation to the man on the street, between certain ages."
Incoming students at the university were also his measurement subjects.56 For the aspiring
physical anthropologist Damon, Hooton's offer was "exactly what I've hoped I could do."
Damon was more than willing to suspend his doctoral study as well as his fellowship from the
Social Science Research Council, since he thought that "my degree is much less important than
being of service in this way." Though his subject changed from criminals and college students to
pilots, Damon would be able to continue to pursue his research interests and serve his country at
war.5 7 In total, Hooton recruited four of his students for field measurement: Damon, Francis
Randall, Judson Shaplin, and Ivar Skarland. As Hooton's students, all of them were familiar with
basic techniques including Sheldon's body build analysis. Still, Hooton asked them to gather in
Boston for training and practice before being deployed to each field station. Damon came from
Chicago in late January, 1942, and spent three weeks "standardizing techniques." He was then
sent to Kelly Field in San Antonio, Texas, and the gunnery school in Harlingen, Texas.58
All four field observers used the same "anthropological survey blank" designed by the
Aero Medical Laboratory's A. P. Gage, Hooton, and Carl Seltzer, another anthropologist at
Harvard. As Damon and Randall wrote in their article for the American Journal of Physical
Anthropology, the survey blank was "a combination of scientific interest, military utility, and an
56 Damon to Hooton, 5 December 1941, box 7, EAH-PMA.
57 Damon to Hooton, 13 December 1941, box 7, EAH-PMA.
58 Hooton to Damon, 12 December 1941, 31 December 1941, 6 January 1942, box 7, EAH-PMA; Albert Damon and
Francis Randall, "Physical Anthropology in the Army Air Forces," American Journal of Physical Anthropology
(1944): 293-316, on 299-300. The gunnery school in Las Vegas was dropped from the original plan for lack of
observers. The third aviation training school at Santa Ana Air Base, Santa Ana, California, could not be included,
either, leaving the West coast region uncovered in the survey.
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attempt to afford a physical basis for differential training of personnel." The AAF's biggest
concern was the turret size problem, but the survey contained more measurements and
observations for "general utility." The rare opportunity of working with such a large group of
subjects like this could not be devoted to just one critical issue. The front side of the survey
blank included items on personal background such as birthplaces (of examinee and his parents),
"national extraction," religion, education, occupation, marital status, and race, followed by
physical characteristics such as colors of hair, eye and skin, and vascularity. The next survey
item was one's somatotype with 7-point scales of each component, followed by scales of
androgyny and dysplasia. The reverse side featured 33 body dimensions, measured from a
subject in standing and sitting postures, and 12 indices calculated from various body
measurements. The anthropological survey blank was designed so that field observers could
finish one blank in 12 minutes.59
As with Hooton's earlier studies of criminals and others, the AAF survey required
systematic management and information processing. Four field observers were divided into two
teams of two people, and one team covered one aviation training field and one gunnery school.
Each observer mailed his daily measurement data to Harvard, using separate envelopes to reduce
the risk of postal errors. At Harvard's Peabody Museum, the received data was coded on IBM
punch cards under Hooton's supervision. In addition to Hooton and Seltzer as consultants and
the four field observers, there were two statisticians who participated in the analysis of the data.
The field measurement took two months from March to April in 1942, acquiring data from 2954
aviation cadets and 584 gunners. For the most urgent problem of turret size, the first thousand
surveys were tabulated and sent to Wright Field. With IBM equipment inside the building, the
59 Damon and Randall, "Army Air Forces," 297-99.
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Peabody Museum literally became a "centre of calculation" that drew raw measurements from
the AAF field stations and produced statistical data on the bodies of the AAF personnel.
Following criminals, college students, and Boston area residents, the aviation cadets and gunnery
personnel, who had physically gathered at the AAF stations from all over the country, were
brought to Cambridge, Massachusetts, in the form of anthropological data sheets. Their bodies
were turned first into a set of numbers for each part and then into a set of holes on the computer
card.60
As manifested in the organization of the survey blank, however, the AAF anthropometric
survey in 1942 represented two different agenda of anthropological research in the AAF. The
first was the use of physical anthropology, more specifically somatotyping technique, for the
purpose of pilot selection. Sheldon's original interest in finding correlations between physique
and human behavior was deemed directly applicable to pilots. The second was an investigation
about how human bodies came into close contact with machinery. The questions the AAF was
most interested in answering were "intensely practical":
how much clearance does the average (or the extreme) pilot or gunner need above his
head or across his shoulders? Where should a range pedal in a ball turret be located? How
many sizes of oxygen masks, clothing, or parachute harnesses are necessary, and what
proportion of each size should be produced?
To provide answers to these questions would "require the anthropologist to become an engineer
or designer himself," wrote Damon and Randall in 1944.61 If the first agenda represented
"scientific interest" of physical anthropologists, the latter aimed for "military utility." Whereas
60 Ibid., 298-300. For the "centre of calculation," see Bruno Latour, Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and
Engineers through Society (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), chapter 6.
6 Damon and Randall, "Army Air Forces," 294-96.
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somatotyping of pilots reflected Sheldon and Hooton's concern about "the elimination of the
unfit" and selection of the better, body measurement for equipment design aimed for
accommodation of maximum number of personnel. As a product of negotiation between wartime
military needs and long-standing research motivations, these two approaches co-existed in the
AAF anthropology program and offered different explanations about what kind of person a pilot
was and should be.
Damon's Physique Analysis and the Pilot as a Somatotypic Man
As Hooton's students, Damon and Randall thought highly of the use of somatotyping in the AAF
survey. They believed Sheldon's constitutional approach was "an excellent means" to relate
physique to other human qualities, since it was "concise, quantitative, and based on objective
anthropometry." As Sheldon briefly attempted to do with the Navy data in 1940, the method
seemed to offer much value for "the classification and differential selection of personnel."
Damon and Randall wrote of the work of Sheldon, who was now at the School of Aviation
Medicine in Texas, that it showed "a significant and usable correlation" between physique and
flying aptitude. The "early elimination of those unlikely to succeed" as judged by Sheldon's
method would greatly save "time, money, and lives." But as with Sheldon's other correlations,
all these benefits would only be possible "if such is conclusively established," which was rarely
the case.62
Damon and Randall's article published in 1944 did not give more details about
somatotyping study of pilots, but Damon would take up the topic more seriously. In the spring of
1944, still working for the AAF on what he cynically called "our clothing sizing program,"
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Damon sought Hooton's advice for his dissertation topic. Damon wanted to use the data he
collected at the AAF, but he was "afraid that even in wartime, anything on the practical
application of this stuff wouldn't make a respectable Thesis." What was necessary was a topic
"of scientific interest and importance" despite the fact that the data came from "such a selected
group."63 The final choice, presumably more scientific than practical, was "Physique and
Success in Military Flying." With this thesis work, Damon attempted an application of Sheldon's
constitutional program at a scale comparable to Sheldon's original work in Varieties of Human
Physique and Varieties of Temperament. Pilots became a major test case of the validity of
Sheldon's framework. It even preceded Sheldon's own application of this method to young
delinquents in 1949, in his book Varieties ofDelinquent Youth, which Sheldon claimed was "a
first report, a field report, on constitutional psychology in action."64 In addition to Sheldon's
somatotyping, Damon's dissertation employed two more methods to find correlation between
physique and flying success: the "classical anthropometry" of German anthropologist Rudolf
Martin and the "disproportions" analysis by Carl Seltzer of Harvard. If, as Damon expected,
there was a correlation between one's physique and flying ability, it was also necessary to find
the best measuring technique to reveal such connections.65
If successful, Damon's project would make an argument for anthropological criteria of
pilot selection, supplementing medical and psychological standards already in use (see chapter
2). To Damon, it seemed that the existing methods of pilot selection were permeated by "an aura
of subjectivity." In labeling other approaches as "subjective," Damon was repeating McFarland
63 Damon to Hooton, unknown date (most likely in March 1944), box 7, EAH-PMA.
64 William Sheldon, Varieties of Delinquent Youth: An Introduction to Constitutional Psychiatry (New York:
Harper, 1949), xvi.
65 Albert Damon, "Physique and Success in Military Flying" (PhD diss., University of Chicago, 1946), 1. In 1955,
Damon published a summary version of his dissertation as a journal article with the same title. Albert Damon,
"Physique and Success in Military Flying," American Journal of Physical Anthropology (new series) 13 (1955):
217-52. Unless noted otherwise, I refer to his 1946 dissertation in this chapter.
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and other psychologists' strategy to promote their own method as more objective. From Damon's
perspective, however, the subjective, unreliable methods included not only medical examinations
and flight instructors' ratings but also psychological tests. Citing L. H. Bauer, the editor of the
Journal ofAviation Medicine, Damon noted that the results of physical and medical exams could
not be an indicator of one's "flying aptitude, the exact nature of which is unknown." Damon was
also replicating Hooton's assertion of physical anthropology's sole authority to define an
American, when he discredited the efforts of flight surgeons, flight instructors, and psychologists
to define what flying was about and who a good pilot was. A truly objective, unbiased evaluation
was only possible with anthropological measurement.
Yet the morphological approach by Sheldon and Damon, in fact, built on the "subjective"
claims of senior pilots that one could readily recognize a good pilot when encountering one in
person. As Sheldon stated, "experienced aviators ... thought they could 'pick flyers' by looking
at them, watching them, or listening to them." What Sheldon meant, though, was different from
the psychiatric investigation of "the innermost self' discussed in the previous chapter. Rather,
what counted as basis for judgment was the way one's body looked; Sheldon observed that
"among pilots of proved flying ability, mesomorphs were strongly preferred and trusted."
Although it seems to be subject to pre-formed, unsubstantiated prejudices, this was meant as a
kind of holistic way of knowing a pilot, one that Sheldon, Hooton, and Damon embraced
themselves. For both experienced pilots and physical anthropologists, a pilot had to be
understood as a whole person. Actual measurement of physique had an effect of objectifying
666
customary "hunches" by assigning numerical values to the body.6
66 Damon, "Physique and Success in Military Flying," 10-1 1. Damon cites Sheldon's statement, which was
originally in William Sheldon, "Use of the somatotype in standardizing and objectifying the ARMA (Adaptability
Rating for Military Aeronautics)," Report No. 2, Project No. 127, AAF School of Aviation Medicine (unpublished).
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A holistic approach was not limited to the pilot's body. Flying itself was to be treated in a
similar manner. The ability to fly, which consisted of "physiological as well as psychological
functions," did not fully explain one's success in military flying. No less important were
appropriate temperament, leadership, and character. Rather than just mechanical activity with a
machine, flying was regarded as "a type of behavior," which would reflect "the total organism's
potentialities ... so deeply." A successful military pilot should possess "a definite, highly
complex pattern of personality." The definition of flying as "a type of behavior" rendered the
minute intricacies of operating a machine less relevant, instead allowing for a higher-level
anthropological, or constitutional psychological, treatment of pilots and flying. Involving the
totality of the person, flying was put on a spectrum of behaviors, ranging from academic
achievement to crime, that physical anthropologists and psychologists took as their domain of
expertise. From there it was logically possible to correlate the behavior of flying with physique
according to Sheldon's and Hooton's program. This totality of a pilot as a person was what
psychiatrists had tried to get at through interviews and biographical inventories. Instead of the
time-consuming and ultimately subjective measures of the total person, Sheldon and Damon
proposed to predict successful flying behavior from a person's physique, which would be faster
and more objective. The pilot as a holistic, somatotypic man and flying as a behavior were a
perfect test case for the constitutional research program.67
Indeed, Damon emphasized that his dissertation aimed for something larger than the
improvement of pilot selection: an inquiry of "the mind-body relationship." Important as it had
been during the war, the problem of pilot selection might no longer be a problem at all in the
future. Given the fast development of automatic navigation devices and weapons, Damon
67 Damon, "Physique and Success in Military Flying," 5-9.
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speculated, military pilots could one day be "victims of technological unemployment." Yet the
results of his study would remain relevant, since it was supposed to be part of the general study
in medicine and psychology with the focus on the "total man," discovering the relationship
between one's physique and one's temperament and behavior. For its advocates including
Sheldon and Damon, the constitutional research program was a reaction against the
"preoccupation with extrinsic factors" in explaining diseases and related biological problems.
Reviving the age-old holistic approach in medicine, this program sought to turn more attention to
"endogenous aspects of disease." Criminological work by Hooton, who had been influenced by
Italian criminal anthropologist Cesare Lombroso, was another application of this approach,
suggesting that explanations of criminal behavior should involve the individual's intrinsic
biological traits. Since one's physique, especially the somatotype, was believed to be intrinsic to
the individual and immutable during one's lifetime, it could serve as a solid basis to the
investigation of body-mind or body-behavior relationship. Likewise, morphological study of
pilots looked for the physique (endogenous aspect of a flier) that related to success in flying
(behavior or phenomenon to be explained). In this endogenously-oriented explanatory and
predictive frame, the focus was on what a pilot had already had in himself even before he started
to fly.68
It is not clear what exogenous factors for success in flying might have been, if one had
had to look for them. But, given this characterization of flying as involving strong endogenous
factors, functional and operational tasks in actual flying received little attention. Just as
biological theories of crime were concerned less about particular activities in crime than about
one's propensity to do criminal behaviors, anthropological criteria of pilot selection did not take
68 Ibid., 1-2. For the rise and fall of constitutional medicine in the first half of the twentieth century in the U.S., see
Tracy, "Evolving Science of Man."
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into account the actual moves made by pilots while in flight. A pilot was not a person who made
engagement with a machine, but someone who made a flying behavior. A particular aspect of a
person, like the psychomotor skill explored by McFarland, could not fully account for such a
complex "pattern of behavior" as success or failure in flying. Damon thought it worthwhile to
pursue further investigation of the concrete relationships between physique and other factors in
flying, the ones that psychologists also considered in devising various tests for selection. One
could ask, Damon suggested, whether physique was specifically related to "temperament and
personality; muscular coordination, strength, speed of reaction; perception; or with all of these."
Maybe a certain physique (e.g. mesomorphy) contributed to the strength to operate controls,
endowed one with better visual perception, or simply gave one stronger confidence. But Damon
left these questions for future studies. Even without knowing these specific connections, the
somatotypic man and his physique were still useful enough for predicting and selecting pilots. 69
The results of Damon's analysis confirmed all of these assumptions and hypotheses.
There seemed to exist "a clear association of physique with success in military flying."
Differences in physique were found among four groups with different levels of flying success:
non-fliers, beginners in flight training, recent graduates from flight training, and combat pilots
who finished a certain number of missions (at least 10). Moreover, Damon reported that
difference exited even between bomber pilots and co-pilots, as they were so assigned according
to their performance and leadership. The entire sample included 3,675 subjects; 426 students
from Harvard and Chicago and 57 AAF ground soldiers as non-fliers; 1,231 flying cadets and
109 aerial gunners as trainees; 885 graduate flying officers and 610 graduate gunners; and 161
bomber and fighter pilots returning from missions. These sample groups did not come from a
69Damon, "Physique and Success in Military Flying," 30 and 216-17.
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single measurement project; college students from surveys at each school, AAF cadets from the
survey Damon worked for during the war; graduate fliers from clothing sizing program; and the
"returnee" pilots from a postwar survey (October 1945) for aircraft seating and controls. Due to
the different circumstances in which each survey was conducted, the groups did not provide the
same set of measurements to permit simple comparisons. Even so, Damon claimed that there
emerged notable differences among groups.70
What were the differences? Among the measurements of classical anthropometry, chest
circumference showed the most marked differences among groups. It tended to increase not only
from non-fliers to fliers, but also from earlier stage fliers to more successful fliers. The increase
was both in absolute numbers and in the ratio to stature or head circumference. Among
somatotypes, mesomorphy was the key component differentiating the sample groups, as it
increased for each stage of flying success. On the other hand, gynandromorphy, the bodily
characteristic of the opposite sex, tended to decrease over successive groups. In addition,
successful military pilots were a more homogeneous group with less constitutional
disproportions. All of the techniques used-classical anthropometry, somatotyping, and
disproportions-combined to produce this result. In summary:
... physique at each of the four stages here contrasted is larger, more mesomorphic and
masculine, shows fewer disproportions, and is less variable than at the preceding stage.
The greatest differences between adjacent stages are found, as expected, between non-
flyers and flyers, while successful combat pilots are markedly different in these respects
from college students and-though less signally-from cadets.'
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Higher homogeneity and mesomorphy of flying cadets over college population had already been
observed by Sheldon in 1940. Other studies had also indicated that "[p]romising officer
candidates ... were more 'masculine' than unpromising and mediocre ones; while civilian pilots
seemed to be taller, heavier, and more stockily built, on the average, than the general
population." Yet it was "indeed remarkable" that "progressive, significant differences" were
72found even within the flying population depending on levels of flying success.
Even more remarkable and "indeed unexpected" was the finding that bomber pilots and
co-pilots, who sat next to each other in the cockpit, were distinguishable by their bodily
characteristics. Both groups (107 pilots and 106 co-pilots) were successful graduates of long
training process, but their assignments as pilots or co-pilots were presumably based on the
combination of flying ability and leadership skills. Assuming that the classification truly
reflected (rather than tautologically defined) the degree of success as a flier, Damon found that
"[p]ilots, the superior group, are larger than co-pilots in every one of 14 dimensions,
significantly so in at least half' such as weight and chest and neck girths. Not only larger than
co-pilots, the pilots were more mesomorphic as well. Since pilots and co-pilots had gone through
the same selection and training processes together and their traits were measured at the same
time, Damon claimed that the physical differences were "unequivocally associated" with flying
success, at least in training if not in combat yet. Within this highly selected group of bomber
fliers, Damon concluded, "the best and most highly trusted flyers seem to be large
mesomorphs." 73
Again, it is hard to determine whether large mesomorphs did in fact perform better than
others, earning a superior rating as pilots, or whether the flight surgeons and instructors'
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72 Ibid., 30 and 209.
73 Ibid., 185, 188, and 208.
favorable perception of mesomorphs affected their evaluation and classification. If, as Sheldon
had observed, mesomorphs were "strongly preferred and trusted" in the field, the exact dynamics
among preference, trust, performance, and evaluation becomes difficult to delineate. To explain
the large mesomorphs' greater success as fliers, which consisted of flight ability and personality,
Damon drew upon "common knowledge" that "large men inspire more confidence and are more
likely to be successful leaders than small men," as evidenced by a 1918 study of corporate
executives' physique. As to the physique's connection with specific flying ability, another
dimension in flying success, Damon could only make a guess about the strength needed to
handle the cockpit controls. Nevertheless, Damon took this finding about bomber pilots and co-
pilots as making his general argument "undeniable."74
Damon's claim of "undeniable" association between high mesomorphy and successful
fliers put the latter on a par with what Sheldon had called "current heroes" of the "masculine
ideal" type 172. It also resonated perfectly with the popular perception of military fliers as
symbols of masculinity and heroism. This easy connection, however, was complicated by
Sheldon's own study that had begun before the war but was published in 1949. Sheldon studied
the physique and temperament of "delinquent youth" at Hayden Goodwill Inn in Boston. The
somatotypes of the 200 boys, Sheldon found out, showed a distribution that was markedly
different from that of the 4000 college male students from his earlier study. A recognizable
majority of the delinquents were concentrated in the zone of mesomorphy, whereas the college
males tended to be distributed more widely on the diagram. Moreover, through his interviews
with the boys, there emerged a "disturbing relationship between delinquency and heroism."
Some mesomorphic delinquent youths seemed to harbor personal qualities that belonged to
74 Ibid., 189.
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heroes. Sheldon wrote that he "again and again experienced the feeling ... that I was in the
presence of what could at least be called a heroic component."75 "Behind the mask of the
outlaw," he wrote, "the shining countenance of Robin Hood sometimes is seen." This small
number of delinquent boys, then, possessed "qualities that in a 'right' society (right for them)
might have made them heroes, along with Roosevelt, Babe Ruth, and Hitler."76 Piloting and
delinquency were put on the same spectrum of behaviors that were associated with mesomorphic
bodies, including politics and baseball. Under the gaze of physical anthropologists, a pilot's body
expressed a moral quality that contributed to socially respectable, even heroic, achievements. It
was distinct from, but not unrelated to, the qualities expressed by a delinquent's body.
As flying was discussed in the terms relevant to success or failure of other social
activities, Damon did not exclude "socio-economic backgrounds" altogether in his analysis.
There were some research "by-products" regarding possible, though inconclusive, effects of such
factors. The most distinct difference was found in "national extraction" of successful fliers; the
returnee pilots (the most successful of the sample groups) were "less mixed ancestry" and "more
Old American." Specific reasons for Old Americans' merits as pilots were yet to be
investigated-personality, physical traits, etc.-but Damon could not think of any explanation
for "the returnees' Old Americanism" other than that it was actually associated with success in
military flying.77 Other socio-economic factors were less marked but still interesting. Damon
75 Sheldon, Varieties of Delinquent Youth, 726-30 and 857-58, also quoted in Gatlin, "William H. Sheldon and the
Culture of the Somatotype," 153.
76 Sheldon, Varieties of Delinquent Youth, 858 and 863 (italics original). For a contemporary critique of Sheldon's
work on delinquent youth as well as his constitutional psychology in general, see Edwin Sutherland, "Critique of
Sheldon's Varieties of Delinquent Youth," American Sociological Review 16:1 (1951): 10-13.
77 Damon, "Physique and Success in Military Flying," 212-13. One was considered an "Old American" if the person
in question, both of one's parents, and all four of the grandparents were born in the U.S. See Ales Hrdlicka, The Old
Americans (Baltimore: The Williams and Wilkins Company, 1925). Hooton wrote a review of this book in
American Anthropologist (n.s.) 28 (1926): 549-51. Writing in 1946, Damon thought that the criteria of "Old
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speculated whether the smaller number of the Jewish among successful pilots reflected their
incompetence at flying or it was a consequence of their higher education level, better suited for
bombardiers and navigators than for pilots. The proportion of college-educated men among
returnees was also lower than that among cadets, raising a similar question why this was so.
Occupational differences between bomber and fighter pilots were interpreted as reflecting the
personality type required of each specialty; bomber pilots were more likely to have been in jobs
that required good interpersonal skills such as sales, clerical, or managerial work. Damon
suggested all of these as interesting future research topics, but mainly for the differentiation
among various aircrew assignments (fighter- and bomber-pilots, bombardiers, and navigators).
Within the flying group, the socio-economic backgrounds were "so similar" that they could not
serve as a significant factor in explaining different degrees of flying success. 78
While he took this as reinforcing the role of physique in flying, Damon once again
revealed, though unconsciously, "the social structure of selection" of pilots. Throughout his
dissertation, Damon observed that pilots were a homogeneous group in terms of physique as well
as socio-economic backgrounds. Damon did not regard such homogeneity as a result of the long
selection process from volunteering to initial exams to training stages, each of which operated
within certain social and cultural perceptions and expectations. Instead, he considered high
mesomorphy and Old Americanism as a manifestation of the true underlying association between
one's personhood and his success in military flying. It was a confirmation of Sheldon's premise
on the correlation among physique, temperament, personality, and achievement, and also of the
larger schema on the mind-body relationship.
American" would have to be revised so that the descendants of the massive group of immigrants since the mid-
nineteenth century would be excluded from the category. Damon, "Physique and Success in Military Flying," 113.
7 Damon, "Physique and Success in Military Flying," 116-19 and 213.
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"This Human Engineering Stuff'
It was only after the war ended, however, that Damon could work on the scientific (i.e. physical
anthropological) question of physique and behavior. During the war, Damon and his colleagues
had to occupy themselves with more practical agenda of measuring body dimensions with regard
to dimensions of machines and equipment. It was unavoidable that "military utility"
overwhelmed "scientific interest" in the wartime AAF studies. The AAF's main motivation to
recruit physical anthropologists was not to figure out body-behavior correlation, but to ensure the
dimensional fit between the AAF personnel and equipment, also known as "human engineering."
For Damon and Randall, the human engineering work they performed for the AAF illustrated the
role of the war as "a notorious accelerator of the practical trends in a science." It was due to the
war that he and colleagues came to work on human engineering, which was considered "a branch
of physical anthropology as yet relatively undeveloped." As practical military needs "dictated"
the entire project, scientifically interesting topics such as the one Damon chose for the thesis had
to be "eschewed for the present." Although he suspected that this practical direction in physical
anthropology would someday enlarge the influence of his discipline "on the daily lives of us all,"
Damon made a clear distinction between the two kinds of work.79
Even as he was heavily involved in it, Damon was not enthusiastic about human
engineering. After all, human engineering, whose main concern was "the mechanical integration
of flyer and equipment," was considered "not directly relevant" to the scientific investigation of
pilots' physique and their success.80 Measurement in human engineering, unlike that for
79 Damon and Randall, "Army Air Forces," 294-95.
80 Damon, "Physique and Success in Military Flying," American Journal of Physical Anthropology (new series) 13
(1955): 217-52, on 219. Damon does not mention "human engineering" in his 1946 dissertation.
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somatotyping, did not offer any deep-seated correlations between categories or any predictions
based on such correlations. Also, unlike the morphological research of Sheldon and Damon
focused on the whole person with body, temperament and behavior, human engineering divided
the body into small parts and examined each part's relationship with surrounding equipment and
machine. The body in human engineering might make movements, but not behavior.
Despite the lack of excitement among physical anthropologists, demand was increasing
for their work in human engineering measurement in both military and civilian sectors. While he
was supervising Damon's work for the AAF from his Harvard museum, Hooton was asked in
1944 to measure train passengers' bodies. The furniture manufacturer Heywood-Wakefield
Company, located in Gardner, Massachusetts, asked Hooton to conduct a survey of seating
dimensions of railroad passengers and to write a report for the Car Construction Committee of
the American Association of Railroads. Hooton measured 3,004 and 863 passengers at Boston's
North Station and Chicago's Northwestern Station, respectively. Based on his conviction that
people from different regions showed different patterns of growth, Hooton insisted that the
birthplaces of those passengers be collected. With the assumption that "individuals from higher
economic levels (as college populations) tend to be slightly taller," judgments on the passengers'
economic status were made from one's "appearance" and it was believed that the subjects
represented all levels of economic situation. By Hooton's racial classification, nearly all the
subjects were white; there were only 12 blacks and 1 oriental in the Boston sample (3,004), and
13 blacks and 3 orientals in the Chicago sample (863).81
8 Earnest Hooton, A Survey in Seating (Gardner, MA: Heywood-Wakefield Company, 1945), 6, 19, 21, and 25.
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Figure 13. The measuring chair Hooton used for the railroad seating survey.
ISource: Hooton, A Survey in Seating, 25.1
For the seating survey, Hooton used a measuring chair built by the Heywood-Wakefield
to his specifications. Body measurements were tabulated and correlations were calculated.
Statistical analysis resulted in recommendations for key dimensions in railroad passenger chair:
20 inches for seat length, 19 inches for hip breadth, 16.9 inches for seat height, etc. These
numbers could not be simply the medians of all measurements or the extremes at both ends, but
were compromised choices. The seat length of 20 inches fell at the 90th percentile of the
population. One more inch would have seated five additional percent of people but would have
made many women move forward on the chair. The seat height was set for the 5th percentile,
provided that taller people could put their legs forward. The choice of the 19 inch hip breadth
was affected by the limitations in the train's interior dimensions and the width of individual
cushions.82 The chair with dimensions recommended by Hooton would not be a perfect fit for the
body of an average person or of any real individual. The purpose was to accommodate the
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maximum proportion of the population within the spatial limit of a railroad car. The survey did
not concern itself with the morphology of a whole person, but only with specific dimensions
required for designing a passenger chair. It was an exemplar of human engineering as understood
by physical anthropologists.
The practical work of a well-known Harvard professor of anthropology garnered much
publicity, which Hooton himself found amusing. The New York Times quoted him speaking of
the purpose as "fit[ting] railroad coach seats to the public instead of attempting to make the
public fit the seats."8 3 Damon saw a picture of the "Hoot Seat," the measuring chair for the
survey, in the Newsweek magazine (27 March 1944), while he was temporarily stationed at
MacDill Field in Tampa, Florida, taking measurements for air crew clothing. The caption
explained the interesting research transition of Hooton, "who has spent a lifetime measuring
racial characteristics" and would "next measure characteristics of another sort." Intrigued by the
publicity Hooton was getting, Damon wrote to his teacher and asked directly, "You don't really
take this Human Engineering stuff seriously, now-do you?" Caught between the AAF's
practicality and the need for a scientific topic worthy of dissertation, Damon asserted to Hooton,
"I don't take this Human Engineering stuff seriously!"8 4 To Damon's relief, Hooton was in the
same opinion of his human engineering work:
It amuses me somewhat to get your repeated suggestions that I do not take "this human
engineering stuff' too seriously. I think it very unlikely that I attach as much significance
to it as those who are doing it. I call it "tailoring." I think it is useful, but I do not think it
is earth shaking. All of the ballyhoo about the seat measuring in the North Station has
been promoted by the Publicity Department of the Boston and Maine. I must confess that
83 "Riders to Test Rail Coach Seats," New York Times, 11 March 1944.
84 Damon to Hooton, unknown date (most likely in March 1944), box 7, EAH-PMA.
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I am considerably astonished that this very simple little task which is perhaps the least
interesting and the most elementary we have undertaken should occasion such enormous
public interest. If you read anything to the effect that I have made public statements that
this is a project besides which the invention of radar is nothing, you will have to
disbelieve them.85
"Tailoring," the term Hooton used for his measurement of railroad passengers was a more literal
description of Damon's clothing sizing work in Florida. Despite the meager scientific enthusiasm
these works provided, they were still "useful" in brining media publicity, personal pride for
serving one's country, and especially, a huge number of subjects whose data could be utilized for
genuinely interesting future projects of their own. Hooton and Damon were willing to tailor their
science for the practical needs of the society at war or peace. Especially for Damon, what began
as a temporary wartime diversion-"human engineering stuff'-would come to occupy much of
his later career. 86
The Making of the "Functional Man"
Summing up his wartime work for the AAF, Damon co-wrote, with three others including
Randall, a technical report Human Body Size in Military Aircraft and Personal Equipment,
which was published in 1946, the same year as his University of Chicago thesis. Whereas his
doctoral dissertation was written for a degree in "Human Development" course, the AAF report
was meant to be a guide for aircraft designers, giving them "specifications on the man."8 7 If his
85 Hooton to Damon, 31 March 1944, box 7, EAH-PMA.
86 For the long term influences of Hooton's seating survey, see Charles Winick, "Anthropology's Contributions to
Marketing," The Journal of Marketing 25:5 (July 1961): 53-60; Vince Staten, Why is the Foul Pole Fair? Answers
to the 101 Most Perplexing Baseball Questions (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004), 46-47 (on the width of the
seats in baseball parks).
87 Randall et al., Human Body Size, 4.
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thesis had a scientific bent and dealt with the "total man" of the constitutional research
framework, the AAF technical report centered on the concept of the "functional man." As the
word "size" in the title indicated, the report covered variations of the human body to be
accommodated in aircraft and equipment and therefore was distinct from the search for "the ideal
body type" to become a pilot.88 Unlike the whole body of the somatotypic man, out of which his
temperament, ability, and behavior could be inferred, the body of the functional man was
composed only of dimensions, stripped of the possibility for character judgments.
The authors of the report proposed the "functional man" as a concept that would
"complicate the entire picture in the design of aircraft." It was a reaction against the conventional
treatment of the human as a "constant" and "static" entity by designers and manufacturers, which
had resulted in failures and accidents. The first premise of the functional man concept was that
"the 'man' is not of a single size," let alone the ideal type of the superman. The "man" varied not
only in his naked body size, but more importantly wore various amounts and types of equipment
such as clothing, parachutes, emergency vests, and life rafts. Regardless of the amount of
equipment, the functional man could not move freely in a free space; the aircraft's spatial
structure severely restricted his movement. An example would be the location of the rudder
pedal, which would have to be determined by the length of the pilot's leg and its range of
movement, not by "other considerations of the aircraft designer." Lastly, it was dangerous to
assume that the aircraft initially designed for short-range flying would remain so, given the
common tendency to add fuel tanks or improve power capacity for operational reasons. From the
88 Wilson, "Ideal Body Type for an Aviator."
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perspective of the functional man, this posed a serious threat to his function unless appropriate
arrangements were built into the cockpit in advance.8 9
Consideration of human physical variability was similar to what Hooton did in his survey
in railroad seating, but the functional man was different from the train passenger in that he was
regarded as equipment to be "installed." He was "the man sent to the aircraft for installation from
a training center." Distinct from any other man in the pool, he possessed "certain inherent
characteristics in him which can in no way whatsoever be modified." He therefore needed to be
"taken as he stands upon 'delivery' and installed effectively in an airplane." To treat him as a
part of equipment to be installed in and integrated with machinery was meant to be, ironically or
not, a call for a more realistic view of the human operator of machines. The inhumane-sounding
language notwithstanding, anthropologists were asking designers to give more comfort and less
fatigue to the human components by writing specifications for them as carefully as they did for
machine components. Typically, aircraft engineers and designers had not taken a pilot or other
crew as their subjects. For example, the 1922 edition of Handbook ofInstructionsfor Airplane
Designers, published by the Army Air Service, included no human body data, let alone
discussions about it. On the corporeal level, tight integration of human and machine began as a
critique of inadequacies in machine design that did not take human operators into account.90
89 Randall et al, Human Body Size, 6-9.
90 Ibid., 9-10; United States Army Air Service Engineering Division, Handbook ofInstructionsfor Airplane
Designers, 3rd ed. (Dayton: U.S. Army Air Service, 1922).
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Figure 14. Facial integration of the functional man.
ISource: Randall et al., Human Body Size, 15.]
Although the ultimate goal was the integration of the entire human body through its
installation inside the cockpit, it comprised many smaller levels of integration. A pilot became
fully functional only after several personal equipment were integrated to the surface of his body.
For instance, a full-facial equipment set in 1945 included the A-I1 type helmet, the B-8 goggle,
and the A- 14 demand type oxygen mask. Inside the helmet was a socket for earphones. All of
these had to "[add] up into a fairly well integrated unit in such a manner as to cover the face
completely." Faces of different sizes and shapes had to be tightly covered with several items,
each with different sizes and shapes. Therefore, the integration of and on the functional man was
predicated on "size control." Appropriately sized personal equipment would produce the
maximum number of functional men. Proper size control was also necessary to make
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manufacture and supply of items more predictable and manageable. In this sense, human-
machine integration was a logistical problem as much as a psycho-physical one.91
The need for size control and coordination among many suppliers for military
procurement agencies brought to the fore the absence of accurate, shared knowledge of the AAF
personnel's body, especially their heads and faces. When the U.S. entered the war, there were no
reference data available to use in the design of these personal equipment. The anthropometric
survey of AAF cadets and gunners in which Damon and Randall participated provided much
needed basic data for calculating size standards and the production ratio of each size. The head
was a three dimensional entity, but for the purpose of helmet sizing head circumference served as
reference, whose distribution helped decide the ranges and amounts of helmet sizes: small (510-
540 mm, 10%), medium (541-565 mm, 40%), large (566-590 mm, 40%), and extra large (591-
620 mm, 10%). The face was more difficult to tackle, as it was "a conglomeration of greatly
variable features which amalgamate themselves into a set of topographic mounds and
depressions which remain in our memory as the 'face."' From the engineering point of view,
there had been little numerical, objective investigations of its complexity, especially with respect
to the protective gear to be put on it. Unlike the head, the face had both soft and bony parts,
complicating the specifications of an oxygen mask. Again, the AAF survey offered as a yardstick
the distance from the base of the chin to the root of the nose, called "nasion-menton" in
anthropometry terminology. From the nasion-menton range, a three-size system was devised for
oxygen masks: small (96-116 mm), medium (117-132 mm), and large (133-152 mm). 9 2 For the
flying population, the two anthropometric numbers-head circumference and nasion-menton-
91 Randall et al, Human Body Size, 12-13. For an analysis of human-machine integration as a psychological problem,
see Paul Edwards, The Closed World: Computers and the Politics of Discourse in Cold War America (Cambridge,
MA: The MIT Press, 1996), chapter 7.
92 Randall et al., Human Body Size, 13-33.
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became convenient and important markers for classification and functionality, just as lengths of
hands and feet were for a non-flying person's gloves and shoes.
As with most classification and standard-setting practices, the determination of the sizes
of helmets and oxygen masks was neither neutral nor all-inclusive. 93 Physical anthropologists
were proud of examining, arguably for the first time, the unavoidable human variations in
military equipment design, but they always took the white male group as their main concern to
account for and manage. Although variations of women and blacks were included in the data set
and calculation, the standards of size were devised from the viewpoint of white male fliers who
constituted the absolute majority of military flying population. The bell curve-like 10:40:40:10
distribution of the helmet sizes was obtained exclusive of the Women's Army Service Pilots
(WASP) and the Flying Nurses. More than 80% of the WASPs belonged to the small or medium
group, and more than 90% of the Flying Nurses belong to the same lower half. The head
circumference data of black fliers were not available for this calculation. Likewise, in the oxygen
mask sizing, the nasion-menton numbers for women and blacks showed different distribution
from those of white males (101 to 146 mm); the range was from 96 to 136 mm in the white
females, and 112 to 152 mm in the black males. The data of black males came from a facial
survey of 132 black ROTCs at Wilberforce University in Ohio, which Randall and Damon
conducted on a single day (20 May 1942), separately from the AAF facial survey of 1454 cadets
conducted for two and half months in 1942. The facial survey of blacks was planned not to
determine proper mask sizes for black fliers but rather to see if the existing masks (A- 10 masks)
would fit well enough with blacks when necessary. (The answer was yes, although it ought to
have been qualified by the very small size of black subjects and their non-flying status.)
93 See, for example, Bowker and Star, Sorting Things Out, esp. chapter 6.
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Consequently, the determination of size ranges was based on the white male distribution of
nasion-menton numbers. The medium size mask in the three-size system covered the central bulk
(~75%) of the white male distribution, separating the small and large segments almost evenly.
According to this labeling, the black population, whose distribution extended farther to the right
than the whites', would need more "large" masks than the white fliers. On the contrary, only
0.69% of WASP fliers and none of Flying Nurses would need "large" masks. Although the
specifications indicated that the "small" and "large" sizes extended to the lowest nasion-menton
number of women and to the highest number of blacks, marginal cases in women and blacks
were more likely to be ill fitted with oxygen masks, since the three-sized masks could not even
cover the complete white male variations.94
Less comfortable fit of helmets or masks for women and blacks both reflected and
constituted the exclusion and segregation in the AAF. Gestures were made toward integration by
conducting surveys on very small samples, but the degree of integration in personal facial
equipment did not exceed that of general recruit integration of women and blacks in the military.
Human-machine integration, whose first step was the integration of personal equipment on the
functional body, was not independent of social integration within the segregated military. Human
physical varieties were worthy of accommodating only so far as it would increase
"interchangeability" of human bodies in the cockpit. As long as the white males filled most
positions in the AAF and they were not interchangeable with women or blacks, the functional
94 Randall et al., Human Body Size, 13-33; Francis Randall and Albert Damon, "Anthropometric Facial Survey at
Wilberforce University, Memorandum on," 7 July 1942, serial no. EXP-M-49-695-4, located at Wright State
University Library, Dayton, OH; Francis Randall and Albert Damon, "Facial Surveys of Aviation Cadets and Other
Flying Personnel, Memorandum Report," 31 August 1942, serial no. EXP-M-49-695-4B, located at Wright State
University Library.
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man in the discourse of the AAF physical anthropologists remained a gendered and racialized
character.95
In a literal sense, flying equipment such as masks and helmets and the pilots who used
them were co-constructed through the AAF human engineering work. The anthropometrical
surveys, both body and facial, provided not only statistical data for determining size ranges of
equipment but also a set of dimensions from which to build type heads, busts, and manikins. For
the AAF cadet facial survey data, seven type heads were constructed, representing the averages
of the entire cadet population (same as the average for medium size), short size group, large size
group, the lowest 1% group, the highest 1% group, and the maximum and minimum facial ranges
from the most common nasion-menton numbers (122, 123, and 124 mm). The 1,453 head shapes
of the cadets, each distinct from one another and as a group presumably different from non-
flying population, were abstracted into seven representative types and solidified as hard-shaped
AMRL type heads I through VII. Re-constituted from the averages of one-dimensional
measurements taken from real heads, the three dimensional type heads were not identical to any
real head. But as these model heads were circulated among aircraft designers and medical
personnel for reference in a way that no real head could be, they began to stand solidly for all the
heads in the AAF, including the excluded and marginalized ones of women and blacks.96
95 On black personnel in the AAF, see Alan Osur, Blacks in the Army Air Forces during World War II The Problem
of Race Relations (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977). For the WASP program, see Molly
Merryman, Clipped Wings: The Rise and Fall of the Women Airforce Service Pilots (WASPs) of World War II (New
York: New York University Press, 1998). On women in aviation in general, see Deborah Douglas, American Women
and Flight since 1940 (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2004); Margaret A. Weitekamp, Right
Stuff Wrong Sex: America's First Women in Space Program (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press,
2004).
96 Francis Randall and Albert Damon, "An Interesting Application of a Basic Science to Aviation Medicine,"
Journal ofAviation Medicine 14 (1943): 200-205; W. M. Krogman, "Physical Anthropology at Work," Scientific
Monthly 58 (June 1944): 468-69. The AAF was not the only military agency that constructed type heads during
WWII. For the purpose of making gas masks, the Chemical Warfare Service (CWS) conducted an anthropometrical
survey and built several head forms at the Chemical Warfare Service Development Laboratory located at Building
12 on the MIT campus. It seems, however, that the AAF type heads predated those of Chemical Warfare Service,
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Figure 15. Manikins embodied the concept of
the "functional man."
ISource: Randall et al., Human Body Size, 196.1
After wearing properly sized personal equipment, a functional man had to sit in the
aircraft cockpit. In order to help aircraft designers on this task, the AAF physical anthropologists
built three types of manikins (called Type A, B, and C), representing average, short, and tall
men, respectively. The heights and weights of each type were 5 feet 9.4 inches and 154 pounds,
5 feet 5.5. inches and 140 pounds, and 6 feet 1.5 inches and 172 pounds. Since the notion of the
"functional man as an item of equipment" should be kept at all stages of design, including the
first drawings, the anthropologists constructed jointed profile manikins at the 1/30th scale, which
would then be scaled up as necessary. More important, three dimensional manikins at full scale
were also built for use in later, mock-up stages of design and development. As with the type
though the latter might have wider circulation in the Army. See Sidney Smith, "C. W. S.," Tech Engineering News
27 (December 1945): 112-13, 141, 148, 150; Frederick Holt, Jr., "Chemistry Goes to the Battlefield," Technology
Review 48 (December 1945): 103-6 (thanks to Deborah Douglas for this source). Damon's response to the CWS's
publicity regarding its head forms is found in his letter to Hooton, 17 January 1945, box 7, EAH-PMA.
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heads, each of the three types of the functional manikin was "man," although female pilot
manikins were also made "for reference use." 97
Figure 16. Type heads of the Aero Medical Laboratory based on the AAF anthropometrical survey data.
[Source: Randall et al., Human Body Size, 28.1
The type heads and manikins built by the AAF were not of a kind that would easily
belong to a long history of artificial life, "attempts to understand life and mind by reproducing
them or some of their aspects artificially."98 These manikins for engineering use, or "dummies"
as they have often been called, did not reveal anything that might be interpreted as "life and
mind." The type head was opaque and solid with no pretense of real life inside it, and the
manikin had transparent structure with simple internal joints visible from outside. In short, these
dummies were devoid of life. From a physical anthropologist's point of view, however, at least
one aspect of these artificial figures was closer to the real human being than any other artificial
97 Randall et al., Human Body Size, 193-201.
98 Jessica Riskin, ed., Genesis Redux: Essays in the History and Philosophy ofArtificial Life (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2007), 2.
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life forms had been: physical dimensions. Based on the anthropometric data of thousands of real
people, the sizes and their proportions had some elements of human truth in them. And the
dimensional verisimilitude, or at least the representational quality in dimensions, was crucial to
safety, efficiency, and indeed life and death of real machine operators such as pilots. By
shedding life-like features and becoming fully "functional," the type heads and manikins enabled
engineers to think about life-related issues in design.
From this perspective, the functional man was not aperson. The type heads and manikins
embodied the notion of the functional man better than real pilots did. Therefore, the functional
man lacked qualities of a person-personality, temperament, and behavior-that were regarded
to be inherent in a person. This was in contrast with the somatotypic man in Sheldon's
constitutional research, according to which a person's whole body was direct indicators and
predictors of one's personality, temperament, and behavior. Instead of these personal qualities,
the functional man had only postures. In fact, the functional man was characterized by its
multiple postures, whereas the somatotypic man in a photograph had only one static posture of
standing upright. Dimensions and postures were what made them functional rather than personal.
If, as Kuriyama suggested, the muscular body in the Western culture, like that of a successful
flier, signified a personhood with qualities often attributed to males, rulers, and warriors (and not
to females, slaves, and cowards), the dimensional body of the functional man lost much of these
personal qualities, despite the fact that it was composed from predominantly white male body
measurements.99
The posture that a functional pilot took most frequently was that of sitting, which became
a serious research topic for the AAF physical anthropologists. Attention to seating in aircraft,
99 Kuriyama, Expressiveness of the Body, 139-43.
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especially fighter types, was new in WWII, partly because the maximum duration of continuous
flying had been about only two hours. Mechanical developments and the demands of the world
war extended the possible flying hours long enough to make it an engineering and human
concern. The AAF Anthropometric Unit borrowed a Universal Test Seat, a chair on a mount with
many adjustable positions, from the Murray Corporation of America, a manufacturer of
automobile parts, and made a copy for its own use. The anthropologists started by defining
pilots' seats as "working seats" and asserting the intimate connection between "comfort" and
"efficiency" of pilots. They also pointed out the lack of attention in previous designs to the
premise that "structures in cockpits have certain functions which they should perform, and which
they will not perform if they are removed from certain relationships with other portions of the
equipment." Designs that had not thought through the varieties of human sizes and functions
often gave pilots "unduly cramped" legs or "an accentuated crouched attitude." Cockpit seats
were not merely physical supports for pilots' buttocks, but had to be considered as part of the
tightly integrated system of aircraft equipment to be used by a pilot with varying types and
amounts of personal items. And the cockpits in general were "functional assemblies of
equipment, including the man." 100
00 Randall et al., Human Body Size, 82-83. The "universal test seat" was developed by W.E. Lay and L.C. Fischer;
see Lay and Fischer, "Riding comfort and cushions," S.A.E. J. (Transactions) 47 (1940), cited in Hertzberg,
"Applied Physical Anthropology," 624. See also Ross McFarland, Albert Damon, Howard Stoudt, Alfred Moseley,
Jack Dunlap, and William Hall, Human Body Sizes and Capabilities in the Design and Operation of Vehicular
Equipment (Boston: Harvard School of Public Health, 1953), 92-94.
224
Figure 17. Universal Test Seat.
[Source: Randall et al., Human Body Size,
80.1
Determination of the pilot's seated position depended on several interrelated
configurations within the cockpit. Randall, Damon, and others at the Aero Medical Laboratory
examined different arrangements of the cockpit space by changing the height of the horizontal
line of vision from the foot level. It was deemed an important dimension in the cockpit, since a
small deviation could affect "the entire functional behaviour of the cockpit assembly" and cause
unsatisfactory functional operation of the aircraft. This height had to remain between 35 and 43
inches. Minimum 35 inches was necessary to make space for personal equipment such as
parachutes, and the maximum height was designated to prevent "the absurd condition of standing
in the cockpit." First of all, the height and angle of the seat was crucially related to the pilot's
horizontal line of vision toward the outside. The attitude of the seat also affected the distance to
the rudder pedal, which had to be adjusted carefully to allow easy operation. The location and
angular moving range of the control stick was examined in terms of the pilot's reach from the
seat and full operability. Also, the line of vision toward instrument panels should not be
interfered with the pilot's knee movement. And all of these arrangements should tolerate size
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differences among pilots; if a design enabled the smallest pilot permitted-5 feet 4 inches- to
reach all the controls comfortably, it was more difficult for taller men to do so in the same
configuration. Through these adjustments for the pilot's seating, it was no longer possible to treat
the cockpit as "a random assortment of controls, seats, and dimensions." Human anatomy
interacted with structures of equipment and instruments to turn the cockpit into "a highly detailed
functional system."101
Figure 18. A functional pilot meticulously calculated and comfortably
seated. [Source: Randall et al., Human Body Size, 88.1
101 Randall et al., Human Body Size, 79-115, quotes on 84 and 114.
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Seated with comfort and efficiency, the pilot became a fully functional man, a piece of
equipment taken into design consideration from the beginning to the end. Dimensional
integration with the cockpit was critical for the pilot's functionality and even for his life. His
lines of vision to the outside and to instruments were coupled with his foot reach for the rudder
pedal and the control stick, all of which were in turn related to the integrated system of personal
equipment on his body such as parachutes, life rafts, protective helmets, oxygen masks, goggles,
gloves, and boots. Piloting a fighter plane came to mean full immersion in this mechanical
environment. Fixated amidst a myriad of dimensions, the pilot became a truly sedentary entity.
McFarland (in chapter 2) had noticed the stationary nature of a pilot's life in the sense that one's
physiological strength was becoming less predictive of flight performance and that flying fatigue
might be attributed to factors outside the cockpit, especially for civilian pilots. Anthropometrical
designs of cockpit space and equipment aimed to remove any remaining fatiguing factors inside
the cockpit by minimizing dimensional deviations. Comfort and efficiency, however, had to
circle back to longer hours of the sedentary posture. With their design measures, the physical
anthropologists made it "possible to maintain the pilot in an efficient and comfortable condition
for a period of not less than eight hours, and possibly for a period as great as twelve to sixteen
hours." 0 2 Indeed, the functional man became a piece of equipment.
Efficiency through Comfort: Postwar Air Force Anthropometry
"Efficiency" achievable through "comfort," as articulated in the 1946 AAF report, served as a
main justification for postwar anthropometry in the Air Force. Earlier studies of efficiency,
especially time and motion studies by Frederick Taylor and the Gilbreths, had of course aimed to
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102 Ibid., 114.
"reduce fatigue" and make a task "easy and satisfying" to perform, but the term "comfort" had
not often been paired with efficiency. Almost by definition, the manual and muscular work that
efficiency experts had examined was difficult to do with much "comfort." One could regulate
work hours and rest periods, improve working conditions such as lighting and noise, and propose
new ways of working to reduce toil, but it was not the efficiency experts' chief concern to make
workers comfortable when working.' 03 For a sedentary but fatiguing task of piloting an airplane,
however, it seemed possible to improve efficiency by providing comfort. Thus H. T. E.
Hertzberg, who led the postwar Anthropometric Unit (later renamed as Anthropology Unit) at
the Aero Medical Laboratory with Hooton's recommendation, defined the mission of his Unit as
providing three kinds of information to the AAF: "human dimensions," "human muscle
strength," and "human comfort."' 0 4
The rhetoric of "human comfort" for the sake of efficiency, however, did not sell well to
engineers and designers. To Hertzberg's disappointment, many of them were still
"anthropometric heathen," who had never had considered "the operator's comfort as bearing on
the excellence or efficiency of the product." Despite some publicity that Hooton and his students
won during the wartime, there remained much "missionary work" or "crusade" to promote the
issue. Ambitious as he was, Hertzberg was the only "anthropometrist" in the Anthropometric
Unit in 1948 (the other three members were a doctor, "a gadget builder," and a designer) and he
added only one physical anthropologist to his staff up until 1950.105
103 Ralph M. Barnes, Motion and Time Study, 2nd ed. (New York: John Wiley & Sons: 1940), 134-44.
104 H. T. E. Hertzberg and Gilbert S. Daniels, "Air Force Anthropology in 1950," American Journal of Physical
Anthropology 10 (1952): 201-8, on 201. Daniels was the assistant for Hertzberg. Hertzberg worked with Hooton at
Harvard on eye colors and was regarded by Hooton as "admirable." Hooton to Damon, 11 May 1946, box 7, EAH-
PMA.
105 H. T. E. Hertzberg, "Post War Anthropometry in the Air Force," American Journal of Physical Anthropology 6
(1948): 363-72.
228
One example of the "comfort" part of Air Force anthropometry in the early postwar
period was experimentation on the prone position of a pilot. Given that the first Wright Flyer in
1903 was designed for a prone position, this was not an unthinkable alternative to the normal
seating position of the pilot.' 06 From an engineering point of view, there were some clear
advantages. A prone pilot reduced the size of fuselage, leading to better air speed. It was also
known that the prone position gave a pilot better tolerance for g forces, reducing the risk of
"blackout." The pilots disliked this position, however, because of the severe discomfort they
experienced in flying in the prone position. Maintaining a good line of sight while lying prone
caused pain in one's neck and back. Supporting body weight with the chin, elbows, and knees
was another source of discomfort. In short, a pilot could not become functional in the prone
position. The Anthropometric Unit set out to solve this problem by providing "comfort" to
prone-positioned pilots and returning them to a fully functional state. The solution was to make
"a bed which is comfortable for at least the length of time that a modem military airplane is
likely to be flown on missions." The Unit tested various materials to use for the "bed" in aircraft
and designed the frame to support the body without causing much fatigue. The result was a bed
so comfortable that 18 subjects with varying sizes could lie on it easily more than 8 hours.
Hertzberg reported proudly:
A number of these men have volunteered the opinion that they could have continued to
12 or even 16 hours if they had only had something to do. Indeed, we have found that the
106 The Wright Flyers of 1903, 1904, and 1905 were designed for a prone-positioned pilot, whereas Alberto Santos-
Dumont, another aviation pioneer who has often been featured in the debates about the "real" first heavier-than-air
aircraft flight, stood up at the controls. The Wright brothers changed their design to a seated position in 1908. See L.
F. E. Coombs, Control in the Sky: The Evolution and History of the Aircraft Cockpit (Barnsley: Pen & Sword
Aviation, 2005), 14.
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major complaint was neither fatigue nor discomfort, but simply sheer boredom, which, by
the way, we combatted successfully by the use of moving pictures.10 7
Provided with comfort bordering on boredom, they were ready to perform whatever functions
assigned. Whether seated or lying prone, the pilot achieved maximum functionality when his
body was most carefully configured in the small space allowed.
Postwar Air Force anthropometry aimed to provide the best functional fit with machines
for every member. In 1950, the USAF launched one of the largest anthropometric projects since
the war-"Anthropometry of Flying Personnel-1950." The survey initially planned to measure
5,000 subjects from 16 Air Force bases, but had to stop at around 4,000 from 14 bases due to the
outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. From each subject were taken 132 body measurements
and 4 somatotype photos as well as social background data. The number of measurements on
each subject's body was larger than any previous survey, and more than 30 of them were newly
added dimensions, presumably tailored to the needs of the Air Force personnel and equipment
(e.g. the grip diameter). As the first major postwar anthropometry project, the 1950 flying
personnel survey eventually became a much-cited reference work both in the U.S. and abroad.'08
The data thus collected became valuable resources for producing and managing the
maximum number of functional men in the U.S. Air Force. For each body dimension, mean
value, standard deviation, and ranges were calculated and the percentile values were given in
both centimeters and inches (for anthropologists and engineers, respectively). There was no
attempt, however, at least in the official anthropometrical report, to predict pilots' future success
from their body dimensions. Even though somatotype photos were taken, they were not analyzed
107 Hertzberg, "Post War Anthropometry," 365-67.
1 H. T. E. Hertzberg, G. S. Daniels, and E. Churchill, Anthropometry ofFlying Personnel-1950 (Dayton, OH:
Wright Air Development Center, 1954) (WADC Technical Report 52-321), 1.
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or discussed in the report. The information on birth places and base locations were collected and
tabulated for analysis to determine any geographical differences, and the subjects were divided
according to different aero-ratings (fighter pilot, bombardier, navigator, etc.). Compared with the
wartime survey, the main use of physical anthropology in the Air Force was functional
anthropometry and accommodation rather than somatotyping and elimination. The status of the
pilot's body changed from a predictor of flying ability to a design concern for safety and
comfort.
Conclusion: Pilots, Delinquents, and Manikins
The figures of the pilot in Damon's 1946 dissertation and the AAF 1946 technical report he co-
authored seem to represent two different personhoods: the somatotypic man and the functional
man. The whole body of the pilot in the "scientific" thesis can be contrasted with a practical
perspective in the AAF report, which was more concerned with local fits between parts of the
body and parts of the machine. While the former concerned physique and behavior, the latter
involved postures and movement. 0 9 The functional man also seems to be set in opposition to the
pilot whose "innermost self' was investigated by psychiatric examiners. As manifested in the
anthropometric manikins, the functional man did not have to have a temperament, let alone a
soul. A somatotypic pilot or a pilot with his "innermost self' was not considered in his actual
relation with the machine that he operated. It was who he was by nature, revealed through
somatotyping inspection or psychiatric examination, that would affect his ability to fly. From the
perspective of the functional man, however, his body dimensions had to be carefully coordinated
109 The term "behavior" itself can be historicized in its use in the public-health related studies. See David Armstrong,
"Origins of the Problem of Health-related Behaviours: A Genealogical Study," Social Studies ofScience 39 (2009):
909-26.
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with the dimensions of the machine, so that his efficiency (considered distinct from ability) could
be improved through his comfort. It was always within the machine environment that his body
was examined.
A parallel may be drawn between the two representations of the pilot's body in WWII
and the two representations of the criminal's body in the late 19th century, the latter analyzed by
historian Allan Sekula. Whereas Francis Galton, the champion of statistical analysis and
eugenics, used composite photographs to produce a pure "criminal type" that was "an abstract,
statistically defined, and empirically nonexistent," French police officer Alphonse Bertillon
devised a practical system of criminal identification with the use of photographs and filing
cabinets. There existed a stark difference in the "expressiveness of the body" between the two, to
use Kuriyama's phrase. The "specimens of composite portraiture" in Galton's Inquiries into
Human Faculty (1893) included faces-each composed from many "cases" -that presumably
revealed underlying conditions of "health," "disease," "criminality," or "consumptive." By
contrast, within Bertillon's photographic archive, Sekula writes, "the criminal body expressed
nothing. No characterological secrets were hidden beneath the surface of this body." Sekula's
description of Bertillon's photos as "indexical"-"nothing more than the physical trace of its
contingent instance-and Galton's as "symbolic, thus expressing a general law through the
accretion of contingent instances" is helpful to understand the difference between the somatotype
photographs and the anthropometrical diagrams and manikins of pilots." The successful flier as
a somatotypic man carried with him a long history of conventions of relating physique, character,
and ability as well as assigning differing values to differently endowed individuals and groups.
The functional man was relatively free of these conventions, or at least could turn the value-
110 Sekula, "The Body and the Archive," 353, 360, 366, and 372-73. For his characterization of indexical and
symbolic photographs, Sekula draws on Charles Sanders Peirce.
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laden issues of normality and abnormality, or "fit" and "unfit," into a question of functional and
dimensional fit. Of course, this parallel is not purely coincidental but derives from the historical
connection between sorting out criminals for the betterment of society and screening pilots for
efficient execution of war, a connection mediated by eugenics, physical anthropology,
photography, and various measuring instruments.
As historian Sarah Tracy wrote, Sheldon's explicitly eugenic and biologically
deterministic thinking faced many objections within the constitutional research community,
which had in fact shown a higher appreciation of the role of the environment in people's
constitution. As the best-known practitioner of the research program in the 1940s and 1950s,
Sheldon can be held responsible for its decline by 1950. Especially, his more practical works
might even be called "reductionistic" and representative of the "[shift] away from medicine
toward anthropometry and the prediction of performance," as seen in Damon's work with the
strong influence of Sheldon."' Through Sheldon, Hooton, and Damon, the science of man turned
into the "human engineering stuff," betraying the initial goal of constitutional approach in
medicine. Or, the total man was qualitatively transformed into the functional man, from a person
to a non-person.
The two kinds of men, however, were not in so clear opposition to each other as they
seem. After all, both involved the assignment of numbers to human beings, treating them as
resources to produce able and functional bodies. More importantly, the selection and elimination
studies of the pilot as a somatotypic man based on the eugenic assumption of inherently superior
and inferior people lay the groundwork for the anthropometrical design work that aimed to
accommodate all those selected in the cockpit. Selection of predictably successful pilots was
Tracy, "Evolving Science of Man," 162, 171, 176, and 179-82.
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closely related to the maximum accommodation by design. Borrowing from Donald
MacKenzie's discussion of eugenics and I.Q. debates, these two seemingly different tasks can be
understood as analogous to the mutually reinforcing discourses of hereditarianism and
environmentalism. Selection as a pilot based on inherent abilities had to be accompanied by
considerate designs of mechanical environment. MacKenzie, rephrasing Nikolas Rose, points to
the intertwined nature of the two strategies: "The strategy of eugenics is segregation; the strategy
of environmentalism is socialisation, re-attachment of marginal or disaffected groups to the
social order. Eugenics seeks control by exclusion and the tightening of boundaries;
environmentalism by integration."" 2 Likewise, for pilots, the selection and elimination through
classification on the one hand and the accommodation and integration through design on the
other were both the strategies of maximum recruiting. It is in this regard that the postwar USAF
anthropometrist Hertzberg's statement can be interpreted as an ambitious project, both
technically and socially: "[A]pplied anthropometry brings a definite contribution not only to
military gadgetry, but also to the welfare and comfort of the populace at large."" 3
This connection between the somatotyping of the total man and the anthropometrical
integration of the functional man was not lost on a perceptive reader of contemporary science,
Aldous Huxley. In a philosophically titled article "Who Are You?" for Harper 's Magazine,
Huxley praised Sheldon's two Varieties books, which "[made] it possible for us to know who we
and other people really are." The objective classification of psycho-physical variations-
knowing who you really were-led to the next step of knowing where you really belonged in a
12 Donald MacKenzie, Statistics in Britain, 1865-1930: The Social Construction of Scientific Knowledge
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1981), 49-50. MacKenzie was referring to Nikolas Rose, "The
Psychological Complex: Mental Measurement and Social Administration," Ideology and Consciousness No. 5
(1979): 5-68.
113 Hertzberg, "Post War Anthropometry," 371.
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society and "assigning individuals to their proper place in the natural caste system." The
scientific study of the human, especially one in the direction offered by Sheldon, had to be
combined with the expertise of "vocational guidance" based on the findings of "human
engineering" that each individual "belong[ed] congenitally to one kind of caste" for the benefit
of both oneself and society. "When that happens," Huxley hoped for the future, "society will be
in a position to reorganize itself on the basis of a rejuvenated and thoroughly beneficent, because
thoroughly realistic, caste system." That was the mission shared by the eugenically minded
human classification, especially the somatotyping, and the practically inclined human
engineering. The somatotypic man had to be examined and classified in order to become
eventually a fully functional man for the greater good of society.114
Another commonality of the somatotypic man and the functional man, as conceptualized
in the studies of the pilot, is that they came from the overwhelmingly white male population in
the U.S. More specifically, they are modeled upon white male fliers in the USAF during the war.
Not only in considerations of constitution and temperament, but even in the practical matters of
measuring dimensions, the bodies of black and women fliers, if any, took only marginal places.
As somatotypic men, the pilots were most commonly Old American mesomorphs. As functional
men, their body dimensions served as the norm with which to design helmets, masks, and
garments. The gender- and race-biased model of the pilot, however, would eventually pose
challenges to the USAF, which had to accommodate more women and blacks as pilots." 5
114 Aldous Huxley, "Who Are You?" Harper's Magazine, November 1944, 512-22, quotes on 513 and 520. Huxley
mentions Sheldon's three types of physique and temperament in his 1958 non-fiction work Brave New World
Revisited (New York: Perennial, 2000), 107-8. For the friendship between Sheldon and Huxley, see Gatlin,
"William H. Sheldon and the Culture of the Somatotype," chapter 5.
115 See, for example, Rachel Weber, "Manufacturing Gender in Commercial and Military Cockpit Design," Science,
Technology, and Human Values 22 (1997): 235-53.
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Another sort of challenge to this representative figure of the pilot would be that coming
from non-American and non-white pilots. How would the model of the Old American
mesomorphic functional man fare in other nations of fliers like, say, Japan during and after
WWII? If, as Sheldon diagnosed, the Japanese race was "a more mesomorphic and somatotonic
stock" as judged by such aggressiveness as to engage a world war, what would the potential of
the Japanese be for becoming successful pilots? (Sheldon had not somatotyped the Japanese
himself. See chapter 4 for a somatotype study of Japanese people.) 16 Granted, being
mesomorphic and somatotonic does not necessarily make one a pilot; indeed, Sheldon found
more mesomorphs than other types among juvenile delinquents. " "Of three men with the same
high degree of somatotonia," Huxley pointed out as well, "one may become a suavely efficient
executive, another a professional soldier of the explosive, blood-and-guts variety, and the third a
ruthless gangster.""18 Finally, it could be said that an individual's somatotype and temperament
type and those of a nation or a race should not be conflated, if one were serious about Sheldon's
methodology. In reality, however, such conflations did happen and were indeed characteristic of
Sheldon's and others' discourses and techniques of restricting human possibilities and potentials
with dubiously inherent traits. As the next chapter will show, therefore, the qualification of
Japanese pilots by Americans had political and cultural, as well as physical, dimensions.
116 Sheldon's conjecture of the mesomorphy of the Japanese body may seem ironic, given that the muscular body in
ancient Greece had been associated with European identity in contrast to the soft, inarticulate body of Asians. See
Kuriyama, Expressiveness of the Body, 141-43.
117 Sheldon, Varieties of Delinquent Youth, 726-30.
"1 Huxley, "Who Are You?" 520.
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Chapter 4
"No Japanese in the Cockpit":
Political, Cultural, and Somatic Qualification of Pilots in Postwar Japan
Introduction
"It's really difficult to become an English-speaking kamikaze pilot," said Takashi Ishinabe.' It
was 1993, not 1945, and Ishinabe was not a pilot but an actor who played the role of a kamikaze
squadron commander. Ishinabe and his fellow Japanese actors came to New York City to go on
stage at the Actors Studio, famous for the Method style, with a play "The Winds of God." It was
written and directed by a Japanese, but the New York performance would be in English. Not
being native speakers of English, the Japanese actors had to practice so diligently as to be
"gamely mouthing their lines in an emotive Brando style." A New York Times reviewer of the
play's 1998 performance with a different Japanese cast even had "the impression that smart
American street talk is their native tongue." The play tells the story of two present-day
comedians who, through a motorcycle accident, are suddenly thrown back into their previous
lives as kamikaze pilots being trained for suicidal attacks at the end of WWII. Much as the actor
Ishinabe found it difficult to perform in English and in New York, the main characters in the play
at first become frustrated at their doomed fate, especially because they have the historical
' In this chapter, the Japanese convention of putting the family name before the given name is not followed to
maintain consistency with other chapters and footnotes. For example, "Ishinabe" is the family name of Takashi
Ishinabe.
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knowledge of the war's end and the personal memory of their future lives in the 1990s. At a
moment approaching the fiftieth anniversary of the war's end (the movie adaptation came out in
1995), becoming an English speaking kamikaze pilot for the New York audience was a doubly
uneasy exercise for both the actor and the character.2
This chapter is about neither Japanese actors playing kamikaze pilots nor real wartime
kamikaze pilots, but instead describes Japanese pilots (some of them having flown during the
war) who learned to fly in English and in the American way in postwar Japan. The questions
posed in previous chapters remain relevant here: What kind of persons were thought to qualify as
pilots? How and by whom were those criteria set up and maintained? What sorts of knowledge
and techniques were generated and employed to qualify or disqualify pilots? This chapter,
however, goes beyond research and discussion by scientists and engineers to examine postwar
situations in which the qualification for becoming a pilot took on a political tone. While the
American cockpit before and during WWII was filled with psychological and anthropological
assumptions about what kind of American should be seated there, the cockpit in occupied and
post-occupation Japan reflected the new political and cultural order between the U.S and Japan,
which affected American (and Japanese) decisions on whether and how the Japanese should be
allowed to re-enter the cockpit. Once again, the seemingly technical space of the cockpit was
saturated with larger concerns from outside the cockpit.
As the allied forces moved into Japan to occupy the defeated country in September 1945,
one of the first policy measures instituted by the occupation authority was to ground all aircraft
2 Quoted in "Kamikaze Method," New Yorker, 31 May 1993, 29-30. The play was written by Masayuki Imai, an
actor and playwright, who also played one of the leading roles in it. In 1995 (the fiftieth anniversary of the war's
end), the play was adapted to a movie with the same title, in which actors also performed in English. "The Winds of
God" is a translation of kamikaze (or "the divine wind"). D. J. R. Bruckner, "The Punch Line Is No Joke for Comics
Turned Pilots," New York Times, 3 July 1998.
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and all pilots in Japan. Japanese pilots remained grounded until the end of the Allied Occupation
in 1952. This "aviation blank" of more than six years had enormous impact on the course of both
civilian and military aviation in Japan. 3 When they attempted to fly again in 1952, Japanese
pilots had to be reconfigured in the post-occupation era cockpit with new qualifications set by
Americans. Just as the Japanese actors in "The Winds of God" sought acknowledgement and
appraisal from American audience and critics, the Japanese pilots needed American instruction
and evaluation to fly in the postwar sky dominated by Americans. "The Winds of God" was
recognized as the first Method performance "to come out of Japan" and worthy of a New York
debut.4 And the certification of the first postwar Japanese airliner captain in 1954 and the first
flight from Tokyo to San Francisco by a Japanese captain in 1956 were also marked in Japan's
aviation history. Though in seemingly unrelated realms, the two occasions-a theatrical play and
flying-reveal the various ways in which the Japanese understood themselves vis-A-vis
Americans in the postwar period, often taking American practices and perspectives as a norm. In
both, the weight of history, language, and culture was noticeable in the ways in which the
Japanese came to grips with the America-dominated postwar order by refashioning themselves
into competent and reliable members within it.
The discourses and practices of qualifying Japanese pilots during and after the American
occupation mirrored the political and cultural qualification of Japan as a trustable and
manageable American ally. Studies of postwar U.S.-Japan relationship have suggested that the
rapid re-fashioning of Japan from a ruthless, racialized war enemy to one of America's most
3 There are few studies in English language on postwar ban and rehabilitation of Japan's civil aviation. Useful
information and basic narratives can be found in Hitoshi Yoshioka, "Lifting the Bans on Weapons Production and
Rebuilding the Aircraft Industry," in A Social History of Science and Technology in Contemporary Japan, Volume
2: Road to Self-Reliance, 1952-1959, ed. Shigeru Nakayama (Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 2005), 47-60; Hitoshi
Yoshioka, "Re-establishing Civil Aviation," Ibid., 61-79. Japanese-language materials, including institutional or
company histories, journalists' non-fiction books, and aviation magazines, are cited below.
44 "Kamikaze Method," 29.
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important strategic allies and economic competitors was mediated by the metaphorical recasting
of the Japanese as women or immature youth in need of care and education by an adult male,
America. It was crucial for the new U.S.-Japan relationship that Americans accepted the
Japanese "not as savages but as dependents that needed U.S. guidance and benevolence." As the
"modernization theory" during the Cold War would put it, the Japanese were weak by every
measure, but had the potential to grow up into democracy and capitalist economy. As in political
discourse and popular culture, "these commonly accepted, pre-existing ideologies about gender
and maturity" affected the ways in which the Americans perceived and worked with Japanese
pilots.s Here, the Americans drew not only from knowledge of physiological, psychological, and
somatic characteristics of the Japanese but also from the historical memories of war and
stereotyped cultural perceptions. The Japanese who worked hard to rehabilitate aviation after the
occupation were aware of these American reservations and responded to them carefully.
After describing the ban on aviation during the Allied occupation, especially on Japanese
nationals' flying, I will focus on the two modes of qualifying Japanese pilots in the context of the
post-occupation U.S.-Japan relationship. One is the slow, politicized process of permitting
Japanese pilots to fly again and training them with reference to the American models of flying
and pilots between 1950 and 1957. During this period, the Japan Air Lines (JAL) began its
service and the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) was established. The process involved
bringing former Japanese pilots to the United States for an American-style training and
5 Naoko Shibusawa, America's Geisha Ally: Reimagining the Japanese Enemy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2006), 5; Sheila Johnson, The Japanese through American Eyes (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1988). On modernization theory as a reflection and product of the Cold War academic discourses, see Ron
Robin, The Making of the Cold War Enemy: Culture and Politics in the Military-Intellectual Complex (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2001), chapter 1. For a critique of the modernization theory within the field of Japanese
studies, see John W. Dower, "E. H. Norman, Japan, and the Uses of History," in E. H. Norman, Origins of the
Modern Japanese State: Selected Writings of E. H. Norman, ed. John W. Dower (New York: Pantheon Books,
1975), 3-101.
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instituting American practices and conventions within the Japanese training system. It also took
some time for American public to shed the stereotyped perception of wartime kamikaze as
defying rationality and to accept Japanese pilots' occupancy of the cockpit.6 The hyper-
masculinity of the wartime kamikaze, as perceived by the Americans, turned into the sincere
diligence of postwar pilots eager to learn the American way of flying, including the new flying
language of English.
The second mode of qualification occurred in the late 1950s and early 1960s, when the
JASDF established its own aero-medical unit and the U.S. Air Force sought more data and
coordination from the JASDF. In both American and Japanese eyes, the Japanese pilots' bodies
were recognized as small, which was not a sign of maturity and masculinity. And it seemed
necessary to measure the Japanese bodies carefully against the body dimensions of American
pilots, so that they would fit comfortably in America-designed flying suits and cockpits. As there
existed unmistakable differences between the bodies of the two countries, both parties made
efforts to register the differences in a scientific manner and to accommodate them by re-
designing equipment and gear. What American physical anthropologists learned from their own
flying population (as seen in chapter 3) was applicable to the Japanese pilots with smaller stature.
Both modes of qualification could be humiliating for Japanese fliers, who had achieved
high level of skill and confidence during the war, but they mostly accepted the changing situation
and cooperated in the making of the new Japanese pilot. Thoroughly retrained and refitted by the
6 Historical studies as well as the diaries and memoirs of kamikaze pilots have qualified the popular views of these
young Japanese fliers as blindly devoted to their emperor. See, for example, Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney, Kamikaze,
Cherry Blossoms, and Nationalisms: The Militarization of Aesthetics in Japanese History (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2002); Ryuji Nagatsuka, I Was a Kamikaze (New York: Macmillan, 1974); Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney,
Kamikaze Diaries: Reflections ofJapanese Student Soldiers (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006).
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American way, the veteran Japanese pilots experienced almost a reincarnation into an
Americanized figure of the pilot.7
The Ban: A Nation of No Fliers
Before WWII, many countries, especially those in Europe and North America, developed
national efforts to promote aviation and to make their citizens "air-minded." In manners specific
to each country's politics, economy, and culture, a strong connection was made between
advances in aviation and state power and prestige. As historian Peter Fritzsche wrote of aviation
and German nationalism around and after WWI, the goal in these national projects was to make
"a nation of fliers." Youngsters in these countries, especially boys, were encouraged to take up
model plane building, gliding, and eventually piloting for their hobby and vocation. Movies,
posters, literature, and paintings boosted up the citizens' motivation to become fliers. More fliers
and more air-minded citizens meant a more powerful nation.8
In contrast to domestic campaigns that celebrated its own citizen-fliers, before December
1941 Americans judged Japanese fliers not so well qualified. Military commentator Fletcher
Pratt wrote in 1939 simply that the Japanese "can neither make good airplanes nor fly them
7 It is noted that the ban on flying was not implemented only for the Japanese. German and Italian nationals at the
end of the war went through similar measures by the Allied forces that prevented them from flying for several years.
Moreover, the return of German civilian pilots to the cockpit was later than that of the Japanese. Italy was the first to
resume commercial aviation, followed by Japan. "Third Ex-Enemy to Regain Wings; West Germany, like Italy and
Japan, Will Soon Return to Commercial Flying," New York Times, 1 January 1955; David Mackenzie, ICAO: A
History of the International Civil Aviation Organization (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010), 221-26.
8 For studies of aviation culture, air-mindedness, popular imaginations, and nationalism, see Robert Wohl, A Passion
for Wings: Aviation and the Western Imagination, 1908-1918 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994); Robert
Whol, The Spectacle of Flight: Aviation and the Western Imagination, 1920-1950 (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 2005); Joseph Corn, The Winged Gospel: America's Romance with Aviation, 1900-1950 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1983); Peter Fritzsche, A Nation of Fliers: German Aviation and the Popular Imagination
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992); Scott Palmer, Dictatorship of the Air: Aviation Culture and the
Fate of Modern Russia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); David Edgerton, England and the
Aeroplane: An Essay on a Militant and Technological Nation (London: Macmillan, 1991); Jonathan Vance, High
Flight: Aviation and the Canadian Imagination (Toronto: Penguin, 2002); and Edward Young, Aerial Nationalism:
A History ofAviation in Thailand (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1995).
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well." These kinds of comments about Japanese incompetence in flying were based on ideas
about racial differences in psychology, physiology, behavior, and culture. Disqualifying
statements such as Pratt's revealed contemporary American assumptions about what constituted
flying and who made good pilots. Pratt, for example, claimed that myopia and defects in the
inner ear among "the Japanese as a race" left them with a poor sense of balance, "the one
physical sense in which an aviator is not permitted to be deficient." Japanese Bushido and the
cultural attitude that "the individual life is valueless" also made them poor pilots, since they
would not try hard enough to escape from emergencies in the air but instead choose to die
gloriously. Moreover, because the Japanese were "a people of combination" and "poor
individualists," they were not fit to become an aviator, who tended to be "peculiarly alone" in the
air. On top of all this, it was said that the Japanese raised their children with "fewer mechanical
toys and less mechanical training than those of any other race." 9 Even the color of the eyes
seemed to be working against the Japanese. In the Fortune magazine of March 1941, aviation
writer Beirne Lay Jr. wrote of flight surgeons' observation about the prevalence of blue or blue-
gray eyes among pilots-"a superficial indication that Americans, Britishers, Scandinavians, and
9 The words of Fletcher Pratt are quoted in John Dower, War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War
(New York: Pantheon, 1984), 102-3. The original source is Fletcher Pratt, Sea Power and Today's War (New York:
Harris-Hilton Books, 1939), 175-80 (given in Dower, 334). These stereotypical images of the Japanese have much
in common with those from the wartime "national character studies" about Japan, which sought to find generalizable
explanations of one nation's "character," often with an emphasis on the Japanese ways of raising children. Examples
include Geoffrey Gorer, "Themes in Japanese Culture," Transactions of the New York Academy of Sciences, Section
11, 5 (1943): 105-24; Arnold Meadow, An Analysis of Japanese Character Structure: Based on Japanese Film Plots
and Thematic Apperception Tests on Japanese Americans (New York: Institute for Intercultural Studies, 1944)
(mimeographed); Jesse Frederick Steiner, Behind the Japanese Mask (New York: Macmillan, 1943); Ruth Benedict,
Japanese Behavior Patterns (Office of War Information, 1945) (mimeographed); Ruth Benedict, The
Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1946); Douglas Haring,
"Aspects of Personal Character in Japan," The Far Eastern Quarterly 6:1 (1946): 12-22; Douglas Haring, "Japanese
National Character: Cultural Anthropology, Psychoanalysis, and History," Yale Review 42 (1953): 375-92; Bernard
Silberman, Japanese Character and Culture: A Book of Selected Readings (Tucson: University of Arizona Press,
1962). For critiques of these approaches, see Alfred Lindesmith and Anselm Strauss, "A Critique of Culture-
Personality Writings," American Sociological Review 15:5 (1950): 587-600; Richard Minear, "The Wartime Studies
of Japanese National Character," Japan Interpreter 13 (Summer 1980): 36-59.
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Germans have more flying aptitude than their Latin and Asiatic brothers." 0 Americans were
disqualifying the Japanese in the cockpit for every conceivable reason.
When the war ended, Americans were in a position to have a direct influence on Japanese
pilots. The first directive issued to the Japanese government by the General Headquarters,
Supreme Commander for Allied Powers (GHQ/SCAP) on September 2, 1945, required the
Imperial Japanese Headquarters to submit "lists of all aircraft, military, naval and civil, giving
complete information as to the number, type, location and condition of such aircraft" and
instructed Japan's armed forces and civil aviation authorities to "insure that all Japanese
Military, Naval and Civil Aircraft remain on the ground, on the water, or aboard ship, until
further notification of the disposition to be made of them."" It was followed the next day by
SCAPIN (SCAP Instructions to the Japanese Government) 2, which directed that "[a]ll Japanese
aircraft and equipment will be safeguarded pending further instructions." 2 On September 22,
GHQ issued another directive that declared the prohibition of producing "[a]ll types of aircraft,
including those designed for civilian use."' 3 Although the rationale was to limit the potential
military capacity of Japan, these directives included civilian aircraft as well, given the indistinct
boundary between civil and military aviation in terms of production capacity and possible uses.
For a brief period between September 14 and October 9, 1945, Japanese pilots were
allowed to fly in order to serve the initial needs of the occupation forces. Scheduled flights
operated by Japanese pilots connected Tokyo and several other cities including Osaka, Fukuoka,
Nagoya, and Sapporo. The program was called Green Cross Flights, since green crosses were
10 Beirne Lay Jr., "The Airman," Fortune, March 1941, 122-23, 137-38, and 140, quote on 137.
" SCAPIN I "General Order Number 1, Military and Naval." 2 September 1945. SCAPINs can be found in the
Records of Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, World War II, Record Group (RG) 331, National
Archives, College Park, MD (hereafter NARA).
1 SCAPIN 2, 3 September 1945.
13 SCAPIN 47, 22 September 1945.
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visibly painted on the fuselages of the airplanes. The GHQ issued specific instructions for these
flights, telling the pilots, for example, to follow the flight path as straight as possible and not to
exceed the altitude of 1,200 meters. While participating in the Green Cross Flights, Japanese
pilots and aviation personnel hoped that civil aviation activity in Japan could resume soon, even
if it would clearly be controlled by occupation forces. Their hope, however, turned out to be
overly optimistic.' 4
The most comprehensive measure directly aimed at Japan's aviation was taken in
SCAPIN 301 of November 1945. To the surprise of many people in Japan's aviation circle,
SCAPIN 301 instituted the ban not only on aircraft production or military flying but also on
nearly all aspects of civil aviation. First, all official bodies engaged in civil aviation were to be
abolished by the end of the year. Moreover, necessary measures were to be taken to dissolve all
companies and other agencies related to civil aircraft operation and "pilot or other training
related to aircraft design, construction, maintenance or operation." After it covered governmental
and commercial organizations in aviation, the ban went down to the individual level. With a
studied comprehensiveness, the SCAPIN 301 ordered: "On and after 31 December 1945 you will
not permit any governmental agency or individual, or any business concern, association,
individual Japanese citizen or group of citizens, to purchase, own, possess, or operate any
aircraft, aircraft assembly, engine, or research, experimental, maintenance or production facility
related to aircraft or aeronautical science including working models." By this clause, all Japanese
pilots were effectively grounded by the end of 1945 and were not to fly again until the
occupation's official end about six and half years later."
" Akira Suruga, Ozora no shogen I. shasen: non-fiction sengo minkan k5kaIshi (Tokyo: Ikkan KkU, 1992), 237-
313.
"5 SCAPIN 301, 18 November 1945.
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All of a sudden, Japan became a nation of no fliers. The cockpit was declared "off limits"
to the Japanese, just as were many buildings, facilities, and areas in Japan.' 6 It was a sudden
transition from a space that invited all Japanese boys throughout the wartime to the one strictly
closed to all Japanese. Among the many ways to disqualify someone as a pilot, the GHQ's policy
was one of the easier measures to implement. No family history checks, no personality tests, no
psychomotor tests, no flight trainer testing, no measure of physical body dimensions, or no
primary flight training was needed. Repeated instructions or confirmations were sufficient to
keep the Japanese on the ground. With as much importance as that on the aviation manufacturing
industry, the ban on flying itself was reiterated and maintained firmly throughout the occupation
period. As noted in the "Far Eastern Commission Policy on Reduction of Japanese Industrial
War Potential" (18 August 1948), the GHQ continued to prohibit "the participation by the
Japanese Government or Japanese nationals in the ownership or airborne operation of civil
aircraft."
The ban was maintained, but behind the scenes it remained a thorny issue. That the
aviation policy was a sensitive matter to the occupation forces can be found not in the heated
debates about it, but rather in the absence of such discussions. Potential forums for discussion
such as aviation periodicals were discontinued as well.'7 Whenever inquires were made on
aviation matters, however, the GHQ reiterated its policy not to allow civil aviation activities by
the Japanese government or Japanese nationals. In replying to an inquiry from an air traffic
controller from Belgium about "documentation services within Japan concerning aviation,
16 John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War / (New York: Norton and the New Press,
1999), 207.
17 One illustration of the complete disappearance of aviation in occupied Japan is that one can hardly find a
publication on aviation topic within the Gordon Prange Collection (University of Maryland), which is the most
comprehensive collection of Japanese publications between 1945 and 1949. The Prange Collection, by contrast, has
many publications on electrical, automotive, or civil engineering.
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aeronautics, and aeronautical meteorology," the GHQ started by pointing out an error in one of
the paragraphs in the letter. Contrary to the inquirer's assumption, "Japan has not maintained an
aircraft industry" since September 1945. Even scientific works in aeronautical meteorology, the
reply added, had not been published by the Japanese government since 1939. Hence, the reply
implied, there would be no need for "documentation services." 8
Sometimes, the SCAP's Civil Transportation Section (CTS) took great efforts to prevent
possible controversies around its transportation policy including aviation matters. The measures
taken by the CTS while participating in SCAP's preparation for "Town Meeting of the Air"
broadcast in the summer of 1949 illustrated the CTS's concern. Conceived as a world tour
version of ABC's weekly radio program "America's Town Meeting of the Air," the "Round the
World Town Meeting" broadcasts were held in 14 capital cities "from London to Tokyo."' 9 Each
town meeting would feature presentations on a pre-selected topic by representatives from
American organizations and their counterparts in the host country, followed by questions and
comments from the audience. The Meeting had ambitious purposes. It aimed to facilitate both
"American understanding of world problems" and "understanding of America 'round the world."
Moreover, the Meeting was considered an opportunity "to show our genuine interest in other
peoples and their problems" and even "to strengthen and spread the democratic way of free
discussion." Finally, the Town Meeting was "to promise peace, freedom and well-being."
As conceptualized by its producers, the Town Meeting was to be in accordance with the
recent report of the U.S. Information Services to Congress that recommended "personal friendly
18 H. Frazier to P. De. Boer, 8 March 1951, box 8760, UD-1809, RG 331, NARA.
19 "Round the World Town Meeting and World Town Hall Seminar" (Memo from Town Hall #1), 6 April 1949, box
8769, UD-1810, RG 331, NARA.
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contact" as the best way of "interpreting our democracy to our world neighbors." 20 Therefore, the
topic to be discussed needed to be of "vital and widespread public interest" to people in both the
U.S. and the host country. The producers also wanted the topic to be something "controversial on
which two or more viewpoints can be expressed."2 In this way, the Town Meeting would
function as a true exhibition of American democracy, in which:
They will hear questions freely raised by both American visitors and their own
countrymen. Thoughtful men and women will be expressing different views in the search
for right answers. Those who participate and listen will gain a better understanding of the
spirit which animates our democracy, of the attitudes and views of competent interpreters
of American opinion. By this method we will be talking with our world neighbors rather
than at them.
The question for the SCAP was, then, what would be such a topic for Japan's "Town Meeting of
the Air"? What topic would be vital, interesting, and controversial enough to be suitable for
exhibiting "the democratic way of free discussion," and yet would not be detrimental to the
SCAP's status in Japan?
The Civil Transportation Section decided early on that, whatever the best topic might be,
it must not be the issue of transportation. In early May 1949, the Civil Information and Education
Section (CIE), which was in charge of coordinating different SCAP sections for this broadcast
project, requested each section to submit several topics to be reviewed for selection. From the
nature of the series' governing theme, "peace with individual freedom and understanding," and
20 Ibid.
21 "Round the World Town Meeting and World Town Hall Seminar" (Memo from Town Hall #2), 7 April 1949, box
8769, UD-1810, RG 331, NARA.
"Round the World Town Meeting and World Town Hall Seminar" (Memo from Town Hall #1), 6 April 1949, box
8769, UD-18 10, RG 331, NARA (emphasis original).
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by looking at the list of participating American organizations, the CTS was well aware that the
transportation issue was very unlikely to be considered as one of possible topics for this forum.
Nevertheless, the CTS acted aggressively to prevent any possibility of putting the transportation
issue on the table. Based on its internal judgment that "no good can be accomplished by a public
radio discussion" and that "any such discussion might only lead to embarrassment to the SCAP,"
the CTS opposed any topic that would "in any way touch upon transportation in Japan."
According to the CTS's evaluation, the issue of transportation was "too apt to involve a
discussion of the Occupation position to be permitted either as a topic for broadcast or for
seminar."2 5 Therefore, the CTS did not submit potential topics to the CIE and instead requested
that any reference to transportation be discouraged in the Meeting. There was no reason, the CTS
assumed, for the American public to be interested in transportation issues of Japan. If there were
any interest, however, it would be about the extent of Japan's participation in international trade
"with their own fleet," which might have met the criteria of being "controversial." But this, the
CTS judged, was too controversial.
As this latter subject is extremely controversial and can hardly be finalized prior to the
signing of the peace treaty, and since there are conflicting interests to be considered, the
Chief of CTS will strongly oppose the use of this subject as a topic of discussion either
for a broadcast or in a seminar.26
Putting this issue to public debate would not serve the interest of the Occupation, "as the material
and views expressed might readily be utilized to create embarrassment for the Supreme
W. L. Ogden, "Town Meeting of the Air Broadcast"(CTS memo of conference), 16 June 1949, box 8769, UD-
1810, RG 331, NARA.
2 4
"Memo for Record" (CTS), 17 May 1947, box 8769, UD-1810, RG 331, NARA.
2 W. L. Ogden, "Town Meeting of the Air Broadcast" (CTS memo of conference), 23 May 1949, box 8769, UD-
1810, RG 331, NARA.
26 CTS to CIE, 24 May 1949, box 8769, UD-1810, RG 331, NARA.
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Commander."27 Other sections also offered lists of topics to be avoided in the Town Meeting, but
none attempted to block, as the CTS did, all topics related to its own mission.28
Unfortunately, the first round of topics survey did not go well. The list of topics
submitted by the SCAP sections other than the CTS "appeared dull." The section representatives
were reminded that they were "playing to an audience of 150 million people." It was re-
emphasized that the topics needed to be "controversial in order to be interesting and to stimulate
discussion." Even "highly controversial" topics, one representative pointed out, might lead to a
good discussion without hurting anyone's feeling. Each section was requested to submit a new
set of topics. 29 For the second round, the CTS did submit a set of topics suitable for the Town
Meeting, but did not revise its previous position. The topics submitted by the CTS were in the
fields of labor, politics, diplomacy, and industry, but not in transportation at all.3 0 Another
meeting was convened to discuss these new sets of topics and eight of them passed the first
screening. These eight topics, which were apparently deemed as controversial enough to be
interesting but not as controversial as the transportation issue, included, "Should the communist
party be outlawed in a democracy?" and "Can Japan remain aloof enough from conflicting
international interests and pressures to become the Switzerland of the Orient?" Satisfied that this
result would guarantee the exclusion of transportation topics, the CTS now decided to stop
27 Ibid.
28 Topics to avoid as suggested by other sections were: a. The right to strike of government employees. (LS) b.
Purge and economic deconcentration. (LS) c. Censorship of mail. (LS) d. The renunciation of war clause in the new
Constitution of Japan. (LS) e. Birth Control (NRS) f. Land Reform Program. (NRS) g. Fishing problems. (NRS) h.
All topics which would tend to criticize SCAP. (CCS) i. Should Japan Deal with a Communist China? (CIE). CIE to
other SCAP sections, 31 May 1949, box 8769, UD-1810, RG 331, NARA.
29 CIE to other SCAP sections, 9 June 1949, box 8769, UD-1810, RG 331, NARA.
30 CTS to CIE, 10 June 1949, box 8769, UD- 1810, RG 331, NARA. Suggested topics were: a. Has the emancipation
of labor in Japan helped the economic recovery? c. Should Japan work toward the establishment of a two-part
political system or continue the present multi-party system? d. Should Japan, prior to the conclusion of a peace
treaty, be permitted diplomatic and commercial relations with other countries, including the United Nations? e.
Should Japan's future industrial economic policy stress production of capital goods or consumables?
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attending the SCAP preparations for the Town Meeting.3' The topic that was finally chosen for
the Town Meeting of the Air was: "How can Japan become a self-supporting nation?"
The position of the CTS might seem ironic, since this kind of "direct exchange of public
opinions" could be made possible only "in this age of travel by air and communications by
radio." As the organizers clearly knew, touring 14 capital cities around the world and holding
town meetings and seminars in 65 days was in itself a showcase of postwar American power,
technological as well as political. The American group's tight itinerary was predicated on smooth
operation of air transport. Indeed, the Pan American World Airways cooperated with the
program's producers and offered "special services" for air travel and hotel reservations for the
entire American group, although the travel would be on its regular scheduled flights. This
world tour of democratic public forum was not separable from American business interests in
aviation. In fact, the Pan American (and the Northwest) had been flying into and from Japan
since the early days of the occupation. Moreover, in an attempt to appropriate the forced vacuum
of domestic airline service in Japan, the Pan American and the Northwest had competitively
asked the SCAP in the summer of 1947 for a right to operate internal service in Japan, though
neither airline succeeded at that time.33 The question of who, if any, should be allowed to run
airline services in Japan during or after the occupation could not be discussed in the Town
Meeting of the Air, not because the issue was so technical that few people cared about it, but
31 W. L. Ogden, "Town Meeting of the Air Broadcast"(CTS memo of conference), 16 June 1949, box 8769, UD-
1810, RG 33 1, NARA. Other controversial but not too controversial topics were: "a. Can Japan raise the standard of
living of its people and still compete with the selling of its goods in the world market? b. Are Democratic forces in
Japan now strong enough to prevent the emergence of authoritarian rule whether of extreme right or left? c. Are
post-treaty controls of Japan necessary? d. Can the world trust the permanency of Japanese democratic reforms? e.
Has organized labor in Japan progressed to the point of being a stabilized factor in the establishment of a permanent
democracy? f. (To be re-phrased) Has the breakdown of the crust of Japanese tradition, law and custom under the
impact of occupation reforms created a meeting place for the cultures of East and West or a new schizm in the
Japanese social structure which will lead to social instability."
32 "Round the World Town Meeting and World Town Hall Seminar" (Memo from Town Hall #1), 6 April 1949, box
8769, UD-1810, RG 331, NARA.
3 Correspondences on this matter are in box 785-12, UD-1 168, RG 331, NARA.
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rather because it would raise larger political and economic questions about current SCAP
policies and post-occupation prospects.
"No Japanese in the Cockpit"
By the time of the Town Meeting of the Air broadcast in the summer of 1949, discussions in
Washington were beginning on the possibility of opening domestic airlines in Japan. The U.S.
carriers including the Pan American and the Northwest had been tapping into this closed market,
and the British Overseas Airways Corporation was also keenly interested in the potential of
aviation business in Japan. Moreover, Japanese businessmen had been writing letters to the
SCAP, asking for serious consideration of the need for domestic airline service. Japanese
officials who had been interested in reviving Japan's civil aviation were also preparing for such a
change in policy. As an initial but serious step, young officials in the Aviation Safety Agency,
some of whom were former wartime pilots, had started attending English conversation classes
and were making attempts to meet any American aviation officials visiting Japan, even without
formal appointments. What they sincerely hoped was, of course, to fly again. 4
From this early stage of discussion, however, a clear line began to be drawn between
permitting commercial flights within Japan and permitting the Japanese to pilot those flights. An
English-language newspaper Nippon Times reported in September 1949 that Washington was
contemplating re-opening Japan's domestic air service. "But under no circumstances," Nippon
Times added quickly, would the American Air Force want to see "any Japanese operating or
3 "Zadankai: kk5 no kahaku jidai o kataru" [Roundtable: talk about aviation's blank period] in Nihon kdkaishi:
shdwa sengohen [History of Japanese aviation: Showa and postwar period], ed. Nihonk6kaishi Hensan linkai(Tokyo: Nihon KkFa Kyokai, 1992), 619-37. Among the participants in this roundtable conversation was Hidemaro
Nagano, a former pilot who had flown during WWII, belonged to Aviation Safety Agency during the Occupation,
and then flown again for Japan Air Lines after the Occupation ended. Nagano was one of the two JAL employees
that were sent to the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) Aeronautical Center in Oklahoma in April 1952 for
training.
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owning planes." As to why the Japanese should not be allowed to fly, a lesson from recent
history was recalled. "We remember," a high-ranking official was quoted, "when we allowed the
Germans to start glider training after the World War I."" If Germans were thought to have
proceeded toward the second world war through gliding, the Japanese back at the control of
flying machines would mean a threatening step towards similar rearmament and war. It was the
last thing for the SCAP to allow regarding its aviation policy in Japan.
The SCAP's policy of no aircraft owned or flown by the Japanese was firm and
consistent. In June 26, 1950, one day after the Korean War broke out, the SCAP finally issued a
directive (SCAPIN 2106) that it would permit one airline to be issued a license to operate an
internal airline service in Japan. The licensee, SCAPIN 2106 stipulated, should be chosen among
those airlines that had been flying into Japan during the occupation. These meant foreign airlines
such as Pan American, Northwest, Canadian Pacific, Philippine, CAT, BOAC, and Quantas.
Accordingly, this topic was referred to as "non-Japanese civil aviation." 36 These seven foreign
airlines formed the Japan Domestic Airline Company and applied for a license. After this
proposal did not proceed smoothly, SCAPIN 2106 was revised in January 1951 (SCAPIN
2106/1), so that the license could be issued to a "Japanese controlled juridical person." This
might have excited the Japanese in the aviation circle, but it came with a strong conditional
clause. A Japanese-controlled company could only be allowed, "provided neither the Japanese
Government nor Japanese nationals participate in the development, manufacture, assembly,
ownership or airborne operation of civil aircraft."37 This meant that a Japanese-controlled
3 "Airline for Japan?" Nippon Times, 10 September 1949, found in box 649, UD-1 153, RG 331, NARA.
36 See, for example, "Revision of SCAP Circular No. 6, International Air Traffic in Japan, 9 March 1949," 23 June
1950, box 648, UD- 1153, RG 331, NARA.
37 SCAPIN 2106/1, 27 January 1951 (emphasis added). A chronological summary of these events is found in "Brief
on Status of Japanese Domestic Air Service" (CTS memorandum), 16 July 1951, box 8768, UD-18 10, RG 331,
NARA.
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domestic airline company should run air service without owning aircraft and that no Japanese
pilot could be allowed to fly for that airline. Its business activity would be limited to what could
be done on the ground such as scheduling, marketing, ticketing, customer service, and
maintenance, but flight operation would be performed by an international airline with non-
Japanese pilots through a contract with this Japanese company.
The Supreme Commander himself summarized this policy most clearly. In a meeting
with a (U.S.) Civil Aeronautics Administration official held in December 1950, General Douglas
MacArthur offered his "guiding principles" for this internal civil airline project. The first of them
was "No Japanese 'in the cockpit' until after the peace treaty is signed." He considered this
airline as necessary not only for "betterment of Japanese economy" but also for the "United
Nations military back-up," and therefore wanted to get it running as early as March 1951.38 But
he made it clear that airborne operation of aircraft could not be left to Japanese fliers at all.
MacArthur's guideline was observed until the end of the occupation. When the question
was raised in July 1951 about whether the Japan Domestic Airline Company might use Japanese
nationals as co-pilots, the Legal Section in the GHQ concluded that "Japanese operation of
aircraft in Japan is prohibited, and not contemplated." 39 And when the Japan Domestic Airline
Company actually asked the SCAP for a permission to use the U.S. Air Force's Link Trainer to
train its future Japanese co-pilots and pilots, the request was denied in order to avoid making an
"undesirable precedent."40 In January 1952, only three months before the peace treaty took
effect, the SCAP finally allowed the use of Link Trainers by Japanese nationals after consulting
38 Dallas. B. Sherman (PAA) to Donald Nyrop (CAA), "Domestic Airline for Japan," 19 December 1950, box 5,
entry 22, RG 237 (Records of the Federal Aviation Administration), NARA.
39 Alva C. Carpenter (Chief, Legal Section) to General G. V. Keyser, 24 July 1951, box 8768, UD- 1810, RG 331,
NARA.
4 Paul Ruston (Japan Domestic Airline Company) to GHQ/SCAP, "Use of Link Trainers for Japan Domestic
Airline Pilots," 10 August 1951, box 739, UD- 1154, RG 331, NARA; Headquarters, Far East Air Forces to SCAP, 2
September 1951, box 739, UD-1 154, RG 331, NARA.
254
the State Department. This decision was possible, however, because the State Department
understood the Link Trainer quite literally as belonging to "ground activities" just like the
training of mechanics and inspectors, which had already been permitted. Probably the State
Department did not recognize the fact that the Link Trainer was one of the most widely used
pilot training devices in the past war and that its effectiveness and efficiency resulted exactly
from not having to be in the air (see chapter 1). By contrast, the State Department advised that
the SCAP keep prohibiting "sport gliding," since to allow it would mean "the Japanese
resumption of any type of airborne operation."41 Although Japanese pilots could now sit in a
mock-up cockpit to train themselves, Japan remained a nation of no fliers until the last day of
Allied Occupation.
Learning the American Way of Flying
Technically, Japanese nationals could fly into the air the moment the peace treaty took effect in
April 1952. And some did make their first flights with great joy and even tears soon after the
occupation ended. In general, however, Japanese fliers faced significant challenges in the post-
occupation aviation environment. Having been grounded for six and half years, they had to adapt
themselves to new techniques and norms of flying, especially to those of American aviation, in
ways that were acceptable to Americans. The terms of the peace treaty stipulated that Japan
would apply for membership in the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) within six
months after the treaty and would accordingly observe the new international standards set by the
ICAO. Because the ICAO originated from the International Aviation Conference held in Chicago
in 1944 and became a specialized agency of the United Nations in 1947, Japan was excluded
4 Diplomatic Section to G-4 and Transportation Section, "Civil Aviation Activities by Japanese Nationals," 21
January 1952, box 8768, UD-1810, RG 331, NARA.
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from this postwar paradigm of international aviation throughout the occupation period.42 During
the last months of the occupation, Japan's Civil Aeronautics Agency (JCAA) tried to prepare for
the upcoming task of joining international aviation community. And for that, it had to seek
assistance and guidance from the U.S.
The most challenging of all tasks was to obtain and train new personnel to take care of all
aspects of aviation: aircraft inspection, air traffic control, maintenance, and, of course, piloting.
Japan's Civil Aeronautics Agency was well aware that the ban on aviation during the occupation
stripped Japan of its aviation capacity to such an extent that it would not fulfill its mission
"unless the training for such personnel is started immediately." As its first move, the JCAA
asked the SCAP in January 1952 if it could train 20 aircraft inspectors at the training courses of
the Far East Air Force (FEAF) within Japan.43 The SCAP gave the FEAF its opinion in favor of
this program since this would not only contribute to Japan's aviation development but also would
work as "an effective means of furthering friendly relations between the Japanese Government
and any residual Security Forces."A4
These efforts for "friendly relations" between the United States and the post-occupation
Japan played a significant role in reviving Japan's civil aviation, as the U.S. continued to offer
training programs for the Japanese nationals in the early post-occupation years. While aircraft
inspectors and other ground crew began to be trained within Japan, it seemed necessary to both
Japan and the U.S. to send pilots to the U.S. and have them trained there first, until Japan's own
pilot training could start. In the spring of 1952, the Japanese Government sent six aviation
42 Mackenzie, ICAO, 24-59.
43 Director, Civil Aeronautics Agency, Ministry of Transportation (Japan) to Chief, Transportation Section,
GHQ/SCAP, "Training for Aircraft Inspectors," 7 January 1952, box 739, UD-1 154, RG 331, NARA.
44 Aileen M. Webster (GHQ) to Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, "Training of Employees of the Civil
Aeronautics Agency, Ministry of Transportation, Japanese Government," I1 January 1952, box 739, UD-1 154, RG
331, NARA.
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personnel, who were veteran pilots from the past war and had been grounded for nearly seven
years, to the Aeronautical Center in Oklahoma City for training. Two of them, Hidemaro Nagano
and Yoshikazu Itonaga, were now affiliated with the newly formed Japan Air Lines. According
to a statement by the newsletter of an aeronautical school in Tulsa, Oklahoma, where they first
trained for commercial rating, "from active participation in aviation ... during the recent conflict
to enrolling in the Spartan School of Aeronautics under the sponsorship of their State
Department is a long step to be taken in seven short years." Recognizing the symbolism of the
arrival of former Japanese pilots, the aeronautical school described itself as "A Small United
Nations," to which the Japanese government sent its representatives to "help re-establish the
island's airlines."45
A maI U -nited. INations
Figure 19. Japanese pilots in the Spartan Academy of Aeronautics in 1952.
[Source: Spartan News, July 19521
45 "Spartan School A Small United Nations," Spartan News, July 1952, found in box 5, entry 2, RG 237, NARA.
The other four were Masao Kimura, Yukiaki Kawata, Tadanao Kameyama, and Kiyoshi Nishimura.
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It may be noted here that these men were not the first Japanese former pilots to be
brought to the U.S. At least one former Imperial Navy pilot named Richard Yukimasa
Nishiyama, who had been trained for, but not actually put into, a kamikaze mission thanks to the
war's timely end, came to the U.S. in 1948. The purpose of the visit to America by this "ex-
kamikaze," however, was not flight training, but college education at Lafayette College.
Remarkably, the Johnstone Scholarship that Nishiyama received was established specifically for
Japanese students by a family of an American solider killed in the Pacific War. The award of the
Johnstone Scholarship to this ex-kamikaze was praised by many as a noble Christian act of
forgiving and even giving opportunity to former enemies, but it was also in accordance with
broader American initiative to educate Japanese youth at American colleges in the hope that they
would learn the American versions of democracy and capitalism and eventually spread them
when they returned to Japan. Hence the SCAP used GARIOA scholarship ("Government and
Relief in Occupied Areas"), allocated by the U.S. Congress, to send more than 1,000 Japanese
students to American colleges between 1949 and 1952.46 After the occupation ended, the
Fulbright Program took the same role of sending thousands of Japanese scholars and students to
the U.S. for temporary study. The arrival of former pilots at the Oklahoma flight training center
in 1952, then, can be understood as part of the American efforts to turn the former enemy into
earnest students of America, though delayed by several years due to the aviation ban.
In fact, the Japanese pilots were not the first group to come to Oklahoma for aviation
training after WWII, either. Students from the Philippines and Latin America had already gone
through training programs according to the American system since 1947. As seen by the
46 Shibusawa, America's Geisha Ally, chapter 5 ("A Kamikaze Goes to College").
47 Shigeru Nakayama, "Sending Scientists Overseas," in A Social History ofScience and Technology in
Contemporary Japan, Volume 1: The Occupation Period, 1945-1952, ed. Shigeru Nakayama (Melbourne: Trans
Pacific Press, 2001), 249-60.
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Oklahomans, the ultimate goal of this aviation-training program for foreign nationals went far
beyond the practical acquisition of aviation techniques. It was hoped that this program would
contribute to what seemed to "stagger the imagination-namely a lasting world peace."
Although the columnist for the Daily Oklahoman warned the readers against assuming the
superiority of everything American to other societies and cultures and against teaching "the
beauty of the American way" in a condescending manner, it was inevitable that this program was
designed to spread the American way not only of flying but, in fact, of everything. 4 8 At the same
time that the CAA was teaching American regulations and techniques of civil aviation, the
Oklahoma City University offered lessons in American history and culture that would "extend
the good-neighbor relations between the United States and all democratic nations."49 The
ambitious project for world peace would begin by inviting "young men and women from every
nation on earth, to study and become acquainted with American ways."50
What the former Japanese pilots learned in Oklahoma were exactly these "American
ways." Although Japanese aviation officials believed that the "excellent aviation technique and
quality before and during the war" would give their own pilots "sufficient qualifications to reach
world standards," they still needed to get approval by the American system.5 ' After the first
group attended courses in Oklahoma, the U.S. CAA proposed that it train 55 Japanese per year
who would help "establish, operate and maintain civil aviation in their country." The CAA
expected that some of those Japanese sent to the U.S. for aviation safety training would have
48 Elmer T. Peterson, "A Might Portent for Oklahoma City," Daily Oklahoman, 27 December 1947, found in box 1,
entry 59, RG 237, NARA.
49 "U.S. Backs City Bid as Foreign Student Center," Daily Oklahoman, 21 December 1947, found in box 1, entry 59,
RG 237, NARA.
50 Elmer T. Peterson, "Good Will to Men Means Hard Job," Daily Oklahoman, 28 December 1947, found in box 1,
entry 59, RG 237, NARA.
51 "Reconstruction Policy for Japan's Civil Aviation" (Report of Aviation Council to Minister of Transportation), 12
November 1952, attached as an enclosure to "Report of Special Civil Aviation Study (Tokyo, 1952)," box 5, entry
22, RG 237, NARA.
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"previous flight experience" from the wartime, but still recommended that they be given "a
refresher course," so that they could get CAA's commercial certificate as well as instrument
rating and airline transport rating. After the first group of six people sent by the Japanese
government returned to Japan, another group of eleven pilots of the Japan Air Lines went to
Oakland, California, in November 1952 to train at the TALOA Academy of Aeronautics run by
the Transocean Air Lines, which was also providing pilots and engineers for the JAL. This
second group was led by Sabur6 Ejima, who was a veteran pilot.
Even before these trainees went to the U.S., they had had chances to experience the new
American way of flying in Japan. In September 1951, when the JAL was established but was not
allowed to own or operate aircraft, Hidemaro Nagano sat curiously at the back of the cockpit in a
test flight of JAL's first Martin 202, chartered from the Northwest and flown by an American
pilot. As the plane flew from Tokyo to Sapporo through thick clouds within a short two and half
hours, Nagano realized that things had changed radically from his wartime flying. The
"technique gap" between American and Japanese pilots was made most conspicuous when the
pilot did a GCA (Ground Controlled Approach) landing on Tokyo's Haneda airport on a rainy
night with extremely low visibility. Nagano had not had experienced such a thing before. "Six
years' blank" left all Japanese pilots so far behind their times. Ejima and his colleague veteran
pilots experienced similar surprises as they received training at TALOA academy in Oakland.
There were lots of terms and techniques that he had never heard of before-range beacon, NDB
(non-directional beacon), GCA, ATC (air traffic control), and position report. Ejima compared
52 Harold J. Carrick, "Budget Discussion-Japan," 30 October 1952, box 5, entry 2, RG 237, NARA.
5,"M6 10-nen, mada 10-nen," Ozora, October 1961, 16-30, Nagano's recollection in 17-18 (ozora was a JAL
company magazine); Soichi Kaji, Jetto Pairotto: kokusaisen kich5 monogatari [Jet pilot: the stories of the captains
for international flights] (Tokyo: Pelican-sha, 1969), 87-88. For the debate around the GCA method, in comparison
with the ILS (Instrument Landing System) in the U.S., see Erik Conway, Blind Landings: Low- Visibility Operations
in American Aviation, 19/8-1958 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006).
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his four-month training in Oakland to a happy occasion in which "fish acquired water," but the
water seemed to have changed since the last time the fish swam in it.54 To these early groups of
Japanese trainees, the American way of flight instruction was characterized by the emphasis on
various safety measures during emergencies as well as theory-based instructions. As the
Japanese saw it, the American training centered on how to deal with failures of various
instruments. They compared this American way with the prewar and wartime Japanese way,
which, they remembered, focused on getting the plane into the air. The American way of
training, moreover, seemed more liberal than the rigid military discipline they had been used
to.5 5 As the veteran Japanese pilots finally returned to the sky in the U.S., the American flying
seemed more advanced, systematic, and rational than what they had learned back in Japan and in
wartime.
This Japanese perception of the American way of flying persisted as the Japan Air Self-
Defense Force, established in 1954, started to receive the USAF style training, often by
American instructors. Just like many other ideas, things, and practices in postwar Japan, the
American method of flight training for the JASDF pilots was dubbed, by a Japanese aviation
magazine, as a "new [flight] operation instruction method." The magazine's article on the
JASDF's training outlined the "basic principles" of the USAF as a new standard. The first was to
teach how to make a safe and accurate flight, and the second was to have pilots acquire "rational
operation method" within a short time. What this American style training purported to produce
was "a new pilot." By the postwar redefinition based on the Japanese perception of American
flying, a pilot was "a driver" who "operates a machine called an airplane and faithfully abides by
14 Sabur5 Ejima, "Honjitsu no kono aoi aki no sora," Ozora, October 1966, 13-14.
5 Tanehiko Sei, "Kusawake no koro: JAL gaishi no shuyakutachi, Vol. 9," Kikan 5zora [quarterly 6zora], April
1987, 17-19.
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the rules with caution and accuracy of one's own." No longer relevant in this definition of the
pilot were "mysterious talents unique to Oriental people, the breadth of personal character, or the
senses uniquely possessed by an individual." The Japanese aviation writer suggested that the
progress of "modern science," which presumably included modern aviation, had something to do
with making "even an idiot" be able to "operate switches without mistakes." In the scientific and
rational way of American flying, at least as understood by the Japanese in the 1950s, there was
no longer room for "legendary" tales of an individual pilot and his "tours de force." Just as
"modern science" tended to "replace human talents and brains with vacuum tubes," modern
flying would make human beings "adapt to disciplines and customs." To achieve this, the USAF
training method was said to "classify, systematize, make patterns of, and scrutinize" all
dimensions of flying.56
In this article about "new" pilots and flying, nothing was said of what had gone before,
but the implication was that the old way of making pilots was the opposite of the new one. This
was a typical postwar negation of prewar and wartime Japanese practices as unscientific and
even irrational, except that in this case it was made more than ten years after the war's end. This
self-critique of the Japanese way of flying, however, may be put into perspective by recalling the
wartime thinking by American researchers, most notably Norbert Wiener, who gave Japanese
pilots an ontological status of the "calculating enemy," as distinct from the racialized or
anonymous images of the Enemy Other. As targets of Allied antiaircraft fire, historian Peter
Galison wrote, the "calculating enemy" that included Japanese and German pilots were
56 ,Jieitai no atarashT sojakyoikuh6," Kdkfljdho [aviation information], June 1956, 36-37. The English title of the
aviation magazine Kokajdh6 was "Aireview." The phrase "new [flight] operation instruction method" is the
translation of atarashi sdjii kydikuh6, which does not include the word for "flying" or "flight." The word "operation"
(s5ja) implies the operation of an aircraft. The phrase "rational operation method" is the translation of gdri-teki na
sdjfah5.
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considered by Wiener and other researchers as "neither invisible nor irrational" but instead "so
merged with machinery that (his) human-nonhuman status was blurred."5 7 It is ironic, then, that
the Japanese aviation commentators in the mid 1950s were saying that they had lacked exactly
the "rational" way of flying and that they should now become faithful and rule-abiding operators
of aircraft by foregoing all "mysterious talents unique to Oriental people" and accepting "modern
science."
No less ironic was their labeling of modern, rational understanding of flying as typically
"American," given that the wartime Japanese aviation research, especially aviation psychology,
had also explored the view of a pilot as a "skilled technician" who carefully operated the
machine by the rule.58 As will be described below, however, the pre-1945 Japanese research and
practice were rarely referenced in the post-occupation Japanese discussion of aviation.
Everything about flying had to be remodeled after the American norm. The Japanese pilots and
aviation commentators did not appreciate the fact that the postwar "rational" practice of pilot
training was something new even in the American context, which was a consequence of the
processes described in the previous chapters. Nor did they take into consideration that the now
" Peter Galison, "The Ontology of the Enemy: Norbert Wiener and the Cybernetic Vision," Critical Inquiry 21
(1994): 228-66, quote on 233.
58 The wartime Japanese psychologist Mamoru Mochizuki wrote in 1944 about what it meant to be a pilot:
"Needless to say, the job of becoming a pilot is chiefly a matter of becoming the skilled technician who, while
bound by certain limitations, knows well these limitations, and who can manipulate his machine in spite of them
with maximum efficiency. There must be rigid fidelity to the natural laws which govern the machine." Mamoru
Mochizuki, Koka shinri [aviation psychology] (Tokyo: Koyama Shoten, 1944). As of 1947, this book was believed
by American psychologists to be "the only book in the world carrying the title 'Aviation Psychology."' Frank
Geldard (University of Virginia) to Morris Viteles (University of Pennsylvania), 14 October 1947, Records of the
Committee on Aviation Psychology, The National Academies Archives, Washington, DC. Geldard served as a
member of the AAF Psychological Mission to Japan in late 1945 and interviewed Mochizuki as an important
informant about Japanese wartime research in aviation psychology. Geldard brought a copy of Mochizuki's book to
the U.S. and had it translated with the support from the Committee on Aviation Psychology. The phrases quoted
above are from this English translation, which has not been published officially. The English translation copy is
located within the Records of the Committee on Aviation Psychology, The National Academies Archives. For
Geldard's findings about Japanese wartime practice in pilot selection, see Frank Geldard and Chester Harris,
"Selection and Classification of Aircrew by the Japanese," American Psychologist 1 (1946): 205-17.
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disreputable reliance on "mysterious talents unique to Oriental people, the breadth of personal
character, or the senses uniquely possessed by an individual," if only one substituted "American"
for "Oriental," had been no less prevalent in American aviation. The image of the modern pilot,
which American researchers and practitioners had constructed during the recent war, acquired its
distinctive American-ness when it traveled to postwar Japan and encountered the Japanese fliers
struggling between their own experiences and the new model imposed on them.
Among all the new ways of American flying, what felt undeniably American to the
Japanese pilots was the obvious fact that they were learning to fly in English.59 Even during the
occupation when aviation was still banned, Japanese officials including Nagano prepared for a
possible resumption of aviation by attending English conversation courses.60 The English
language became a serious problem, however, as the Japanese started to train both in the U.S.
and in Japan. For Ejima's group, the four-month stay in Oakland was "entirely a battle against
English." As their training was conducted "in English, from morning to evening," some of them
reached a state of "nervous breakdown." Ejima was not surprised to see this happen, since
everyone was "under such a pressure from English."6 1 While flying a DC-3 with one's own eyes
was relatively easy, another trainee remembered, listening to English without seeing was not fun.
Even after they returned to Japan, English was a big hurdle for the Japanese pilots. It was
thought that this English problem was part of the reason it took more time for Japanese pilots to
start working on scheduled flights. Communications in English from air traffic controllers were
often hard to understand. It seemed remarkable that Japanese pilots flying in the Japanese sky
should use only English, but they had no choice. Finally, Masao Kimura, who was known to be
59 Sei, "Kusawake no koro," 17-19.
60 "Zadankai," 625-26.
61 Ejima, "Honjitsu no kono aoi aki no sora," 13-14.
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good at English, became the first Japanese co-pilot for DC-4 aircraft in August 1953, almost a
year after the first Oklahoma group returned.62
The problem of flying in English was not limited to those sent to the U.S. in the
immediate post-occupation period. Japanese pilots who were trained within Japan faced the same
language issues. Any Japanese who wanted to fly again or anew had to learn the new language of
the cockpit, which happened to be the language of the nation that had defeated and occupied
Japan. The very first stage of the JASDF pilot training program was four-month long English
instruction at the Special English Instruction Unit in Hamamatsu for both novices and those with
flying experiences. Only after finishing the language course could the cadets be transferred to
Ozuki air base for basic ground and air training. When a Japanese aviation magazine reporter
asked of "the most difficult aspect" in training, one student enrolled in a P (Primary) course at
Ozuki answered, "It's English." At the time of the previous war's end, it turned out, this student
had been enrolled in the Imperial Navy's preparatory flying course. Then he went to Hosei
University, majoring in economics and graduating there before he entered the JASDF. Even this
well-educated man, however, felt "squeezed by English," an experience he had not anticipated.
"Using English from morning to evening," another student interviewed at Ozuki said, "I get
nervous breakdown." It was frustrating to him that some excellent people finished the English
course only in one month while others struggled to score the minimum requirement. While the
classroom instruction at Ozuki included subjects on aircraft maneuvering, communication,
maintenance, engine, meteorology, and aviation law, this student said he was "spending thirty to
forty per cent of the brain on English." For, without English skills, one had to expect more
troubles at later stages of pilot training. Impressed by these answers, the reporter asked, "Is
62 Kaji, Jetto pairoto, 92-93; Sei, "Kusawake no koro," 17-19; "Ashikakejgnen," Ozora, May 1960, 12-20, on 15.
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English that important?" The student's answer slid onto a more abstract level: "Anyhow, we are
now making strenuous efforts to catch up with advanced countries. The attitude is that we absorb
all things just as they are."63 Learning to fly in English was part of the postwar national efforts to
learn from and overtake the U.S.
The problem of English remained a concern even at the top level of the JASDF, since it
vividly represented the challenges the new JASDF faced in all of its activities. As the JASDF
Chief of Staff Sadamu Sanagi told a reporter in 1957, the biggest difficulties in the JASDF
consisted in overcoming "ten years' blank" and managing "the relationship with the American
forces." As the "blank" was being filled by "American style" maintenance, training, etc., the
differences in "manners and customs" and even in "the way of thinking" became conspicuous.
And of course, there was the "language problem" as well. The chief of staff pointed out that
more recent pilots showed better English capability than their predecessors, but he clearly knew
that the problem remained unresolved. Speaking of a recent accident, which was in part
attributed to miscommunication of flying altitude, Sanagi gave a concrete example of the
difficulties in pronouncing numbers in English. "To the ears of a Japanese," he explained, it was
hard to tell "thirteen" from "thirty," which could lead a pilot or an air traffic controller to mistake
13,000 feet for 30,000 feet. Moreover, reading the number 10,000 as "ten thousand" was strange
to the convention of Japanese language, which has separate units for 1,000 and 10,000 (sen and
man). All of these linguistic differences could be critical in high-speed flying situation.64 Not
being native to English language became a serious safety issue in flying, putting all Japanese
pilots at a disadvantage.
63 Kazuo Baba, "Nobiyuku hinomaru no tsubasa, Jieitai no kMk5 kichi meguri," Kbkn johd, June 1956, 31-43, quotes
on 31-32. A chart of the JASDF training courses is on p. 82 in this issue of Kdkiijdho.
64 Katsu Kori, "Sora no robi: KkD Bakuryoch6 Sanagi Sadamu Kasho," K~kfijdh, November 1957, 116-19.
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As some people saw it, it was perhaps "Japan's tragedy" that one must speak English
"while in the sky of Japan." But everyone agreed that it was an unavoidable challenge for
postwar Japan and Japanese pilots. The interview article with Sanagi included a photo of the
JASDF pilots taking an English class, each wearing a headphone. The caption for the photo read:
"One can say that English conversation is the biggest cancer in the Self-Defense Force." Only by
overcoming it through hard work and practice could the Japanese pilots master the new
American way of flying and sit next to American pilots in the cockpit.65
Americans in the Japanese Cockpit
Since the flight training for the Japanese started after, not before, the occupation ended (April
1952), the flight operation of the Japan Air Lines had to be taken up by foreign pilots, mostly
Americans. Starting from October 1951, pilots and planes chartered from the Northwest Airlines
flew on JAL's domestic routes. As the charter contract with the Northwest ended in September
1952, the JAL purchased its first DC-4 planes. The JAL marked this occasion as the beginning of
"independent operation," but American pilots, provided by the Transocean Air Lines, continued
to occupy the cockpits. Japanese pilots entered the cockpit only gradually. Following Kimura as
the first Japanese DC-4 co-pilot (August 1953), Nagano became the fifth DC-4 co-pilot in
December 1953. The honor of becoming the first Japanese captain since the war's end went to
Ejima in October 1954, two years after the beginning of "independent operation" and eight
66
months after the beginning of the first international Tokyo-San Francisco route. As late as
656Ibid.
6 6 Nihon Kokii Kabushiki Kaisha, Nihon Kbkii 40-nen no kiseki: shashin de miru Nihon Kdkal 40-nenshi (Tokyo:
Nihon Koki Kabushiki Kaisha, 1992), 16. Before they could sit in the cockpit, many Japanese former pilots at JAL
worked as pursers, observing the American pilots' performances over their shoulders. Among them were Saburo
Ejima, Yoshikazu Itonaga, and Eishi Kimoto, who would later go to Oakland for training. "Pasa [purser] o
kakonde-Nihon K6kn ni saiyosareta moto s6jnishi," Kdkijdho, April 1952, 60-70.
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November 1954, Japan had only 38 pilots with commercial licenses, a small number when
compared with 1945 when there were 4,800 commercially licensed pilots. Moreover, most of
them were working as co-pilots. 67 For Japanese officials in aviation, this situation was a source
of "great regret." Japan was failing to achieve "independent flight" in the fullest sense of the
words even after it was allowed to do so. As a consequence, a lot of dollars had to be spent
employing foreign pilots. Reporting in November 1952, Japan's Aviation Council urged the
government to take measures "to insure aircraft navigation by Japanese pilots themselves."6 8
The absence of certified Japanese captains was made conspicuous by a highly publicized
event in the history of Japan's civil aviation. On August 23, 1954, Emperor Hirohito (or, the
Showa Emperor), with his wife and the staff for the imperial family, boarded a Japan Air Lines
aircraft for a specially scheduled flight from Sapporo to Tokyo. It was the first time in Japanese
history that an emperor flew in an airplane. The Japan Air Lines carefully orchestrated this
historic flight, hoisting the national flag outside the cockpit window, reviewing the route of the
imperial motorcade at the Sapporo airport, arranging the order of boarding, cleaning a carpet for
the ramp at Tokyo and sending it to Sapporo (while getting a new one for Tokyo), preparing the
imperial meal under the watch of an Imperial Household Agency officer, and calculating the
time between the emperor's getting off the plane and getting into his car (two to three minutes).
The JAL even prepared a special transcript for the in-flight announcements regarding departure,
landing, no-smoking signs, etc. As the aircraft was flying over many regions of Japan, there were
brief explanations of those areas in the manner of a tour guide. The aircraft designated for this
67 Data from Interavia, no. 11 (1954), quoted in "Japanese Civil Aviation," World Trade Information Service, Part 4,
No. 55-15 (August 1955), found in box 5, entry 2, RG 237, NARA.6 8 
"Reconstruction Policy for Japan's Civil Aviation" (Report of Aviation Council to Minister of Transportation), 12
November 1952, attached as an enclosure to "Report of Special Civil Aviation Study (Tokyo, 1952)," box 5, entry
22, RG 237, NARA.
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special flight was the City of Tokyo, a DC-6B plane usually used in international routes, with a
back-up plan to use the Takachiho, a DC-4 plane. The JAL staff carefully inspected the
conditions of the aircraft, cleaning the toilets, replacing the curtain with a new one, and putting
new seat belts for the emperor and empress. The City of Tokyo was to depart from Tokyo at 8
am, arriving at Sapporo 10 am. The emperor would arrive at the plane at 12 pm, and the plane
was to leave Sapporo at 12:10 pm, arriving at Tokyo's Haneda airport at 14:20 pm.69
The JAL's Japanese staff worked hard for this historic flight, but it was notable that the
captain who flew the emperor to Tokyo was an American, Claude Turner. Another American,
Sydney Joiner, served as the first officer, while Saburo Ejima sat in the cockpit as the second
officer. The back-up plan had a similar team structure in the cockpit, with Joiner as the captain,
and another American and Japanese as the first and second officer, respectively. In contrast, the
other crew members-flight engineers, navigators, and flight attendants-were all Japanese,
except for James Henderson as a flight engineer listed in the primary plan. In this high-profile
flight for the emperor of Japan, the cockpit was the only place where a Japanese could not play a
major role. A few days after the flight, Turner, Ejima, and the chief stewardess Kikuko Sasaki
were presented with imperial gifts for their good work.70
The relationship between American and Japanese pilots was delicate. Throughout the
1950s, there were more than fifty American pilots who came from the TALOA in Oakland, in
addition to a smaller number of flight engineers, navigators, and dispatchers. As there were no
Japanese pilots qualified to fly the newly introduced American aircraft before and immediately
after the peace treaty took effect, the former Japanese pilots now employed at the JAL could only
69 The planning documents are in a photo album that was created for this imperial flight and has been kept at the
JAL archive center in Tokyo.
70 Ibid.
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stare at the cockpit with an envious eye. While they waited for the day they could fly again,
many of them worked as pursers (the chief among the cabin crew) instead, serving the
passengers. Soon more and more Japanese pilots began to fly after training, which was a huge
saving for JAL's budget, but was also a threat to the jobs of the Americans. In fact, the American
pilots were paid a salary about five times higher than that of the Japanese pilots. Even more
delicate, however, was the shared experiences of the past war; some of the American pilots had
bombed Japan or engaged in the battles against Japanese pilots during the war. In a country they
helped to defeat and occupy, these American pilots now occupied the cockpits, often
accompanied by the former enemy pilots as compliant co-pilots. Sometimes, the Japanese pilots
felt that the American pilots, still living with memories of the war, were intentionally giving
them hard time in their instruction as captains. Iyozo Fujita, a wartime fighter pilot of the famous
Zero aircraft in the Imperial Navy, who had participated in the Pearl Harbor attack and the Battle
of Midway, had a dramatic encounter with a former enemy, an American pilot of B-26 at
Midway. W. E. Murray, now working as a captain for the JAL, sat next to Fujita as a safety
captain to observe Fujita's performance in the test to qualify as a DC-4 captain.7' An experienced
fighter pilot of the Zero was being tested by an American former bomber pilot, both of them now
wearing the JAL uniform. While the relationship between the two men would eventually become
a friendly one, this encounter was an intimate instantiation of the long history of American
qualification of Japanese pilots, which had been psychological, physical, political, cultural, and
personal.
7 Soichi Kaji, Jetto pairotto monogatari: roman o himeta otoko no gunzd (Tokyo: Asahi Sonorama, 1988), 150-68
(flying with former enemy); "AshikakejOnen," 14 (bombing experience); Harvey Klemmer, American Embassy
(Tokyo) to the Department of State (Washington), "Japanese Pilots to Fly Pacific," 16 April 1956, box 5, entry 2,
RG 237, NARA (on salary difference); "U.S. Pilots Lose Jobs in Japan," Washington Post, 3 October 1955 (on
salary difference); "Nihon no kok0 o kataru," Kdkaj6h5, May 1953, 58-65, on 61 (foreign pilots' salary).
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"Japanese Pilots to Fly Pacific"
By October 1955, the JAL had replaced all American pilots with Japanese pilots on domestic
routes, but it took much longer to do so for international flights.72 Japan's re-entry into
international aviation was generally welcomed, but there were some lingering reservations and
doubts from recent memory. Given the American influence on postwar Japanese aviation, it
should not be surprising that the Japan Air Lines's first international destination was San
Francisco, but the symbolism of Japanese planes crossing the Pacific into the U.S. could not go
unnoticed. The permit to operate a route into the U.S. was presented to the JAL in the office of
Vice President Richard Nixon in January 1954, and Japan's acting ambassador, Ryniji Takeuchi,
told reporters about the significance of this event for the "friendly relations" between the two
countries. While for the Japanese ambassador this San Francisco route meant Japan's "re-
entering international aviation after an absence of more than ten years," the New York Times
chose a title that must have appealed more directly to American readers, and would have
sounded quite different if the year had been 1941: "Japanese Planes to Cross Pacific."73 Many of
the 46 American passengers on JAL's demonstration flight of the new route could see the
"blazing red circle, symbol of the Land of the Rising Sun" on the wings and tail of the DC-6B,
and recognized that "this was the first time a plane with that insigne had penetrated American
territory on a peaceful mission in more than a decade." 74
As if to comfort American readers and future passengers, however, these reports about
JAL's first international route also pointed out every American element in it. "Strangely
72,"U.S. Pilots Lose Jobs in Japan," Washington Post, 3 October 1955.
7,"Japanese Planes To Cross Pacific," New York Times, 14 January 1954.
Paul J. C. Friedlander, "By Air to Tokyo-Japanese Carrier Holds Preview of Its New Service Across the Wide
Pacific," New York Times, 31 January 1954.
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enough," the New York Times reporter Paul Friedlander noted, the JAL plane was virtually
indistinguishable from its American competitors on the same route. Except for "a few typical
Japanese decorations and drawings" inside the cabin and "pure Japanese delicacies" in the in-
flight meals, the JAL plane was "an American built and furnished airplane." The lack of
uniquely Japanese features on the JAL's plane and flight, however, was "no drawback." Rather,
it was a "comfort on the long, long overwater jumps" to know that the plane was being taken
care of by a maintenance crew of the United Airlines. Above all, the plane with the "blazing red
circle" would be flown by American pilots, co-pilots, and flight engineers who had originally
been with the Transocean Air Lines based in Oakland, California. It was also noted that even in
JAL's domestic routes a Japanese co-pilot was being accompanied by an American captain.
Friedlander finished his article with a candid explanation of his preference for the American
pilots.
There is no chauvinism in the passengers' interest in having American pilots at the
controls in this part of the world. It merely recognizes that the Pacific offers few earthy
harbors for its airplanes, and that it is hard to relax in your seat unless you know that the
men up front take as serious and safety-conscious a view of the practical business of
flying as do the passengers who put up $650 for one-way, $1,170 for round-trip passage
between San Francisco and Tokyo."
As this passage implied, Japanese pilots were not yet considered to be "serious and safety-
conscious" enough about "the practical business of flying," despite all their training in the U.S.
as well as in Japan. Another version of this statement was given in the form of a question from
an American customer to one JAL employee stationed in Los Angeles: "Are your pilots one-way
75 Friedlander, "By Air to Tokyo."
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kamikaze?" 76 The lingering doubt was: the Japanese may know how to fly, but are they tamed
enough to be trusted with your life?
The absence of Japanese men in the cockpit during this landmark trans-Pacific flight was
contrasted with the unmistakable presence of Japanese female attendants in the plane. The New
York Times reporter took it as another comforting fact that these Japanese women spoke English
and wore blue uniforms that looked like that of the United Airlines. Rather than weaken their
Japanese character, however, it must have had the effect of confirming the American passengers'
existing assumptions about Japanese women's hospitality.77 As noted by the American embassy
in 1957, American passengers and observers gave a very warm reception to Japanese
stewardesses, who were regarded to be "naturally good" in service and therefore "an asset of
great value to JAL."78 This kind of evaluation based on stereotypes of national character could
have been, but in fact was not, qualified by the fact that a United Airlines flight attendant came
to Japan and trained the first group of Japanese stewardesses. 79 Inside the JAL airplane, then, one
could observe two related cultural markings simultaneously: the strengthening of the images held
by Western men (and women) of Japanese women as docile and subservient and the denial of
Japanese men's ability and reliability to occupy the cockpit. The so-called "Madame Butterfly
myth" was updated while the masculinity of pilots continued to be suppressed.80 Together with
"a few typical Japanese decorations and drawings" and "pure Japanese delicacies," the female
76 Gur~su Fujita, "Ros [Los Angeles] shiten kaisetsu toji no kotodomo," Ozora, April 1964, 65, also quoted in Nihon
KkO Kabushiki Kaisha Chosasitsu, Nihon Kokfi 20-nenshi [20 years' history of Japan Air Lines] (Tokyo: Nihon
Kok0 Kabushiki Kaisha, 1974), 93-95.
77 Friedlander, "By, Air to Tokyo."
78 American Embassy, Tokyo, to the Department of State, "Civil Aviation in Japan," 10 July 1957, box 5401,
Central Decimal File 1955-1959, RG 59 (General Records of the Department of State), NARA.
79 United Airlines flight attendant, Alice "Ty" Attwood (recheck the name) was invited to Japan to train JAL's flight
attendants from August 1953 to April 1954. A source from JAL archive center: Vicy Morris Young, "United
Stewardess Makes History-Tokyo 1953-54," National Historian (publication information unknown), 2 pages.
80 Karen Ma, The Modern Madame Butterfly: Fantasy and Reality in Japanese Cross-Cultural Relationships
(Rutland, VT: Charles E. Tuttle, 1996), 9.
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attendants stood for Japanese culture (to the Western eyes), offsetting the lingering memories of
untamable kamikaze men. The power dynamics in the airplane reflected a broader shift in the
American cultural perception of postwar Japan.8'
It took a little more than two years from JAL's inauguration of international flights in
February 1954 to the first Japanese pilot taking control of the cockpit for that route. On April 16,
1956, a 42-year-old pilot Sabur6 Ejima, who had had the honor of becoming the first Japanese
captain of the JAL in October 1954, took control in a Tokyo-San Francisco flight. The American
embassy in Tokyo reported this news back to Washington with a title similar to that of the New
York Times two years before: "Japanese Pilots to Fly Pacific." Ejima would hand over control at
Wake Island, however, "until he becomes familiar with trans-Pacific flying," the embassy report
added. This shift in flight crew was expected to occur gradually, probably in the course of three
or four years, since there would need to be 19 pairs of Japanese captains and co-pilots in addition
to the Japanese navigators and flight engineers who had already been working this route since
the spring of 1955.82 As the American embassy observed a year later, the JAL was taking
"extreme caution" in replacing American pilots with the Japanese. In addition to giving Japanese
pilots "maximum training," the embassy noted, this slow process was intended to "minimize the
risk of losing American passengers-some of whom, for one reason or another, prefer to fly with
" Social anthropologist Sheila Johnson wrote of the occupation period: "...rather than concentrating on Japanese
men, American attention was suddenly focused on the charms of Japanese women, and the martial arts of the nation
were played down in favor of such arts as ceramics, painting, architecture, and flower-arranging. Growing American
appreciation of these aspects of Japanese culture proved to be an important bridge between the two countries, as well
as being of great importance to Japan's economy in the immediate postwar years." Johnson, Japanese through
American Eyes, 91.
82 Harvey Klemmer, American Embassy, Tokyo to the Department of State, Washington, "Japanese Pilots to Fly
Pacific," 16 April 1956, box 5, entry 2, RG 237, NARA.
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American pilots."8 3 As with the loosening of SCAP's aviation policy in 1951, Japanese fliers
were the last group among all aviation personnel to be accepted by Americans.
Eventually, it took another year or so from Ejima's first flight to Wake Island to the first
all-Japanese crew flight across the Pacific. Ejima and another Japanese pilot underwent a
"checking out" process with American colleagues in order to extend their control in the cockpit
as far as Honolulu and San Francisco. While this first flight all the way to San Francisco by a
Japanese captain was expected to be "a milestone in Pacific and Japanese civil aviation," the
Pacific Stars and Stripes did not forget to mention that 28 American pilots would continue to fly
in this route "for a long time." Although the newspaper stated that the JAL had been "training
and re-training Japanese pilots" and carefully testing them from domestic lines to the Western
Pacific segments, the ultimate question remained the same: would American passengers feel
comfortable flying with a Japanese captain and a Japanese co-pilot at the control? Are they as
reliable as American pilots? Given the fact that nearly all foreign passengers on JAL's
international routes were Americans, this was a vital matter that was relevant not only to
Americans' historical memory but also to JAL's corporate interest. Claude Turner, the American
chief pilot for the JAL, who had flown for Emperor Hirohito in 1954, offered an optimistic but
nuanced prospect: "I think in a matter of time the American flying public will accept Japanese
captains the same way they have accepted the pilots of KLM (Dutch), Swissair, and
Scandinavian airlines."8 4 Apparently, passing exams and obtaining certificates was not sufficient
for the Japanese to be trusted as a pilot in the West-dominated world of fliers. The Japanese were
83 American Embassy, Tokyo, to the Department of State, "Civil Aviation in Japan," 10 July 1957, box 5401,
Central Decimal File 1955-1959, RG 59 (General Records of the Department of State), NARA.
84 "JAL To Use Japanese Pilots, Crews," Pacific Stars and Stripes, January 1957.
275
allowed to fly the Pacific, only after they could prove they were different from the pilots at the
Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.
Another Test: Japanese Bodies in American Cockpits
By the late 1950s, an increasing number of Japanese pilots replaced their American colleagues in
the cockpits of JAL planes, and the JASDF pilots were also working hard to set up their own
system of flight training. From political, economic, and cultural perspectives, Japanese fliers
were gaining recognition, legitimacy, and confidence as new participants in the postwar
international system of aviation. In other words, they proved that they could fly just like
Americans did. A close look at the cockpit occupied by the Japanese pilots, however, reveals a
more mundane kind of scrutiny that they had to go through; their bodies were measured and
compared against those of American pilots. The difference in American and Japanese body
dimensions was first recorded and discussed by Japanese aviation medicine researchers at the
JASDF, but soon became a mutual concern of American and Japanese aviation circles, calling
for coordinated interventions for the maximum accommodation of Japanese bodies. As seen in
chapter 3, the space of the cockpit once again brought into focus the physical variations within
and across human populations and reformulated them into a technical matter.
About the same time that Saburo Ejima became the first Japanese captain to take control
in a JAL flight from Tokyo to San Francisco, four Japanese researchers went to the U.S. for
training in aviation medicine. Masamitsu Oshima, a 41-year-old medical doctor and physiologist,
and three other Japanese were sent in April 1956 by the JASDF to the Randolph Air Force Base
in San Antonio, Texas, to study at its School of Aviation Medicine. A graduate of Tokyo
Imperial University Medical School, Oshima served in the Japanese Navy's aviation medicine
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unit during the war. After the war ended and all aviation research was banned, Oshima worked at
the Labor Research Institute for a decade. As the establishment of the JASDF required the
resumption of aviation medicine research in Japan, Oshima was called in once again to rebuild
the discipline and start a JASDF unit in that field. As indicated by the fact that Oshima's trip to
the U.S. for training was four years later than the initial Oklahoma trip by Japanese pilots, the
"blank" period in aviation medicine was even longer than that in flying itself.8 5
At the Randolph School, Oshima's group enrolled in a three-month basic course in
aviation medicine. Just like the other Japanese sent to the U.S. for training, Oshima had difficulty
studying in English, but nevertheless worked hard, eating only two meals a day. There Oshima
attended a lecture by Hubertus Strughold, a well-known German researcher in aviation and space
medicine, who came to the U.S. after the war and whose book Oshima had read passionately a
long time ago. After graduating from the course as the oldest member of his class, Oshima stayed
two more weeks at Strughold's laboratory, trying to absorb the frontier research of the field as
well as making personal connections. After leaving San Antonio, Oshima toured other aviation
medicine research facilities in the U.S., spending a month at the Holloman Air Force Base in
New Mexico and then another month at the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio. His overall
impression from a six-month stay in the U.S. was that American aviation medicine was, like
American flight instruction, "systematic" and the researchers were "creative." After returning to
Japan, Oshima organized the Temporary Aero Medical Experimental Group in November 1957,
86which dropped the "temporary" from its title a year later, and he became its first director.
85 Masamitsu Oshima, Hito kara ningen e: aru ningen kagakusha no hachingonen (Tokyo: Kenk6 Kagaku Kenkya
F~ramu, 2000), 103-19.
86 Ibid., 103-19; Kku Igaku Jikkentai, K5kn Igaku Jikkentai ichinen no ayumi [One year's progress of the Aero
Medical Experimental Group] (Tokyo: Kka Igaku Jikkentai, 1958), 1-2. It is notable that a former German
researcher could be respectably brought to the U. S. to teach and research aviation and space medicine, while a
former Japanese researcher was only able to try to start from scratch after a long research ban.
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The main subjects of research of this new Aero Medical Experimental Group, later
renamed as the Aero Medical Laboratory, were of course the Japanese pilots at the JASDF. But
in many cases, what the Laboratory had to study was specifically the Japanese pilots in American
cockpits. Japan's wartime capacity of aircraft production had been decimated during the
occupation, and aeronautical engineers who had worked on the Zero and other military aircraft
during the war migrated at the war's end to more peaceful engineering projects such as the
railroad.87 Japan's Air Self-Defense Force, established with guidance and help from the U.S. Air
Force, had to rely on American aircraft during its early years. It was imperative, therefore, to
check how Japanese men sat and performed in American machines. As the Aero Medical
Laboratory researchers started to examine the JASDF pilots, one of their first findings was that
the Japanese bodies seemed relatively small for the American cockpit.88
In postwar Japan, the airplane cockpit was not the first space where the smallness of the
Japanese body was recognized in comparison with an American one. A much more striking and
public incidence of such revelation had already happened in Douglas MacArthur's Tokyo
residence in September 1945. In the historic photograph of MacArthur and Emperor Hirohito
standing side-by-side, the Japanese people first witnessed the declining political stature of their
emperor, who traveled the streets of Tokyo to visit the residential quarters of the head of the
occupying forces.89 What was also manifested clearly was the difference in physical stature, as
the emperor stood straight and the general put his hands on the hips; Hirohito was only as high as
87 Takashi Nishiyama, "Swords into Plowshares: Civilian Application of Wartime Military Technology in Modern
Japan, 1945-1964" (PhD diss., The Ohio State University, 2005).
88 There should be some subjective element in evaluations of the relative sizes of cockpits, and it is difficult to say
that one cockpit is definitely smaller than the other. A U.S. AAF Information Intelligence Summary (No. 59, 4
September 1942) had the following observation on the cockpit of the Mitsubishi A6M, the famous Japanese Zero:
"Although perhaps somewhat smaller than average, the cockpit provides ample room for a pilot of normal size,"
quoted in Donald N ijboer, Cockpit: An Illustrated History of World War H Aircraft interiors (Erin, Ontario: Boston
Mills Press, 2006), 126.
89 Dower, Embracing Defeat, 292-95.
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MacArthur's ears. In the wake of a lost war, Japan as a nation was overwhelmed by the political
and military power of the U.S., and the Japanese as individuals were beginning to meet
Americans who were taller and bigger. As historian John Dower pointed out in his analysis of
cartoon representations of the U.S.-Japan relationship during and after the war, the smaller
stature of the Japanese was regarded by many Americans as "an apt physical representation of
broader racial and cultural inferiority, backwardness, immaturity, and irrelevance." 90 Historian
Naoko Shibusawa also wrote that, whereas the Americans viewed the Germans as "a mature
race" with both culture and physical stature comparable to their own, the smaller height of the
Japanese contributed to the American perception of "Japanese immaturity."9 1
Thus, in 1957, twelve years after the Hirohito-MacArthur photo, the physical difference
between the American and the Japanese was not news.92 What was new, however, was the fact
that, in the JASDF measurement of body dimensions, the difference was understood in technical
terms related to machine operation rather than as having political or cultural implications. The
smallness of Japanese pilots was now being registered in terms of its fit or misfit with a machine,
which was designed and made in America and brought to Japan to accommodate the Japanese
body. Instead of a passing glimpse of stature difference, as one did for the Hirohito-MacArthur
photo, exact measurement and recording of such difference was necessary for the JASDF aircraft
90 John Dower, "Graphic Japanese, Graphic Americans: Coded Images in U.S.-Japanese Relations," in Partnership:
The United States and Japan, 1951-200!, ed. Akira Iriye and Robert Wampler (Tokyo: Kodansha International,
2001), 301-33, quote on 312.
9 Shibusawa, America's Geisha Ally, 92.
92 It should be noted that the height gap has not remained at a fixed number. The average height of the Japanese
population has increased noticeably since the wartime, while the American average height has changed little. These
two contrasting trends are cited as examples of the influence of nutritional and other socio-economic conditions on
the population's average stature. See Phyllis Eveleth and James Tanner, Worldwide Variation in Human Growth,
2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); John Komlos and Marieluise Baur, "From the Tallest to
(One of) the Fattest: the Enigmatic Fate of the American Population in the 20th Century," Economics and Human
Biology 2 (2004): 57-74.
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operation. The body of the JASDF pilots shed many of its previous cultural markers as a
masculine and racialized flier, and instead was subjected to numerical and functional analysis.
The Aero Medical Experimental Group conducted physical examinations of flying cadets
and flying officer candidates from December 1957 to July 1958. The subjects consisted of 71
officer candidates and 184 flying cadets, whose age spanned 22-26 and 18-22, respectively. The
physical examination measured thirteen items of each examinee: height, weight, chest
circumference, vital capacity, respiratory standstill, grasping power, pulse rate, distant vision
acuity, near vision acuity, point of convergence, accommodative power, blood pressure, and
hearing acuity. In the analysis of the data, the researchers reported that "the most remarkable
point of the results was found in the body size." What they meant by "the body size" was in fact
the difference in body size between the American and the Japanese. When the bodies were
measured for the airplane cockpit, the numerical data of the Japanese would be most meaningful
when compared with the American ones. The Japanese body size data became that of difference,
always measured against the American body.93
How different were they? The existing data of the general population had already shown
a remarkable height difference between the Japanese and the Americans.94 The reference data
included in this JASDF report was the 1956 Handbook ofBiological Data, which was a product
93 K6k0 Igaku Jikkentai [Aero Medical Experimental Group], "The Result of Physical Examination for Flying of Air
Cadets and Candidates," Kdki Igaku Jikkentai hdkoku [the reports of the Aero Medical Experimental Group] 24(1959), quotes from the English abstract.
94 The smaller height of the Japanese than that of people in the West was not a phenomenon unique to the postwar
period. My interest here is to note that the cockpit in the late 1950s became a space in which the stature difference
between the Japanese and Americans was closely examined and highlighted, which was a phenomenon unique to the
postwar situation. Based on the height data of military physical examination from 1892 to 1937, anthropometric
historian Ted Shay reports that "before World War II, the Japanese were very short compared with their
contemporaries in the West." See Ted Shay, "The Level of Living in Japan, 1885-1938: New Evidence," in Stature,
Living Standards, and Economic Development: Essays in Anthropometric History, ed. John Komlos (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1994), 173-201. The average height of 20-year-old Japanese males in 1937 was 160.3
cm, which was a result of steady increase from 156.1 cm in 1892. According to Shay, there are no available adult
height data from the WWII period, possibly due to intentional destruction of the data at the end of the war.
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of the (American) National Research Council's Committee on the Handbook of Biological Data
(under the Division of Biology and Agriculture) through a contract with the Aero Medical
Laboratory at the Wright Air Development Center (Dayton, Ohio). An encyclopedic collection of
445 tables of biological data on plants, animals, and humans, the Handbook contained the height
and weight information of the Japanese measured in 1951, when Japan was still under the Allied
Occupation. In the male age group between 20 and 30, there was more than 10 centimeters of
difference in height between the Japanese and the Americans (either "White" or "Negro"). A
twenty-five year old Japanese male, the tallest age group in the data, was 162.4 centimeters
(about 63.9 inches) on average. Japanese women of the same age group were also shorter by over
10 centimeters than "White" American women and the gap was slightly less than 10 centimeters
with "Negro" American women.95 Another Japanese general population data, quoted from a
1954 Japanese nutritional survey, showed similar results, in which a twenty-one year old male
stood 162.7 centimeters on average.96
The data related to physical standards for fliers revealed more specific differences. The
Japanese height range accepted for flying duty was between 158 and 193 centimeters, while the
American Air Force accepted those between 162.56 (64 inches) and 193.04 centimeters (76
inches). The JASDF had a lower bottom limit than the American one by about 5 centimeters,
which seemed necessary given that an average Japanese male could barely meet the 64-inch limit
of the American standard. Indeed, the data of the total 255 flying cadets and candidates showed
that more than 30 percent of them were shorter than 163 centimeters; 31 subjects (12.15%)
9 William Spector, ed., Handbook of Biological Data, prepared under the Direction of the Committee on the
Handbook of Biological Data, Division of Biology and Agriculture, The National Academy of Sciences, The
National Research Council(Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Company, 1956), 178-80. Portions of the Table no. 150
("Height and Weight: Man, Various Nationalities") were included in the JASDF report as Table 1.
96 K6kU lgaku Jikkentai, "Result of Physical Examination," Table 2.
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belonged to the 158-160 centimeter range, and 47 subjects (18.43%) were in 160-163 centimeter
range. Had they been Americans, these people could not even have entered flight training. Even
those who met the minimum height requirement also tended to gravitate toward the lower limit.
119 subjects (46.68%) fell between 163 and 169 centimeters, and only one subject (0.3%) was
taller than 182 centimeters (71.7 inches). The height gap between MacArthur and Hirohito,
which had carried such symbolic significance, could also be seen here in the gap between an
average Japanese pilot and an American pilot in 1957. Its significance would be less public, but
could have arguably higher stakes.
That a country's population as a whole was shorter in height than the U.S. was not
Japan's unique experience. At the time of the war's end, Americans were the tallest in the world,
a rank that had been held for two centuries. The Japanese flying cadet data, however, showed
that they were shorter than Americans in a particular way. What counted as a more practical
concern was not the standing height. As all pilots were to sit, not stand, in the cockpit, the sitting
height and the crotch height (roughly the standing height minus sitting height) had to be taken
into account. As it turned out, despite the big difference in standing height, the Japanese had
almost the same average sitting height as the Americans. This implied that given a Japanese and
an American with the same standing height, the Japanese would be taller when sitting in the
cockpit. The American procedure of physical examination stated that a sitting height should be
measured for those taller than 6 feet (182.88 centimeters) when standing and that the result
should not exceed 38 inches (96.52 centimeters) for acceptance. While the 193 centimeter upper
limit in standing height might have looked superfluous for Japanese pilots, the report suggested,
there might need to be a standard on the sitting height, which the JASDF did not have at the
97 Komlos and Baur, "From the Tallest."
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time. As long as the aircraft used by the JASDF were of "American design" aimed to fit the
"American body," and given that the JASDF was adopting the same upper limit of standing
height (193 centimeters) as the USAF, the JASDF might as well have the same standard on
sitting height as the American one.98
In addition, by simple calculation, the almost identical average sitting heights meant that
most of the height gap was accounted for by the shorter legs of the Japanese. The crotch height
of an American pilot at the bottom limit of standing height (162.5 centimeters or 64 inches) was
calculated to be 78.0 centimeters. By contrast, the shortest possible Japanese pilot (158
centimeters) would have crotch height of 71.416 centimeters, shorter than the American
counterpart by 6.58 centimeters. This difference, the report suggested, could cause
"inconvenience" in operating the controls, especially with brakes. Considering that about 30% of
the flying cadets were shorter than the shortest American Air Force pilot, this was potentially a
serious issue. More attention needed to be given to the problem of leg length, the report
concluded. The crotch height gap was so significant that the English abstract of this official
report did not mention any other major findings of the physical examination. Instead it just ended
with a suggestion that the crotch height be measured "in order to see if a [sic] examinee can fit to
the present aircraft." It was assumed that the American aircraft was designed from "human
engineering" perspectives to suit the American body comfortably and that a Japanese-designed
aircraft would not have caused inconveniences for a Japanese body. It was also assumed,
however, that such a condition of mismatch and awkwardness was to a certain extent
98 Kk6 lgaku Jikkentai, "Result of Physical Examination," 85-89.
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unavoidable in the postwar U.S-Japan relationship and that one could only try to deal with it
wisely. 99
Another study conducted in June 1958 by the Aero Medical Experimental Group
addressed the issue of body size and other related problems in pilot fatigue. The researchers
observed pilots and flying conditions during actual flights on three consecutive days, focusing on
"hygienic conditions" (vibration, noise, illumination, temperature, speed of ascent and descent),
"job analysis," and "ergonomical analysis." For the last category, also called "human
engineering" investigation, the researchers conducted not only measurements in the cockpit and
the front panels but also interviews with pilots. The aircraft studied was the American-built C-46
transport plane. As to the instrument panel, some pilots complained about the American system
of units with feet, miles, and pounds that were inscribed on the instruments. What bothered the
pilots most was the pound, which made it "difficult to judge with actual feeling" about pressure
or weight. This was deemed an "important problem" for accident prevention.' 00
As to the body size problem, arms as well as legs entered the discussion. The average arm
length of the Japanese pilots, excluding the hand, was 57 centimeters. This was found to be 10 to
20 centimeters short of the distance from the pilot's shoulder to many of the controls, which
made it necessary to bend the body forward to manipulate them. Throttle controls were 83
centimeters away, landing gear control 73 centimeters, wing flap control 67 centimeters. As
noted in the physical examination report, however, the legs were a more serious concern. What
gave pilots "the most inconvenience" was the rudder pedal. Due to their short legs, the Japanese
pilots were not able to fully operate the rudder unless they adjusted the rudder pedal or the
99 Ibid., 89-90 and English abstract.
100 Kok0 Igaku Jikkentai, "Studies on the Fatigue and Environmental Conditions of C-46 Pilots," K5kfl Igaku
Jikkentai hikoku 10 (November 1958). Chapter 5 discusses the development of "human engineering" in the U.S.,
with which the Japanese human engineering research had close connections.
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cockpit seat to the closest positions possible. But in such positions, the report noted, one's feet
tended to be crammed to the extent of being unable to exert enough force, which was "extremely
fatiguing" to the pilot. Repeated movements in this manner even made some pilots' feet
"tremble." All of this suggested that "the position of stick and rudder pedal is necessary to be
adapted to the Japanese constitution."' 0' Here the numerical difference of "Japanese
constitution" vis-a'-vis that of Americans was corroborated by the subjective feelings of fatigue
in controlling an airplane, which in turn raised the necessity of design modification of the
American-built aircraft.
Just as the racial and gender variations within the American anthropometric data affected
the practice of human-machine integration in the U.S. AAF cockpit (chapter 3), the distinctive
"Japanese constitution" became a potential obstacle for a smooth integration between Japanese
pilots and American machines and, by extension, between Japan and the U.S. as strategic and
economic allies. American anthropometrists, who had developed measurement techniques and
created a large archive of pilots' body data during WWII, would be given another set of
measurement subjects from the JASDF.
American Intervention: Registering and Managing the Differences
American physical anthropologists had measured Japanese bodies long before they took the
JASDF pilots' dimensions, often with warm cooperation from the Japanese side. The Japanese
body had served as a good sample for comparison with the American body. In the early 1930s,
for example, Earnest Hooton's former students Harry Shapiro and Frederick Hulse measured
thousands of people with Japanese origin to study the influence of environment on the human
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101 Ibid.
body. Based on the comparative analysis of the measurements of Japanese immigrants to Hawaii
and those who remained in Japan, Shapiro and Hulse showed that the new environment did affect
one's physical shape, questioning Hooton and others' assumption about the stable racial types
recognizable from one's physical body.'0 2
William Sheldon's somatotyping also entered Japan, taking Japanese people as
measurement subjects and comparing them with American ones. In the winter of 1945-46,
several months into the Allied Occupation, Bertram Kraus, a physical anthropologist at the
University of Arizona, went to Japan to conduct what was arguably the first somatotyping study
on "a non-Caucasoid group." This was an opportunity to explore whether "the varieties of
mankind (anthropological races) [were] characterized by different types and/or frequencies of
body build." The basic scheme of the study was to measure the somatotypes of "a segment of the
Japanese population" and then to compare them with those from "an American Caucasoid
population."103
Local government officials in the region surveyed, Red Cross hospital and a university
hospital staff, local police departments, and even the governor of the prefecture all offered their
warm support to this American anthropologist's research project. From the two cities of Sendai
and Morioka, more than 700 male subjects between 19 and 45 years old posed in nude
photographs from three different angles. The photographs were taken with a Leica 35 mm
camera at a 14 feet distance, and then the films were sent to the Photographic Laboratory of the
Oriental Institute in Chicago for printing and enlarging. In the end, photographs of 544 subjects
10' Harry Shapiro, Migration and Environment: A Study of the Physical Characteristics of the Japanese Immigrants
to Hawaii and the Effects of Environment on Their Descendants (London: Oxford University Press, 1939). On the
implication of this study, see Marks, Human Biodiversity, 124-25.
1 Bertram Kraus, "Male Somatotypes among the Japanese of Northern Honshu," American Journal of Physical
Anthropology, new series, 9 (1951): 347-66, on 347-48.
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survived the process and received analysis. The data went through a first, crude somatotyping
and then three stages of refined somatotyping before a final rating was produced as a three digit
number. 0 4
The results, published in 1951 in the American Journal of Physical Anthropology,
anticipated those of the later anthropometric survey of the JASDF pilots: "The Japanese are
considerably more homogeneous in body type than the Americans." From the 544 samples, only
25 somatotypes were found, a tiny number when compared with the 76 somatotypes represented
in Sheldon's 1940 work, The Varieties of Human Physique, from about 4,000 American college
boys. Moreover, over 70% of the Japanese subjects would be covered by only six of the twenty-
five somatotypes. "The varieties of human physique" was exactly what was absent in Japan in
the wake of the war. Most impressive, however, was the fact that the top two somatotypes of the
Japanese, 361 and 351, comprised as much as 37.3% of the sample population. At lease one in
three of the Japanese surveyed fell in these two types. Not just more homogeneous, the Japanese
somatotypes had fewer overlaps with the American ones than one would have expected. Nine of
the twenty-five types, representing about one quarter of the sample population, could not be
found among the 76 American types, including the second rank type 351. Conversely, three
quarters of the American population had somatotypes that were not to be found among the
Japanese.10 5
When each component of the three digits were compared, it was found that the Japanese
in average were higher in mesomorphy (the middle digit) by almost two units and lower in
104 Ibid., 347-52.
1" Ibid., 353, 360, and 363-64. Discussing Klaus's study, Clyde Kluckhohn of Harvard University cautioned the
reader against making generalizations about the American variability in body types, since the sample size of Klaus's
somatotyping was much smaller than that of Sheldon's and the Japanese sample was drawn from a narrow
geographical region. Clyde Kluckhohn, "Physical Anthropology," American Anthropologist, new series, 57:6
(1955): 1280-95.
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ectomorphy (the third digit) by more than two units. This finding helped to produce a typical
image of the Japanese compared against the American:
The bulk of the population in both samples is different in body types. The Japanese have
somatotypes in which the endomorphic component is medium, the mesomorphic
component high, and the ectomorphic component extremely low. The Americans show a
tendency toward medium ratings in all 3 components. 0 6
In fact, two-thirds of the Japanese were rated 1 in ectomorphy (and no one above 4), while 85%
of them had ratings 5 or 6 in mesomorphy. Therefore, the ectomorphy frequency curves
displayed an "almost normal" pattern for the American and a "greatly skewed" one for the
Japanese. Posited against the American norm in body types, the Japanese were oddly distributed
and lacking in diversity. It could seem to confirm Sheldon's observation in 1942 that the
Japanese constituted "a more mesomorphic and somatotonic stock" with a tendency to be
aggressive and to provoke a war.' 07
It is against these preceding measurement projects of the Japanese body that the problem
of the "Japanese constitution" of the JASDF pilots needs to be discussed. The Japanese pilot's
body continued to serve as a point of comparison for Americans. However, as in the turn from
the "somatotypic man" to the "functional man" in the U.S. AAF survey (chapter 3), the earlier
studies with implications for Japanese racial characteristics and differences were succeeded by
more functional measurement of Japanese pilots with a concern for dimensional fit within the
cockpit.
106Kraus, "Male Somatotypes among the Japanese," 361-62.
107 Ibid., 353 and 361; Sheldon, Varieties of Temperament, 432. This interpretation, however, should be qualified by
Sheldon's another observation that successful (American) pilots tended to be more mesomorphic (See chapter 3).
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By 1961, it was well understood that the Japanese constitution was different enough to
deserve official recognition by the U.S. Air Force. The occasion that helped initiate a larger-
scale, more systematic measuring project was the Joint JASDF-USAF-MAAG-Japan Pressure
Suit Conference in Tokyo in March 1961. As the JASDF planned to introduce for their pilots the
CSU-4/P Partial Pressure Assembly, which was developed by the U.S. Air Force Systems
Command, to be used with Lockheed F-104J aircraft, the difference in body size between the
Japanese and Americans came into focus again.' 08 The U.S. eight-size Height-Weight Program
used for the flying garment design was based on the 1950 anthropometric data of USAF flying
personnel. During the Tokyo conference, several measurement of Japanese male bodies showed
that the dimensions were "sufficiently different from those of USAF personnel to effectively
preclude the use of the UASF sizing system for JASDF personnel." A different system of sizing
would be necessary "to properly fit the JASDF pilots" with American flying garment.109
An American participant in the conference, Milton Alexander of the Anthropometry
Section of the Wright Air Development Center, proposed an anthropometrical survey of a large
group of Japanese pilots "to clarify the physical difference" and "to obtain necessary information
for the design of Japanese-sized pressure suit."10 The JASDF agreed to this proposal and
Alexander gave a quick training in anthropometric techniques used by the USAF to a group of
108On the production of F-I 04J, see Richard Samuels, Rich Nation, Strong Army: National Security and the
Technological Transformation ofJapan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 214-221. The F-I 04J was
manufactured in Japan by Mitsubishi, which paid license fees to Lockheed. Political scientist Richard Samuels
writes that "licensed production of the F-104 dramatically raised the competence of Japanese manufacturers in
airframe, engine, and avionics technologies." Samuels also notes the significance of F-104 as "Japan's first
supersonic jet fighter and the first case of U.S.-Japan military coproduction" (Ibid., 216).
109 Milton Alexander, John McConville, James Kramer, and Eugene Fritz, "Height-Weight Sizing of Protective
Garments, Based on Japanese Air Self-Defense Force Pilot Data, With Fit-Test Results," Technical Documentary
Report No. AMRL-TDR-64-66 (July 1964), 1.
110 M. Oshima, T. Oguro, T. Mori, T. Watanabe, T. Fujimoto, N. Tobimatsu, I. Tanaka, and M. Alexander,
"Anthropometry of Japanese Pilots," The Reports of the Aero-Medical Laboratory 2:2 (March 1962): 71-1 14,
reprinted in March 1965 by the Aerospace Medical Research Laboratories, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, as AMRL-
TR-65-74. The quote is from the English abstract of the original Japanese publication.
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Japanese flight surgeons from several air bases. Relevant anthropometric publications by the
USAF, including the one on the 1950 flying personnel anthropometric study, were provided to
them "to be used as guides." The flight surgeons went out to five air bases and measured 62 body
dimensions for 239 Japanese pilots, about 20% of the JASDF fliers, during an eight-week period
"under severe time limitations and trying circumstances." The data thus collected were sent to
the USAF Aerospace Medical Laboratory in Ohio, which contracted with Antioch College for
the statistical analysis of the data."'
The survey produced 62 tables of body dimensions, each consisting of parallel columns
of the JASDF and USAF data. Although the sample size was quite different between the two
populations (239 JASDF pilots in 1961 and approximately 4,000 USAF flying personnel in
1950), the data confirmed the findings of earlier physical examinations of the JASDF. The
average heights were 166.89 centimeters and 175.54 centimeters, respectively, while the average
weights were 61.12 kilograms and 74.30 kilograms. More interesting results were found, again,
in sitting height and crotch height. Sitting heights differed by only 0.5 centimeters (90.78 vs.
91.28), whereas there was almost 9 centimeter difference in crotch height (74.53 vs. 83.40).' 12
While the initial Japanese report of the survey presented only the dry data without further
comments from Japanese researchers, the results were remarkable for the American analysts in
Ohio who wrote a subsequent report for the sizing scheme.
The results of the analysis indicated that the Japanese pilots were lighter and smaller
than the USAF flying population ... and were significantly different in their body
proportions. This difference in proportions was best illustrated by the dimensions of
." Alexander et al., "Height-Weight Sizing of Protective Garments," foreword and 1-3. Note that Antioch College
was also involved in the statistical analysis of the 1950 USAF anthropometric survey of flying personnel (see
chapter 3).
12 Oshima et al., "Anthropometry of Japanese Pilots."
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Crotch Height (an approximation of leg length) and Sitting Height (an approximation of
trunk length) ... . In the Japanese sample, the arithmetic mean value of Height was
approximately equal to the 8th percentile of the USAF sample, whereas the mean Sitting
Height value of the Japanese sample was comparable to the 40th percentile of the USAF
sample. It would logically follow, then, that the values for Crotch Height and other leg
lengths would be less for the Japanese than for the USAF sample. The 50th percentile
Crotch Height value for the Japanese pilots was found to be comparable to the 1st
percentile value of the USAF sample." 3
Now it was officially recognized by both parties that the Japanese pilots were not only "lighter
and smaller" but also equipped with differently proportioned trunks and legs.
This had serious implications for the USAF personnel charged with developing sizing
systems for different flying populations. The Japanese body proportion, not the raw values of
height or weight, would make the garment based on American dimensions uncomfortable for the
Japanese pilot. "The USAF garments would in all likelihood," a 1964 report on garment sizing
pointed out, "be extremely short and tight in the trunk with excessive length in the appendages,
particularly the legs." There would have to be a modified sizing method "based upon Japanese
body sizes." This finding even led the U.S. researchers to question the validity of "the rationale
underlying the USAF sizing system" for a population with such a different constitution. The U.S.
system used height and weight as "key dimensions" to determine garment sizes with the
assumption that these two numbers were highly related to other variables in body dimensions.
But this assumption had to be reexamined against the Japanese population. Fortunately,
calculation of many correlations with the Japanese data showed that height and weight were
" Alexander et al., "Height-Weight Sizing of Protective Garments," 3.
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indeed the best indicators for garment sizing of the Japanese as well. It was at least possible to
examine the Japanese body with the same probes of height and weight as used for the American
body." 4
They could now move on to the Height-Weight bivariate table to see the distribution of
the Japanese body size. This bivariate table offered another remarkable generalization about the
Japanese population. Many subjects on the table seemed to be clustered closely. Compared with
the American fliers, the Japanese were "more homogeneous in body size." One practical
consequence of the homogeneity in body size would be a smaller number of garment sizes. The
U.S. system widely in use had 8 sizes, each category spanning no more than 4.5 inches in height
and 25 pounds in weight. For a homogenous population like the Japanese pilots, it was
suggested, a four-size scheme would cover up to 95% of the population, each group with a range
of 3.94 inches and 26.4 pounds. The four sizes for the 239 Japanese pilots were labeled as Small
Regular, Small Long, Large Regular, and Large Long. The Small-Large weight range covered
those between 50 and 73.9 kilograms and the Regular-Long height range between 156 and 177.9
centimeters. Only 12 out 239 pilots fell outside these ranges, including one person of 187.3
centimeters (the tallest in the group) and about 65 kilograms." 5
The garment sizing data were sent to the David Clark Company in Worcester,
Massachusetts, the original developer of the CSU-4/P Partial Pressure Assembly. The company
made prototypes of each size for the Japanese pilots. Then the USAF took these prototype
garments back to Japan, where the initial raw body data came from. This time, 75 pilots from
Hamamatsu and Tachikawa air bases were called upon for a fit-test. Among the 75 pilots, sixty-




upgrade due to his large chest. Five pilots could not be fitted, two of who were heavier than the
upper limit. Even those two, it was believed, could have succeeded if the garments for them "had
been stretched with repeated use." Since it was "almost impossible" to fit any population in its
entirety, achieving 70 successes out of 75 trials was "considered satisfactory," especially after it
was known that the Japanese officer in charge of the fit-test had selected 16 pilots with extreme
body sizes. The results with Japanese pilots had wider implications. It proved that the Height-
Weight size system of the USAF could be applied "successfully for other populations," as long
as "an adequate knowledge" of the target population was appropriately taken into
consideration."16
The two anthropological studies of the Japanese-the 1945-6 somatotype study of adult
males and the 1961 anthropometrical survey of pilots-were not entirely unrelated in intellectual
genealogy. If the former study directly adopted the measuring techniques and analytical methods
developed by William Sheldon, the latter was conducted by the USAF's Anthropometry Section,
whose members had had connections to or had worked with Albert Damon and Earnest Hooton,
the wartime supporters and practitioners of Sheldon's methods. In both studies, the bodies of the
Japanese were first measured either directly by an American researcher or by some Japanese
personnel trained by Americans, their data on paper or film were transported to the U.S. for
processing and analysis, and finally the numbers were re-configured to produce typified Japanese
bodies that could be either stereotyped or categorized.
There were significant differences, however. The technique of somatotyping, including
the nude pictures of subjects, was no longer used in the tabulation of pilots' body data, whereas
the former study not only took nude photos of the Japanese but also published a few of them as
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part of the journal article to illustrate the two most frequent types of 361 and 351. While the
former explored the possibility of registering different human races by the variety or
homogeneity of body types, the latter concerned with accommodating the differences between
populations by clever design. The ultimate goal was to produce and manage the "functional
man" out of the Japanese. Unlike the somatotype data that stayed in the pages of the American
Journal of Physical Anthropology, therefore, the pilots' anthropometrical data had to be sent
back to Japan in the form of reconfigured garments to face again the real, physical bodies of
Japanese pilots. Sitting comfortably in the re-sized flying garments from the U.S., the JASDF
pilots would be fully functional and operational in their cooperative mission with the USAF.
As long as American aircraft were used in Japan, it almost became a necessity to compare
the Japanese pilot's body with the American ones, whether the measurement was done on
military or civilian pilots by American or Japanese researchers. The same pattern was repeated in
a 1967 study by researchers at the Tokyo Medical College. The Japan Air Lines commissioned
the study "with the purpose of making aircraft with cockpit seats that suit the Japanese." The
motivation was that the dimensions and arrangements of cockpit seats and controls did not match
the Japanese body properly, causing "inconvenience" to pilots' operation. The subjects were 51
Japan Air Lines pilots and the American data for comparison were drawn from Damon's 1955
article "Physique and Success in Military Flying." The two sets of data were displayed side by
side in a summary table, which confirmed the findings of earlier studies. Among the 19 body
dimensions, the measured values from the Japanese were smaller than the Americans in all but
three. The Japanese had larger eye height when sitting, elbow-to-elbow breadth, and head
breadth by 1 centimeter, 2.3 centimeters, and 2.7 millimeters, respectively. As confirmed many
times before, the Japanese were shorter by 11 centimeters, but the Japanese sitting height was
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smaller by only 3.5 centimeters. If the differences in body size were taken into account, the
article concluded, the seat height and depth as well as the distance to the pedals for the Japanese
would have to be smaller than the American standard." 7
That there was difference would have not mattered much if the U.S. had not been
exerting such an influence on postwar Japanese aviation. There would not have been the need to
make a comparison table with the American data every time, either. This particular form of
comparative anthropometrical work was both a product and a part of the postwar and post-
occupation relationship between the U.S. and Japan. The causes of such differences, however,
were not the concern of those studies in aviation medicine. In neither of these anthropometrical
surveys of Japanese pilots was there any discussion of whether the differences in body
dimensions were due to the genes in the Japanese race, malnutrition during and after the war, or
something else. Still, the difference seemed significant to the researchers. The Japanese body
constitution, however, could not be left as a disqualifying factor for Japanese pilots. The U.S.
needed the Japanese pilots to fly as members of its Cold War allies. The constitutional
differences and consequent awkward postures in the cockpit had to be rectified by deliberate
design measures, whether they be garments, flight controls, or cockpit seats. For both parties, the
Japanese and the Americans were unmistakably different groups, but, for practical postwar
purposes, the differences were deemed manageable.
117 Sh6ji Arai, Koji Yoshitoshi, and Eiichi Nishino, "Anthropometry of Japanese Pilots with Reference to the Design
of a Pilot's Workspace," The Journal of Tokyo Medical College 25 (1967): 733-35 (in Japanese with English
abstract).
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Conclusion: Americanized Reincarnation of the Japanese Pilot
From the occupation period to the 1960s, the American policies and attitudes toward Japanese
pilots changed from outright prohibition to qualified acceptance to active management of
difference by accommodation. By creating and maintaining a vacuum of aviation for more than
six years, the United States was able to direct how the vacuum would be filled again. American
influence on Japan's aviation was felt in all aspects-aircraft used, aviation laws and regulations,
flight instruction methods, the language of flying, and flying garments. American policies and
actions toward Japanese pilots well illustrate the American perceptions and anxieties about the
post-surrender and post-occupation Japan. Simply lifting the ban on paper did not put the fliers
of "a sovereign Japan back into the air" all at once."8 Every measure had to be taken to train and
re-train aviation personnel, especially pilots, by the standards and procedures of American
aviation. Even with American training and certificates, however, the question of whether and
how the Japanese should be allowed to sit in the cockpit again could not be neatly resolved. The
Japanese had to prove that they were not just technically capable but also trustworthy and
conforming in the cockpit. Indeed, through these efforts, Japan joined the ICAO in October 1953
as the 61st contracting state, with no objections from the states that had been attacked by
Japan.' In postwar Japan, the entry into the cockpit, a seemingly technical and neutral space
filled with instruments, was closely associated with issues of historical memories and political
decisions, cultural perceptions and stereotypes, and different bodily constitutions.
During the two decades since the war's end, the figure of the American pilot spread to
Japan as well as to other ally countries. American pilots, who trained and flew during the
118 American Embassy (Tokyo) to the Department of State, "Civil Aviation in Japan," 10 July 1957, box 5401,
Central Decimal File 1955-1959, RG 59, NARA.
119 Mackenzie, ICAO, 221-24.
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wartime, came to this nation of no fliers and flew for the business of the occupation forces and
then for a Japanese airline. For the Japanese former pilots as well as aviation authorities, these
Americans embodied an American way of flying-technically advanced, systematic, rational,
rule-abiding, and English-speaking. In a reversal of direction, veteran Japanese pilots went to the
U.S. to be refreshed and re-trained into a Japanese version of the American pilot. After they
returned to Japan, many other Japanese fliers were trained on the same American model. Even
the scholars who would study Japanese pilots had to go to the U.S. to learn how to do so the
American way. Concurrent with this human traffic of pilots and researchers, the American and
Japanese data sets of pilots' bodies moved across the Pacific as well. The anthropometric data of
American pilots came to Japan as a norm, against which the Japanese compared their own
bodies. As soon as the Japanese data were aggregated using the American techniques of
measurement, they were transported back to the U.S. to become an entry in the Aerospace
Medical Research Laboratory's "Anthropometric Data Bank," which also contained
anthropometric data from Turkey, Greece, Italy, and South Korea.120 Along with the
international reach of the postwar American power, international-scale knowledge about pilots
and, by extension, populations was generated in and around the cockpit.
In the postwar period, the figure of the American pilot not only traveled internationally
affecting other nations' pilots, but also moved domestically to other spheres of machine
operation-ground vehicles, factories, and even offices. The American pilot served as a
conceptual and practical platform, on which the postwar "human engineers" developed methods
and techniques to study and manage the human operators of machines. The next chapter
120 Webb Associates, Inc., "Sampling and Data Gathering Strategies for Future USAF Anthropometry," AMRL-TR-
74-102 (1976), 9.
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describes the expansion and extension of the pilot-operator, which provided a technological
interpretation for the "human condition" in postwar America.
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Chapter 5
From Pilots to Humans:
The Postwar Expansion of Aviation Research into Human Engineering
Introduction
In postwar America, aircraft pilots became a model population. While American pilots served as
a model for Japanese pilots, the figure of the pilot, sitting in the cockpit, stood for ordinary
Americans working in front of machines. In this chapter, I examine how knowledge and
techniques from wartime studies of pilots formed a basis for psychologists, anthropologists, and
engineers to understand, produce, and control the human operators of various kinds of machines
in postwar America's military and industry settings. In the late 1940s and 1950s, diverse groups
with wartime experience in pilot research came together to work on more general situations of
machine operation, leading to the formal establishment of an interdisciplinary field called
"human engineering" (later renamed "human factors engineering"). Through this expansion and
generalization of the pilot, a particular type of human-the one who operates machines through
displays and controls-came into being as an object of study and control. The human engineers
worked to meet the military and industrial need for the installation of efficient, safe, and able
operators for a vast number of machines to ensure smooth functioning of the entire system. The
making of the operator was a social project, as much as it was a technical one.
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In their socio-technical project of producing machine operators, the human engineers'
research focus went beyond the qualification, selection and training of pilots and other operators.
Already by the war's end, psychologists and physical anthropologists were asking for new efforts
to incorporate the findings of their research on human capacities and limitations (both in mind
and body) into the design of machines. In addition to selecting a small number of people who
would fit better with existing machines, they argued, the military and industry should design
machines that would fit a maximum number of people. Increasing emphasis on equipment design
with full consideration of human operators called for more cooperation among psychologists,
anthropologists, and engineers.
The postwar move from pilots to humans occurred at multiple levels. The most obvious
were the continuous careers of researchers from the wartime to the postwar period. For example,
Ross McFarland (in chapter 2) and Albert Damon (in chapter 3) collaborated in the late 1940s
and 1950s on the Harvard project on highway safety, bringing their experiences from pilot
studies to the problem of highway driving. Engineering psychologists at the AAF, most notably
Paul Fitts, also applied their expertise in pilots and cockpit design to various problems from air
traffic control to general equipment design. More significant in the move from pilots to humans
was the carry-over of the conceptual characterization of machine operation as a problem of
displays and controls, following the model of piloting as engagement with cockpit instruments
(dials and gauges) and controls (sticks and rudder pedals). The condition within the cockpit was
regarded analogous to what truck and bus drivers and factory machine operators faced. Finally,
the huge amount of data from pilots, especially the anthropometric data of the AAF "functional
man," became a core reference for engineers and industrial designers of all kinds of machines
from automobiles to computer work stations. In the form of scaled diagrams and charts of
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human-machine dimensions, every Joe and Josephine in postwar America, not just elite jet pilots,
became operators.
The making of the machine operator was an effort to specify the human position vis-&-vis
machines in the mid-twentieth century. In this chapter, I describe the work of postwar human
engineering against the background of the contemporary discussion about the changing human-
machine relationship in the age of automation. In the late 1940s and 1950s, the vision of
"machines without men" was debated among engineers, managers, workers, and scholarly and
literary commentators. The human engineers' focus on machine operators, I suggest, reveals an
aspect of automation that was missing in the discussion about whether it was feasible or even
desirable to replace human laborers with machines. Instead of putting humans and machines in
opposition, human engineering posed a question about the particular form of the human that
emerged in the process of operating the machine. The operators under the scrutiny of human
engineers did not make machines so much as monitor and respond to them on a daily basis.
Tracing the trajectory from the pilot in the cockpit to the operator in general offers a nuanced
understanding of the shifting relationship between human and machine.'
"Machines without Men ": Human and Machine in the late 1940s and 1950s
One of the keywords for understanding the human-machine relationship in the late 1940s and
1950s is "automation." D. S. Harder, Vice President at Ford Motor Company, first coined the
word in 1946 to refer to automatic work-feeding and material handling between machines. Soon
Ford became the first company to establish an "automation department," and its practice began
As a study of the place of humans and humanity in the shifting boundaries and relationship between human and
machine, this chapter is chronologically situated between the following two studies. David Mindell, Between Human
and Machine: Feedback, Control, and Computing before Cybernetics (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 2002); Sungook Hong, "Man and Machine in the 1960s," Techni 7 (2004): 49-77.
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to draw attention in the media. The word and the concept became part of popular discourse with
the publication of John Diebold's Automation in 1952. The same year, Kurt Vonnegut published
his first novel, Player Piano, which was based on his experience as the public relations staff at
the General Electric, another major site of automation practice and dispute. In 1955, the U.S.
Congress had a hearing on "Automation and Technological Change" to discuss its definitions
and effects. As James Bright at the Harvard Business School noted in 1958, the word was "the
phrase of the hour."2
Often, both promoters and critics of automation talked about automation as if it meant
making human beings disappear from sites of production. As historian David Noble pointed out,
one of the influential writings on automation among engineers and managers was an article by
Eric Leaver and John Brown in the Fortune magazine published in November 1946 with a
provocative title: "Machines without Men." Though Brown and Leaver did not use the word
"automation" here, the piece expressed the intuition that would soon be typical among engineers
and managers. They imagined a "factory of the future" that would be "barren of men."
According to their bold statement, "[n]owhere is modern man more obsolete than on the factory
production floor."3 The MIT mathematician Norbert Wiener offered one of the gloomiest
implications of automation in his popular book The Human Use of Human Beings, first published
in 1950. In Wiener's view, automatic machines were "the precise economic equivalent of slave
labor," an analogy that made him pessimistic:
Any labor which competes with slave labor must accept the economic conditions of
2 James Bright, Automation and Management (Boston: Division of Research, Graduate School of Business
Administration, Harvard University, 1958), 3-6.
3 E. W. Leaver and J. J. Brown, "Machines without Men," Fortune, November 1946, 165 and 192-204, quote on
165.
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slave labor. It is perfectly clear that this will produce an unemployment situation, in
comparison with which the present recession and even the depression of the thirties will
seem a pleasant joke.4
The possibility of human-free production was also picked up, though satirically, by Vonnegut in
his description of the Ilium Works, the imaginary factory of "production with almost no
manpower."5
In practice, however, both proponents and critics knew that completely automatic,
laborless production would not be the ultimate result. "Automatic factories," Diebold asserted at
the end of his book, "will not be workless factories."6 Despite Wiener's worry about "the
greatest period of unemployment we have yet seen," a sober anticipation was, in the words of
Marxist critic Harry Braverman, "not the elimination of labor, but its displacement to other
occupations and industries." 7 The question then was: who would be displaced by whom or what?
Also, what did the displacement mean to workers and work?
Optimists like Leaver and Brown believed that automation would help reverse the on-
going trend in industry "to degrade the worker to an unskilled and tradeless nonentity."
Automatic machines would in fact, they argued, "emancipate the worker forever from degrading
or monotonous toil." They thought that automation meant upgrading, rather than the degradation,
of work and workers, since it was "the replacement of unskilled labor by high-skilled technicians
and operators." As evidenced by the wartime experience of quick learning and transition, people
4 Norbert Wiener, The Human Use of Human Beings: Cybernetics and Society (New York: Avon Books, 1954), 220,
also quoted in Bright, Automation and Management, 5.
5 Kurt Vonnegut, Player Piano (New York: The Dial Press, 2006) [first publication in 1952], 1.
6 John Diebold, Automation: The Advent of the Automatic Factory (New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1952),
142.
Wiener quoted in David Noble, Forces of Production: A Social History of Industrial Automation (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1984), 75; Harry Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Denigration of Work in the
Twentieth Century (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974), 172.
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would acquire new skills and become technicians and operators. One could account for this view
as a product of the naivetd of young physicists (Leaver and Brown were thirty and thirty-one)
fresh from their wartime work on radar and with keen interest in applying basic science to
industry. But Leaver and Brown were sincere believers in the power of new machines. In a fully
automated factory, there still would be people, but "[o]nly a few engineers, technicians, and
operators walk[ing] about on a balcony above, before a great wall of master control panels,
inserting and checking records, watching and adjusting batteries of control instruments." As
illustrated by the fact that the Fortune issue in which this article was published was devoted to
the labor problems in American industry, the argument of automation from these young
physicists was meant to be good news for management.
John Diebold, who popularized the term automation, also made a kind of upgrading
argument, albeit a more qualified one. More realistic than Leaver and Brown, Diebold did not
consider it much necessary for "the assembly line worker" to be "transformed into a design
engineer," the kind of upgrading Leaver and Brown had thought possible. At the same time,
however, he did not think that automation would contribute to any "debasement of the worker," a
pessimistic vision expressed by Wiener. Rather, automation would free the workers from the
debasing experience of having to "tend" and be "paced" by machines, and then enable them to
pursue jobs that would utilize their "inherent human capacities." For Diebold, these new jobs
meant "semi-skilled and highly skilled maintenance and repair." Though some training efforts
would be required, the "maintenance and repair" jobs were definitely not as complex as
"engineering and design" and therefore suitable for those who had performed "the simple
repetitive tasks of the assembly line." More importantly, since in maintenance and repair tasks
8 Leaver and Brown, "Machines without Men," 165 and 204.
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the person did work "on machines" rather than being "paced by machines," it could mean an
upgrading of the worker's human dignity.9 In Diebold's opinion:
In an odd and entirely unexpected way, automation may bring us back to the human and
psychological values of the self-respecting craftsman. Electrical and mechanical repair
work, instrument adjustment, and general mechanical thinking can provide challenges,
pleasures, and satisfactions very much like those enjoyed by the sword-smith or
cabinetmaker of old.'0
"The upgrading of labor," Diebold concluded, would be "a rounded process of fuller
development of the whole man."" A person who maintained and repaired machines was
regarded a fuller human being than the one who tended machines.
Such a displacement to maintenance and repair jobs generated despair and anger among
the (former) workers sketched in Vonnegut's Player Piano. At a bar, one man, who had been
displaced long ago, challenges Dr. Paul Proteus, the 35-year-old manager-engineer of the Ilium
Works, about the career path of his eighteen-year-old son. The father says his son is "awfully
clever with his hands" and has "a kind of instinct with machines" but unfortunately did not do
well in the National General Classification Tests. When the father asks Proteus about a possible
position at the plant, Proteus simply tells him of the strict requirement of a graduate degree for a
factory position and suggests instead, "Maybe he could open a repair shop." Frustrated and
angered, the father says: "Repair shop, he says. How many repair shops you think Ilium can
support, eh? Repair shop, sure! I was going to open one when I got laid off. So was Joe, so was
Sam, so was Alf. We're all clever with our hands, so we'll all open repair shops. One repairman
9 Diebold, Automation, 158-64 (italics original).
'
0 Ibid., 164.
'' bid., 164 (italics original).
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for every broken article in Ilium. Meanwhile, our wives clean up as dressmakers--one
dressmaker for every woman in town." When Proteus tells his wife Anita about this encounter
and his feeling of guilt, Anita asks, "Is he starving?" Hearing her husband's reply, "Of course
not. Nobody starves," Anita sums up the whole point of automation from the management
perspective. "And he's got a place to live and warm clothes. He has what he'd have if he were
running a stupid machine, swearing at it, making mistakes, striking every year, fighting with the
foreman, coming in with hangovers." No reason for people with clever hands to work the
machine and make troubles.12
James Bright, the Harvard business professor, had no illusions about "upgrading-through-
automation," though he used the term "upgrading" for a slightly different purpose. Bright began
to study "automation" in 1954 mainly from the standpoint of management and published the
results in 1958 both as a book, Automation and Management, and as an article in the Harvard
Business Review. One of Bright's major findings was that, contrary to popular perception of both
management and labor at the time, automation would "not necessarily result in a net upgrading
of work-force skill requirements to a major extent." Bright refuted claims on automation from
both sides: one from enthusiasts that automation would "upgrade labor into higher caliber, more
dignified, satisfying, and valuable social and economic positions," and the other from labor side
that "the common man" lacking adequate higher education and skill would be excluded from
automated factories. To avoid the confusions of overly vague definitions of automation, Bright
came up with a scheme of 17 "levels of mechanization," ranging from the simplest hand
operation (level 1) to the use of a machine that "measures characteristic of work" (level 9) to a
machine that "anticipates action required and adjusts to provide it" (level 17). During lower
12 Vonnegut, Player Piano, 30-31 and 37.
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levels of mechanization, Bright admitted, the skill requirements might increase, but he
emphasized that "automated machinery tends to require less operator skill after certain levels of
mechanization are achieved." The implication of this claim, however, was more favorable to
management than to labor. Bright urged management to grasp the correct relationship between
automation and skill levels, without which they were bound to make "unsound policies" in union
contract, "excessively strict hiring standards" to the exclusion of cheaper workforce available,
and "inappropriate and unfair wage rates." According to Bright, the "upgrading," understood as
the need to pay more for higher skilled workers due to automation, was not likely to happen.' 3
Given his focus on the management side of automation, Bright did not pay much
attention to the subjective experiences of workers with possible "degrading" or "downgrading."
Bright viewed "machine operators" simply as "workers of less training" than "machinists," who
therefore deserved less pay. Writing in 1974, Marxist writer Braverman criticized Bright's study
as "detached and rigidly factual." For Braverman, automation meant the downgrading of
experienced machinists into machine operators, and the crucial difference between the two
groups lay in "all the decisions, judgment, and knowledge" that were now taken away from the
latter and put into the "program tape" of numerically controlled (NC) machines. With less skill
and training, the machine operator was more subject to alienation from work.'4 Likewise, in his
analysis of the introduction of NC machines, David Noble sees the essence of automation in
management's desire to have "more direct control over the machinery of production" and to
"undermine the power of machinists on the shop floor." At stake was "not only working people's
11 James Bright, "Does Automation Raise Skill Requirements?" Harvard Business Review, July-August 1958, 85-98
(italics original).
" Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital, 202 and 214.
307
means of livelihood but their social identity as well."" As the subtitle of Braverman's book
suggests, this removal of "social identity" from experienced machinists represented "the
degradation of work in the twentieth century."
It was apparent to all commentators of automation, including Leaver and Brown,
Diebold, Vonnegut, Bright, Braverman, and Noble, that the engineers were making all this
possible for the sake of management. In contrast to the reduction of workforce in factories,
Diebold predicted, "[a]utomation will further increase the demand for good engineers," of whom
there was "a great dearth" as of 1952. Diebold asked these engineers, the designers of
automation, to be better prepared to work closely with management and even to take up
managerial positions themselves. The American educational system, Diebold argued, would have
to provide the young engineer generation with better understandings of the business world they
would go into.16 The diminishing skill and power of workers were closely related to more
opportunities for young engineers who were mathematically savvy enough to design automated
machinery even without much bodily knowledge and experience of working with machinery.
They would be the core of the "permanent war economy" and the "military-industrial-scientific
complex" in the postwar America.' 7 As exemplified in the segregated geography of the town of
Ilium in Vonnegut's Player Piano, engineers would now form a ruling class with managers and
live on the opposite side of the world from the workers who were displaced to repair jobs.
Thus, there were three groups, other than managers, whose "means of livelihood" and
"social identity" were affected by automation. In the case of metalworking industry that Bright,
Braverman, and Noble discussed, they were engineers, skilled machinists, and machine
15 Noble, Forces ofProduction, 58 and 82.
16 Diebold, Automation, 131-32.
17 Noble, Forces of Production, 21 and 40.
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operators. Roughly put, driven by the vision of "machines without men," the engineers designed
automatic machinery that would displace skilled machinists while introducing machine operators
as a replacement. Both Braverman and Noble have criticized engineers for their blindness to
human cost, or even presence, in the process of automation. Although the level 17 in Bright's
mechanization scale was rarely achieved in reality, ambitious engineers took it as their goal to
reduce not only traditional machinists but also, if possible, low-skilled machine operators. As an
indication of this motivation, Braverman pointed to "the awkward grammar of the passive voice"
in engineering literature, with which the engineers often wrote as if the machine operations could
"perform themselves, without human agency." 8 "In the view of the engineer, the new designer
of improvements," Noble wrote echoing Braverman, "the human operator all but disappeared."
While machinery was deemed to have "a life of its own apart from the person who used it,"
Noble stated, that person turned into "a phantom appendage."' 9 For the engineers, there existed a
clear intellectual as well as social hierarchy between those who designed automatic machines
and those who operated them, skilled or not. Through their drive to automation, the engineers
successfully elevated themselves above the workers who gradually lost their control over
machinery and work.2 0
Beyond the scope of individual factories, managers, and engineers, the debate on
automation has been understood as an indication of and a response to the postwar social reality in
which "production no longer defines or encompasses the totality of social being." As
1 Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital, 186.
1 Noble, Forces of Production, 81.
20 Enlightenment philosophers, with their ability to understand and create the mechanisms of automata, attempted to
set up a similar intellectual and social hierarchy between laborers (who worked like machines) and themselves (who
made visible the mechanism of such work). On this relation "between machinery viewed as human and humans
managed as machines," see Simon Schaffer, "Enlightened Automata," in The Sciences in Enlightened Europe, ed.
William Clark, Jan Golinski, and Simon Schaffer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 126-165, quote on
127.
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technologies of automation seemed to be "making corporeal work obsolete," or at least "replaced
by images, by communication, and by cybernetic systems of self-regulation," the worker's body
lost its once central position in factories and in social discourses. According to historian Anson
Rabinbach, this represented the disappearance of "the metaphor of the human motor" that had at
once driven and limited the nineteenth-century discourses and practices of productivism, social
reform, and modernity. The displacement of the worker's body as energy converting and
conserving motor with muscles, nerves, and fatigue, Rabinbach suggested, was reflected in "the
decline of the 'science of work' in the postwar era." In the age of automatic and cybernetic
machines, the "science of work" with its ancestors in the nineteenth-century physiological work
such as E. J. Marey's and the early twentieth century scientific studies of efficiency such as
Frederick Taylor's seemed to be losing its object of study. In the words of French sociologist
Georges Friedman, the worker was becoming "less and less a homofaber in the classic sense of
the term."2 1
However, this view of the disappearing worker and his body with a focus on the
elimination of the human-motor type workers ignores the new group of machine operators. Work
lost its meaning with the displacement of physical workers, it seems to imply, rendering the
remaining operators of machines devoid of technical and social meaning. The operators of
automatic, informational machines are likewise treated as non-physical entities that exchange
signs, not energy, with machine displays. Who exactly the machine operator was, however,
remained a difficult question. Mechanical and electrical engineers often deprived the operator of
his or her active voice in machine operation, but they did not define the operator in specific
terms. Apparently the operator was less skilled and educated than traditional skilled workers, but
2 Anson Rabinbach, The Human Motor: Energy, Fatigue, and the Origins of Modernity (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1992), 295-99, Friedman quoted on 299.
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he or she still operated increasingly complex, though automatic, machines. What kind of person
was the machine operator? Finding answers to this question fell on the human engineers, who
were a scientific group distinct from the mechanical and electrical engineers, the victorious
players in automation. The human engineers, consisting of psychologists and anthropologists
with their wartime and postwar research experience on pilots and radar operators, took up the
task of defining and locating the generic human operator of machines in the automatic factory
and other settings. They shared Noble's critique of design engineers that the human operator
could never be displaced into a "phantom" in the background.
"Machines Cannot Fight Alone"
In 1946, the year Leaver and Brown published "Machines without Men" in the Fortune, Harvard
psychologist S. S. Stevens published in the Scientific American an article whose title may well be
considered a response to Leaver and Brown: "Machines Cannot Fight Alone." Just as with
Leaver and Brown, young physicists with radar work experience, Stevens was writing from his
own experience of psychological research during the war. While he had been a collaborator in
William Sheldon's somatotyping research (see chapter 3), the focus of his essay was on the
wartime and on-going research in "psychophysics." Stevens emphasized the significance of
research in human senses and communication capacities involved in the operation of machines
such as radar, sonar, gun turrets, and airplanes. As his title suggested, the essay was a celebration
of the wartime work on "the human side of engineering," or simply "human engineering," that
Stevens believed had been crucial for the victory in a war fought with machines. From the
perspective of a psychophysicist, it was radar, not the atomic bomb, that made the most
significant contribution in the war. "[N]uclear fission did not fight the war-it only ended it,"
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wrote Stevens. In the essay, the distinction between radar and fission consisted not just in the
number of enemies killed or lives saved. Unlike the bomb whose use-to drop it-was only
fleeting with little human contact, the radar required constant monitoring by a human operator
and efficient communication between operators. In the combat operation of radar and other
equipment, Stevens wrote, "the sensory powers of the operators became the factor of
limitation."22
Stevens's own Psycho-Acoustic Laboratory (PAL) at Harvard conducted a good deal of
research on the problem of noise and communication in human-machine systems such as radar,
tanks, airplanes, or submarines. These systems were, according to historian Paul Edwards,
"primitive examples of what would eventually be labeled 'cyborgs."' The psychologists worked
to enable "human organisms" situated within "electromechanical military systems" to
communicate in the midst of extreme noises from combat and from machines themselves. While
the lab's activities were often "mundane and fairly straightforward chores of developing and/or
testing earplugs, microphones, headsets, and acoustic insulator for use in intense noise," Edwards
found one of the lab's significances in the fact that its researchers would later "develop computer
models and metaphors and ... introduce information theory into human experimental
psychology." Moreover, Edwards considered the PAL's work "vital for the future of cognitive
theory" and the lab "the central locus for the nascent cognitive approach to psychology."23
While Edwards rightly credits the PAL for defining "human-machine integration as
problems of psychology," it must be noted that the task was not exclusively psychological, as
22 S. S. Stevens, "Machines Cannot Fight Alone," A merican Scientist 34:5 (1946): 389-400. As mentioned in chapter
3, Stevens had cooperated with William Sheldon on the somatotyping research of college students, which was
published as The Varieties of Human Physique.
23 Paul Edwards, The Closed World: Computers and the Politics of Discourse in Cold War America (Cambridge,
MA: The MIT Press, 1996), chapter 7, quotes on 210, 212-13, and 220.
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illustrated by the anthropometrical research on pilots, and that even in the realm of psychology
there were many serious problems other than noise and voice communication.2 4 For pilots in the
air, other basic tasks such as reading instruments and controlling aircraft for navigation and
landing drew attention from psychologists interested in "human engineering" problems,
especially at the Aero Medical Laboratory of the Army Air Forces. The latter type of
psychological work had less to do with the development of information theory or cognitive
psychology and instead was concerned with more mundane things like dials and knobs. One may
still call this psychological research on equipment design as a case of "human-machine
integration," but the solutions these researchers looked for were not so much the creation of
cyborgs with blurred boundaries between human and machine as the adaptation of machines to
human capacities and limitations. Rather than being subsumed into the integrated system, the
pilot-operator reaffirmed his or her own role as the ultimate monitor and controller of the
machine.
"Fitting the Cockpit to Man ": Cockpit Studies and the Making of the Pilot-Operator
During the later stage of the war, psychological research for equipment design rather than
selection and classification was conducted at the Aero Medical Laboratory in Dayton, Ohio.
Established in July 1945 and led by experimental psychologist Paul Fitts, the Psychology Branch
focused on the actual practice of operation within the cockpit, using the AAF cadets and college
students as research subjects. Distinct from the work of the NRC Committee on Selection and
Training of Aircraft Pilots to define qualities for pilots and select candidates with those qualities,
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24 Ibid., 220.
the AAF's psychological research on equipment design focused on how and why the pilots made
errors in actual operation within the cockpit.2 5
Fitts edited and published the results of the Psychology Branch's work in 1947 as part of
26the AAF Aviation Psychology Program reports. Fitts first pointed out that psychologists' work
in aviation had focused on "techniques for selecting and training men to use existing equipment
rather than on the investigation of equipment design problems." Psychological research on the
latter problem was called "engineering psychology" and Fitts believed that this specialized
branch of psychology would more than supplement the work of other psychologists in aviation.
This belief, however, required a re-statement of the objective of psychological research on pilots.
While the psychologists of the NRC committee had often mentioned savings in time and money
as the benefit of their selection research, the main concern of Fitts and other engineering
psychologists was "operator efficiency." Fitts had no reservations in referring to pilots as
operators, who interacted with equipment and instruments. For the efficiency of pilot-operators,
Fitts wrote, "minor design changes" would make greater difference than "months of intensive
training or ... careful screening of operators on the basis of aptitude."27
In order for psychologists to take up equipment design issues, a pilot's work in the
cockpit had first to be defined as psychological task. Fitts classified possible psychological
problems in the cockpit into two categories: "display problems" and "control problems." The
first set of problems was concerned with pilots' errors in "reading" cockpit instruments. It was
2 For a summary of Fitts's research career, see Richard W. Pew, "Paul Morris Fitts, 1912-1965," in Division 21
Members Who Made Distinguished Contributions to Engineering Psychology, ed. Henry L. Taylor (Washington,
DC: Division 21, American Psychological Association, 1994), 23-44.
26 For a brief account of the AAF Aviation Psychology Program, see James Capshew, Psychologists on the March:
Science, Practice, and Professional Identity in America, 1929-1969 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1999), 107-10.
27 Paul Fitts, ed., Psychological Research on Equipment Design (Army Air Forces Aviation Psychology Program
Research Report No. 19) (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1947), 1-2.
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not uncommon for pilots to misread altimeters or air speed indicators, especially when one
instrument dial included multiple pointers from which to read and combine (e.g. mistaking
13,000 as 3,000 feet). Also, pilots sometimes mistook one instrument for another, for instance,
carburetor air temperature for gas gage or tachometer for manifold pressure gage. In addition to
the problem of direct "reading," there was an issue of interpreting "the meaning of an
indication," as in the case of pictorial representation in the artificial horizon. The AAF research
addressed these problems by devising experiments to figure out better display configurations.
For example, the efficacy of 24-hour clock display was tested on eleven different dials with
various positions and arrangements of numerals. Also, experiments on instrument legibility
revealed that the dials with less dense markings (e.g. one marking for every 100 rpm rather than
every 20) produced fewer reading errors. For the artificial horizon display method, researchers
used the Link Trainer to see how well the subjects maintained the attitude with different types of
artificial horizon.2 8
The control problems were at once psychological and tactile. Pilots often operated the
wrong switches, knobs or buttons, either due to the locations or proximity of controls or because
they had to grab them while wearing gloves and without looking. One experiment divided the
frontal cockpit surface into 20 small areas and rated each by the relative accuracy for pilots to
reach that small area. Expectedly, the controls right in front of the pilot were reached more
accurately than those located upward, downward, or on the sides. An extensive research on the
tactile differentiability of knobs tested 22 differently shaped knobs, which were grabbed and
28 Paul Fitts, "Psychology and Aircraft Design," Mechanical Engineering 69 (February 1947): 135-41. The
experiments mentioned in this paragraph are included as chapters in Fitts, Psychological Research on Equipment
Design. See Walter Grether, "Design of Clock Dials for Greatest Speed and Accuracy of Reading in Military (2400-
Hour) Time System," 91-99; Roger Brown Loucks, "An Experimental Evaluation of the Interpretability of Various
Types of Aircraft Attitude Indicators," 111-35.
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identified by 40 blindfolded pilots with or without gloves. The experiment found 8 shapes that
showed little chance of confusion among themselves, while it also discovered a pair of knobs
with the highest chance of confusion (42 errors in the test)-a cross and a hexagram-shaped
knob (see Figure 20).29
Figure 20. Experiments for reaching different areas and differentiating shapes.
[Source: Fitts, Psychological Research on Equipment Design, 208 and 200.1
In all of these experiments on display and control problems, the pilot was assumed to
work within the space of the cockpit without much need to make contacts with the outside. After
all, what pilots did (and made errors in) were reading instruments correctly and manipulating
appropriate controls. The word "display" itself revealed the essence of pilots' work situation.
Defined in equipment design as "any method of providing information which cannot be obtained
directly through the sense organs," the display became a central problem in the cockpit where
29 Fitts, "Psychology and Aircraft Design." The experiments mentioned in this paragraph, too, are found in Fitts,
Psychological Research on Equipment Design. Paul Fitts, "A Study of Location Discrimination Ability," 207-17;
William Jenkins, "The Tactual Discrimination of Shapes for Coding Aircraft-Type Controls," 199-205.
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"very little of the essential information" was directly sensed and, moreover, "that which can be
perceived is often erroneous or inaccurate." In an aircraft, display was a life and death matter. As
the AAF researcher Walter Grether stated:
There are few, if any, situations where the human being is provided with such a variety
of displays to which the appropriate reactions must be made as quickly and accurately as
in the airplane. Likewise, there are probably no other common situations where failure to
react correctly to the displayed information can lead to such serious consequences.3
In short, pilots worked with displays, not with unmediated vision or feeling, and the possibility
of error lay in confusion among displays. Likewise, pilots were supposed to "react rapidly and
accurately to one of a closely bunched group of controls." Confusion between controls was no
less dangerous, as exemplified in many accidents from pilots' confusion between flaps and
landing gear controls. Surrounded by confusing markings, numerals, and shapes, the pilot had to
be a competent discriminator of signs in the cockpit.
The "Boundaries" between Human and Machine
At the same time that the engineering psychologists attempted to tackle human-machine
integration through the improvement in display and control design, an anthropological approach
to cockpit design set the physical parameters of such integration. The wartime anthropometrical
survey of Damon and Randall, despite their concern with dimensional comfort in the cockpit, did
not take into account the different locations of cockpit controls that a pilot had to reach. In 1947,
three researchers at the Naval Medical Research Institute, Barry King, Dorothy Morrow, and
30 Walter Grether, "Survey of Display Problems in the Design of Aviation Equipment," in Psychological Research
on Equipment Design, ed. Paul Fitts, 21-33, quote on 21.
-' Jenkins, "Tactual Discrimination of Shapes," 199.
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Erwin Vollmer, published arguably "the first investigation ... to find out 'how far man can
reach"' in the cockpit. To be sure, studies of working areas were not a novelty in industrial
settings, and the Navy researchers cited a well-known text in time-and-motion studies to
conceptualize the pilot's work area in the cockpit. The situations were not identical, however,
between the cockpit and the factory floor. The pilot was supposed to reach the controls while he
was "in a fixed position" and had the shoulder harness "tightly locked." Due to the risk of
temporary misreading of instruments or unintentional mishandling of controls, the pilot was
discouraged to make "major movements," "disturbing his normal sitting posture." The life of a
pilot, which Ross McFarland had called "sedentary" in physiological sense (chapter 2), became a
literally fixed one.32
Instead of making the boundary porous and blurred, human-machine integration in the
cockpit required meticulous demarcation between humans and machines. King, Morrow, and
Vollmer recruited 139 subjects from aviators and non-aviators in the Navy and had them reach
various points in the surrounding area-at 0, 15, 45, 75, and 105 degrees laterally and covering
60-inch range vertically. The reach increased, they found out, as the arm swung to the sides
laterally and decreased as it moved upward or downward. This variability in reach distances,
complicated by flexible movements of shoulder joints as well as individual differences, produced
"a segment of the shell of an ellipse" with a thickness of about 5 inches, within which 93 percent
of the subjects could reach every control device. This elliptical shell represented "the boundaries
of the maximum area for the operation of manual controls." Putting controls beyond this
boundary, the study implied, would render them inoperable by a significant portion of the pilot
32 Barry King, Dorothy Morrow, and Erwin Vollmer, "Cockpit Studies: The Boundaries of the Maximum Area for
the Operation of Manual Controls," Project X-65 1, Report No. 3 (Bethesda: National Naval Medical Center, 1947),
1, 8, and 11. The report cited Ralph Barnes, Motion and Time Study, 2nd ed. (New York: John Wiley and Sons,
1944).
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population. Once established as cockpit design criteria, the authors suggested, these results could
also be sent back to aviator selection stations to screen those who could not reach far enough. On
a very practical level, it had to be known where the human finger tips ended and where the
machine began. "Cockpit studies," however mundane they sounded, rendered the "boundaries"
between human and machine visible and designable and made the figure of the pilot-operator
more concrete.3 3
Boundary-making in the actual operational situation, however, was a difficult task.
Conventional anthropometric techniques that had been used by Damon and others were not ideal
for measuring the pilot's body specifically for control movements in the cockpit. King and his
colleagues could not find a convenient index among existing AAF anthropometric dimensions
that would correlate well with the maximum reach of the pilot's arm. Determination of the range
of such simple movement as reaching the controls could not be solved by standard
anthropometry. Moreover, King pointed out in another publication, human positions and
postures "in operating his machine" were not the same as those taken for anthropometrical
surveys. A pilot would assume a conventional posture for sitting height measurement "only in
the presence of an anthropologist."35 For the purpose of "functional cockpit design," one had to
make a distinction between pilots "as subjects for an anthropologist" and pilots as aircraft
operators. This was at once an elaboration and a critique of wartime pilot anthropometry, which
3 King, Morrow, and Vollmer, "Cockpit Studies," 6 (and the report title).
3" Ibid., 5.
3 Barry King, "Measurement of Man for Making Machinery," American Journal of Physical Anthropology 6:3
(1948): 341-5 1, quote on 348.
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had provided valuable data but had not fully addressed the pilot's condition in "normal operation
or function."36
As psychologists and anthropologists such as Fitts, King, and McFarland summed up the
wartime research on pilots and proposed new research directions for "fitting the cockpit to man"
or "making airplanes to fit man," an agreement emerged across disciplines on the matter of
"human limitations" in the operation of airplanes. 37 In an influential synthesis of aviation
research up to 1946, Human Factors in Air Transport Design, McFarland asked for more
attention "on human limitations than on instrumentation and aerodynamic considerations alone."
The phrase "human factors" in the title was an expression of this concern about the limited
capability of human operators. The number of things to be "watched and manipulated" in the
cockpit was already overwhelming, for example, over 125 in the DC-3 (airline and transport
aircraft introduced in the mid 1930s) and over 250 in the C-54 (four-engine transport aircraft
introduced in the early 1940s). Working in a dense technological environment, the pilot had not
only "physical limitations" in handling controls simultaneously (only two hands and two feet)
but also psychological ones in the number of items to which he could attend. Even worse, there
would be more, not fewer, instruments in the near future, increasing "competition for the space
on the pilots' instrument panel, which is already so overcrowded." Besides these limitations in
actual operation, there were plenty of other "human factors" that would undermine efficiency
and threaten safety of flight in physiological, psychological, and anthropological sense. As the
36 Barry King, "Functional Cockpit Design," Aeronautical Engineering Review 11:6 (1952): 32-40, quote on 32. In
the realm of pilot selection tests, Ross McFarland had made similar points when he proposed to approach the
selection problem in "functional or operational sense" (see chapter 2).
37 King, "Functional Cockpit Design."
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cockpit was increasingly saturated with instruments and controls, it became a proving ground in
which the human imperfection of machine operators was brought to the fore.38
From Pilots to Humans: Human Engineering in Postwar America
It did not require much imagination to expand discussion from a pilot in a cockpit to a general
human being in front of a machine. In the late 1940s, those who had been involved in wartime
psychological, physiological, and anthropological research for pilots, radar operators, and others
in similar human-machine environments began to talk actively to engineers who designed and
built such equipment and machines. The efforts for taking "human factors" into account for
general engineering design were summarized as a phrase and field "human engineering."
"Human engineering" was not a new phrase of the postwar period. The movement for
"scientific management" by Frederick Taylor and his followers had been called human
engineering. In pre-WWII America, however, human engineering was not confined to the factory
floor. Human engineering comprised scientific management of production and "medical
management of society," which were not separable, as exemplified by the work of psychologist
Robert Yerkes. As Donna Haraway has argued, psychobiological studies of personality and sex
differences at the Yale Laboratories of Primate Biology led Yerkes to emphasize the need for
"human engineering" and "personnel research" for industry, military, and society at large.39
Indeed, in 1941, Yerkes made "a case for human engineering" for effective "man-power"
38 Ross McFarland, Human Factors in Air Transport Design (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1946), 417-
18 and 477. For an experienced pilot's view about this ever-increasing "burden," see Robert Buck, The Pilot's
Burden: Flight Safety and the Roots of Pilot Error (Ames: Iowa State University, 1994).
39 Donna Haraway, "The Biological Enterprise: Sex, Mind, and Profit from Human Engineering to Sociobiology,"
Radical History Review 20 (1979): 206-37, quotes on 212 and 222. Haraway called Yerkes's primate laboratory "a
pilot plant for human engineering."
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preparation by the American military for the impending war.4 0 The selection and training
research described in the previous chapters conforms to this characterization of "human
engineering"-its focus on "the person," finding his or her place in industry as well as in military
organizations, as prescribed by the person's "nature." Haraway contrasts the pre-WWII human
engineering of Yerkes with the postwar sociobiology of E. 0. Wilson, the latter characterized as
the science of systems, populations, information, and communication control. In the postwar
systems science approach, "the person" lost its central location, as operations research since
WWII "conceived of the human operator and the physical machinery as the unified object of
analysis." In Haraway's comparison, "ergonomics" represented this postwar approach, whereas
the "time-motion studies" and "human engineering" stayed in the prewar period.4 '
Does widespread use of the phrase "human engineering" by experimental psychologists
and physical anthropologists in the late 1940s complicate Haraway's contrast between prewar
"human engineering" and postwar "ergonomics"? Is there any significant implication beside the
simple fact that the term continued to be used in the postwar period? A look at the discourses and
practices of the "human engineers" in the late 1940s and 1950s reveals continuities as well as
discontinuities from the prewar projects of human engineering of Taylor, Yerkes, and the like.
There existed some sense of newness among the postwar human engineers about what they were
doing. And it was based on their recognition, as described above, that fitting "the person" to
machines (if not to industry or society) was no longer the best option. However, their version of
"human engineering" in the late 1940s did not exactly lose sight of "the person" in preference for
40 Robert Yerkes, "Man-power and Military Effectiveness: The Case for Human Engineering," Journal of
Consulting Psychology 5 (1941): 205-9, cited in Capshew, Psychologists on the March, 48-51.
41 Haraway, "Biological Enterprise," 208 and 222. For a history of "human engineering" understood as the attempts
to study, predict, and control human behaviors in the twentieth century, see Rebecca Lemov, World as Laboratory:
Experiments with Mice, Mazes, and Men (New York: Hill and Wang, 2005).
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"the system." It was rather to re-center the person, or to re-define the person as the operator, and
then to design the system to fit the operator. In the long run, transformation did occur in the
direction Haraway describes, but "the person" lingered on in the system, challenging the new
generation of human engineers.
Another continuity from prewar to postwar human engineering-ergonomics was that the
aircraft pilot served as a main example, whether as a person or an operator. A pilot's capacities
and limitations in the operation of aircraft were readily translated into those of general human
beings operating any kind of machines worthy of engineers' attention. The pilot's situation was
the clearest instance of the "conflict between engineering possibility and human limitation,"
according to Leonard Mead, a psychologist at the Navy's Special Devices Center and one of the
most active promoters of human engineering in the late 1940s and early 1950s. In a meeting of
automotive engineers in 1947, Mead presented a general thesis of human engineering that "the
limits of engineering development are dictated by the characteristics of the human being who
must operate the machine." To fit the postwar context, Mead changed the statement of S. S.
Stevens only slightly: "Machines cannot operate or fight by themselves." Expectedly, most of the
cases Mead offered as examples of the human engineering approach were from researches on
aircraft displays and controls. Analogies could be made without much need to explain; airplanes
stood for machines and pilots represented human operators in general. The section titles of
Mead's article might well have been taken from Fitts's 1947 AAF report with some words
replacement: "Machines as Sensory Displays" and "Man As a Controller of Machines."
Fitts led a similar move from pilots to other operators in a major report collectively
written by aviation psychologists in 1951. Now working at the Ohio State University, Fitts edited
42 Leonard Mead, "Human Factors in Engineering Design," The SAE [Society of Automotive Engineers] Journal
55:12 (1947): 40-46, quotes on 40 and 46.
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a human engineering study of air navigation and traffic control systems, which was submitted to
the Civil Aeronautics Administration by the NRC Committee on Aviation Psychology, the
successor of the wartime Committee on Selection and Training of Aircraft Pilots. The research
group consisted of 10 psychologists in the aviation field including Alphonse Chapanis, who had
conducted psychological research for the Navy before establishing the Systems Research
Laboratory at the Johns Hopkins, Alexander Williams, Jr., who had worked for the AAF and was
now leading an aviation psychology program at the University of Illinois, Edwin Newman, a
psychologist at the Psycho-Acoustic Laboratory at Harvard, and Walter Grether, a psychologist
at the Air Force Aero Medical Laboratory and one of the researchers for the 1947 AAF report.
Since the air navigation and traffic control system comprised pilots as well as air traffic
controllers, all working long hours with displays and controls, the study seemed like an ideal
occasion to think about basic principles of human engineering. Two main objects of study and
concern for the wartime human engineering-a pilot and a radar operator-were present in one
system.
The human engineering approach to the air navigation and traffic control problem
focused on "the role of the human operator." The ultimate goal of such study would be the
"effective integration of men and machines for the accomplishment of an over-all task," but "the
entire assemblage of men and machines"-the "system"-had first to be analyzed for
capabilities and limitations of each component, the human operator and the machine. What
exactly was the operator doing as part of the "system"? What information did the operator get
from machine displays and what decisions were made based on the information? While these
questions sounded specific enough to the task at hand-analysis of air traffic control system-
43 Paul Fitts, ed., Human Engineeringfor an Effective Air-Navigation and Traffic-Control System (Washington, DC:
National Research Council, 1951) [a report of the Committee on Aviation Psychology].
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they could easily turn into abstract inquiries. Especially, considering future developments of the
system, the authors stated, an important question would be "What should men do and what
should machines do?" If men and machines must work together, as they did in take-off, flight,
and landing, what would be the appropriate "division of responsibility between men and
machines"? 44
The authors hypothesized four scenarios with varying roles of the human operator in the
system. In a system of "fully automatic control," there would be no role for human operators
and, accordingly, no role for human engineers in the operational phase of the system. In the
second possibility, "automatic control with human monitoring," the human operator was
necessary mostly for emergency situations such as unforeseen machine breakdown. The human
role would be limited to "monitoring, maintaining, and calibrating automatic machines." The
object of study for the human engineer, then, would be the human being characterized "as a
monitor, as a trouble-detector, and as an emergency controller." The third scenario was "semi-
automatic control" that was "supplemented" by human operators who would perform "critical
functions." These functions included "reasoning, judgment, planning, and decision making," the
tasks that would require human engineering work on better display and communication. In the
fourth and last situation, the human operator took "primary control" and was "assisted" by
machines that would analyze, transmit, and display data for the human. This would be close to
the contemporary work situation for controllers, but possibly with better machines.4 5
The report did not pick one of the four scenarios as the most plausible, but still implied
that the third and fourth with relatively larger roles for the human operator were likelier to
happen. The human possessed, the human engineers noted, "some remarkable powers that cannot
44 Ibid., v, xx, and 1-2.
45 Ibid., 5.
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yet be duplicated by machines." More concretely, humans were said to be better than machines
in six capacities: sensory functions, perceptual abilities, flexibility, judgment, selective recall,
and inductive reasoning. On the other hand, machines were known to "excel" humans in several
tasks and had already taken over some of them. They were better in speed and power, routine
work, computation, short-term memory, and simultaneous activities.46
Figure 21. What Men Do Better vs. What Machines Do Better
ISource: Fitts, Human Engineering for an Effective Air-Navigation and Traffic-Control System, 7-8.
Courtesy of the National Academy of Sciences Archives.
The tricky part for the authors was the second possibility of "automatic controls with
human monitoring." Contrary to the contemporary perception that this would be the near future,
the human engineers were skeptical about the idea. The caution, however, did not come from
their negative prospect about the development of automatic machines. Instead, they were
uncertain about the human capacity of "monitoring" machines:
We believe that men, on the whole, are poor monitors. We suggest that great caution be
46 Ibid., 8.
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exercised in assuming that men can successfully monitor complex automatic machines
and "take over" if the machine breaks down. We believe that engineers should seriously
consider systems in which machines monitor men, especially in respect to matters of
safety, and prevent them from making serious mistakes.47
In contrast to the human superiority in perception, judgment, and reasoning, humans were not
good at enduring a long period of inactive monitoring and tended to "become inattentive, and
bored, and sometimes fall asleep." It was doubtful whether humans could really "take over"
when emergencies did occur. "[A] monitoring system," the authors suggested, was "one of the
worst kinds of work situations when we want the human to stay alert." Instead, therefore,
machines must be made to monitor human operators, so that it would be "impossible for any
human in an aircraft or on the ground to violate basic safety rules, such as assigning two aircraft
to the same block of space." 48
Although it remained a hypothesis and no concrete proposal was made of a machine that
would monitor men, this collective opinion of ten leading engineering psychologists represented
a tipping point for the working condition of the human operator. Provided with insufficient
opportunities to use uniquely human capacities of judgment and reasoning and almost bored by
increasingly automatic machines, one of the main tasks for the human operator was to stay
"alert." Morris Viteles, the chairman of the Committee on Aviation Psychology, sensed that this
was a provocative suggestion. In his foreword to the report, Viteles anticipated criticisms
specifically of this man-the-poor-monitor hypothesis. "However," he then added, "the very fact
that the issue is raised is, in itself, of importance," since there were now available new venues of
research to tackle such a problem seriously. Human engineering would address the issue, for
4 7 Ibid., 11.
48 Ibid., 6.
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example, by examining "power plants or military outlook posts, where men are now employed as
monitors."4 9
Man-monitoring machines were not readily available, but the human engineers could
offer at least some provisional guidelines to make men less poor monitors. Lest the human
operators make fatal mistakes, the task of operating a machine had to be more complex than
mere monitoring. The first was that "human tasks should provide activity." To operate an
airplane or a radar system was to act on the machine, to engage with it. The second solution was
that "human tasks should be intrinsically interesting." This was to help "human efficiency to
remain at a high level." These requirements from human engineers that human-machine
relationship be active and interesting are a revelation that the relationship was becoming the
opposite. It took good human engineers to keep the operators awake, occupied, and efficient in
front of machines.50
Although their own balance sheet of "what can men do better than machines?" and "what
can machines do better than men?" seemed to carry almost equal weight, human engineers
focused their attention on the weakness and unreliability of the human operator. The list of what
humans could do better, they had to point out, was always subject to change, since "we cannot
foresee what machines can be built to do in the future." The human position could only become
weaker. The Handbook of Human Engineering Data, published by Tufts College with the Navy
Special Devices Center in 1952, made it the purpose of the field "to eliminate the danger of
making an operator the bottleneck in this man-machine system."5' For Francis Bello, the science
writer for the Fortune magazine, it was a good thing that people "finally faced up to their own
49 lbid., iv and xiv.
50 Ibid., 6 (emphasis added).
5 Institute for Applied Experimental Psychology, Handbook of Human Engineering Data, 2nd ed. rev. (Medford,
MA: Tufts College, 1952), 1. The first edition of this Handbook was published in 1949.
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shortcoming as machine tenders." Contrary to a possible connotation of "human engineering" as
manipulation of people, Bello wrote, "the human engineer accepts people as he finds them, with
all their quirks and idiosyncrasies." Writing in 1954, Bello was glad to see that the human
engineering was beginning to spread from military to industry in general. "At last," the article
heading ran, "industry is grasping the fact that people are imperfect operators of machines." Not
merely applicable to pilots or air traffic controllers, this was becoming a general human
condition.
Thus, at the same time as pilots came to exemplify general human beings, the task of
human engineering was quickly expanded, at least rhetorically, to the scale of industrial society
at large or even human civilization. Introducing the psychological studies on equipment design in
1947, Fitts talked of the field (engineering psychology) as one solution to general issues in
contemporary society:
Engineering psychology is concerned with adapting one important aspect of the
environment, the machines of a technological society, to man's own requirements.
Broadly conceived, the techniques of engineering psychology can be applied to many
aspects of our present-day industrial civilization for the purpose of improving them in
terms of human requirements.53
More than just tools for human use, the machines now formed the environment that surrounded
humans. In Fitts's view, to help design machines was to affect the basic conditions of human
existence in industrialized society.
In a similar vein, the human engineers regarded the postwar formation of their field as a
notable moment in the history of human civilization. In a lead article for the Annals of the New
52 Francis Bello, "Fitting the Machine to the Man," Fortune, November 1954, 134-37, 148, 152-158, quote on 134.
5 Fitts, Psychological Research on Equipment Design, 3.
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York Academy of Science, a volume devoted to human engineering in 1951, Mead nicely situated
the type of work being done at the Navy's Special Devices Center within a long history of
technology, industry, and workers. "Human engineering problems," Mead wrote, "seem to arise
whenever man is confronted with technological advancements." But the serious business of
human engineering began only in the nineteenth century with the realization that "man was
actually the weak link in mechanized production." Writing from the perspective of a
psychologist, Mead pointed to both continuities and discontinuities in the history of the attempts
to "make man a more efficient partner in the modern industrial scene." Within psychology, Mead
explained, its contribution to this problem had changed from intelligence and aptitude tests of
WWI era to more experimental approach to equipment design based on the knowledge of human
psychological capacities. In its relationship with engineering, the postwar human engineering
could also mean a repayment of the engineers' earlier intervention into psychology with
behavioral suggestions based on time and motion studies. For these overlapping but disparate
groups of engineers and psychologists, Mead claimed, the war and early postwar years provided
"a unique opportunity and need" for the emergence of a "biomechanical field" as the
combination of "engineering and biological professions."5 4
The remarks of Admiral Luis de Florez, who had been instrumental in the Navy's
wartime synthetic training devices, are typical of human engineers' historical interpretation of
human-machine relationship. In the foreword to the Handbook of Human Engineering Data, De
Florez pointed to a significant historical moment:
Up to the present, we have been able to keep up with technological progress by
54 Leonard Mead, "A Program of Human Engineering," Annals of the New York Academy ofSciences 51 (195 1):
1125-34, quotes on 1125-27.
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education and training. But we have now reached the point where the machine has
dwarfed the man, for the characteristics of the individual-the human machine-have not
changed in the memory of man and will not change for countless generations to come,
while the man-made engine is capable of ever increasing power, scope, and speed of
operation.55
For Mead and Joseph Wulfeck, who fully agreed with de Florez, the emergence of human
engineering was "inevitable," since it was "for perhaps the first time" that the human capacity
became so important a factor in realizing or limiting the full potential of machines.56
The attempt of the human engineers to invoke a long human history in order to situate
their own field resembled the rhetorical strategy of cyberneticians, who were contemporaries of
the human engineers, to present their cybernetics as a universal science. As historian Geof
Bowker pointed out, in their promotion of the new field, the cyberneticians stated that "we were
now at an historical conjuncture where machines were becoming sufficiently complex and the
relationship between people and machines sufficiently intense" to call for a new scientific
language.57 Human engineers shared some of the insights from cybernetics on the similarities
and blurring boundaries between humans and machines. The human engineers' claim for
universality, however, was not based on the collapse of such boundaries and the application of
the same principles to both sides, but rather on the ubiquity of the irreducible human position in
front of machines. Likewise, when and where mechanical and electrical engineers saw a
" Quoted in Leonard Mead and Joseph Wulfeck, "Human Engineering: The Study of the Human Factor in Machine
Design," Scientific Monthly 75:6 (December 1952): 372-79, on 372.
56 Mead and Wulfeck, "Human Engineering," 373.
5 Geof Bowker, "How to Be Universal: Some Cybernetic Strategies, 1943-70," Social Studies ofScience 23 (1993):
107-27, quote on 117.
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possibility of making humans disappear through automation, the human engineers reaffirmed the
crucial place of the human being in machine operation.
Inside and Outside the Box: Representations of the Human Operator
In their generalization from pilots and radar operators to all kinds of machine operators, applied
experimental psychologists, or engineering psychologists, tended to focus on "the single man-
machine pair"-one operator working with one machine-as their unit of analysis. The influence
of cybernetics and related theories of information and communication was evident in this
direction. Paul Fitts's 1947 report in engineering psychology neither featured cybernetics or
information theory nor mentioned Wiener or Claude Shannon, whose influential works were
published in 1948 and 1949, respectively. Nevertheless, Fitts's and other engineering
psychologists' view of the human operator as working with displays and controls was readily
translated into a research frame that treated "man as, or as a part of, a servomechanism." In a
much-cited piece on the "theory of the human operator in controls systems," British experimental
psychologist Kenneth J. W. Craik asserted that "the human operator behaves basically as an
intermittent correction servo" and also that "electrical models could fairly exactly simulate the
human operator's behaviour in tracking."58 Although most servomechanism systems were not
designed with human engineers' advice, they claimed that human engineering had much to offer
for improving the human-machine servomechanism performance. 59 Thus, the psychological
approach within human engineering soon took the form of "systems research," as indicated by
58 Kenneth J. W. Craik, "Theory of the Human Operator in Control Systems 1: The Operator as an Engineering
System," British Journal of Psychology 38 (1947): 56-61. Craik studied psychology at Cambridge University with
Frederic Bartlett, who conducted much research in aviation psychology during the war. Harry Braverman cited
Craik's article as an example of how human beings were treated in engineering terms. Braverman, Labor and
Monopoly Capital, 179.
59 Mead and Wulfeck, "Human Engineering," 373-74.
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the name of Alphonse Chapanis's lab at the Johns Hopkins University.60 With the concept and
language of "system" and "man-machine system," the human engineers claimed themselves as
the "new ally for the electrical engineer."
Between experimental (engineering) psychologists and electrical or control engineers,
however, the exact shape of the "man" within the "man-machine system" varied, often
depending on the context in which it was represented. Diagrams used to explain the man-
machine system in the writings of psychologists and engineers revealed fluid ideas about how
much and what aspects of a "man" should be configured in the system. When the psychologists
speculated on what humans could do better than machines (in the report on air traffic control),
they used a drawing in which a man wearing a suit and tie was surrounded by the six capacities.
In a 1957 article on psychology and machine design in the American Psychologist, written by
Franklin Taylor at the U.S. Naval Research Institute, the "man-machine system" diagram
featured the entire body of a naked "man" connected to "mechanisms" via "displays" and
"controls." Visible through his body, by imaginative drawing, were the brain and the spinal cord,
presumably the most important parts of the body for the connection with mechanism. 62 When
Taylor was writing with a colleague for radio engineers in 1954, by contrast, the human element
in the system was not pictorially represented and instead divided into three boxes that said
"receptors," "effectors," and "CNS" (central nervous system). The boxes of receptors and
effectors were coupled with equivalent boxes of "displays" and "controls" on the machine side,
60 The Systems Research Laboratory at the Johns Hopkins University, established in 1948, is considered "perhaps
the most prolific human factors laboratory of the early postwar years." Sharolyn Converse Lane, "A Historical View
of Human Factors in the United States," in Historical Perspectives in Industrial and Organization Psychology, ed.
Laura L. Koppes (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2007), 243-64, on 249. On Chapanis's research
career, see Alphonse Chapanis, The Chapanis Chronicles: 50 Years of Human Factors Research, Education, and
Design (Santa Barbara: Aegean, 1999).
61 J. W. Dunlap, "The Human Engineer: New Ally for the Electrical Engineer," Electrical Engineering 71 (February
1952): 107-12.
62 Franklin Taylor, "Psychology and the Design of Machines," American Psychologist 12:5 (1957): 249-58, on 250.
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respectively, producing a symmetry between human and machine in abstract forms. In the
authors' representation, "[t]he man is schematized by the boxes shown above the heavy black
line, while components of the machine are blocked in below.'"63 Engineers took the abstraction of
human operators much further. For example, an article for control engineers, written by Duane
McRuer, a well-known aeronautical engineer and founder of Systems Technology, Inc., and Ezra
Krendel, an engineering psychologist at the Franklin Institute, characterized the human operator
in a block diagram as "a describing function plus an additional quantity.,64 As psychology and
engineering came closer to each other for the study of human-machine systems, the human
component seemed to be losing its body and shape while turning into an assemblage of boxes
and arrow lines representing functions and information flow.
63 H. P. Birmingham and F. V. Taylor, "A Design Philosophy for Man-Machine Control Systems," Proceedings of
the Institute of Radio Engineers 42 (1954): 1748-58, on 1748.
64 Duane McRuer and Ezra Krendel, "The Human Operator as a Servo System Element, Part I," Journal of the
Franklin Institute 267:5 (1959): 381-403, image on 387.
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Figure 22. Various representations of the operator in the system
[Sources: top left, Taylor, "Psychology and the Design of Machines," 250; top right, Birmingham and Taylor,
"A Design Philosophy," 1748; bottom, McRuer and Krendel, "Human Operator," 387.j
The analytical focus on the "man-machine system" adopted by both engineering
psychologists and engineers did not go without criticism. The modeling of man-machine system
integration presumed the existence of the "average American GL" or civilian workers whose
functions and properties for machine operation were readily put into block diagrams and
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mathematical formulations.65 For those outside engineering psychology, this was too simplistic.
Writing as a reviewer of the 1951 air traffic control report, psychologist Thomas Gordon at the
University of Chicago, emphasized the irreducibility of the human being into machine-
compatible terms.
... unlike machine, the output of the human is not always simply a function of input, the
human system is affected by many factors other than the quality and quantity of
informational data received through his senses. Human engineering, if it is to escape the
dilemma of the old time and motion study engineering, must guard against exclusive use
of the 'machine' model in its theory of human behavior.66
In other words, psychology should continue to address the questions regarding whom to bring
into the system in the first place and how to keep them in the system as persons. New directions
in human engineering should not eclipse earlier contributions of psychology in selection,
training, morale, and motivation.
For the researchers concerned with non-psychological issues-most notably the body-
the human operator in the box made even less sense. As illustrated in anthropometrical studies of
pilots and the cockpit dimension studies, physical anthropologists, or engineering
anthropologists, were skeptical about the efficacy of the notion of "the average man." "[I]t is a
fallacy," wrote H.T.E. Hertzberg of the Anthropology Section at the Air Force Aero Medical
Laboratory, "to use merely the 'average' as the basis of design for human accommodation." To
drive this point home, Hertzberg cited an analysis of the anthropometric survey data of the 4,063
Air Force flying personnel. After choosing 10 dimensions for clothing design, the researchers
65 Mead and Wulfeck, "Human Engineering," 373.
66 Quoted in Morris Viteles, editorial foreword to Fitts, Human Engineeringfor an Effective A ir-Navigation and
Traffic-Control System, iv-v, quote on v.
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counted how many of the men belonged to the "approximate average"-a range of plus and
minus 15 percent from the average value-in all 10 dimensions. First, the thirty percent range for
stature contained 1,055 men, out of whom 302 men were of approximate average in chest
circumference. After applying the ninth filter, thigh circumference, only 2 men remained.
Finally, none of the two men had "approximate average" crotch length. "The assumptions of the
'average man' concept are fundamentally incorrect," Hertzberg argued, "because no such
creature exists." From the physical anthropology viewpoint, "a major purpose of human
67
engineering" was figuring out appropriate space requirement for a large group of operators.
Other examples in physical anthropology provided by Hertzberg also revealed the
tenacity of the human body that never disappeared from the scenes of human-machine
integration. One was about the muscle strength of the operator, especially in emergency
situations such as the use of ejection seats in aircraft. As Hertzberg emphasized, the trigger for
ejection must not be designed for pilots with "average" grip strength, endangering the lives of
almost half the group. There was also the "amazingly ramified" problem of seating, summarized
as the intriguing question, "What happens to buttocks when we sit on them?" The pain in the
buttocks was a very difficult problem to tackle, because:
one cannot normally see the buttocks when they are sat upon and, even if one could, the
discomfort occurs inside, with few external traces. Breaching the epidermal defenses of
the buttocks by needles, or electromyographic devices would destroy their integrity, and
68
would alter the physiological equilibrium by inserting a different kind of pain.
67 H.T.E. Hertzberg, "Some Contributions of Applied Physical Anthropology to Human Engineering," Annals of the
New York Academy of Sciences (195 5): 616-29.
68 Ibid., 624.
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With ingenuity, the Air Force anthropologists modified a "C-Ray Pediscope," initially invented
for the study of feet, so that it could be used for buttocks pressure measurement with a tentative
new name "Buttock Assessor." By means of florescent tubes, the subject's tuberosities could be
seen "shining out of the buttock pattern" and allowed for various detailed measurements that
were heretofore impossible, such as "(1) the distance between the tuberosities; (2) the angle
between the tuberosities; (3) the area of the tuberosity for a given seating position; (4) the
location of the tuberosities within the seating area."69 Concerns of the human operators of
machines created new dimensions and properties of the human body worthy of measurement. If
one was to compose a figure of the machine operator in the early 1950s, it had to incorporate the
sizes and angles of the tuberosities, without which the human-machine integration was
incomplete.
Despite their different assumptions about the human operator, both parties-engineering
psychology and applied physical anthropology-had a tendency to generalize from a particular
case in their study (frequently a pilot in the cockpit) to other situations where human operators
worked with machines. The model of the human operator as a servo mechanism, which put the
human element into abstract notation, was deemed applicable to not only air traffic controllers
and radar operators but also machine operators in factories. Likewise, physical anthropologists
regarded their contribution to human engineering as extendable to other areas, though these were
not limited to machines. Their work on buttocks fatigue, for example, could be translated from
pilots to the drivers of buses, trucks, and automobiles as well as mattresses and chairs.
Practitioners in human engineering in the 1950s came to share an object of study, the human
operator, though there existed multiple views of and approaches to it within the field.
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69 Ibid., 628.
Human Engineering as the Postwar Recruiting Project
Psychological and engineering studies of the single human-machine system and anthropometrical
and statistical analysis of the operator population were supplementary to each other in
constituting the human engineering as a social project. As the concerns of human engineering
expanded from the initial military context to industry, and from aircraft and radar to other kinds
of vehicles, equipment, and machines, human engineers took it as their role to provide ways to
maximize the number of people available for machine operation. In a 1953 Harvard study of
"human body size and capabilities" for vehicles, in which Ross McFarland and Albert Damon
participated, the authors defined "two basic goals of human engineering":
One is that all men be able to operate all machines, or if not all men, then 98% of them.
Combat conditions require interchangeability; ... it is poor policy to impose further
limitations upon the supply of capable operators by restrictions relating to height and
weight. Another goal is not to limit the machine's performance by human failure. Any
vehicle, however cleverly engineered, may be destroyed or abused by an uncomfortable
or inefficient operator.70
As can be expected from the research careers of McFarland and Damon, this study did not deal
with human-machine systems from the perspective of engineering psychologists like Paul Fitts.
The "two basic goals," however, could serve as a representative statement from the field in
general, especially in the emphasis on the provision of "alert, capable, and efficient" operators.'
70 Ross McFarland, Albert Damon, Howard Stoudt, Alfred Moseley, Jack Dunlap, and William Hall, Human Body




In this regard, human engineering participated in solving the postwar "manpower"
problems in America. Just as the combination of the Cold War, the Korean War, and the postwar
economic boom necessitated the production of an unprecedented number of scientists and
engineers, these same conditions meant the need for more able operators for the machines that
were proliferating everywhere. This imperative was most clearly manifested in physical
anthropologists' research on workspace design such as that of cockpit dimensions. As Barry
King, one of the researchers in the 1947 "cockpit studies," noted, their concern was to implement
designs "for the greatest possible percentage of a population of potential operators." 73 Even as
the human-machine systems were being analyzed in abstract forms and terms, the human
engineers were in fact engaged in making machines more operable for both military and civilian
sectors. Also, although postwar researchers often described their work on equipment design
("fitting the machine to the man") as distinct from the earlier paradigm ("adapting the man to the
machine"), the postwar human engineering had no fewer implications for selection and training
work. J. W. Dunlap, for example, wrote in 1952 that human engineers' work in equipment design
would actually ameliorate "personnel problems." "Better human engineering," according to
Dunlap, "means less difficulty in selecting and training personnel." This was a valuable
contribution, especially "during periods of full employment, such as we are now experiencing."74
From his wartime experience in pilot selection, McFarland knew better than any others
the implication of human engineering consideration in design for the selection and training of
operators. Machines inadequately designed for operators, McFarland wrote, would increase the
72 On the postwar scientific manpower issues, see David Kaiser, "Cold War Requisitions, Scientific Manpower, and
the Production of American Physicists after World War 11," Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological
Sciences 33 (Fall 2002): 131-59.
73 King, "Measurement of Man," 348.
7 Dunlap, "The Human Engineer," 111.
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need for "exceptional individuals" who were capable of working with demanding machines.
Selection of "pilots with superior ability" had been a goal of recruiters and psychologists during
the war, but having to do so due to poor design was considered undesirable in the postwar
imperative of manpower maximization.75 Lessons had to be learned from the wartime when "the
supply of physically and mentally competent operators never equals the demand." The solution,
for McFarland, was the design with human engineering considerations, which would bring about
"more efficient and wider use of the nation's potential manpower." 76 Rather than trying to select
"the best of the best," human engineers attempted to enlarge the pool of potential operators, if
possible, to the entire population.
Thus, human engineers' work in personnel selection and machine design served as a
science of recruiting in postwar America. Instead of setting up high standards of capacity and
selecting a small number of people who met them, human engineers worked to make the entire
population recruitable. The increase of recruitability through the work of human engineers was
an important step for the production of "docile" bodies and minds inside and in front of
machines. Foucault's notion of "discipline" has been frequently used to describe the relationship
between the human body and the "machinery of power," the latter understood both literally and
figuratively. As it makes other bodies "operate as one wishes, with the techniques, the speed and
the efficiency that one determines," Foucault wrote, "discipline produces subjected and practised
bodies, 'docile' bodies." As to these docile subjects, discipline "dissociates power from the
body" and reframes it as "aptitude" or "capacity," which should be increased for maximum
7 Ross McFarland, "Problems Relating to Aircrews in Air Transport Design," Annals of the New York Academy of
Sciences 51 (January 1951): 1146-58.
76 McFarland et al., Human Body Size and Capabilities, 14-15.
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economic utility, while its political form is carefully checked.77 Human engineering as a science
of recruiting added a new element of "design" to the disciplinary resources for producing docile
and able operators. Seated alertly and comfortably, it was hoped, any operator could perform to
the maximum specification of the human-machine system.
From Cockpits to Cabs: The Postwar Collaboration of McFarland and Damon
Human engineers' pursuit of "making all men be able to operate all machines" through selection
and equipment design was best exemplified in McFarland's studies of highway transport safety
in the 1950s. In 1946, McFarland published a major synthesis of aviation research, Human
Factors in Air Transport Design, and the next year changed his Harvard affiliation from the
Business School to the School of Public Health. In 1949, he began to lead a large research
project on "human factors in highway transport safety."
As the list of the project sponsors illustrates, the operator question attracted various
parties' attention. The Harvard project on "Human Factors in Highway Transport Safety"
secured support from the Commission on Accidental Trauma of the Armed Forces
Epidemiological Board, the Surgeon General of the Army, the National Association of
Automotive Mutual Insurance Companies, the American Trucking Association, and the National
Association of Motor Bus Operators. Having an operator stay alert and efficient in adequately
designed space was a common concern among the military, the insurance industry, and the
freight and passenger transport industry. Statistics from WWII showed that the U.S. Army had
more deaths from accidents than from diseases, and within the former category more than half
were aircraft and automobile accidents. Between 1947 and 1949, more than half of the Army's
77 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage
Books, 1977), 136.
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fatalities resulted from motor vehicle accidents. Even on the Korean battle front, land vehicle
accidents accounted for roughly 35 per cent of deaths. On the civilian side, accidents ranked the
third cause of death, after cardiovascular disease and cancer. Among accidents occurring outside
homes, those in transportation vehicles were the most frequent. Human-machine systems of
transportation became a serious public health concern, deserving a major study by the Harvard
School of Public Health.7 8
For this new research project, McFarland drew heavily from his experience in aviation
research, especially the understanding of pilots and piloting in "functional or operational sense."
The view of the pilot as an attentive operator of a machine and the research questions on
selection procedure as well as cockpit design were easily transferable to operators of motor
vehicles. 79 McFarland suggested that his own two books on aviation human factors-the 1946
publication mentioned above and Human Factors in Air Transportation in 1953-could serve
"equally well to other fields of transportation."80 Although the field of automobile accidents and
safety had its own accumulated research history, it was believed that aviation research had more
to offer to land vehicle problems. McFarland wrote in one of the reports on highway safety:
Since many problems of airplane design are also relevant to land vehicles, the extensive
78 The accidents statistics are quoted in McFarland et al., Human Body Size and Capabilities, 5-7.
79 My emphasis on the connection from aviation studies to motor vehicle operators need not be taken as ignoring a
long research tradition on automobile drivers or railroad operators. As historian John Burnham showed
comprehensively, the idea of "accident prone" drivers and workers generated much research by psychologists,
physiologists, and engineers since the early twentieth century, which later merged with the "human factors" research
in the postwar period. See John Burnham, Accident Prone: A History of Technology, Psychology, and Misfits of the
Machine Age (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009). To be sure, not every principle and technique in the
highway research of the 1950s originated from the wartime aviation work. My aim in tracing such a connection,
then, is to note the historically contingent role of wartime emergency to make it possible to speak of different types
of operators within a common research frame.
80 Ross McFarland et al., Human Factors in the Design of Highway Transport Equipment: A Summary Report of
Vehicle Evaluation (Boston: Harvard School of Public Health, 1953), 42.
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research in the field of human sizing and capabilities with reference to aircraft serves as
an excellent introduction to the whole problem. In addition the methods employed are
often equally applicable to ground vehicles.
There seemed to exist a similarity not only between the vehicles on land and in air, but also
across much broader spectrum of mechanical operation. As McFarland noted in the proposal to
the Ford Foundation for a program in "industrial and transport safety," the basic principles of
human engineering were valid "whether an employee is operating motorized equipment on the
highway, flying an airplane, operating a lathe or punch press, or carrying out any of the
numerous mechanized duties of a manufacturing or base repair shop." Extending prior studies in
aviation, McFarland suggested, "similar studies should be made, therefore, relating to highway
transportation and to industry in general."82 From the human engineering perspective, pilots,
truck and bus drivers, and factory workers shared an identity as operators of machines, which
enabled the human engineers to study them with similar principles and techniques.
References to the studies in aviation human factors were most conspicuous in the analysis
of instrument panels in truck cabs. McFarland's team evaluated 12 models of commercially
available trucks that were identified with number codes in the report. It was assumed, following
the psychological studies in cockpit instrumentation, that poor instrument design and
arrangement increased the possibility of vehicle accidents. As discussed above, since information
display for operators started to receive serious attention in aircraft cockpits, most literature
available on the topic in the early 1950s dealt with cockpit instrumentation. Therefore,
McFarland's team evaluated the truck cabs with techniques and criteria obtained from the
81 McFarland et al., Human Body Size and Capabilities, 89.
82 "Proposed Teaching and Research Program in Industrial and Transport Safety" (submitted to the Ford Foundation
in 1956), box I 11, folder 10, RAM-WSU.
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cockpit studies. Examination of "driver-dashboard relationship" soon revealed that "satisfactory
design has been sacrificed for aesthetic appeal." The location of the dials was too skewed to the
right side because of "unnecessary emphasis on symmetry" rather than on function. The
researchers also pointed out that three of the vehicles examined used dial colors with poor
legibility (green on brown, tan on cream, or yellow on brown) and recommended the use of
white figures on black background. General recommendations on the design of dials, including
the principle of fewer markings for better legibility, were taken from Paul Fitts's work on cockpit
equipment design. 83
Another area of concern that owed much to the wartime aviation research was the sizing
and arrangement of the mechanical workspace suitable for varying human dimensions.
Researchers sat in each of the twelve cabs and looked for any difficulties in making operational
movements. They listed seven body dimensions that were "most often neglected" in the cab
designs, including anterior arm reach, knee height, and foot length and breadth. For example,
none of the twelve cabs showed satisfactory accommodation of anterior arm reach, "one of the
most important and most neglected" body dimensions. This was detrimental, the research
suggested, to safe and efficient vehicle operation, since arms and hands were essential to
"activate windshield wipers, turn on lights, flick the ash from a cigarette, engage and disengage
gears, pull out the hand brake, etc." in addition to handling the steering wheel. Also, negligence
of knee heights resulted in so narrow space between the steering wheel and the brake pedal that
all models were deemed inconvenient to some portion of the operator population (from 15 to 70
per cent), slowing driver reactions on the brake. In one truck cab model of 1950, researchers
83 McFarland et al., Human Factors in the Design of Highway Transport Equipment, 22-26.
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found out, drivers had to shift gears before they could move a foot onto the brake pedal.84 In the
GMC M- 135 truck used in the Army, the hand brake was located on the floor between the
driver's and passenger's seats, forcing the driver to break from normal driving position in order
to operate it in emergency situation.85 All these actions of the driver in the cab, including some
mundane and simple ones, were subjected to human engineers' exacting examinations.
As in the case of aircraft cockpits and pilots, the analysis of truck cab dimensions had to
be based on the body size data of the driving population, requiring an equivalent of the 1946
anthropometry report by Albert Damon and Francis Randall for the Army Air Forces. For this
purpose, McFarland enlisted as a part-time member Damon, who, after finishing his Ph.D. at
Chicago, pursued an M.D. degree at the Harvard Medical School. Damon brought his research
experience in anthropometry of pilots to the study of vehicle operators. The research team of
McFarland and Damon made anthropometric measurements of 372 drivers, consisting of 168
"regular" truck drivers, 103 bus drivers, and 103 "champion" truck drivers. Most regular drivers
were from the companies in the Northeast region (Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont,
Rhode Island, and New York), and one truck company in Texas was included.86 From the
perspective of anthropometry or physical anthropology, truck and bus drivers meant more than
simply another group of subjects. What made the driver significant for human engineers was that
he was "the normal healthy working man," distinct from the earlier subjects who, the researchers
admitted, had not been representative of general population (e.g. elite college students, soldiers,
or criminals).87 The bus or truck driver represented "that great biological unknown, the Normal
84 McFarland et al., Human Factors in the Design of Highway Transport Equipment, 26-31.
8s McFarland et al., Human Body Size and Capabilities, 157-5 8.
86 Ibid., 20-21; Albert Damon and Ross McFarland, "The Physique of Bus and Truck Drivers: With a Review of
Occupational Anthropology," American Journal of Physical Anthropology 13:4 (1955): 711-42, quote on 723.
87 Damon and McFarland, "Physique of Bus and Truck Drivers," 711.
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Worker."88 Moreover, these "heavy vehicle drivers" were "perhaps the largest distinct
occupational group in the country," comprising more than five million people. 89 By showing that
what had been "true" for pilots was also applicable for truck and bus drivers, as they did in this
study, Damon and McFarland were claiming the validity for "all man-machine integration."90
Damon's presence in the research team, however, meant that two different views of the
human body in machine operation, which he had expressed in the wartime studies of fliers,
would be manifested with respect to bus and truck drivers-one's physique correlated with
successful driving and the dimensional body of the "functional man" (see chapter 3). As much as
he bought into the postwar human engineering focus on the latter, Damon did not give up his
"scientific" interest in the former. The inclusion of champion truck drivers for anthropometric
measurement is revealing, for it was not indispensable for obtaining representative body data of
"normal" driving population. The 103 champion truckers were enlisted for measurement at the
1950 and 1951 national truck "Roadeos," where they competed after passing "gruelling state
contests comprising written and practical tests of first aid, automotive maintenance, rules of the
road, and driving skill under intense pressure." In short, they were "unquestionably among the
country's finest drivers." 9' These drivers with superior performance record enabled Damon (and
McFarland) to repeat what he had done with the AAF fliers during the war-conducting
somatotype analysis and correlating physique with occupational success, this time truck driving
instead of flying. This part of investigation was not included in the official project reports of the
Harvard study, but instead was published separately in the American Journal ofPhysical
88 Ross McFarland, Albert Damon, and Howard Stoudt, Jr., "Anthropometry in the Design of the Driver's
Workspace," American Journal of Physical Anthropology 16:1 (1958): 1-23, quote on 19.
89 Damon and McFarland, "Physique of Bus and Truck Drivers," 713.
90 McFarland, Damon, and Stoudt, "Anthropometry in the Design of the Driver's Workspace," 19.
91 Damon and McFarland, "Physique of Bus and Truck Drivers," 723.
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Anthropology in 1955. Perhaps not coincidentally, Damon published in the same year in the
same journal an excerpted version of his 1946 dissertation on physique and success in military
flying. 92
By adding the champions of truck driving in the sample, Damon could relate the
anthropometrical project to much larger social questions than the "mundane level" problems in
human engineering. Damon hoped to answer:
Who, in a free society, chooses what job, and why? Once having chosen, who succeeds?
How large a part is played by genetic or constitutional factors of physique and
temperament; are the latter associated, and how closely?93
To get at these questions, the measurement of truck and bus drivers used both new and old
anthropometric techniques. Newly adopted was a method of the Royal Air Force that used
numerically ruled measuring boards, against which the subject was seated for easy measurement.
Directly carried over from the wartime survey of American pilots was Sheldon's somatotyping
technique. As in the AAF study, the researchers were all trained at Harvard laboratory for
standardization of techniques. Damon conducted an ancestry survey of the drivers, as had been
done in the AAF study, but this time only incompletely "due to unwarranted fear of offending"
them. In so doing, Damon admitted, "the few Negroid regular truckmen have been discarded for
present purposes," which made the group "predominantly Northwest European." 94
The results, predictably, confirmed the stereotypical image of large vehicle drivers,
though in "less dramatic" manner than expected. Compared with general population, the bus and
truck drivers were heavier, more masculine, and more mesomorphic. It was remarkable that the
92 Albert Damon, "Physique and Success in Military Flying," American Journal of Physical Anthropology 13:2
(1955): 217-52.
93 Damon and McFarland, "Physique of Bus and Truck Drivers," 712-13.
94 ibid., 723-24.
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drivers were more mesomorphic than even the AAF pilots (when compared between equal
levels, i.e., regular vs. regular, and champion vs. champion). Interestingly, the Texas truckers
were "taller, leaner, less mesomorphic, but more 'masculine' and stronger" than their
Northeastern colleagues, which conformed to "the cowboy stereotype." Champion truckers were
found to be "younger and taller, with broader shoulders ..., longer necks and faces ... , longer
forearms, longer heads ..., and shallower abdomens." Most significant, however, was their
"excess of mesomorphy in an occupational group already characterized by high mesomorphy."
The champion truckers' height seemed to Damon to confirm earlier findings of Francis Galton,
in Hereditary Genius (1869), and Enoch Gowin on business executives (1918), that leaders
tended to be taller than "average performers."95
Once again, Damon saw "a real association" between one's physique and one's
occupation or even one's success in it. Mesomorphy and masculinity characterized heavy
vehicles drivers, as they did military fliers, "probably reflecting common factors in the two
occupations." The exact nature of the similarity between the two was not specified, but there was
no doubt that these groups were in stark contrast with "research workers," whose constitutions
showed strong ectomorphy. It was not just a matter of muscular strength, Damon stressed, that
mesomorphy was associated with heavy driving or flying. As Sheldon's research on physique
and temperament showed, Damon believed, mesomorphy brought with it all the personal
qualities useful for success in driving, such as motor ability, visual acuity, or endurance of
discomfort and fear.96
95 Ibid., 729-33 and 737; Francis Galton, Hereditary Genius: An Inquiry into Its Laws and Consequences (London:
Macmillan, 1869); Enoch Burton Gowin, The Selection and Training of the Business Executive (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1918). For a recent commentary on this issue, see Stephen Hall, Size Matters: How Height
Affects the Health, Happiness, and Success of Boys-and the Men They Become (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2006).
96 Damon and McFarland, "Physique of Bus and Truck Drivers," 734-35.
349
In interpreting these apparent associations, Damon's use of Darwinian or Spencerian
language was explicit. It seemed that the correlation between physique and occupational success
had more to do with "selection and adaptation (i.e., survival of the fittest)" than with the job's
"environmental" influence on physique. Damon stated, "Research work does not 'make'
ectomorphs, nor does driving 'cause' mesomorphy." Rather, 'jobs require specific patterns of
physique and temperament for success." In the case of research jobs, a "negative type of
selection" was at work, since such jobs provided "a haven for cerebrotonic weaklings," who
might or might not be good researchers. The job of driving, by contrast, had "a positive selective
value," specifically for the mesomorphs. The social implication was clear: know your body and
temperament (which are associated), and choose your job accordingly. Likewise, if you are an
employer, "preventing failures" is worth more than the loss by "eliminating potential
successes." 97 Basically, Damon repeated what he had done with the AAF pilots during the war
and did it with a smaller sample size. Since it dealt with "the Normal Worker," however, the
result seemed better suited for generalization.
As mentioned in chapter 3, the human body in somatotype analysis was related to success
and failure in occupation not through functional or structural requirement of the job. It was
through the tripartite association among physique, temperament, and behavior that one's body
was judged as well- or ill-fitted for the task of machine operation. In this sense, the "regular" and
"champion" drivers in this type of analysis were not "operators," the object of measurement and
analysis by the postwar human engineering. The body of the champion driver, mesomorphic and
masculine, was examined not for its smooth fit in the truck cab, but rather to establish inherent
physical and temperamental superiority or inferiority of individuals for certain jobs. This point is
97 Ibid., 734-36.
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illustrated by the fact that only nude measurements were used for somatotyping without any
regard for clothing and gear to be worn by the drivers.
The body of the "operator," by contrast, was measured to give guidelines for design
engineers. By revealing the inadequacy of workspace design with human body data, human
engineers could claim that poor performance in the truck cab was not attributable solely to poor
operators with low intelligence, bad personality, or wrong physique. Much of "driver failure,"
they pointed out, could be in fact "design failure." In one of the official project reports, the
Harvard researchers including McFarland and Damon summed up their advices to the designer:
a) Consider the operator. Once this is done, all else follows.
b) Consider him early. ...
c) The operator is functional....
d) Functional men vary in size.
e) Allow ample margins of safety, both for man and machine....
f) Evaluate human accommodation in complete, functional machines....
g) Particular installations, not overall dimensions, cause the trouble.
h) Follow up.98
The last clause revealed the human engineers' frustration at the engineers' and manufacturers'
inattention to their guidelines and recommendations, and probably to their profession. The
establishment of the operator as a concept and as an entity was intertwined with the recognition
of human engineering as a field.
98 McFarland et al., Human Body Size and Capabilities, 171-73.
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"Designing for People": The Pilot-Operator Goes into Industrial Design
By 1955, an equivalence was established among pilots, truckers, bus drivers, and lathe or other
machine operators in factories. From the perspective of the human engineer, principles,
techniques, knowledge, and numerical data acquired from the studies of pilots were equally
useful to address the issues of efficiency, safety, and comfort in the case of other types of
operators. In all of them, selection and training remained an important part to achieve the goals,
but more emphasis was being placed on approaching the problem through considerate
engineering design. Soon, another group with similar concerns in efficiency, safety, and comfort
took up the figure of the operator seriously and expanded its scope vastly: industrial designers.
Henry Dreyfuss played a pivotal role in bringing the dimensional body of the pilot-
operator into the industrial design circle and into wider popular circulation. One of the most
influential industrial designers in the twentieth century, Dreyfuss designed John Deere Model A
tractor, Hoover vacuum cleaners, AT&T Model 500 desk telephone, Honeywell circular
thermostat, and many more industrial products that became almost ubiquitous in America. In
1955, Dreyfuss published an autobiographical memoir, Designingfor People, which explained
his design philosophy and practice. In it, Dreyfuss expressed a view of machines and products
that echoed those of S.S. Stevens ("machines cannot fight alone") and McFarland and Damon
("consider the operator"): that the products of his design would "be ridden in, sat upon, looked
at, talked into, activated, operated, or in some way used by people individually or en masse."
Dreyfuss fully embraced the principle of human engineering that "the most efficient machine is
the one that is built around a person."99
99 Henry Dreyfuss, Designingfor People (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1955), 22-23 and 28.
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Early in the book, Dreyfuss introduced "a hero and a heroine," a couple named Joe and
Josephine, who were "not very romantic-looking, staring coldly at the world, with figures and
measurements buzzing around them like flies." Joe and Josephine were anthropometric drawings
of a man and a woman, composed from multiple data sets that Dreyfuss's design office had
gathered. Both Joe and Josephine and their imaginary children at the ages of 6, 8, 11, and 14
were shown in the book in standing and seated postures with 97.5 and 2.5 percentile figures
indicated. In seated positions, these "average" American family members had their arms and legs
extend toward various directions, as if driving vehicles or operating machines. They were a
family of operators.
Setting up typical American bodies as those of family members rendered their
dimensional bodies gender-specific. Although both Joe and Josephine were portrayed as nude
figures without any occupational hints and they assumed the same postures for measurement,
Dreyfuss assigned them strictly differentiated roles as operators. As Dreyfuss explained,
Joe enacts numerous roles. Within twenty-four hours he may determine the control
positions on a linotype, be measured for an airplane chair, be squeezed into an armored
tank, or be driving a tractor; and we may prevail upon Josephine to do a day's ironing, sit
at a telephone switchboard, push a vacuum cleaner around a room, type a letter.100
Measurements were made on the same parts of their bodies, but apparently they were used for
designing different kinds of machines and workplaces. "Designing for people" rather than just
for "men" certainly meant the inclusion of larger portion of general population, but that
expansion occurred in a peculiarly gendered way. To industrial designers, the body of the female
operator was new, puzzling, and even "humorous." As Josephine was "purposely drawn ...
'0 Ibid., 26.
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conservatively," she seemed to the design staff like "the most sexless-looking woman they'd
ever seen-in fact, her silhouette looked like a boy." Something had to be done to make the body
of the female operator conform to the stereotypes of her sex and gender.
Everyone had a suggestion, mostly along Marilyn Monroe and Jane Russell lines. Some
questioned her height, arguing that she seemed too short in stature. ... Eventually the
chart was made over with increased femininity, and Josephine is now better-looking than
the average woman she portrays.' 0'
The postwar extension of human engineering to consumer products and to non-military
population, which was Dreyfuss's great contribution to industrial design, instantly revealed the
highly gendered character of the operator with its roots in the war and the military.'o2
In 1960, Dreyfuss made Joe and Josephine even more famous among industrial designers,
engineers and business people by publishing a catalog of anthropometric dimensions, The
Measure ofMan: Human Factors in Design.103 Arguably the first comprehensive compilation of
the human anthropometric data then available, this publication soon became an essential
reference book for industrial designers, maintaining the status for decades through revised
editions and with a more inclusive title The Measure of Man and Woman (since 1993). The first
1960 edition included two life-size anthropometric charts of a American male and a female; 16
diagrams including male and female figures working at control boards, consoles, and inside
101 Ibid., 31.
102 Both his book and the products designed according to his principle were displayed and sold at major department
stores such as the Nieman Marcus. Photographs of such displays are found in box 1-Publications, folder:
Designing for People-Misc. Photographs (Publications), Henry Dreyfuss Papers, Cooper-Hewitt National Design
Museum, New York City.
103 Henry Dreyfuss, The Measure of Man: Human Factors in Design (New York: Whitney Library of Design, 1960).
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vehicles; a long checklist on manual controls, pedals, visual displays, auditory signals, etc. It was
meant to be "a miniature 'encyclopedia' of human factors data for the industrial designer." 04
L. ..........
Figure 23. Anthropometric diagrams of an adult female seated at a console and an adult male seated in a
vehicle. While there was a diagram for an adult male at a console (Diagram K), a diagram for a female in a
vehicle was not included. [Source: Dreyfuss, The Measure of Man, Diagram L and Diagram M.]
The bibliography in The Measure ofMan, however, indicates that the sources from which
Dreyfuss and his staff composed the anthropometric figures were not so representative of the
American population of the 1950s. For body measurement data, Dreyfuss relied on Hooton's
railway passenger study from 1944, Randall and Damon's wartime AAF body size data, the Air
Force 1950 anthropometry of flying personnel, and the report from the Harvard Highway
Transport Safety project, the last of which owed much to earlier pilot anthropometry. Dreyfuss
was well aware of the limitation. He acknowledged that the data were predominantly from
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104 Ibid., 4.
military surveys, which meant that those rejected by the military physical standard were also
excluded from The Measure of Man. Dreyfuss also recognized the dearth of sources on "minority
groups like Negroes, Orientals, and the foreign-born.""' The catalog was also a work of
composition, compilation, and extrapolation of existing data rather than a statistically controlled
treatment of one large survey, which made it hard to trace which numbers came from which
sources. "If reference sources were given for each piece of data," noted A. Tilley who led the
project, "the book would become so voluminous and complex as to be impractical."' 0 6
It must have been lamentable to Dreyfuss that there did not exist "a really complete
survey of the dimensions of the American population, accounting for all geographical areas, all
ages, all racial and occupational groups." But, it must have been also clear that such a perfect
survey would be nearly impossible. It was no accident that most of the available body data were
produced by the military, in which persons could be most easily turned into nude subjects for
measurement. And it was only a small accident that, even within the military, the pilots sitting in
aircraft cockpits served as a model population, from which knowledge, practice, and measures of
human-machine interaction developed.
The Pilot-Operator Comes of Age
Psychologists, anthropologists, and engineers grounded the pilot in the cockpit and used the
figure as a reference to understand other situations of human-machine interactions. It was a
105 Ibid., 5. An internal memo in the Dreyfuss office asked, "Does this mean that our 2-1/2 to 97-1/2 percentile men
are all military? If so, wouldn't this automatically screen out most civilian males-and especially those not meeting
military physical qualifications?" J. Conner to A.R. Tilley, 7 December 1960, box 1-Publications, folder: Measure
of Man-Correspondence, Henry Dreyfuss Papers, Cooper-Hewitt National Design Museum, also quoted in Russell
Flinchum, Henry Dreyfuss, Industrial Designer: The Man in the Brown Suit (New York: Cooper-Hewitt National
Design Museum, 1997), 175.
106 A. Tilley to J. Conner, 9 December 1960, box 1-Publications, folder: Measure of Man-Correspondence, Henry
Dreyfuss Papers, also quoted in Flinchum, Henry Dreyfuss, 179.
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particular kind of pilot-measurable, attentive, alert, in control but subject to discipline-that
these human engineers took as the subject of study. With this pilot-operator at the conceptual
center of the field, the postwar human engineering was not just a Taylorist "science of work," but
a science of humans at work with machines. In the process of highlighting the operator as an
important subject of study and intervention, the human engineers also fashioned themselves as
experts to solve the problems of human-machine integration to meet the needs of postwar
military and industry. In their vision of the new field, their technical work to improve machine
operators' efficiency, comfort, and safety would complement, if not bypass, more complicated
social andpolitical measures in addressing various issues such as labor relations and accident
prevention. Human engineering would make operators feel "at home," but not so bored as to fall
asleep, in cockpits, truck cabs, and factory or military control rooms-the places that, for
Heidegger, were not for "dwelling," but where the techno-social forces of modernity were at
work more visibly than elsewhere.' 07
Within their framework, the postwar human engineering did not have to deal with the
social identity of the pilot-operator. Its treatment of the operator, if anything, was supposed to
make the question of who he or she was as a person no longer relevant in the operation of
machines. Increasingly abstract representations of the operator in the schematic diagrams of the
"man-machine system" reveal such a perspective of human engineers about the operator's
identity. As seen in the family of Joe, Josephine, and their child in Dreyfuss's design guidelines,
however, the operators bore the marks of contemporary American assumptions about work,
family, and gender roles as well as the traces of the history of selecting, training, and measuring
pilots and other personnel over the course of WWII. The fact that McFarland and Damon chose
107 Martin Heidegger, "Building, Dwelling, Thinking," in Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New
York: Perennial, 2001), 141-159, on 143-44.
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(or were asked) to study the truck and bus drivers in the 1950s after they had worked on pilots
during the war also indicates that the making of the operator reflected contemporary concerns
about particular social groups. Not just a theoretical construction, the operator was a real social
entity that defined individual lives and constituted the "human condition" in postwar America.
Either as concrete individual experiences or as metaphors of such experiences, the pilot-
operator was often featured in social and cultural commentaries on the "human condition" of the
1950s America. The next chapter, which concludes this dissertation, describes how the pilot-
operator came to signify a particular human kind, which emerged during the mid-twentieth
century and has influenced people's understanding of themselves and their societies.
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Conclusion
Operators, Homo Faber, and the Engineering of the Human Condition
Homo Faber and the Machine Operator
Does the machine operator constitute a distinct kind of person, or a human kind? As the Oxford
English Dictionary entry on "operator" indicates, its early usage to describe people who operate
machines rather than surgery or financial transactions was most frequent for telegraph and
telephone operators since the mid- and late 19th century. In the twentieth century, especially in
the U.S., the word has been used for motor vehicle drivers. As an object of organized research,
however, the operator came into full existence in the 1950s with the continuation and expansion
of the prewar and wartime research on pilots, radar operators, and others working in tanks or
submarines. Extensive study of the operator's mind and body produced a particular way of
understanding the human being situated in front of and inside machines.
What marks machine operators as a category is the nature of their work. From the human
engineering perspective, operators of telephone switch boards, airplanes, trucks, and numerically
controlled machines belong to the same category of person in that they all work with machines
that have display devices that feed information to them as well as control devices in the form of
switches, knobs, and handles. Their activity is also regarded as less physical and more stationary
than that of industrial factory workers, a characteristic that has become much more pronounced
with the introduction of computers in factories and other workplaces. For example, in a study of
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computers' effect on work and organization, Shoshana Zuboff refers to those who work in
computerized factories as "operators" without any need to define the term against the older one
"worker." As Zuboff describes, operators felt they were losing physical contact with their work
while at the same time developing another sort of tacit knowledge with new "smart machines."'
With more display instruments, automatic controls, and finally computerization, workers have
turned into operators.
Another way to characterize the operator is to put it up against one of the well-established
definitions of the human being: homofaber, man as a tool-maker. Does the operator simply
represent an aspect of human nature as homofaber, or are they two distinct categories? It is
known that Benjamin Franklin spoke of the human being as "a tool-making animal." Karl Marx
is another important thinker whose conception of human nature was close to that of homofaber.
It is to Henry Bergson, however, that the use of the specific phrase is often attributed. In his
Creative Evolution, first published in French in 1907 and in English translation in 1911, Bergson
saw "mechanical invention" as the "essential feature" of human intelligence. The age he lived in,
Bergson wrote, would be defined by the steam engine and related inventions, while "our wars
and our revolutions will count for little." If this perspective was used "to define our species,"
Bergson believed that:
we should say not Homo sapiens, but Homofaber. In short, intelligence, considered in
what seems to be its original feature, is the faculty of manufacturing artificial objects,
especially tools to make tools, and of indefinitely varying the manufacture.2
Shoshana Zuboff, In the Age of the Smart Machine: The Future of Work and Power (New York: Basic Books,
1988).
2 Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1911), 138-39 (italics original).
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Bergson's reference to "tools to make tools" is significant here, which indicates that his
conception of homofaber was most influenced by the industrial machinery of recent decades
rather than pre-historical tool-making practices.
As N. Katherine Hayles pointed out, the definition of the human being as a tool-maker
was a revision of an earlier definition by anthropologists as a tool-user, since instances of the
latter were found among animals as well.3 Though without using the phrase homofaber, Kenneth
Oakley of the British Museum echoed Bergson's statement in Man the Tool-maker (1949).
"Systematic making of tools," Oakley wrote, "implies a marked capacity for conceptual
thought." Chiefly concerned with the pre-historical origin of tool-making, however, Oakley
considered the machine-tools of his own time not so special; they were rather executing "in
complicated ways only the same basic operations as the simple equipment in the tool-bag of
Stone Age man."4
It was in the late 1950s that the notion of homofaber was more seriously discussed in
relation to contemporary configurations of technology, work, and culture. In The Human
Condition, published in 1958, Hannah Arendt examined homofaber in the context of what she
called a "threatening event," that is, "the advent of automation." Arendt made a distinction
between "labor," which is concerned only with maintaining and reproducing the biological
process of life, and "work," which "provides an 'artificial' world of things, distinctly different
from all natural surroundings." The former was the activity of animal laborans using their
bodies, while the latter was what homofaber did with hands. In Arendt's distinction, whereas
labor "never 'produces' anything but life," the work of hands "adds new objects to the human
3 N. Katherine Hayles, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 34.
4 Kenneth P. Oakley, Man the Tool-maker (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), 4 and 139.
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artifice." Homofaber was "the builder of the world and the producer of things," by which the
"man-made world" acquires its "objectivity." It was from the work of homofaber, Arendt wrote,
that "men, their ever-changing nature notwithstanding, can retrieve their sameness, that is, their
identity, by being related to the same chair and the same table." 5
Unlike Oakley, Arendt regarded the introduction of automatic machinery in the 1950s as
a marked break from the tools and implements that homofaber had made as a craftsman. For
animal laborans, automation threatened its very existence, invoking "the prospect of a society of
laborers without labor."6
Even the most refined tool remains a servant, unable to guide or to replace the hand.
Even the most primitive machine guides the body's labor and eventually replaces it
altogether.7
For homofaber, completely automated production meant the impossibility of "wilful and
purposeful interference," and what it produced was not "in accordance with human standards of
either utility or beauty" but was "primarily determined by the operation of the machine." "For a
society of laborers," Arendt wrote:
the world of machines has become a substitute for the real world, even though this
pseudo world cannot fulfil the most important task of the human artifice, which is to offer
mortals a dwelling place more permanent and more stable than themselves.8
Automation was bringing to light, Arendt suggested, the danger of the vision of homofaber
pushed to one extreme. Homofaber no longer worked as "the maker of objects and the builder of
5 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 4, 7, 88, 137, and 160.
Another significant context for this book's publication, Arendt notes, was the launch of the Sputnik in 1957, which
revealed one fundamental human condition of earthbound-ness. The third category of human activities was "action,"





the human artifice who incidentally invents tools" and instead reduced himself to "primarily a
toolmaker and 'particularly [a maker] of tools to make tools' who only incidentally also produces
things." Homo.faber was losing his worldliness, his capacity to build the "man-made world."9
Arendt's description of homofaber was modeled after a craftsman, and she did not talk
specifically of engineers as a profession. When more recent events were considered, however,
the engineers in the 1950s might well have embodied what Arendt listed as "the typical attitudes
of homofaber" such as the "instrumentalization of the world" and the "conviction that every
issue can be solved and every human motivation reduced to the principle of utility."10 Indeed,
these attitudes of homofaber were embodied by Walter Faber, the engineer-protagonist in the
novel Homo Faber. Originally published in German in 1957 and in English translation in 1959,
this popular novel by Max Frisch took the form of the first-person narrative by Faber, a Swiss
"technologist" working for UNESCO. As a technologist, Faber does not "believe in providence
and fate" but only works with "the formulas of probability." Instead of what people call
"experience," Faber asserts, "I'm a technologist and accustomed to seeing things as they are";
the moon is simply "a calculable mass circling round our planet, an example of gravitation,
interesting, but in what way an experience?" Moreover, Faber had no reservation in saying that
"the profession of technologist, a man who masters matter, is a masculine profession, if not the
only masculine profession there is." Both Walter Faber and homofaber were confident creators
of a literally man-made world."
In the course of his travels to many places and many personal encounters, Faber repeats
the technologist's view of life and world, although the conviction is complicated by a series of
9 Ibid., 309. The quote within quote seems to have come from Bergson's Creative Evolution (see chapter 5).
10 Arendt, Human Condition, 305.
" Max Frisch, Homo Faber, trans. Michael Bullock (New York: Harcourt, 1959), 19, 22, and 78.
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unpredictable and accidental events.' 2 After he realizes that Sabeth, the girl whom he met by
chance and with whom he had a romantic relationship, was his own daughter whose birth Faber
(and her mother Hanna) had not wanted and he had no knowledge of, he speculates about the
issue of abortion. As for a critique that it is "unnatural," Faber points to the unnaturalness of
almost everything in the modern world built by homofaber: "We live technologically, with man
as the master of nature, man as the engineer, and let anyone who raises his voice against it stop
using bridges not built by nature." Echoing a contemporary debate, Faber even mentions
"automation" as a case for abortion: "we no longer need such a large number of people." Later in
the narrative, Faber begins to rethink his views, as he regrets Sabeth's accidental death and has
argument with Hanna, who says that technology is "the knack of so arranging the world that we
don't have to experience it." Faber admits that his "mistake lay in the fact that we technologists
try to live without death." "Life is not matter," Faber says as a self-reflecting technologist, "and
cannot be mastered by technology." Faber's confidence in his own rationality and productivity
could only be checked by the complex and often troubling experiences of life.'3
In addition to appearing in political philosophy and literature, homofaber also emerged
as a topic for historical scholarship in the late 1950s in the U.S. The Society for the History of
Technology (SHOT) was established in 1958 and its official journal Technology and Culture
(T&C) began publication in 1959. Writing in the first issue of the journal, business scholar Peter
Drucker started out by stating what he called "the Wallace insight" (from Alfred Russell
Wallace, the competitor of Charles Darwin): "Man, alone of all animals, is capable of
12 In Faber's first air trip in the novel, he flies from New York's La Guardia airport in a Super Constellation, whose
interior was, in reality, designed by Henry Dreyfuss. In one conversation, he refers to Norbert Wiener's Cybernetics,
the notion of information, and "the lightening calculating machine, also known as the electronic brain." Frisch,
Homo Faber, 3 and 75.
13 Frisch, Homo Faber, 109 and 178-79.
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purposeful, non-organic evolution; he makes tools."' 4 The first editor of T&C, Melvin
Kranzberg, also defined technology as "one of the most distinctive and significant of man's
capabilities." It was "the use of tools" that advanced mankind from Stone Age to industrial
society. The need for a new academic society for the study of technology, however, arose from a
recognition that "the engineer, the man responsible for this progress" was not garnering the
social respect he deserved. Technology was worthy of serious scholarship, Kranzberg suggested,
for the simple reason that "homo sapiens could not be distinguished from homofaber."5
All of these philosophical, literary, and historical commentaries on homofaber, however,
did not apply to machine operators. Within Arendt's classification of human activities, the
operator of the 1950s would appear to be neither animal laborans nor homofaber. On the one
hand, pilots, drivers, and even factory operators were not displaced with the introduction of
machinery. Rather, they were much in demand to operate jet aircraft, long-haul trucks, and
(automated) production machinery. On the other hand, they were not builders of the world, who
could add new objects to human artifice. Rather than creating a man-made world themselves,
they were asked to perform with "comfort, efficiency, health and safety in a world increasingly
man-made" by homofaber, the engineers. 16 Likewise, the emergent discipline of the history of
technology took those who made technologies as its central actors. At least for the first two
decades after the establishment of the SHOT, studies of inventors, engineers, and other builders
of devices and systems drew the majority of scholarly interest to the extent of excluding users,
consumers, operators, and maintenance personnel of devices and equipment. As a consequence,
14 Peter Drucker, "Work and Tools," Technology and Culture 1 (1959): 28-37, quote on 28.
15 Melvin Kranzberg, "At the Start," Technology and Culture 1 (1959): 1-10. For a historiographical analysis of the
first twenty-five years of SHOT, see John M. Staudenmaier, Technology 's Storytellers: Reweaving the Human
Fabric (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1985).
16 Ross McFarland, Albert Damon, and Howard Stoudt, Jr., "Anthropometry in the Design of the Driver's
Workspace," American Journal of Physical Anthropology 16:1 (1958): 1-23, on 1.
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reflecting Walter Faber's assertion that his was "a masculine profession," early scholarship in the
history of technology did not examine seriously women or other social groups-including non-
white or non-European groups-who did not enjoy the elevated status of homofaber in the
modern world.' 7 As a category of person, then, the machine operator was closely related to, but
certainly distinct from, homofaber, the engineer of the mid-twentieth century.
Around the same time that homofaber was much discussed in the late 1950s, the operator
acquired a definition and those who studied the operator established an institutional status. In
1957, one year before the founding of the SHOT, the Human Factors Society of America was
established, and began publishing its official journal Human Factors in 1958.18 Somewhat
paradoxically, the choice of "human factors" instead of "human engineering" in the title
indicates that the Society incorporated increasing influence of the engineering approach,
especially the systems perspective, in understanding the issues in the human operation of
machines. Moving away from what Haraway identified as prewar style "human engineering"
with a focus on the person's adaptation to environment, the emerging interdisciplinary field
"human factors engineering" was explicitly conceptualizing the humans as "factors" in the
system. The word "engineering" was not adopted for the sake of brevity, but the "engineering
orientation" was strongly confirmed in the Society's constitution and in practice. Although
17 In recent decades, the heavy focus on inventors and engineers in the history of technology has been criticized by
those who began to pay attention to the role of users and consumers as having agency in the trajectories of
technologies. For example, see Nelly Oudshoorn and Trevor Pinch, eds., How Users Matter: The Co-construction of
Users and Technology (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2003). Gender perspectives on technology and the social
construction of technology (SCOT) approaches have contributed much to this recent literature. Ruth Cowan, More
Work for Mother: The Ironies of Household Technology from the Open Hearth to the Microwave (New York: Basic
Books, 1983); Francesca Bray, Technology and Gender: Fabrics of Power in Late Imperial China (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1997); and Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes, and Trevor Pinch, eds., The Social
Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology (Cambridge,
MA: The MIT Press, 1987).
1 For a disciplinary history written by an established scholar within human factors engineering, see David Meister,
The History ofHuman Factors and Ergonomics (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1999), esp. chapters 4
and 5.
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psychology was still the most represented field within the group, many participants emphasized
the "engineering applications of human factors principles" and for this reason some asked for the
inclusion of "engineering" in the Society's name. For the first issue of the journal, "the de-
emphasizing of psychology" was explicitly discussed.' 9 By putting the human operator squarely
within the system, the human factors engineers also fashioned themselves as another sort of
homofaber, who "must assume his fair share of the responsibility for the success or failure of
this very complex undertaking-the creation of modern man-machine systems." They were
builders not just of things but rather of "man-machine systems."20
The title of an article in the first issue of Human Factors aptly defined the human
operator: "Man as a Monitor." Although Paul Fitts had already claimed that a man was a poor
monitor, it was nevertheless a fundamental human role in human-machine systems. The authors,
Albert Hickey, Jr. and Wesley Blair of the General Dynamics Corporation, first pointed out the
insufficiency of the psychological models of stimulus-response (S-R) or stimulus-organism-
response (S-0-R), and then adopted "the ubiquitous feedback model" that treated the operator as
a system element. However, they did not believe that the operator's task in the feedback system
could be best characterized as "continuous control" or "tracking." "More often," they suggested,
"the human operator acts as a monitor," making responses that are "markedly discontinuous and
relatively infrequent." As usual, an example from aviation was due: "Even the pilot, whose
19 In the beginning, 53 percent of the members were psychologists, while engineers (including physicists and
mathematicians) constituted 30 percent and the biological and medical scientists 12 percent. See Human Factors
Society ofAmerica Bulletin 1:2 (February 1958), 8 and 14; Human Factors Society of America Bulletin 1:3 (March
1958), 1. One indication of the changing self-definition from human engineering to human factors engineering is
found in one of the most well-known textbooks in the field. Ernest McCormick's book Human Engineering, first
published in 1957, changed its title to Human Factors Engineering in its second edition published in 1964. Ernest
McCormick, Human Engineering (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1957); Ernest McCormick, Human Factors
Engineering, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964). The current edition of this textbook is Mark Sanders and
Ernest McCormick, Human Factors in Engineering and Design, 7th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993).
20 Julien Christensen, "Trends in Human Factors," Human Factors 1 (1958): 2-7, quote on 7.
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difficult tracking task has been so assiduously studied by engineers and psychologists, has a
large burden of monitoring operations to perform." Even in seemingly continuous processes,
Hickey and Blair noted, the operator "actually does behave like a monitor" or "like an
intermittent or sampling servo." As a human activity, monitoring lacked the active quality and
productive capacity of building and making, the work of homofaber. It was not supposed to add
anything to the human artifice. Rather, it was a form of stewardship for the creations of homo
faber.2'
This definition of the human role in human-machine systems offered a way to bypass the
troubling question of whether, in the age of automation, it was the human or the machine that
had to "adjust" to the other. Was the human being a master or a servant of the machine? For
Arendt, "the apparently endless discussion" was bound to be "sterile," since the man was "a
conditioned being for whom everything, given or man-made, immediately becomes a condition
of his further existence." The same could be said of tools, implements, and machines of all ages.
"[M]an 'adjusted' himself to an environment of machines," Arendt noted, "the moment he
designed them." However, there was something distinct about machines that, Arendt
acknowledged, made her contemporaries raise such a question at all. One was the observation
that, as Lewis Mumford had noted two decades earlier, the human body must conform to the
machine's rhythm. Another was, of course, the possibility of displacing human labor
altogether. By characterizing the human worker as a "monitor" of machines, human factors
engineering redefined the human role within machine systems in a way that made people neither
servants nor masters, neither animal laborans nor homofaber. A monitor was apparently in
2 Albert Hickey, Jr. and Wesley Blair, "Man as a Monitor," Human Factors 1 (1958): 8-15, quotes on 8-10.
22 Arendt, Human Condition, 147; Lewis Mumford, Technics and Civilization (New York: Harcourt, Brace and
Company, 1934).
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control of machines, claiming for himself some irreplaceable humanity inside the machine. The
status of the monitor, however, was strictly bounded, always requiring others who could define,
qualify, and monitor the machine monitors.
"Man as a Monitor" can also be used to understand the contradictions that John Ward
noticed in 1958 in America's celebration of Lindbergh's famous flight of 1927. "In Lindbergh,"
Ward wrote thirty years after his flight and only months after the Sputnik, "the people celebrated
both the self-sufficient individual and the machine." On the one hand, Lindbergh was hailed as
the archetypical American pioneer, who "did it alone." On the other hand, the flight was
regarded as a triumph of the machine that "represented an advance into a complex industrial
present" and as a feat "not so much of brave aviators as of engineers, who have through patient
and protracted effort been steadily improving the construction of airplanes." A heroic individual
was contrasted with hard-working homofaber. Ward's observation on America's response to
Lindbergh's flight, then, was also a commentary on American society in 1958: "We cherish the
individualism of the American creed at the same time that we worship the machine which
increasingly enforces collectivized behavior."23 The figure of the machine operator, the monitor,
existed as a compromise out of this contradiction, which became an almost ubiquitous position
for the individuals in mechanized society. If Lindbergh had heroic qualities of "a single daring
individual," one of them was manifested in his decision to do away with the front vision and
instead focus on flight instruments and a periscope, that is, to fly as an attentive monitor of his
machine. Lindbergh as a competent operator or monitor did not make his flight less heroic. It
does not suggest that pilots could no longer be heroes, but only that they would now become
23 John Ward, "The Meaning of Lindbergh's Flight," American Quarterly 10 (1958): 3-16, quotes on 8, 10, 14, and
16.
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heroes as operators. Pilot-operators, the heirs of Lindbergh, worked as individuals, but always
under collectivized scrutiny.2 4
The Operator and the Human Condition
The ultimate operator of the 1950s was the jet pilot. In Roland Barthes's mythological reading,
Lindbergh had maintained the traits of the traditional pilot-hero, "whose whole value was to fly
without forgoing his humanity" by, for instance, flying "in a lounge-suit." By contrast, the jet
pilot of the 1950s, while being "a reified hero," had "none of the romantic and individualistic
elements of the sacred role." Unlike the pilot-hero who had been defined by "a whole mythology
of speed as an experience," the jet pilot did not "know either adventure or destiny, but only a
condition." In human engineering terms, he needed aptitude and capacity to perform safely,
comfortably, and efficiently in the cockpit that engineers designed with human considerations.
His work was less of action than of posture, the maintenance of conditions. For Barthes, the jet
pilot's state of "motionlessness" amounted to "pure passivity (what is more inert and more
dispossessed than an object expelled injet-form?)." Barthes's mythological reading of the jet-
pilot may sound exaggerated, but what he saw in the jet-pilot was a logical outcome of the
accumulated research and practice of selecting and training pilots as operators.
Through Barthes's reading, the jet pilot is connected to the ordinary white-collar worker,
another sort of operator within office cubicles of the 1950s. Being in control and in "pure
24 The "miracle on the Hudson" on January 15, 2009, in which the US Airways flight 1549 hit a flock of Canada
geese soon after take-off and came down on the Hudson River in New York City without any loss of all 155 lives
onboard, prompted some discussion on the roles of the heroic pilot (Captain Chesley B. "Sully" Sullenberger III)
and his computerized aircraft Airbus A320. See, for example, William Langewiesche, Fly by Wire: The Geese, the
Glide, and the Miracle on the Hudson (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009). Medical writer Atul Gawande
also discusses this case in a chapter aptly titled "The Hero in the Age of Checklists," in The Checklist Manifesto:
How to Get Things Right (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2010), 158-86.
25 Roland Barthes, "The Jet-man," Mythologies, trans. Annette Lavers (New York: Hill and Wang, 1972), 71-73
(italics original). The original French publication was in 1957.
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passivity" simultaneously was, in a sense, a state of "alienation," which defined "the conditions
of modern work" in general, as described by C. Wright Mills in his influential book White Collar
published in 1951. Americans in the postwar economic boom, not only manual laborers but also
white-collar workers, faced an increasingly alienating conditions at work, where an earlier ideal
of the craftsman was no longer found and new "human relations" experts sought to "make the
worker happy, efficient, and co-operative." Surrounded by new "office machinery and sales
devices," Mills suggested, the office workers were turning into "automatons"; the society
consisted of "a few specialists and a mass of automatons." I would suggest that there existed a
parallel between cockpits and cubicles, between pilots and office workers. Pilots were to human
engineers what office workers were to "a managerial elite, disguised in the pseudo-objective
language of engineers," to use the words of Mills. Just as human engineers provided pilots and
other operators with safety, comfort, and efficiency, office managers worked to foster "job
enthusiasm," which were "attempts to conquer work alienation within the bounds of work
alienation." 26
For social psychologist Erich Fromm, "the automaton, the alienated man" was exactly
what "modern industrialism has succeeded in producing" for its own function and maintenance.
This man manifested both a sense of active control and a habit of passive conformity. As Fromm
wrote in the article "The Present Human Condition" published in 1955 in the American Scholar:
[Our society] needs men who feel free and independent, not subject to any authority or
26 C. Wright Mills, White Collar: The American Middle Class (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1951), 215-38,
quotes on 226-27 and 235. The champion of the "human relations movement" was Elton Mayo at Harvard Business
School. See his The Human Problems ofan Industrial Civilization (New York: Macmillan, 1933). Architecture
scholar Branden Hookway made a similar connection between the wartime cockpit and the postwar office in the
U.S. See Branden Hookway, "Cockpit," in Cold War Hothouses: Inventing Postwar Culture from Cockpit to
Playboy, ed. Beatriz Colomina, Annmarie Brennan, and Jeannie Kim (New York: Princeton Architectural Press,
2004), 22-54.
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principle or conscience, yet are willing to be commanded, to do what is expected, tofit
into the social machine withoutfriction; men who can be guided without force, led
without leaders, be prompted without an aim, except the aim to be on the move, to
function, to go ahead.
The relationship that Fromm observed between individuals and the "social machine" might well
be a societal version of what contemporary human engineers were doing for operators and
(actual) machines, namely, fitting them "without friction." Within Fromm's diagnosis, however,
the emphasis was on the humans becoming machines and vice versa, rather than on the new
positions of the humans who haphazardly controlled the machines. "Men are increasingly
automatons," Fromm wrote, "who make machines which act like men and produce men who act
like machines." Although this was an incisive general critique of "the present human condition,"
it failed to capture the emerging "human condition" of working and living as operators, who had
to maintain some bits of humanity even while becoming one with the machines.27
A less extreme and more familiar figure to capture the conditions of the operator would
be the American trucker, who was too human to be considered an automaton. As historian Shane
Hamilton describes, "piloting a big rig" gave an American truck driver "an incredible sense of
power" that stemmed from the belief that the huge machine moved "under the complete control
of one person." The truck's cab was an explicitly masculine space, in which the trucker "could
imagine himself being his own man." The truckers also distinguished themselves from other
types of operators such as "a 'desk-pilot' or a 'factory hand"' who seemed to operate machines
27 Erich Fromm, "The Present Human Condition," American Scholar 25 (1955/56): 29-35 (emphasis added). Fromm
shared Mills's critique of "human relations" studies and practices. "The manager has become a bureaucrat who
handles things, figures, and human beings as mere objects of his activity. Their manipulation is called concern with
human relations, whereas the manager deals with the most inhuman relations, between automatons that have become
abstractions."
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"simply for the sake of a stable home life." From the human engineering perspective, however,
their "sense of empowerment," which arose "as one's body merged with the machine," was a
self-serving rhetoric. The very fact that the truckers had "come to feel so intimately connected to
the equipment" can be understood as a testimony of the efficacy of the human engineering
studies and practices. They did not have to feel like "a mere cog swallowed up and unmanned by
the scale of industrial machinery," not merely because of their inalienable manhood, but also due
to the improvements in cab design, to which they unknowingly contributed by posing, in the
nude, for anthropometric measurement.2 8 The truckers felt free and manly on the open road, but
their freedom and masculinity were the qualities not of cowboys, but of operators, akin to those
of a jet pilot in a G-suit and in a cramped but comfortable cockpit.
By the end of the 1950s, the American figure of the pilot-operator had migrated from the
cockpit to other spheres of human existence in the form of body data and charts, design
principles, research techniques, and metaphors. Seated in a cockpit, in a truck or bus cab, in front
of automatic machinery, and even in office cubicles, the operator came to embody a form of life
within the modern human condition; an operating subject emerged. In the American social
discourses in the 1950s, these operators-especially jet pilots and automobile drivers-can be
understood as liberal, autonomous subjects, finding one's own way through airways and
roadways. They claimed their individuality by reading displays and moving controls at their own
will. They might be free to rebel, but even when they did, they would do it safely and efficiently
within the boundaries of their cockpits and cabs.2 9
28 Shane Hamilton, "Trucking Country: Food Politics and the Transformation of Rural Life in Postwar America"
(PhD diss., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2005), chapter 5, quotes on 339, 351, and 355 (italics original).
29 For an analysis of American automobility and the making of the liberal subject, see Cotten Seiler, Republic of
Drivers: A Cultural History ofAutomobility in America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), esp. chapter
5.
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This dissertation has attempted to relate these conditions of the liberal subjects in
America (sometimes in their interaction with the Japanese) to the history of the making of pilots
and machine operators, who were measured, tested, and designed by engineers, psychologists,
and anthropologists. It is not coincidental that many discussions on modern human conditions
use pilots or drivers as key metaphors. Most notably, in his best-selling book The Lonely Crowd,
first published in 1950, sociologist David Riesman contrasted the "inner-directed person" and the
"other-directed person" by using the metaphors of gyroscope and radar, respectively; the
gyroscope kept the inner-directed person "on course," whereas the radar enabled the other-
directed person to "receive signals from far and near."30 These apt metaphors suggest that all
individuals in the 1950s America had to take positions as some sort of machine operators,
literally and figuratively. Whether one lived autonomously or was subjected to discipline and
design, one had to face a machine as an attentive operator. They had all become pilots.
30 David Riesman, The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the Changing American Character [abridged edition with a new
foreword] (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), 16 and 25. Riesman elaborated more on his gyroscope
metaphor as follows: "This metaphor of the gyroscope, like any other, must not be taken literally. It would be a
mistake to see the inner-directed man as incapable of learning from experience or as insensitive to public opinion in
matters of external conformity. He can receive and utilize certain signals from outside, provided that they can be
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